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201. Making Sense of Cents: Parsing the U.S. Department of Defense’s FY 2022 Budget Request

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Becca Wasser
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report contextualizes the Biden administration’s discretionary funding request for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in fiscal year (FY) 2022, referred to as the “skinny” budget request. The report considers what this initial request—which has not yet been touched by Congress—may mean for the full FY 2022 Presidential Budget Request, given the identified priorities and available resources. The only detailed figure included in the defense budget request is the topline of $715 billion, which is higher than former President Donald Trump’s $705 billion FY 2021 budget request. However, when adjusted for inflation, it amounts to a flat budget. This report identifies several strategic objectives from the skinny budget request, the Biden administration’s interim national security strategic guidance, and the priorities publicly laid out by DoD leadership for which the U.S. government will need to allocate resources. These objectives have implications for ongoing departmental efforts and resourcing. The authors assert that: The continued prioritization of China means the DoD must simultaneously modernize its conventional and nuclear forces to strengthen deterrence. The budget prioritizes additional missions for the DoD, like countering transnational threats—particularly climate change and biothreats such as COVID-19—but it does not resource these missions. There will be fewer resources for modernization due to pressure from the growing military personnel budget, as well as the operations and maintenance budget. The department will undertake these activities with fewer resources and less budgetary flexibility since the overseas contingency operations account has been terminated. However, this move will enhance long-term planning and should make it easier to align future budget requests with the strategy. The FY22 defense budget request identifies a number of planned activities and areas of emphasis, but it does not specify how much money will be allocated toward each area. This report focuses on six key areas of interest—the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), long-range fires, naval shipbuilding, research and development for technological innovation and readiness, nuclear modernization, and transnational threats—where the United States will need to make the greatest investments or tradeoffs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, Nuclear Weapons, Budget, Finance, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

202. Africa and the United States: Reengaging with Africa’s Prosperity in Mind

Author:
Carl Manlan
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
With China as a dominant foreign power in Africa, the only option left for United States to engage with the continent is to follow its priorities: namely, prioritizing African youth.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, Youth, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

203. The Big Squeeze: Japanese Supply Chains and Great Power Competition

Author:
Mireya Solis
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Japan led, and was transformed, by the global supply chain revolution. Facing growing protectionism in industrialized markets and reeling from sharp yen appreciation in the aftermath of the 1985 Plaza Accord, Japanese firms responded with a drastic increase in their overseas investment activities. In so doing, many of these companies spearheaded the movement towards the fragmentation of production across national boundaries that sought efficiency gains by pooling the competitive advantages of different locations. Japan’s experience with the first supply chain revolution was transformative. It altered its export-led model with important implications for its foreign policy. Japanese investments in the United States helped abate trade frictions; integrated production was at the heart of the project to rebuild relations with China, and Japan’s lead as foreign investor in Southeast Asia has been a pillar of its blueprint for regional integration. The strains in the rules-based international trade order, however, have raised questions about the ability of global supply chains to continue to operate effectively. The U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry has manifested in a damaging trade war, and moves to restrict tech flows are creating decoupling pressures. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these trends with lockdowns that disrupt supply chains while export protectionism and calls to renationalize production are on the rise. The intensified risk environment could lead to a second supply chain revolution with a greater emphasis on redundancy and diversification and bifurcation of productive chains. How will Japan respond to the challenges to international production, a central engine of its economic prosperity, and with what consequences for its relations with major powers? To provide greater clarity on this overarching question, this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the central role of Japanese firms in the emergence and deepening of regional production networks. Although Japan’s overall share of intra-regional trade has decreased in the 21st century—in tandem with China’s rise as regional hub- Japanese firms have retained their central role in GVCs (Global Value Chains) through their advanced manufacturing capabilities. Section 2 offers a glimpse of past and recent supply chain shocks—China’s embargo of rare earth metals, the Great East Japan Earthquake in Tohoku, and the Japan-Korea export control dispute—to illustrate both sources of vulnerability and resilience of Japanese GVCs. Section 3 assesses the systemic shift brought about by revived great power competition, and identifies some early adjustment responses from Japanese firms to a new normal of heightened geopolitical tension.
Topic:
Economics, Strategic Competition, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

204. Why the U.S. Should Prioritize Security in Its 5G Roll Out

Author:
James Lee
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
5G technology promises to transform practically every sphere of life, from smartphones and self-driving cars, to remote surgery and virtual reality. Policies related to the rollout of 5G in the United States have tended to focus on mitigating security risks, but does protecting security come at the cost of expanding U.S. global influence—or does it simply cost too much? This policy brief by IGCC postdoctoral research associate James Lee analyzes the three main criteria for deciding what a “good” 5G policy should look like—security, global influence, and efficiency— and recommends that the United States’ 5G strategy prioritize security first, influence second, and efficiency third.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, International Security, Innovation, Strategic Competition, 5G, and Power
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

205. A Crucial Link: Using Intellectual Property to Inform Global Supply Chain Policy

Author:
Philip C. Rogers
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with trade tensions and technological competition between the United States and China, have severely disrupted global supply chains. As businesses and policymakers grapple with “building back better” in a tense trade environment, they face the dilemma of balancing the traditional benefits of global production with the security demands of new geopolitical realities. This policy brief, part of a series on great power competition, highlights the productive role that intellectual property (IP) can play in navigating supply chain disruptions resulting from great power competition in a post-pandemic world. Rather than reinforcing the vicious cycle of techno-nationalist confrontation, it is possible for businesses and policymakers to promote virtuous cycles of competition with a more robust focus on intellectual property. Specifically, businesses and policymakers can look to IP licensing and allocation of rights to play a key role in tariff mitigation strategies and supply chain restructuring. At the same time, competitive pressures can lead to enhanced IP regimes in China and other economies, which argues for a more nuanced discussion of supply chains beyond physical relocation and economic decoupling.
Topic:
National Security, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Innovation, Strategic Competition, COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Global Focus, and United States of America

