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31. The EU and military AI governance: Forging value-based coalitions in an age of strategic competition

Author:
Katja Creutz, Ville Sinkkonen, Mahmoud Javadi, and Michal Onderco
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has increased dramatically, driving discussion on the best way to govern it. While much of the discussion has focused on AI in the civilian domain, its usage in military applications raises distinct ethical and legal questions that actors increasingly seek to address. Governance initiatives are becoming more common, even though strategic competition between major powers remains a challenge. The EU navigates this governance landscape more hesitantly than in the civilian domain with its Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA). More information is needed regarding what kind of regulation, and especially with whom the Union could pursue such avenues. This paper seeks to address these questions by presenting and analyzing results from an expert survey conducted in autumn 2023 by researchers at Erasmus University Rotterdam. It argues that the EU needs to pursue a broad range of cooperation formats to advance its values and interests in the context of military AI. Strategic multilateralism is needed, especially with like-minded states that share values with the Union.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, European Union, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

32. China, the West, and the Rest: Who is Enjoying the Shadow of Whom?

Author:
Jasper Roctus and Bart Dessein
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
On Tuesday, July 25, 2023, Beijing announced that seasoned diplomat Wang Yi would return to his function as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a post he had held for ten years (2013–2022). With this, he replaced his predecessor Qin Gang, a so-called ‘wolf warrior’ diplomat who was in office for only a few months. When former premier Li Keqiang (2013–2023) died of a heart attack on October 27, 2023, crowds of ordinary citizens laid chrysanthemum bouquets across the country, mourning for the more open and optimistic times that had characterized the era under Li’s patron, State President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Hu Jintao (r. 2002–2012). Minister of Defense Li Shangfu was, after an equally short stint in office, replaced by former People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) admiral Dong Jun on December 29, 2023. In the case of Li Shangfu, who was sanctioned by the United States (US) over arms sales to Russia, his resignation was combined with a purge and crackdown on corruption within the rocket force of the PLA. Given the focus on the PLAN in Xi Jinping’s military reforms of the mid-2010s, this could be interpreted as an advantage point for the faction of China’s leader. This signal stands in contrast to the promotion of Hu Haifeng, the son of Hu Jintao, to vice minister of Civil Affairs on January 16, 2024. Keeping the much-speculated removal of Hu’s father during the 20th National Congress of the CCP of October 22, 2022 into mind, one might ask: Who enjoys whose sunlight to step out of the shadows?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

33. Russia and China in Central Asia: Potential For Direct Competition

Author:
Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
China is now undisputedly the leading economic partner for the Central Asia region, with trade and investment continuing to increase despite Beijing’s economic slowdown. Russia is still the dominant political partner for the region, but its influence and ability to strong-arm Central Asian states has been significantly dented by the impact of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Central Asian states are now able in tacitly criticize Putin’s actions without significant cost and some have taken advantage of the negative impacts of Russia’s international isolation and sanctions to strike beneficial deals, in particular Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Moscow remains content in its position, knowing that the lack of democracy in the region and dominance of elite networks in business and politics mean that regional states are still willing to turn to Moscow for political support, as witnessed in the Kyrgyz Republic in particular since President Japarov came to power in 2020. Tensions between Beijing and Russia have failed to emerge, at least publicly, although if the current trends continue the potential for direct competition may increase.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

34. China, Russia, and Power Transition in Central Asia

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since the days of Thucydides, scholars have written about—and policymakers have wrestled with—the dangers of power transition, which occurs when a rising power challenges the previously dominant power in a system. In the 5th Century BCE, this dynamic led to decades of war between alliance systems led by Sparta and Athens. Though Sparta eventually defeated Athens in the Peloponnesian War, the real winner was the Persian Empire, which snatched up territory from the exhausted states of the Hellenic system after the war ended. Much scholarship on the so-called Thucydides Trap focuses on the United States and China, asking if the powers two can negotiate the latter’s rise without conflict. But there is another, more acute power transition underway: that between Russia and China in Central Asia. In the last decade, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia’s power and legitimacy in Central Asia has declined in absolute terms. The erosion of Russian power relative to that of China, however, is more important than the decline in Moscow’s absolute power. Power transitions are notoriously hard to navigate and can strain even amicable relationships, turning erstwhile partners into competitors, or worse. The China-Russia partnership is a relatively recent phenomenon after centuries of mostly competitive relations. This means that Beijing and Moscow do not have a reservoir of goodwill built over decades to draw on as they navigate the erosion of Russian power in a region critically important to both. While this power transition is unlikely to lead to outright war between China and Russia over Central Asia, it is already leading to competition between the two, especially in the economic realm. Competition between Beijing and Moscow is made both more likely and more consequential by several unique features of the region. First, it is geographically contiguous to both. Next, both have high-order political, economic, and security interests at stake there. Finally, the US footprint in the region is light, removing a strong incentive for Chinese-Russian cooperation there. The United States is in many ways the binding agent between China and Russia: Where it is present, their shared resistance to Washington’s influence gives them a focal point for cooperation. Where the United States is absent—as it is in Central Asia, at least with respect to China and Russia—that focal point is removed. This report first analyzes Chinese and Russian influence and interests in Central Asia. It then examines how each pursues its political, military, and economic goals in the region. It concludes with an analysis of how and where their interests are most convergent and divergent and the implications for their overall relationship. If Beijing and Moscow can negotiate their power transition in Central Asia and maintain their overall partnership, this implies that the partnership is deep and durable. But it is Central Asia, more than anywhere else in the world, that will test Chinese-Russian ties.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Strategic Interests, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Central Asia

