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191. Useful enemies: How the Turkey-UAE rivalry is remaking the Middle East

Author:
Asli Aydıntaşbaş and Cinzia Bianco
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Turkey and the United Arab Emirates are engaged in a decade-long feud that is reshuffling the geopolitical order in the Middle East and North Africa. They see each other as existential rivals and are waging a series of proxy wars between the Horn of Africa and the eastern Mediterranean. Their rivalry also plays out in the halls of Washington and Brussels, the global media discourse, the energy industry, and, lately, ports and the high seas. Europe should avoid being sucked into this power struggle to redefine the Middle East and North Africa. Instead of using the UAE to push back against Turkey or vice versa, Europe should develop its own strategy on their rivalry. Europe should establish a NATO deconfliction mechanism, push ahead with the political process in Libya, and design a constructive new framework to insulate European-Turkey relations from the rivalry.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and United Arab Emirates

192. Engagement of External Powers in Africa: Takeaways for India

Author:
Rajiv Bhatia
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
As multiple foreign powers compete in Africa, there is a need to understand the geopolitical landscape, and analyse the various policies, strategies and motivations of each country. Where lies India in this great strategic game? India has a unique relationship with the continent, with respect for equality, mutual benefit, and need-based assistance. By deepening India-Africa cooperation, bolstering economic relations and leveraging new digital, space and medical technologies, the relationship between India and the African nations can be better cemented, despite the global competition at play.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Engagement, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, South Asia, and India

193. Cooperation, Competition, and Compartmentalization: Russian-Turkish Relations and Their Implications for the West

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton and Anna Mikulska
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The relationship between the Russian Federation and Republic of Turkey is one of the most important bilateral relationships in Eurasia today. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) original adversary and one of its earliest members have in recent times veered sharply between cooperation—often against NATO’s interests—and competition so intense that it seemed war between them was possible. Politically, their leaders and their systems of government share a basic compatibility predicated on authoritarianism and resistance to what they claim is Western meddling in internal affairs. Militarily, Moscow and Ankara have at times cooperated closely. For instance, the two have worked to marginalize the U.S. military’s influence in Syria, and Turkey has purchased and deployed Russian S-400 air defense systems, putting its defense relationship with the United States in jeopardy. At other times, such as in the military escalation in Idlib (Syria), the Libyan Civil War, and the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, the two have found themselves backing different sides and had to work assiduously to prevent a direct military clash. Economically, the relationship has been historically unbalanced in Russia’s favor, but Turkey’s increasing trade in services and emergence as an important energy storage and transport hub may change this. The two economies share a basic complementarity, with few areas where they compete in the production of goods and services. This dynamic may increase the ability of their economic relationship to act as a “shock absorber” and minimize the impact of disruptions in other facets of their ties. Overall, Moscow and Ankara have worked to emphasize areas of cooperation and “compartmentalize” areas of difference. Policymakers in Western capitals will need to develop an understanding of the drivers of the Russian-Turkish relationship and their effects on Western interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

194. Re-Thinking Assumptions for a 21st Century Middle East

Author:
Douglas A. Ollivant
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
American policy in the Middle East is based on outdated assumptions. There are at least four novel elements in or impacting the Middle East that require an adjustment in strategy: North American Oil Independence: The United States no longer relies on the Middle East for its supply of energy and could choose to act without that significant tie. Rise of China: The People’s Republic of China is now a near-peer to the United States and is taking steps to protect its own interests in the Middle East. Diminishing Conventional Threats to Israel: All conceivable regional enemies are now peace signatories, wrestling with internal instability, or both. Unconventional threats continue to challenge Israel’s security, but a ground invasion is now a remote possibility. Rise of Sub-State Actors: In addition to widely recognized terror and insurgent groups, other actors, such as financial firms, technology firms, and private military firms, interact with power that rivals that of weak states. These new factors—alone and in concert—make legacy strategies at least suboptimal, if not unsuitable. Today’s Middle East exhibits very different characteristics than that of the Middle East of the past century. An acceptable and suitable strategy must incorporate these new data points.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Oil, Non State Actors, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

