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11. The Australian Defence Force and contested space

Author:
Malcolm Davis
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
This new Strategy report looks at war on the high frontier of outer space, and what the implications such a development might have for the ADF. It highlights that space is not a sanctuary from geopolitical rivalries. The report notes that Australia is heavily dependent on the space environment, both for its national prosperity and societal well-being, and for its defence and national security, and the report examines Australia’s current approach to use of space for Defence. The report then examines emerging counterspace threats. China and Russia are moving towards deploying a suite of ‘counterspace capabilities’ to deny access to essential space systems used by the US and its allies, including Australia, prior to, or at the outset of a military conflict. These include direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons that physically destroy satellites in orbit after being launched from Earth’s surface; they are testing technologies that could be applied towards a co-orbital ASAT system designed to attack satellites from space; and have a range of ‘soft-kill’ ground-based technologies to disrupt, damage, and disable – but not destroy - satellites. Author Malcolm Davis notes that, 'China is developing the ability to rapidly attack US and allied (including Australian) critical space infrastructure prior to or at the outset of a future military conflict, in what amounts to the risk of a ‘space Pearl Harbor’ that would be designed to leave the US and its allies ‘deaf, dumb and blind.’ Such an outcome would severely erode the ADF’s ability to undertake information-led joint, integrated and coalition operations.' The report highlights the risks posed by ‘soft-kill’ systems described above. These don’t generate space debris, and thus have greater operational utility and anonymity, and they raise the threat of ‘grey zones in orbit. The report also examines efforts towards legal and arms control measures to constrain space weaponization and explores how these can contribute to reduce the prospect of warfare in space. The report finally makes a number of recommendations on how Defence should respond to this challenge to maintain freedom of action in space.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Space, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

12. Technology and Strategy: The Changing Security Environment in Space Demands New Diplomatic and Military Answers

Author:
Torben Schütz
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
On the brink of being weaponized, space is becoming a military-operational environment. Proliferating anti-satellite weapons threaten space security and enable first strikes against military space assets crucial to conventional and nuclear forces. This affects the global strategic landscape and decreases crisis stability among major powers. As current arms control regimes are insufficient, Germany and NATO should push new initiatives to keep space peaceful and advance military planning should they fail.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, and Space
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

13. The Influence of Commercial Space Capabilities on Deterrence

Author:
John J. Klein
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
Recent U.S. space policy initiatives underscore the far-reaching benefits of commercial space activities. The White House revived the National Space Council to foster closer coordination, cooperation, and exchange of technology and information among the civil, national security, and commercial space sectors.1 National Space Policy Directive 2 seeks to promote economic growth by streamlining U.S. regulations on the commercial use of space.2 While the defense community generally appreciates the value of services and capabilities derived from the commercial space sector—including space launch, Earth observation, and satellite communications—it often overlooks one area of strategic importance: deterrence. To address the current shortcoming in understanding, this paper first describes the concept of deterrence, along with how space mission assurance and resilience fit into the framework. After explaining how commercial space capabilities may influence the decision calculus of potential adversaries, this study presents actionable recommendations for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to address current problem areas. Ultimately, DoD—including the soon-to-be reestablished U.S. Space Command and possibly a new U.S. Space Force—should incorporate the benefits and capabilities of the commercial space sector into flexible deterrent options and applicable campaign and contingency plans.
Topic:
Space, Deterrence, and Resilience
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

14. Asian Space Race is Rhetoric or Reality: Implication for South Asia

Author:
Fazal Abbas Awan
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
South Asian region is now facing a new star because Space is an advantageous frontier for military uses. Space technology has two aspects on the name of security such as Militarization and Weaponization. These terms cannot properly differentiate the difference between security and threat for space. All current and previous super powers are working on space for more than five decades in the name of technology and security. Now these super powers are going to make grouping on space for getting hegemony not only on earth but also in space. As a result, the challenges in space have triggered and magnified the security dilemma for the South Asian rivals, interconnecting China, India, and Pakistan in the context of an international security complex. Indian foreign policy for other regional countries and applying strategy of Kautilya to defeat their enemy by using name of South Asian Satellite is new wave of race.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Space, and Satellite
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and India