35. Critical Minerals and Great Power Competition: An Overview

Author:
Jiayi Zhou and André Månberger
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
With global politics increasingly fractured, states are rushing to secure critical and strategic mineral supply chains. Each state conceptualizes mineral security differently, driven by a mix of imperatives that range from national development and industrial policy to technological and military dominance. Great power competition pervades all of these issue areas, and that competition may also pose risks at the global level: risks for the pace of green transition, risks of geoeconomic escalation and risks of conflict. This report provides an insightful overview of the mineral security policies of four key powers: China, the European Union, Russia and the United States. It describes the distinct ways in which they conceptualize mineral security, comparing their priority lists of critical and strategic minerals. It considers the wider imperatives that motivate their policies and assesses the implications for developing countries. The report concludes by reflecting on the need to mitigate the worst of the resultant risks through expanded dialogue with a wider set of stakeholders. The goal is a form of mineral security that can serve more broad-based, global developmental interests.
Topic:
European Union, Strategic Competition, Green Transition, Critical Minerals, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

36. Getting Ukraine to a Position of Strength: A Strategy for the Trump Administration

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Below are five reasons why Ukraine is important to US interests. 1. Protecting the US economy. North America and Europe account for nearly half of the world’s GDP. Two-thirds of foreign investment into the US comes from Europe, and 48 states export more to Europe than to China. This supports millions of American jobs. European stability, which Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine undermines, benefits the US economy and, by extension, the American worker. Aiding Ukraine helps preserve that stability. 2. Detering Chinese aggression. Russia is China’s junior partner. A weakened or defeated Russia means a weaker China. Beijing is watching how the West supports Ukraine. A strong and victorious Ukraine makes Taiwan appear stronger and deters Chinese aggression. 3. Succeeding in great power competition. Russia’s war against Ukraine is central to America’s great power competition against the Russia–China–Iran–North Korea axis. North Korea has provided 10,000 soldiers, millions of artillery shells, and hundreds of missiles to Russia in exchange for military technology. Meanwhile, Iran provides Russia with drones and ballistic missiles in exchange for fighter jets and other advanced capabilities. China’s technical, economic, and diplomatic support for Russia enables all this as part of Beijing’s strategy to undermine the US. 4. Preparing the US military enterprise for twenty-first-century warfare. Support for Ukraine has exposed major shortcomings in the US defense industrial base that can now be fixed. The war has also tested American-made military hardware in a way not possible in peacetime—with no American casualties. The US is learning what works, what does not work, and how systems evolve in combat. And as Ukraine receives US weapons, America replaces its own weapons stocks with newer, more effective systems. 5. Demonstrating strength. A successful Ukraine demonstrates American strength. However, acquiescing to Putin and abandoning partners shows the world American weakness. Even forcing Ukraine into a deal that lopsidedly benefits Russia would embolden US adversaries and cause America’s allies to hedge toward other security arrangements.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Deterrence, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

37. Material world: How Europe can compete with China in the race for Africa’s critical minerals

Author:
Sarah Logan
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
In the last two decades, China has come to dominate global supply chains for critical raw materials and the green energy and other technologies they enable. This increases competition and economic risks for Europe. In an effort to build CRM supply chains insulated from China, the EU has signed strategic partnerships with several politically friendly countries around the world, including in Africa. However, the EU will only realise its de-risking ambitions if the European private sector invests in CRM supply chains in partner countries in Africa and elsewhere. Yet the incentives for European companies to enter mining and processing operations in these markets are too weak. The example of Namibia shows that the EU’s strategic partnership with the country has borne little fruit – and may even be benefitting Chinese firms at European expense. To address this, the EU must enhance support to European companies to invest in securing access to critical raw materials. This should include new financial incentives and measures to protect against China manipulating prices on international markets.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Strategic Competition, Supply Chains, Strategic Partnerships, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Europe, Asia, and Namibia

38. The infinite connection: How to make the India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor happen

Author:
Alberto Rizzi
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The war in Gaza and its fallout have stalled plans for the India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor, or IMEC. But this grand US-led connectivity project to link the EU and India via the Gulf can still happen – and it can serve the geopolitical goals of all its participants. With IMEC, the US and the EU aim to draw India closer and counter Chinese influence. The corridor would provide a boost to India’s strategy to escape encirclement by Beijing and become a leader among developing countries. The UAE and Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, embrace IMEC as part of their push to become an economic bridge between East and West. For the corridor to fulfil its potential, the participants will need to coalesce around implementation plans that can reconcile these different goals. They will also need to overcome internal and external obstacles along each leg of the corridor. Europeans should view IMEC as providing a long-term addition to current trade routes. They should also press for the corridor to expand into a network, promote trade liberalisation with India, and support all the participants as they transition to renewable energy. If they are successful, IMEC could enhance Europe’s economic resilience and increase its options for trade diversification. The links IMEC could help forge among this range of powers may in fact constitute IMEC’s greatest prize, with the corridor helping to prevent fragmentation reaching extreme levels.
Topic:
Economics, Infrastructure, Economic Cooperation, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, India, and Gulf Nations

39. China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
As the dust settles on the election, one thing is certain: there is going to be increased interest in expanding America’s nuclear arsenal. Whatever the merits of what that move might be, it’s hardly a complete strategy to cope with a long term strategic contest, Russia, China, and their proxies. That will require far more than any adjustment of our nuclear arsenal. What’s required? At the request of several national security officials and outside experts, NPEC is sharing its answer with today’s release of China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War available as an Amazon book. It consists of four chapters. The first sketches out what a long-term contest with China, Russia, and its proxies will demand. Although building up military might and using threats of massive destruction against our enemies were critical to winning the Cold War, in the coming cool contest, they will no longer serve as our top ace in the hole. Instead, the key levers will be keeping our key military, political, and commercial functions immune to attacks and communicating, protecting, sharing, and analyzing essential information on an unprecedented scale. Wars may be waged against nations but the aim increasingly will be to disable them without physically obliterating them. What, though, should we do about the growing nuclear threat? That’s the focus of the book’s next chapter, “Xi and Putin Are Building More Nukes: How to Compete.” It, in turn, is followed by “What Missile-driven Competition with China Will Look Like,” which was first released three years ago. The Pentagon recently confirmed this chapter’s predictions about China’s development of intercontinental conventional missiles by 2030. The chapter’s other forecasts and military and diplomatic proposals are still timely. This brings us to the book’s last chapter, “Can Self-Government Survive the Next Convulsion?” It examines the domestic political, economic, and social implications of pursuing this volume’s recommendations. What’s needed most is a geographic distribution of America’s critical military and financial infrastructure and demographic capital. Fortunately, this has already begun, driven by the COVID-19 pandemic, and aligns with America’s bent to spread and increase political power and wealth domestically. The book’s final section is an appendix consisting of an introduction Thomas Cochran and I co-authored for “China’s Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?” — a three-year NPEC study of China’s nuclear weapons production potential. The Pentagon has cited this research in each of its annual Chinese military power assessments for the last three years running. The Pentagon has used the study to help explain why China is likely to acquire as many nuclear weapons in a decade as the United States currently has deployed. It was this projection, perhaps more than any other, that caused national security analysts to focus on what is likely to be a long-term strategic contest with China and its new ally, Russia. Paul Bracken, author of The Second Nuclear Age, reviewed the book: “China and Russia’s military buildups have far-reaching political and strategic consequences. Yet the US is not remotely prepared to cope either intellectually or with appropriate hardware. Henry Sokolski takes a major step forward here by analyzing these challenges and what we need to do about them.”
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Strategic Competition, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

40. Kubernetes: A Dilemma in the Geopolitical Tech Race

Author:
Sunny Cheung
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
US-sanctioned Huawei has significant influence in the Cloud Native Computing Foundation and its open-source platform Kubernetes, which underpins US military platforms, including F-16 fighter jets and nuclear infrastructure. The use of open-source technologies in critical systems raises concerns. Despite US efforts to mitigate risks, Kubernetes remains tempting to exploit for attackers. Open source fosters global innovation, from which the United States benefits. But this same openness also strengthens US competitors. The United States should therefore develop a clear framework to understand and mitigate the challenges posed by open source.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Geopolitics, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Huawei
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America