195. Competing in Time: Ensuring Capability Advantage and Mission Success through Adaptable Resource Allocation

Author:
Dan Patt and William C. Greenwalt
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The keystone of the Department of Defense’s institutional architecture is not acquisition, but rather the budgeting process. This governs its ability to allocate funding to achieve national security objectives, links together requirements and purchasing, sets the calendar of the department, controls changes to investment priority, and serves as the mechanism for Congress to exercise its constitutionally granted appropriations powers. While there have been dozens of acquisition reform efforts, the budgeting process has been nearly untouched since 1961. Bureaucratic resource allocation processes—especially planning, budgeting, and appropriations—are a critical engine for maintaining an edge in a long-term military competition. In the 1950s, this realization was mechanized by the US, when fast-paced military developments with shifting directions were used to drive cost into ponderous Soviet planning processes. Ultimately, Soviet strategists also recognized that agility in resource allocation would ultimately determine the outcome of competition given a sufficiently long horizon. The Department of Defense (DoD) allocates resources through the Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) system. PPBE is the scheme by which DoD sets its own plans and priorities and also how it asks Congress to approve its spending and provide oversight (often by verifying actual execution against predicted schedule and performance). The history of the PPBE dates to 1961 and is based on period industrial planning concepts. The PPBE’s inflexibility increases the difficulty of rapidly shifting funding to emergent innovations that appear promising, as new programs must typically wait more than two years to be included in the budget. Additionally, the PPBE encodes divisions between research, production, and operations activities that stymy iterative or feedback-based development. A common theme across core DoD processes including the PPBE is an emphasis on long-term prediction of future needs and an attempt to optimize high-performance weapons against projected requirements. When these conditions are not met (whether from shifting technology or shifting adversaries), these processes may not yield optimal, relevant, or militarily effective results. Historical analysis of innovation time cycles—the time measured from the origin of a new concept for military capability until its initial fielding—indicates the cycles were shorter prior to the implementation of the triad of McNamara-era processes, commonly with an average time around five years for both ships and aircraft, and have grown steadily since. Emerging technologies, especially information technologies, are central to future conflict and are largely commercial and globalized. The defense acquisition process and legacy defense industrial base approach struggle to accommodate timely adoption of these technologies, as evidenced by lengthy modern time cycles (more than ten years) for development and fielding of new-start weapon systems. China may have an edge in its resource allocation process, although this topic merits further investigation. Evidence includes their ability to develop and field twenty-five new unmanned aircraft systems from 2010 to 2020, including stealthy carrier-based unmanned systems. Efforts to improve adaptability that focus on acquisition milestones have been only partially successful. Analysis of the chained and linear components of the modern military capability development and fielding process suggests that it is difficult to create a competitive, adaptable resource allocation scheme without revisiting the PPBE and key decision processes that govern the ability to make rapid, early investments in new operational capability or concepts. Incoming administration leadership, military leaders, and Congressional leaders need to revisit institutional structure and the budgeting process recognizing the central role of time in driving innovation, adaptability, and resilience. It is not yet too late to favorably shape the trajectory of long-term military competition with China, but the only hope of an upper hand rests on agility and initiative.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Military Affairs, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

