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931. The Growing Threat of Special Groups in Baghdad

Author:
Marisa Cochrane Sullivan
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
While al-Qaeda in Iraq remains the primary threat in northern Iraq, violence by Special Groups—Shi'a extremist elements funded, trained, and armed by Iran—remains a key challenge to stability and security in central and southern Iraq. Despite reports in late 2007 that Iranian sponsorship of Special Groups had declined, the trend in Special Groups activity in January and February 2008 suggests otherwise. In a recent briefing, Admiral Gregory Smith, the Deputy Spokesman for Multi-National Force-Iraq, explicitly stated, “The Special Groups' activity has not decreased in recent months. They continue to be probably the most violent of the extremist groups that we're seeing from Shi'a sects. [The] intent of Iran in supporting the training and financing we believe continues.” Other officials from both the Departments of State and Defense have also cited an increase in Special Groups activity since the beginning of 2008.The use of highly-lethal explosively-formed penetrators (EFP), a hallmark of Iranian-backed groups, has risen since the start of 2008.Indeed, the month of January saw twelve EFP attacks, which was the highest monthly total of such attacks in over a year. This meant that, on average, from early January to early February, there was an EFP attack every three days.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

932. Iran and Al-Qaeda in Iraq: What's the Connection?

Author:
Marisa Cochrane Sullivan
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
It is widely speculated in the media that the relationship between the Shi'a government of Iran and the Sunni insurgent group, al-Qaeda in Iraq, is a hostile one, primarily because of the sectarian differences between the two. However, there is clear evidence of Iranian support for another Sunni group, the Taliban in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is worth investigating the potential links between al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Iranian regime, particularly the Iranian Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force (IRGCQF). The dossier below contains articles, press releases, and Defense Department briefings from the last year that consider the nature of this relationship. While it may not present a definitive explanation of the connection between these groups, it does suggest possible links exist between the groups and the sectarian grounds for dismissing the relationship are likely too simplistic. The most relevant passages have been highlighted in yellow.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Taliban

933. The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. Counter-terrorism in Mindanao - Asia Report Nº152

Author:
Daniel Heradstveit, G. Matthew Bonham, Michiko Nakano, and Victor M.Sergeev
Publication Date:
05-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
This paper focuses on how leaders in Western countries talk about the “war on terrorism.” The paper discusses the difficulties of defining “terrorism,” because, unlike Marxism or capitalism, “terrorism” is not an ideology. Instead the term may be used to designate actions that are used by members of non-governmental organizations against civilian targets. In the case of the “war on terrorism,” the signifier, “terrorism,” is used widely. However, the signified, the perpetrators and what they do, are quite different. Because the designation of the signified depends upon the speaker, the concept of terrorism seems to be subjective and fluid. The signified switches radically both by context and over time, while the only aspect that is stable is the signifier, “terrorism.” The paper goes on to analyze the “war on terrorism” as an ontological metaphor. The paper concludes by arguing that although figures of speech contribute to the cognitive dimension of meaning by helping us to recognize the equivalence to which we are committed and suggesting new equivalences, metaphors like the “war on terrorism” raise problems and do little to increase our understanding. Considering different cultural codes and world views, this type of metaphor is highly counterproductive for communication on the global level.
Topic:
Globalization, Terrorism, and Counter-terrorism

934. Sunni and Shi'a Terrorism: Differences that Matter

Author:
Thomas F. Lynch III
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
There are significant and little appreciated differences in the trajectory of Sunni extremist terrorism and that of Shi’a extremism. The differences exist across six key areas that impact American policy considerations, especially in light of steadily escalating tensions with Iran. First and foremost, Sunni radicals and Shi’a extremists differ in the overall approach and main objectives for their use of terror. The former tend to operate in a continuous, mid‐to‐high intensity manner, seeing war against infidels and apostates as a perennial condition featuring overlapping waves. Outside of an ongoing and seemingly open‐ended campaign against Israel, terrorist attacks by Shi’a groups have by and large featured discrete terror campaigns tethered to state and organizational objectives. Second, Sunni terrorists and Shi’a extremists manifest different patterns for recruiting terrorist operatives and developing terrorist missions. Shi’a terrorists, unlike their Sunni counterparts, enjoy direct state support and for that reason are far more likely to originate from Iranian embassies, consulates and state‐run businesses. Third, despite holding a minority viewpoint within the wider Sunni Islamic community, Sunni extremists, especially Salafi‐Jihadis, rely more extensively on the support of their coreligionist expatriate communities in facilitating terrorist activities. Fourth, while employing similar tactics and methods, Shi’a terrorist groups have shown a much greater propensity to kidnap innocents to barter, while Sunni extremists more frequently abduct to kill. Fifth, Shi’a terror groups exhibit a much higher incidence of targeted assassinations for specific political gain, rather than the high‐casualty killings featured in Sunni terrorism, and particularly of the Salafi‐Jihadist variant. Finally, each sect’s extremists manage publicity and propaganda differently. The Sunni approach to information management tends to feature doctrine and resources geared to take immediate credit and widely amplify a terrorist event. Shi’a terrorists, while not averse to normal media publicity and amplification, by and large take a much lower‐key approach.
Topic:
Terrorism and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

935. Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication Management Techniques

Author:
Carsten Bocksette
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is a leading transatlantic defense educational and security studies institution. It is bilaterally supported by the U.S. and German governments and dedicated to the creation of a more stable security environment by advancing democratic defense institutions and relationships; promoting active, peaceful engagement; and enhancing enduring partnerships among the nations of North America, Europe and Eurasia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Biosecurity, and Counter-terrorism

936. In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts

Author:
Richard B. Zabel and James J. Benjamin Jr.
Publication Date:
05-2008
Content Type:
Course Pack
Abstract:
This White Paper examines the capability of the federal courts to handle criminal cases arising from international terrorism. In the Paper, we focus on terrorism that is associated— organizationally, financially, or ideologically—with self- described “jihadist” or Islamist extremist terrorist groups like al Qaeda. 1 Many observers have expressed views on this important subject. 2 Some have argued for prosecuting terrorist criminals outside of the civilian court system; others have called for the establishment of an entirely new “national security court.” 3 A premise of such arguments is that the traditional court system is not well-equipped to handle international terrorism cases. We aim to explore that premise.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, Islam, Terrorism, and Governance

937. Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare

Author:
Christopher Boucek
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Course Pack
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In the aftermath of a wave of deadly terrorist attacks that began in 2003, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia launched a wide-ranging counterterrorism campaign. Central to Saudi counterterrorism efforts has been the use of unconventional “soft” measures designed to combat the intellectual and ideological justifications for violent extremism. The primary objective of this strategy is to engage and combat an ideology that the Saudi government asserts is based on corrupted and deviant interpretations of Islam. The impetus for this soft approach came in large part from the recognition that violent extremism cannot be combated through tradition security measures alone. This Saudi strategy is composed of three interconnected programs aimed at prevention, rehabilitation, and post- release care (PRAC). Although only in operation for the past four years, the Saudi strategy—es- pecially the rehabilitation and counter-radicalization programs—has generated very positive and very intriguing results. To date, recidivist and rearrest rates are extremely low, at approximately 1 to 2 percent. Similar programs designed to demobilize violent extremists and their supporters are increasing in popularity, with a number of countries adopting comparable counter-radicalization pro- grams. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia have all established rehabilitation and engagement programs, as has the U.S. military through Task Force 134 in Iraq. As such, the importance of understanding the Saudi strategy, and counter-radicalization broadly, is increasing in relevance in the fight against violent radical Islamist extremism.
Topic:
Security, Islam, Terrorism, and Governance
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia

938. Diplomacy in a Dangerous World: A Conversation with America's Top Diplomats

Author:
Thomas R. Pickering, R. Nicholas Burns, Robert Kimmitt, Marc Grossman, and David D. Newsom
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:
On October 29, 2007, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy hosted a roundtable with Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns, and his predecessors as Under Secretaries from past administrations. This was a rare opportunity to hear from the nation's top diplomatic practitioners together in one room. The Under Secretary for Political Affairs is the third most senior position in the State Department, and traditionally at the center of U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy formulation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political Violence, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Government, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
America

939. Recent Attacks in Iraq: Al-Qaeda in Iraq or Special Groups?

Author:
Marisa Cochrane Sullivan
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
Over the last month there has been an increase in coordinated, well-planned attacks. While Coalition Forces are still investigating the perpetrators of these attacks, others have been quick to credit al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Although AQI is still present in Iraq, their networks have been largely disrupted by aggressive operations by Coalition Forces and Sons of Iraq (SoI). Since June 2007, the number of AQI attacks has decreased by eighty percent. Their recent activity has been limited to the use of female suicide bombers on soft targets. It is unlikely that AQI has regenerated its forces and capabilities in such a short period of time.
Topic:
Terrorism, Armed Struggle, Sectarianism, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Middle East

940. The Iraqi Accord Front's Return to Government

Author:
Farook Ahmed
Publication Date:
05-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
Iraqi Prime Minister Nourial-Maliki's recent offensives against Shi'a extremist groups in Baghdad and Southern Iraq have been credited with bringing ancillary benefits to Iraq, as they have been credited by Iraq's main Sunni Arab parliamentary bloc, the Iraqi Accordance Front (IAF, or "Tawafuq") to return to Prime Minister Maliki's government. This appears to strengthen the Iraqi government while serving as a milestone for Iraqi sectarian reconciliation.
Topic:
Terrorism, Armed Struggle, Governance, Sectarianism, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Middle East