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11. The Russia Factor in China’s Relations with the West

Author:
Klaus W. Larres and Lea Thome
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Tension between China and the Western world has been a characteristic of global affairs for the better part of the last decade. Notwithstanding Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States continues to view China as its greatest global rival and competitor. In fact, many policymakers in Washington (though by no means all of them) view China as an existential threat to America’s global influence and predominance. As the European Union and its 27 member states are not among the world’s superpowers, the Europeans have a somewhat more relaxed attitude toward China. Still, according to an important policy statement issued by the EU Commission in 2019, Brussels has come to see Beijing not only as a “partner and competitor” but also as a serious “systemic rival.” This refers less to geopolitical concerns but very much to global governance issues and geoeconomic, trade, and investment relations with China. The EU is deeply concerned about the continuing lack of reciprocity of market access, intellectual property theft, and China’s frequently state-subsidized competition regarding cutting-edge technology products, including solar panels, EV vehicles, and many other products, which may soon swamp the EU market. The EU Commission has launched an investigation into China’s production of EV vehicles and also Beijing’s shipbuilding industry, which it suspects may well work on the basis of rather unfair and highly subsidized support from the Chinese state.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Markets, Geopolitics, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Production
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

12. Pivotal States, Not Swing States

Author:
Mohammed Soliman
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The United States, in particular, is grappling with the challenges posed by the emerging multipolar order and the need to secure a favorable position in this evolving global landscape. As part of this contemplation, there is a growing recognition of the significance of “swing states” like India, Türkiye, Indonesia, Vietnam, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia in shaping the outcome of the postCold War order and the broader global system. However, framing these consequential states as “swing states” in and of itself carries significant risk, as it implies that the only choice they have is a binary one: pick the U.S.-led West or the China and Russia axis. In reality, their strategic posture is far away from choosing one side over the other; at the same time, they are not behaving similarly to the Cold War-era non-aligned movement that was inherently anti-Western and leaned towards the Soviet-led block under the disguise of anti-colonialism solidarity. The appropriate strategic name for this growing list of countries in the present-day is “pivotal states,” and includes Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, chosen for their strategic geography, demography, and overall strength. Alongside these, there are other pivotal states with unique roles, such as Vietnam due to its position in the global supply chain and Egypt as a maritime bottleneck between the East and West. It is now widely acknowledged that international stability and the outcome of the U.S.-China neoCold War are influenced by factors beyond the behavior of Russia and China. But one crucial factor that remains underappreciated is that the behavior of pivotal states— which are determined to chart an independent course—will play vital roles in shaping the future of the international system. It is essential to recognize that these pivotal states inherently reject the bipolarity and “Cold War 2.0” framing that dominates the perspectives of, for example, Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Strategic Stability, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Indonesia, Turkey, India, Brazil, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

13. Free and Open Spaces: Small and Medium-Sized Nations Can Reshape the Modern World

Author:
James Jay Carafano and Márton Ugrósdy
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
What if most people are wrong about the future? The presumption—the conventional view, both in the policymaking world and in academia—is that great powers have the greatest influence in shaping geopolitics. There is also a presumption that great power competition will inevitably lead to dividing the world into hard spheres of influence, and that there will be an inevitable competition over dominating the “commons,” the routes of air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace that unite the world. We think all these assumptions are wrong. We think there is evidence to the contrary. Indeed, when great powers compete most, this often creates more space for other states to exercise influence. We argue that the countries spanning the traditional pathways of the Silk Road region from Europe and Türkiye to the Caucasus and Central Asia have that power in their hands, if, that is, they are wise in how they wield it. This essay will outline, in broad strokes, the genesis of our argument.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Small States
Political Geography:
Global Focus

14. Emerging Powers and the Future of American Statecraft

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The structure of international politics is changing in ways that are not fully appreciated in Washington. The United States has paid a great deal of attention to the rise of China in the last decade but much less to emerging powers whose rise will also shape the operating environment for American statecraft. No single emerging power will have an impact tantamount to China’s, but they will have a significant impact collectively due to their geopolitical weight and diplomatic aspirations. America has limited ability to influence the trajectory of these emerging powers, identified in this report as Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Türkiye. They have taken stances that contrast or directly clash with U.S. positions on China and on Russia over the past few years. Nearly all have voiced concerns about Washington’s approach to the war in Ukraine, even as they criticized Moscow’s invasion. Almost none would line up with the United States in a confrontation with China. Instead, they are likely to pursue highly self-interested foreign policies. Washington should expect that they will increasingly challenge some of its policies, sustain relationships with its adversaries, and press their own agendas on the global stage. The emerging powers’ statecrafts are shaped in large part by their drive for economic security. But their geographies, different preferences for world order, domestic politics, and defense relationships also play a role. Concerns about the strength of democracy in other countries, which has played an animating role in U.S. foreign policy for decades, are a lower priority for them, no matter how democratic they are. It will be a mistake for the United States to frame its relations with these emerging powers primarily as part of a competition for influence with China and Russia, however tempting it may be to do so. These powers are not swing states that will tilt decisively toward either side in a global great power competition. Most will resist any efforts to bring them into a U.S.-led camp as in the Cold War. Trying to make them do so would also risk strategic overreach by embroiling the United States too deeply in the emerging powers’ domestic politics or by expending its resources in pursuit of building ties that never materialize. A better approach for the United States would be to focus on negotiating interest-based deals with emerging powers while cordoning off areas of disagreement. These might include tailored market access and investment agreements, agreements on technology manufacturing, energy transition initiatives, efforts to combat deforestation, efforts to build public health infrastructure, and infrastructure investments. It would be wasteful of the United States to offer these countries security guarantees, but in some cases providing security assistance can serve its interests. Washington should accept that most of these countries will maintain close diplomatic, economic, and sometimes security relationships with China and probably Russia. Over the longer term, it will serve U.S. interests to strengthen the sovereignty of emerging powers when possible and cost-effective to do so. This will provide a bulwark against the undue expansion of China’s power and influence and help ensure that, even if they do not side with the United States, they are not drawn closely into the orbit of its major geopolitical competitors. Strengthening emerging powers’ sovereignty will also help boost their development as constructive powers with a stake in sustaining a peaceful world order conducive to global economic growth.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and United States of America

15. Between violence, geopolitical competition, and the quest for social justice: Chad’s road to elections

Author:
Valerio Colosio
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Following three years of transitional government since President Idriss Déby’s assassination, Chad will hold presidential elections on 6 May amid tight political controls by the incumbent leader. In this guest contribution, Dr. Valerio Colosio examines political violence in Chad through two generations of Déby rule and whether the election will confirm the status quo or trigger some deeper transformations, in a moment of big geopolitical changes in the Sahel.
Topic:
Elections, Geopolitics, Social Justice, Violence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Africa, Chad, and Sahel

16. The Raw Materials of Economic Security: South Korea’s Evolving Energy and Critical Minerals Policies in an Era of Disruption

Author:
James Bowen
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper argues that resource security is central to South Korea’s broader economic security and President Yoon Suk-yeol’s Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region. The paper contends that postwar Korea has maintained an energy and minerals-intensive economy despite domestic resource scarcity and import dependence. Recent disruptions have, however, threatened the resilience of this relationship. These disruptions include COVID-19, Russia’s war in Ukraine, the escalating climate change crisis and energy transition, and the geoeconomic and geopolitical erosion of the liberal order. Korea’s most important energy security priority is diversifying its energy mix towards cleaner energy—what this paper calls “green security.” This will be a difficult task given the intense national dependence on fossil fuels and policymakers’ desire to avoid disrupting Korea’s manufacturing-heavy, export-focused development model. Korea’s idiosyncratic decarbonization pathway, including a strong presence of hydrogen and, under Yoon, a downgrading of renewables in favor of nuclear, could provide additional challenges. Critical minerals are another rising resource security concern for Seoul. The major priority is to accelerate the development and diversification of international supply chains, particularly away from China. A major obstacle to progress is intense competition across the value chain, influenced by disparate economic and strategic priorities. The paper argues that Seoul must find ways to manage its energy and critical minerals security challenges in a way that is consistent with its preferred development model. The alternative is to accept a new equilibrium in which it has less domestic dependence on foreign resources and on resources-intensive economic activity in aggregate.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Minerals, Economic Security, and Energy
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