196. From Plan to Action: Operationalizing a U.S. National Technology Strategy

Author:
John Costello, Martijn Rasser, and Megan Lamberth
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Ideas abound for actions the United States should take to better position itself for the unfolding global technology competition. Concerning topics as diverse as raw materials to semiconductors to STEM education, a nonstop cavalcade of presidential directives, congressional bills, industry proposals, think tank reports, and pronouncements by big-name luminaries have been issued as measures to address American economic competitiveness and national security challenges. Almost all make their case in the context of dealing with a rising China. Some of these recommendations are excellent and quite a few are good; too many get lost in the noise. It’s not just the sheer volume that presents a challenge to identifying and executing the most promising recommendations. The U.S. government lacks a strategic construct to merge these ideas—for research and development spending, public-private partnerships, tax policy and subsidies, immigration reform, and education—into a coherent whole. The goal of CNAS’ National Technology Strategy project is to create the framework for a comprehensive, whole-of-nation approach for the United States to navigate the global technology competition. The first report in this initiative, “Taking the Helm,” makes the case for a national technology strategy and lays out what such a modern-day strategy should be.1 Its chief argument is that the United States is in a long-term, multifaceted geostrategic competition with China, one that has technology at its core. Technological leadership is more important than ever, yet current U.S. government policies fall well short of what is needed to maintain it. Crafting an affirmative technology policy agenda is not just about competing with China; it comprises the guiding principles for the nation’s technology policy goals and priorities to pursue economic prosperity, protect national security interests and democratic values, and advance society. How the U.S. government should structure itself organizationally and bureaucratically to execute such a strategy is the focus of the second report, “Trust the Process.”2 Today, key institutions such as the National Security Council, National Economic Council, and Office of Science and Technology Policy are not optimized to craft, run, and maintain this effort. “Trust the Process” explains what talent, resources, infrastructure, and processes are needed for strategy development, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. This third report in the series focuses on concrete and pragmatic measures that U.S. policymakers should take to operationalize a national technology strategy. There are four premises to the security and technology competition that guide these findings: the utility of industrial policies, the convergence of national and economic security, gaps in knowledge, and the need for international partnerships. The report offers recommendations for specific changes to U.S. government departmental and agency authorities, regulatory updates, policy initiatives, and diplomatic efforts that will bolster the U.S. government's ability to craft, execute, and maintain this strategy.
Topic:
Diplomacy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

197. Navigating Relations with Russia in the Arctic: A Roadmap for Stability

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Jim Townsend, Lawson W. Brigham, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Until recently, the Arctic was largely immune to the geopolitical tensions that play out between Russia and the transatlantic partners in other regions and on other issues. Indeed, the Arctic is one area where the United States and Russia, together with the other Arctic states, have engaged in quiet cooperation on issues including search and rescue, scientific research, and the environment. Such pragmatic cooperation has been possible in part because bilateral irritants are diffused by shared and cross-cutting interests among all eight Arctic states, as well as the region’s multilayered governance regime.1 However, climate change and the Arctic’s melting sea ice have opened access and allowed for increased human activity, which, in turn, has amplified competition in the region. At stake are core national interests for the Arctic states, ranging from economic opportunities to security and stability. The region’s growing importance and level of activity, alongside the lack of trust and limited dialogue on military issues between Russia and the United States, raise the risk of conflict and instability in the region. For Russia, its part of the Arctic, including an increasingly accessible Northern Sea Route, is central to core national security concerns and an important pillar of the economy and future development. To secure its interests, the Kremlin has taken numerous actions, many of them military, in the Arctic that are of shared concern to the other Arctic nations and NATO.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Economy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

198. Edge Networks, Core Policy: Securing America's 6G Future

Author:
Martijn Rasser, Ainikki Riikonen, and Henry Wu
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Technological leadership by the United States requires forethought and organization. The plan necessary to maintain that leadership—a national technology strategy—should be broad in scope. Its range includes investments in research, nurturing human talent, revamping government offices and agencies, and ensuring that laws, regulations, and incentives provide private industry with the ability and opportunity to compete fairly and effectively on the merits of their products, capabilities, and know-how. Given that key inputs are diffused globally, this plan must also carefully consider how the United States can effectively partner with other tech-leading democracies for mutual economic and security benefit. This includes taking measures to promote norms for technology use that align with shared values. In the context of strategic competition with China, the need to craft new approaches to technology development and deployment is increasingly apparent to government leaders. Many lawmakers grasped the stark reality that U.S. technological preeminence was eroding when they realized that China had become a global juggernaut in telecommunications, a situation exacerbated by Beijing’s push to dominate global fifth generation (5G) wireless networks. The state of play poses national and economic security risks to the United States, which, along with its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, has made notable headway in addressing and mitigating these risks. However, much work remains. Chinese firms continue to push for greater digital entanglement around the world, from Southeast Asia to Africa to Latin America. Given the fundamental importance to the digital economy of communications networks and the standards that govern them, the more successful Beijing’s policies are, the greater the challenge for tech-leading democracies to maintain their economic competitiveness. There is also the specter of norms. If these are dominated by illiberal actors, their power to shape how networks are used and to manipulate data flows poses threats to liberal democratic values the world over.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Norms, Strategic Competition, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