206. Why Summit Optics May Help De-escalate Public Appetite for Conflict

Author:
Max Plithides
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
As competition between democracies and autocratic adversaries such as North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China intensifies, democratic publics may increasingly pressure their politicians to take a more confrontational stance. The implications are dangerous. Public pressure for confrontation during the Cold War caused numerous foreign policy fiascos.1 Public pressure also at times undermined the broad political unity necessary for concluding diplomatic agreements— even between democratic allies.2 How then, as the world enters a new era of great power competition, can public pressure and anger be defused and foreign policy put on a more rational footing? This policy brief, part of a series on great power competition, argues that bilateral summits with autocratic leaders may have a key role to play in shifting the public’s collective emotional ethos. It analyzes results from a large-scale survey experiment, designed around the historic 2018 Singapore Summit, which represented the first-ever meeting of the leaders of North Korea and the United States and was preceded by months of saber rattling.3 According to conventional logic the Summit was worthless: It produced a joint communiqué with “no concrete specifics”4 and had no effect on President Trump’s approval rating.5 Yet evidence shows that joint photographs from the Summit reduced bellicosity in American public opinion towards North Korea by allowing President Trump to act as a visual empathetic mediator. The Singapore Summit thus broadly evinces the potential value of bilateral summits to reduce tensions with autocratic adversaries.
Topic:
Democracy, Citizenship, Strategic Competition, and Autocracy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

207. The One-China Policy: Adapting to Tensions in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
James Lee
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Tensions are growing in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese warplanes have violated Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in record numbers, prompting fears of an invasion.1 2021 was the first year in which a potential crisis over Taiwan rose to the level of a “Tier 1 risk” in the Council on Foreign Relations’ Preventive Priorities Survey, which is an annual survey of American foreign policy experts.2 The United States faces a decision about what it can do to help prevent crossstrait tensions from escalating into war. A vital question is whether, and how much, the United States should change its “One-China policy.” Beginning with the Trump administration and continuing with the Biden administration, the United States has bolstered its support for Taiwan and become more assertive in resisting Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over the self-governing democracy.3 Although U.S. officials stress that the United States continues to adhere to the One-China policy, there is growing concern, as expressed by Daniel Russel of the Asia Society Policy Institute, that the United States is “edging closer and closer to the line that separates unofficial relations with official relations, which, in effect, could hollow out America’s One-China policy.”4 How much flexibility is built into the One-China policy, and what limits does the policy impose on what the United States can do to support Taiwan? To answer those questions, this policy brief explains what the One-China policy is and how it can exhibit both continuity and change. Analysis of the One-China policy often focuses on the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances, which can create the impression that the One-China policy has not changed since those texts were formulated in the 1970s and 1980s.5 In fact, the One-China policy has been revised, such as in the Taiwan Policy Review during the Clinton administration.6 The One-China policy is neither set in stone nor completely fluid, and this policy brief identifies which elements are fixed and which elements are variable. It explains the OneChina policy at three levels: the fundamental position, the doctrinal statements, and the practices and conventions. These levels of policy range from the most abstract to the most concrete, but each is logically consistent with the others.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Security, Strategic Competition, and One-China Policy
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

208. The Scramble for the Eastern Mediterranean: Energy and Geopolitics

Author:
Valeria Talbot
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Over the past few years, the Eastern Mediterranean has become a major hotspot for both natural gas and geopolitical competition. Natural gas discoveries in the last decade have attracted growing interest from regional countries and beyond. However, recent escalations in tensions and outright confrontations suggest that competition goes beyond the scramble for energy. Indeed, natural gas is just one of the factors that contribute to shaping security and geopolitical dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean, which has emerged as a crucial strategic area in the broader Mediterranean and the Middle East. Moving from the analysis of these interconnected factors, this Report examines the strategy and the plethora of interests of regional and international players, as well as the interplay between cooperative and competitive dynamics in the region. What are the geopolitical, security, and energy interests of the countries involved? What are the implications on the regional security context of the moves and policies of regional and international powers?
Topic:
Natural Resources, Geopolitics, Gas, Strategic Competition, and Energy
Political Geography:
Middle East and Mediterranean

209. China After Covid-19: Economic Revival and Challenges to the World

Author:
Alessia Amighini
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The coronavirus pandemic that has rocked China since December 2019 has posed a gruelling test for the resilience of the country’s national economy. Now, as China emerges from its Covid-induced "recession", it feels like the worst is behind it. How did China manage to come out almost unscathed from the worst crisis in over a century? This Report examines how China designed and implemented its post-Covid recovery strategy, focussing on both the internal and external challenges the country had to face over the short- and medium-run. The book offers a comprehensive argument suggesting that, despite China having lost economic and political capital during the crisis, Beijing seems to have been strengthened by the “pandemic test”, thus becoming an even more challenging “partner, competitor and rival” for Western countries.
Topic:
Economy, Strategic Competition, COVID-19, and Economic Recovery
Political Geography:
China and Asia

210. Not In The Cards: U.S.-China Arms Control In The Era of MultiPolar Competition

Author:
Eliza Gheorghe and Dilan Ezgi Koc
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
The distribution of power at the international level and the intensity of the security rivalry can explain the trajectory of arms control between China and the United States. Washington and Beijing were able to work together during the second half of the Cold War and for much of unipolarity because the system was bipolar and the security competition was mild or non-existent. The advent of multipolarity and the ensuing intense security competition put an end to Sino-American cooperation on arms control. The current circumstances are not conducive to a resumption of exchanges.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America