17. Economic Security and U.S.-China Competition: The View from North Korea

Author:
Rachel Minyoung Lee
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper argues that while North Korea does not discuss “economic security” in domestic contexts or have an established definition of the term, it thoroughly understands that the economy and national security are inseparable. North Korea is essentially unaffected by the typical economic issues that many major economies are grappling with in relation to economic security, but like other countries, it has closely tracked economic security developments and deepening U.S.-China strategic competition for potential political fallout and what opportunities and challenges that may generate. The paper shows that U.S.-China strategic competition has offered unique opportunities to North Korea, including China’s cover against fresh and existing sanctions against North Korea, and economic assistance. Moreover, deteriorating U.S.-China ties provide Pyongyang extra space to consider and put into motion alternative foreign and economic policy paths, namely, shifting away from its three-decade policy of nonalignment with China and normalization of relations with the United States. Also, China appears to be a factor in North Korea’s shift to a more conservative economic policy. Despite the opportunities presented by the U.S.-China divide, however, North Korea is wary of the risks of dependence on China and has tried to build economic resilience at home, for example by launching a national campaign on domestic production and recycling. North Korea’s somewhat cooler handling of China and its proportionately warm treatment of Russia since the Armistice Day celebrations in July is a clear example of North Korea’s China dilemma. This is where North Korea’s recent strengthening of ties with Russia comes into the picture. The paper contends that it is hard to conclude at this point whether North Korea’s moves are aimed at short-term, tactical gains or are part of a longer-term, strategic calculus, but we can be certain of this: it has just as much to gain or lose as any other country affected by economic security and U.S.-China strategic competition, though not in the same ways as other countries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

18. Openness as Strength: The Win-Win in EU-US Digital Services Trade

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Dyuti Pandya, and Oscar du Roy
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The discourse surrounding the EU’s supposed over-reliance on digital services imports from non-EU countries, particularly the US, has been a recurrent topic among some political circles. However, this viewpoint tends to oversimplify and misrepresent the nuanced and complex reality of the EU’s status within the global Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector and digitally enabled trade. A thorough analysis of trade data and trends clearly illustrates that the EU’s engagement with foreign (non-EU) digital services, notably from the US, represents a strategic economic advantage, bolstering Europe’s competitiveness and fostering productivity growth. Below we underline the critical importance of openness to foreign innovation and technology diffusion for the EU’s economic future.
Topic:
European Union, Digital Economy, Strategic Competition, Imports, and Productivity
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

19. Ice panda: navigating China’s hybrid Antarctic agenda

Author:
Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Antarctica is often overlooked in strategic discussions, but its role in geopolitical competition deserves attention. This report assesses the continents importance to Australian security, China’s hybrid Antarctic activity, and the need for Australia to develop a balancing strategy capable of bolstering the Antarctic Treaty and ‘pushing back’ against growing Chinese power in Antarctica. Antarctica offers significant strategic advantages for the People's Republic of China (PRC). Although Beijing's actions in Antarctica may not overtly violate the Antarctic Treaty (AT), they effectively undermine its principles and, by extension, Australia's strategic interests. Currently, the PRC is adeptly navigating the AT System to challenge the status quo without explicitly breaching the treaty. China's domestic policies, which merge civil and military sectors, appear to contravene the spirit of the AT's military prohibitions, even if they have not yet resulted in direct military activity on the continent. This evolving dynamic underscores the pressing need for Australia to safeguard the existing Antarctic status quo. With robust Australian foreign and security prioritization, the AT can counter Beijing's growing ambitions, which may directly impact Australian interests. We must protect and uphold the principles of the AT. With diverse domestic and international priorities, Australia must not neglect Antarctica, as Beijing continues to exploit the strategic gap left by our limited focus. Australia, with its rich history and commitment to Antarctica, must assert its role as an Antarctic claimant and clarify that China's presence is contingent on Australian and other claimants' cooperation. It's time for Australia to lead in Antarctica and protect our strategic interests.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Antarctica

20. New global (dis)order – about a world that frightens us

Author:
Vedran Džihić
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
This report provides an analysis of the shifting global landscape characterized by the dissolution of the post-Cold War normality into a perpetual state of crisis. It examines the intertwining of emotional politics with power dynamics, the escalating competition between democracies and autocracies, and the looming dilemma between war and peace. The report underscores the rise of emotional narratives in shaping geopolitical tensions, the emergence of a bipolar world order between democracies and authoritarian regimes, and the existential threat posed by escalating conflicts. It concludes by urging for a renewed commitment to democratic values and concerted efforts to navigate the turbulent global landscape of 2024.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and International Order
Political Geography:
Global Focus