This report examines the correlates of individual-level support for terrorism in fourteen Muslim countries. I identify a variety of factors that are correlated with support for terrorism. These factors can be divided into a several categories: attitudes toward Islam, attitudes toward the United States, attitudes toward politics and economics in the home countries, and demographic factors.
Topic:
Development, Peace Studies, Religion, and Terrorism
As investigative journalists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) increasingly uncover the nature and scope of a U.S. government program known for transferring terrorist suspects outside of normal legal and administrative channels, the role of European states has come under scrutiny. To a large degree, these states have erected a “wall of fog,” as a report from the German Institute of Human Rights describes it, blocking access to information that would allow for independent assessments of the human rights implications of the counterterrorism practice known as “extraordinary rendition.”
Five years after President George Bush declared that America would act decisively to "rid the world of evil," terrorism continues to pose an urgent threat to our national security. In fact, an overwhelming majority of national security experts believe that the United States is actually losing the "war on terror."
Sharon Burke, Dr. Elaine C. Kamarck, and William Galston
Publication Date:
05-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
For more than four decades, the purpose of American foreign policy was to win the Cold War. On November 9, 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, that understanding of America's place in the world changed forever. Less than one month later, the Presidents of the Soviet Union and United States met at Malta and agreed that the Cold War was over.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, America, Middle East, and Soviet Union
The idea that Americans are safe from al Qaeda because the group has not struck inside the United States since 9/11—a claim repeated just this week by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff—is one of the Bush administration's most dangerous, short-sighted and questionable notions about terrorism. Experience alone suggests otherwise: eight years passed between al Qaeda's first attempt to destroy the World Trade Center in 1993 and their attack in 2001. Indeed, a more thorough examination of the facts suggests that the threat not only remains—it is growing.
General David Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq, and Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, launched a coordinated offensive operation on June 15, 2007 to clear al Qaeda strongholds outside of Baghdad. The arrival of the fifth Army "surge" brigade, the Marine Expeditionary Unit, and the combat aviation brigade enabled GEN Petraeus and LTG Odierno to begin this major offensive, named "Operation Phantom Thunder." Three different U.S. Division Headquarters in different provinces are participating in Phantom Thunder. Multi-National Division-North (Diyala); Multi-National Division-Center (North Babil and Baghdad); and Multi-National Division-West (Anbar). In addition to reinforcing these areas with new troops, LTG Odierno and his division commanders have repositioned some brigades and battalions that were already operating in and around Baghdad.
What began in Anbar as a local movement of tribes is developing into a national phenomenon. In Baqouba, the erstwhile capital of al Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq, between 40 and 60 al Qaeda operatives sought on August 15 to attack the southern Buhriz neighborhood of that city. As the first wave of attackers entered they were met with withering fire from a group of concerned citizens, calling themselves the 'Baqouba Guardians.' These volunteer fighters killed seven in that first clash, including two suicide bombers interdicted before they could reach their intended targets. A call for Coalition gunship support broke up the next attack even as it prepared for action. At the end of the fight some 21 al Qaeda terrorists were dead.
In March 2003, before Operation Iraqi Freedom I began, Baghdad's Mansour district was an affluent Sunni enclave with “villas, gardens, and private pools.”Also known as the “embassies district,” it attracted shoppers seeking luxury foreign goods from all over the city.Due to the ongoing Iraq War, however, the district and its many neighborhoods succumbed to sectarian violence. In the four years between 2003 and 2007, conflict between Sunni and Shiite militias transformed Mansour into “a bombed-out wasteland.”The intense violence included street battles between rival militias, kidnappings, bombings, assassinations and death squads. Thus, many residents to fled from the area due to a lack of security and services. Because this district was “one of the most heavily contested by the Shiite and Sunni militias,” restoring order there has been challenging for U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces.
Topic:
Terrorism, Armed Struggle, Sectarianism, and Sectarian violence
They call themselves Farsan Al Rafidayn, the Knights of the Two Rivers. And in Ameriya, a formerly wealthy district of western Baghdad, they have turned on al Qaeda, routing with the help of the coalition, approximately 90% of the terrorist operatives.
Gen. Ray Odierno, the commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq, has argued that even as security improves in Baghdad, neighborhoods on the fault lines between the Shia and Sunni communities will be among the "last to settle." The neighborhood of Saydiyah, located in southwestern Baghdad, is such a place. Over the last year, it has become one of the principal battlegrounds for the territorial war between Shia militias and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in Baghdad. Located in the western end of the Rashid Security District, Saydiyah was formerly a mixed neighborhood, with a Sunni majority. Prior to the invasion in 2003, many officials in Saddam's government lived in the area, and following the outbreak of the war, it became a stronghold for the Sunni insurgency. Although Al-Qaeda and other Sunni insurgent factions initially cooperated in Saydiyah, it appears that Al-Qaeda slowly pushed out the other Sunni groups, while simultaneously intensifying violence against the Shia residents of the neighborhood. The reaction from Shia militias and Shia-dominated government security forces led to extraordinary violence during the summer of 2007. US forces have sponsored an Awakening group in the Sunni community to protect them from Shia predation and remove the need for Al-Qaeda's protection services. They have also worked to sponsor sectarian reconciliation through local notables and tribal elements, but it appears that these efforts have not yielded the kinds of success witnessed further to the south in Mahmudiyah, or the Abu Disheer - Hawr Rajab area.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, Sectarianism, and Sectarian violence