199. Partners, Competitors, or a Little of Both? Russia and China in the Arctic

Author:
Jim Townsend and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The Arctic’s melting icecaps are changing more than the geography of the region. The diminishing sea ice and declining snow cover have allowed for new shipping lanes and growing access to natural resources, increasing geopolitical competition in the region. A defining feature of this competition is the growing interest and activity of Russia and China in the Arctic. Not only have the two countries increased their presence in the region, but coordination between them is growing. Political observers in Washington and beyond understand well the challenges that Russia and China each pose to the United States. But little thought has been given to how their interests and actions will combine and the challenges that such alignment will pose for the United States and its allies and partners. Previous CNAS research has highlighted the risks that greater Russia-China cooperation creates. This research argues that the growing partnership between Moscow and Beijing is amplifying the challenges that both actors pose. In the Arctic, Russia and China’s interests are converging around resource extraction projects, the expansion of the Northern Sea Route, and the enhancement of operational awareness and security cooperation. The increasing synergy in the Arctic will be most consequential for the United States on two fronts: First, Beijing is working with Moscow to improve its military capabilities. Second, Russia is increasing its economic reliance on China in the Arctic in ways that may raise Moscow’s willingness to back Beijing’s priorities in other regions and on other issues to avoid jeopardizing its economic ties with Beijing. Increasing military cooperation: Through joint research and, to a lesser extent, its joint military exercises with Russia, China is enhancing its military knowledge of and insight into the Arctic. Though China’s actual military presence in the Arctic is minimal, the two countries’ cooperation is enhancing Chinese insight into Russian dual-use technology, which Beijing can use to build its military capabilities. China can learn from Russia’s dual-use and hybrid capability development in the Arctic, accelerating its efforts to erode U.S. military advantages and posing a greater threat in the event of military conflict. Russia and China may also strengthen their military relationship in the Arctic in the future, including expanding the scope of their joint exercises in the region. Ultimately, sustained or deepening Russia-China military cooperation may threaten America’s ability to deter Chinese and Russian aggression in the region.
Topic:
International Relations, Natural Resources, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Arctic

200. Positive Visions, Powerful Partnerships: The Keys to Competing with China in a Post-Pandemic Indo-Pacific

Author:
Stephen Tankel, Lisa Curtis, and Coby Goldberg
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States was losing ground to China in the Indo-Pacific when the COVID-19 crisis began. China’s growing economic might, military modernization, and aggressive diplomatic efforts were already eroding America’s competitive advantage and shifting the regional balance of power. A year after the virus first spread, it is possible to identify where the pandemic is affecting diplomatic, economic, and defense trends in ways that could accelerate declines for the United States, but also might create opportunities to reverse or mitigate some of them. Restoring U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific is critical to competing effectively against China, and President Joe Biden has made this a top foreign policy priority. In particular, his administration is making the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a strategic forum commonly known as the Quad, which is comprised of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—a core component of its approach to the Indo-Pacific. Chinese post-outbreak behavior has driven increased cooperation among these four countries in the diplomatic, economic, and defense domains to address shared challenges from China. Seizing the opportunities this cooperation creates is critical for the United States. While expanding U.S. cooperation with Quad countries, the United States cannot neglect Southeast Asia, where competition with China for influence is fiercest. Southeast Asia is at the heart of U.S. and Japanese efforts to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, and is a region where Australia has played a traditional leadership role. Competing effectively with China requires offering Southeast Asian countries a positive alternative vision to the one Beijing promotes. Whether the United States and its fellow Quad democracies can help Southeast Asian countries recover from the COVID-19 crisis will be a key litmus test of their ability to deliver on such an agenda. This report offers recommendations for the United States to take unilaterally and in close cooperation—bilaterally, trilaterally, and through the Quad—with Japan, Australia, and India to address challenges and seize opportunities created by the COVID-19 crisis along three lines of effort: diplomatic, economic, and defense.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Partnerships, Economy, Strategic Competition, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific