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481. The State of Iraq

Author:
Marina Ottaway and Danial Kaysi
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Within days of the official ceremonies marking the end of the U.S. mission in Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki moved to indict Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi on terrorism charges and sought to remove Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq from his position, triggering a major political crisis that fully revealed Iraq as an unstable, undemocratic country governed by raw competition for power and barely affected by institutional arrangements. Large-scale violence immediately flared up again, with a series of terrorist attacks against mostly Shi'i targets reminiscent of the worst days of 2006.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Democratization, Development, Ethnic Conflict, Terrorism, War, Fragile/Failed State, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Arabia, and Kurdistan

482. U.S. Foreign Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Author:
Ahmed Rashid and Steve Coll
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Columbia University World Leaders Forum
Abstract:
This World Leaders Forum program, titled "U.S. Foreign Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan," will feature a conversation between Ahmed Rashid, Pakistani journalist and author, and Steve Coll, staff writer for The New Yorker and President, New America Foundation, followed by a question and answer session with the audience. Opening remarks will be made by Bill Grueskin, Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Professional Practice, Columbia School of Journalism.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Islam, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency

483. Health in Post-Conflict and Fragile States

Author:
Leonard S. Rubenstein and Rohini Jonnalagadda Haar
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The populations of states experiencing severe instability or unable to meet the basic functions of governance—referred to as fragile states—as well as those embroiled in conflict make up one-sixth of the world's population and suffer from far poorer health than their counterparts in other states at comparable stages of development. During many armed conflicts, health facilities and health workers come under attack, and infrastructure is often destroyed, inducing health workers to leave and undermining management capacity, thus further depleting health system competence to meet basic needs. Evidence is emerging that effective and equitable health services may be a central contributor to state legitimacy. All too often, health interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states are limited to humanitarian relief, which does not advance either health systems development or state legitimacy. Two decades of experience in development of health systems in fragile and conflict-affected states have shown a need to address weaknesses in policy, leadership, management capacty, human resources for health, supplies, service delivery, and data collection and evaluation through World Health Organization's (WHO) building blocks for health services. The military's record of engagement in civilian health systems development is poor, and its efforts to use health interventions to promote stability have not proven fruitful. Its most appropriate role in civilian health in fragile and conflict-affected states is to provide or support health services in highly insecure areas. Donors have not made health systems development in such states a priority in global health programs. Investments are often seen as politically or financially risky, and as having lower potential payoffs. Given the poor health indicators in these states, however, health devel¬opment in fragile and conflict-affected states should be a higher priority. Donors need to confront directly whether the goal of health development is stabilization or population health. Research is warranted on the relationships between health and armed conflict and between health development and state building.
Topic:
Development, Health, Terrorism, Counterinsurgency, and Fragile/Failed State

484. Boko Haram's Evolving Threat

Author:
J. Peter Pham
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The Nigerian militant Islamist group Boko Haram has grown increasingly virulent since late 2010, reflecting a major transformation in its capacity, tactics, and ideology. There are indications of expanding links between Boko Haram and international Islamist terrorist organizations. Support for Boko Haram among some of northern Nigeria's marginalized Muslim communities suggests that security actions alone will be insufficient to quell the instability.
Topic:
Political Violence, Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

485. Middle East Security Report : Syria's Armed Opposition

Author:
Joseph Holliday
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
The rebels will have to rely on external lines of supply to replenish their arms and ammunition if they are to continue eroding the regime's control. The emergence of al-Qaeda-linked terrorist cells working against the regime poses risks to the United States and a challenge to those calling for material support of the armed opposition. As the militias continue to face overwhelming regime firepower the likelihood of their radicalization may increase. Moreover, the indigenous rebels may turn to al-Qaeda for high-end weaponry and spectacular tactics as the regime's escalation leaves the rebels with no proportionate response, as occurred in Iraq in 2005-2006. Developing relations with armed opposition leaders and recognizing specific rebel organizations may help to deter this dangerous trend. It is imperative that the United States distinguish between the expatriate political opposition and the armed opposition against the Assad regime on the ground in Syria. American objectives in Syria are to hasten the fall of the Assad regime; to contain the regional spillover generated by the ongoing conflict; and to gain influence over the state and armed forces that emerge in Assad's wake. Therefore, the United States must consider developing relations with critical elements of Syria's armed opposition movement in order to achieve shared objectives, and to manage the consequences should the Assad regime fall or the conflict protract.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, United States, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Germany, and Syria

