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231. European defence core groups

Author:
Margriet Drent, Anne Bakker, and Dick Zandee
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The why, what & how of permanent structured cooperation The deteriorating security situation around Europe and the burgeoning messages from Washington that Europe has to take more responsibility for its own security call for a step change in European defence cooperation. So far, progress has been too slow. This policy brief argues that permanent structured cooperation (Pesco) offers the option to take a more ambitious and more productive route by member states willing to move forward more quickly, set more demanding objectives and commit themselves more strongly. This would end the well-known ‘voluntary basis’ which has often been used as an excuse for doing little or nothing at all.
Topic:
International Relations, Terrorism, International Security, International Affairs, and Political and institutional effectiveness
Political Geography:
America and European Union

232. Terror overseas: understanding China’s evolving counter-terror strategy

Author:
Mathieu Duchâtel
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council On Foreign Relations
Abstract:
International terrorism has emerged in recent years as a direct threat to Chinese nationals living overseas. As China's footprint becomes increasingly global its exposure to the risk of terror attacks has increased too. China’s approach to international terrorism is becoming militarised. This trend has the potential to accelerate if Chinese nationals are victims of new attacks overseas. Although China is an active and responsible player in the UN with clearly expressed priorities and an interest in protecting its citizens overseas, it is not taking a strong role in leading and shaping the UN’s counter-terrorism agenda. The EU should take stock of the ongoing transformation of China’s approach to explore a modest upgrade of its current policy of cautious engagement. When engaging with China the EU should make clear that an overly politicised approach will be an obstacle to cooperation, and be upfront in setting the conditions of cooperation. The EU should not underestimate what China has to offer but shouldn't make big compromises either.
Topic:
Terrorism and International Security
Political Geography:
China

233. Ben Gardane Attacks: Achievements and Failures

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
The 7 March 2016 attacks on Ben Gardane by Islamic State (IS) occurred in the context of growing upheaval in next-door Libya, internal government tension in Tunisia and challenges faced by Tunisia’s security apparatus after several armed attacks in the country during 2015. This policy brief examines the security, political and regional contexts of the Ben Gardane attack, the positive and negative aspects of the state’s response and addresses preventative measures the state is likely to take in the future.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Terrorism, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Tunisia

234. Terror in Europe: Safeguarding U.S. Citizens at Home and Abroad

Author:
Juan Zarate
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
Juan Zarate gives testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs in the wake of the Brussels attacks
Topic:
Terrorism and International Security
Political Geography:
America

235. The Nuclear Terrorism Threat: How Real Is It?

Author:
Michael Brian Jenkins and John Lauder
Publication Date:
08-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
NPEC Working Paper 1602, “The Nuclear Terrorism Threat: How Real Is It?” presents two opposed views on the threat of nuclear terrorism. Brian M. Jenkins, a Rand analyst and a leading expert on nuclear terrorism, argues that the threat is overblown. John Lauder, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Nonproliferation Center, argues the opposing case that the threat is growing and we need to be hedging against it now.
Topic:
Terrorism, International Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

236. Banners, Barricades, and Bombs: How Social Movements Affect Public Opinion

Author:
Amanda Pearson
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
It’s an argument we’ve heard before: governments should not negotiate with terrorist organizations that engage in violent activity. This idea is pervasive throughout the academic and policy worlds, but what about public opinion? Do citizens think the government should shun social movements that adopt extreme tactics often associated with terrorist organizations? Social protest takes various forms, and organized social movements have various intentions—from benign disruption to purposeful violence. In their forthcoming paper for Comparative Political Studies, Connor Huff and Dominika Kruszewska look at how the tactical choices of social movements affect public opinion about whether or not—and to what degree—governments should negotiate with social movements.1 In research involving 2,000 Polish citizens, Huff and Kruszewska document what many already believe: people were approximately 30% less likely to support government negotiations with organizations that use bombs compared with occupations. “Our results show that public support decreases for both separatist organizations and social movements that adopt bombing as a tactic when compared against occupations and demonstrations,” they write. The researchers find mixed support for whether respondents think organizations that use bombings should receive fewer concessions once negotiations begin.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Terrorism, Social Movement, Protests, Violence, and Demonstrations
Political Geography:
Global Focus

237. Women, Gender and Terrorism: Gendered Aspects of Radicalization and Recruitment

Author:
Jeannette Gaudry
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:
The rise of groups like ISIS has galvanized the expansion of the global terrorism problem. While ISIS is hardly the first extremist organization to attract women and to use gendered tactics for recruitment, its formation and growth has paralleled the explosion of social media, bringing unprecedented attention to the problem. As scholars and policymakers attempt to develop coherent responses to the threats that groups like ISIS pose, three critical issues need to be addressed. (1) What drives individuals to join extremist groups, and are these drivers different for men or women? (2) What are common methods of recruitment, and do they differ by gender? (3) Have states and international institutions integrated gender perspectives in their responses to radicalization and extremist violence? Do these approaches empower women to resist recruitment? Without an integrated dialogue between the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and counterterrorism communities, the answers to these questions will remain incomplete and policy responses may fall short.
Topic:
Gender Issues, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Women, Radicalization, Violence, and Political Movements
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