486. The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat

Author:
Jeffrey Dressler
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
The Haqqani Network represents hh a strategic threat to the enduring stability of the Afghan state and U.S. national security interests in the region. The Haqqanis are currently Afghanistan's most capable and potent insurgent group, and they continue to maintain close operational and strategic ties with al-Qaeda and their affiliates. These ties will likely deepen in the future. Unlike the Quetta Shura Taliban in southern Afghanistan, the counterinsurgency campaign has not weakened the Haqqanis' military capabilities significantly. Few of the “surge” resources deployed to their strongholds in Eastern Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network has increased its operational reach and jihadist credentials over the past several years. The Haqqani Network has expanded its reach toward the Quetta Shura Taliban's historical strongholds in southern Afghanistan, the areas surrounding Kabul, as well as the Afghan north. The Haqqanis maintain considerable sanctuary and support nodes inside Pakistan's tribal areas. From their safehavens in North Waziristan and Kurram Agencies in Pakistan, the Haqqanis project men and materiel to resource their terrorist campaign in Afghanistan's southeastern provinces of Khost, Paktika and Paktia onwards to the provinces surrounding Kabul. The Haqqani Network is the primary proxy force backed by elements of Pakistan's security establishment. Pakistan's support for the Haqqani Network has increased, through both facilitating additional sanctuary and providing strategic and operational guidance. The Haqqanis serve Pakistan's interests by dominating key terrain along the border and beyond in Afghanistan's south and east, serving as a Pakistani-influenced “firewall” against national, northern, U.S. and Indian influence. The Haqqanis would also serve Pakistan's interests by being the primary influence in Afghanistan's Ghilzai Pashtun lands, as well as the tribal areas in North Waziristan, organizing these tribal areas in ways consistent with Pakistan's interests. The Haqqanis execute spectacular attacks in Kabul in order to generate a disproportionate psychological and propaganda effect. The Haqqanis have strengthened their presence in Logar and Wardak, surrounding the southern and western approaches to Kabul. They have also expanded into Kabul's eastern approachs in the provinces of Nangarhar, Lahgman, and Kapisa. The network will use these positions to increase their destabilizing attacks in Kabul. The Haqqani Network has increased their presence in Afghanistan's north, through their partnership with the al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The Haqqani Network and IMU execute targeted assassinations of northern powerbrokers who are affiliated with the Jamiat-e Islami Party. These assassinations are meant to undermine the Jamiat party and the influence of minority powerbrokers, who are historical rivals to the Pashtuns and the Pakistani state. The Haqqanis are ideologically committed insurgents, and they are increasing their territorial reach. The group also has ties to al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The Haqqanis have never given any indication that breaking ties with al-Qaeda was either possible or in their interests. Consequently, the Haqqani Network is not reconcilable. They also do not fully follow the guidance of the Quetta Shura Taliban, because they maintain a separate power base and leadership structure. Coalition and Afghan forces must conduct a sustained, well-resourced offensive against the Haqqani Network inside of Afghanistan. This campaign would likely require at least two adequately-resourced fighting seasons. Consequently, it is imperative that the U.S. retains force levels at 68,000 troops after September 2012, rather than conducting a further drawdown. Without such a campaign, the Haqqani Network will be a dominant force inside of Afghanistan indefinitely, and the United States woulf fail to achieve its stated objective of preventing the return of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups to Afghanistan. Addressing the threat from the Haqqani Network inside of Afghanistan is necessary, even if further action should ultimately be taken to disrupt the organization in Miramshah. The ANSF are not equipped to deal with the threat from the Haqqani Network in their current state. The Afghan Security Forces lack the intelligence, enablers, and sophisticated command and control required to reclaim the enemy support zones south of Kabul. The Afghan units are also under-filled and wrongly positioned for this fight. American troops in a properly-resourced campaign can help reduce the threat from the Haqqani Network to a level that the Afghan Security Forces can handle. The United States must not abruptly shift the mission of its forces in Afghanistan from counter-insurgency to security force assistance. U.S. forces cannot curtail or cease offensive operations in the areas South of Kabul in Regional Command East in 2012. The United States and its Afghan partners must dismantle the Haqqani Network's strongholds in Khost, Paktika, and Paktia and contain the organization's expansion toward Kabul prior to a shift in mission. Failure to do so will present a strategic threat to U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Terrorism, International Security, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

487. The Resurgence of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq

Author:
Sam Wyer
Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
This report examines the political, religious, and military resurgence of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) in Iraq since the withdrawal of U.S. Forces, identifying the group's key actors, their present disposition and strategy, and their regional expansion. AAH is an Iranian-backed Shi'a militant group that split from Moqtada al-Sadr's Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) in 2006. Since that time, AAH has conducted thousands of lethal explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks against U.S. and Iraqi forces, targeted kidnappings of Westerners, rocket and mortar attacks on the U.S. Embassy, the murder of American soldiers, and the assassination of Iraqi officials.
Topic:
Security, Islam, Terrorism, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

488. Beyond Attribution: Seeking National Responsibility in Cyber Attacks

Author:
Jason Healey
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
For more than two decades, cyber defenders, intelligence analysts, and policymakers have struggled to determine the source of the most damaging attacks. This "attribution problem" will only become more critical as we move into a new era of cyber conflict with even more attacks ignored, encouraged, supported, or conducted by national governments.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Terrorism, International Security, and Reform
Political Geography:
China

489. Preparing for Cyber 9/12

Author:
Jason Healey
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Experts have warned about a massive surprise cyber attack since at least 1991, when Winn Schwartau testified to Congress about the dangers of an "electronic Pearl Harbor." More recently, the analogy has changed to a "cyber 9/11" but the fear is generally the same: the dependence of modern economies and societies on cyberspace means a digital attack could fundamentally disrupt our way of life and be remembered for decades as the day everything changed.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, Science and Technology, and Terrorism

490. La relation Pakistan – Etats-Unis : un patron et son client au bord de la rupture ? (The Pakistan-US relations : A relationship on the brink ?)

Author:
Christophe Jaffrelot
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
Abstract:
During the Cold War the US-Pakistan relationship was one in which the US considered Pakistan as a necessary part of its effort to contain communism in Asia while Pakistan considered its relationship with the US as strengthening its position vis a vis India. The high point in this relationship was during the Soviet-Afghan war. The US tried to renew this relationship after 9/11, although when Obama replaced GW Bush he stated his intention to move US-Pakistani relations off the security agenda which the Pentagone and the Pakistani army considered a priority. However, Obama rain into resistance from the Pakistani army and from the national security establishment in Washington- as can be seen from the security-oriented distribution of US aid. But not even in the area of security have the two nations been able truly to collaborate. To begin with, the strengthening of US-India relations angered Pakistan. Then Islamabad protected the Taliban in its fight with NATO. Finally, Obama violated Pakistani sovereignty (the Drone strikes in the tribal belt and the Ben Laden raid). These conflicting interest, however, do not necessary means the end of the relationship.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, War, Peacekeeping, and State
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America