238. Women, Gender and Terrorism: The Missing Links

Author:
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Michael E. Brown
Publication Date:
08-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:
In March 2016, WIIS launched the Women, Terrorism, and Violent Extremism program. With the generous support of the Embassy of Liechtenstein in Washington, D.C., WIIS will facilitate a series of expert roundtables to explore the role of women in terrorist and violent extremist organizations, including the gendered dimensions of radicalization. These round tables will provide a forum for bringing together an international group of experts and policymakers from the counter-terrorism and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) communities. Key takeaways and recommendations of expert roundtables will be captured and disseminated in the form of policy briefs. The first Policy Brief draws on the first roundtable discussion, held on March 20, 2016. This roundtable featured four noted experts: Ms. Sanam Anderlini, Co-founder and Executive Director of the International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN); Dr. Kathleen Kuehnast, Senior Gender Advisor at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP); Dr. Paul Pillar, former official of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and now a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution; and Dr. Lorenzo Vidino, Director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University’s Center for Cyber and Homeland Security.
Topic:
Security, Gender Issues, Terrorism, Women, Radicalization, Violence, and Peace
Political Geography:
Middle East and Global Focus

239. A National Strategic Framework for Countering Violent Extremism in Jordan

Author:
Ghimar Deeb, Jeffrey Woodham, Mia Chin, and Sawsan Gharaibeh
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Abstract:
Following the uprisings in the Arab world, the region has lurched into a period of massive change and instability. An unfortunate consequence of this change has been the rise and proliferation of militant groups such as ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham) and Jubhat al-Nusra in Iraq and Syria. These militant groups successfully recruit members from the region and beyond, fueling conflict in countries that have witnessed unrest, such as Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. Although Jordan has long been seen as a regional hub of stability and security, especially by its Western allies, it increasingly exhibits symptoms of the long-standing pressures exerted upon it by the surrounding conflicts, resulting refugee crises, and pre-existing domestic challenges. Jordan’s hypothetical fall into instability could have catastrophic consequences for the region, exacerbating the crises in Syria and Iraq, empowering ISIS and other militant groups, and threatening regional and global security. In response, this article offers a general framework for the expansion of the country’s nascent Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) program, including both preventative and remedial measures. Beginning with an overview of the processes of radicalization and de-radicalization, this article proceeds with a brief discussion of Jordan’s current situation before synthesizing scholarly articles and analyses of other CVE programs in order to establish a framework to guide Jordan’s developing CVE interventions.
Topic:
Terrorism, Refugee Crisis, ISIS, and Arab Spring
Political Geography:
Middle East and Jordan

240. Guantanamo’s Last Year

Author:
Ken Gude
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
With one year left in his administration, President Barack Obama remains committed to closing the prison at Guantanamo Bay during his time in office. Congress has prohibited, at least for now, one aspect of the president’s preferred pathway to close the prison—transferring some detainees into the United States for trial or continued law of war detention. Much of this debate has focused on the question of whether President Obama will use executive action to override the congressional transfer ban. Doing so would be impractical and extremely unwise. The Obama administration should state publicly that it will not use executive action to bring large numbers of Guantanamo detainees into the United States in defiance of congressional statute. A better strategy would be to pursue alternative options for closing Guantanamo that, even given current statutory constraints, remain entirely in the control of the executive branch. Amid disappointment at the failure to close Guantanamo, it is easy to forget that President Obama originally believed it was feasible to identify, categorize, prosecute, and transfer all 242 detainees in just one year—the same amount of time he has left for the remaining 91 detainees. While congressional resistance is a new obstacle not present at the time of President Obama’s original pledge, moving the majority of detainees out of Guantanamo is now mostly about the implementation of policies and decisions already made, a much more manageable challenge than the one that Obama faced in 2009. If that goal is to be achieved, however, President Obama must command a greater level of urgency throughout his administration and especially at the Pentagon. The risk is not simply a failure that becomes a stain on the president’s legacy; rather, the much more serious risk is that the next administration could resume sending detainees to Guantanamo, which is on the wish list of many conservatives. The latter would do irreparable harm to American national security—and be a colossal waste of money. Holding a detainee at Guantanamo now costs $4 million per year per detainee, compared with less than $100,000 per inmate in the highest security prison in the United States. And while it is fair to say that the salience of Guantanamo as a recruiting tool for terrorist groups has faded during the Obama administration’s efforts to close it, it is not gone. Hostages held by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, are not dressed in Guantanamo-like orange jumpsuits by accident. And if new detainees were to be sent to Guantanamo by the next administration, the prison would roar back to prominence in terrorist propaganda and be an enormous self-inflicted wound on the country. We cannot afford to risk this possibility. Guantanamo must be closed during the Obama administration. This can be achieved by completing the following steps: Hold Periodic Review Board hearings for all eligible detainees by July 1, 2016. Accelerate transfers of those detainees designated for transfer or release. Order the Department of Justice to review detainee cases for prosecution and potential plea bargain in federal court. Pursue agreements with countries to prosecute under their laws any Guantanamo detainees accused of serious crimes. Engage the Afghan government to seek an agreement to transfer back to Afghan custody any remaining law of war detainees captured in connection with the war in Afghanistan. Some of these options may not represent the best or preferred method for the Obama administration to close Guantanamo, but this is a feasible and realistic path to close the prison in one year. Some of these choices will be difficult, but when measured against the possibility that Guantanamo could be back in the business of accepting new detainees in 2017, those difficulties should not be disqualifying. A reinvigorated effort from the Obama administration is urgently needed to make 2016 Guantanamo’s last year.
Topic:
Terrorism, Prisons/Penal Systems, Counter-terrorism, and Detention
Political Geography:
Caribbean, North America, United States of America, and Guantanamo