15. Opportunities for Defense-Industrial Collaboration after Brexit

Author:
Douglas Barrie
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The United Kingdom should seek to continue to support defence-technology cooperation with the European Union and partner states across all military domains. Avoiding, or at least minimising, the second-order effects of Brexit on wider defence cooperation with European partners will be easier if the UK is directly involved in the EU’s defence-technology initiatives. Specific opportunities present themselves across the military domains: Pursue cooperation in the air domain with regard to future combat- aircraft technology. While collaboration at the platform level is unlikely in the near term, exploring common R&D in key systems, such as radar, propulsion, avionics, sensors and weapons, is achievable. In the land domain, explore partnership with France and Germany on participating in the development of a next-generation main battle tank. Collaboration on applicable technologies at the component and sub- system levels should also be encouraged. This could include armour and armament R&D, and laser weapons. In the maritime domain, support cooperation in the air-defence arena, including the use of laser weapons for ship self-defence, and the use of naval vessels for ballistic-missile defence. In the space domain, examine potential cooperation on next-generation communication satellite requirements, and wider collaboration on geospatial intelligence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Brexit, Maritime, and Space
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, London, Germany, and Brussels

16. IFPA National Security Update 6: The Trump Administration's Space Force

Author:
Jack Kelly
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:
This IFPA National This IFPA National Security Update examines the Trump Administration’s proposal to create a new U.S. Space Force, its rationale, alternative approaches, and Congressional perspectives. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Military Affairs, Trump, Space, and Space Force
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

17. National Security Update 3: The 2018 NDAA, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and the New EMP Commission

Author:
Jack Kelly
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:
This IFPA National Security Update provides information on missile defense issues related to the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the soon-to-be-released Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). It also provides an update on several developments regarding electromagnetic pulse (EMP), including Congress’ decision to create a new EMP Commission. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
Topic:
National Security, Weapons, Space, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

18. Forwarding Multilateral Space Governance: Next Steps for the International Community

Author:
Theresa Hitchens
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Over the past decade, concerns about ensuring sustainability and security in outer space have led the international community to pursue a range of governance initiatives. Governance issues regarding the use of space are complicated because of the physical realities of the space environment and because of the legal status of space as a global resource. As the number of space users grows and the types of activities in space expand, competition for access to space will only continue to grow. Different space actors have different priorities and perceptions regarding space challenges. As more and more militaries around the world turn to space assets, the potential development of counterspace weapons also increases tensions. Ongoing multilateral work on space governance has concentrated primarily on voluntary measures. There have been three major multilateral governance initiatives in the field. The three—the EU Code of Conduct, the COPUOS Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, and the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on transparency and confidence-building measures—were related to each other, but each aimed to address slightly different aspects of the governance problem. This paper reviews these initiatives and elucidates ways to forward their progress, for instance, by fully implementing the GGE recommendations, the establishment of national focal points for data exchange, and by fully implementing the UN Registry of Outer Space Objects. It also looks to identify additional steps beyond current activities at the multilateral level for establishing a foundational space governance framework, including institutionalizing the UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines; establishing a public space situational awareness database; and examining ways to move forward discussion on active debris removal, national legal obligations regarding military activities, and space traffic management.
Topic:
United Nations, Military Strategy, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

19. Cybersecurity and the New Era of Space Activities

Author:
David P. Fidler
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
The tasks of securing outer space and cyberspace are converging. The internet increasingly depends on space-enabled communication and information services. Likewise, the operation of satellites and other space assets relies on internet-based networks, which makes these assets, like cars and medical equipment, devices on the internet of things. New government actors, companies, goals, and technologies are expanding and transforming space activities. However, neither space policy nor cybersecurity policy is prepared for the challenges created by the meshing of space and cyberspace, which could increase national security risks. To meet these challenges, government, industry, and international action is needed. The Donald J. Trump administration’s National Space Council should develop cybersecurity recommendations for space activities, and federal agencies should prioritize these within the government and in cooperation with the private sector. In crafting needed legislation for commercial space activities, Congress should bolster industry efforts to strengthen cybersecurity. Private-sector actors should strengthen their adoption of cybersecurity best practices and collaborate with one another on improving implementation of cybersecurity strategies. Internationally, the United States should pursue collaboration on space cybersecurity through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), plurilateral space cooperation mechanisms, and bilateral forums.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Space
Political Geography:
United States and North America

20. Space Cooperation and Space Security in the Asia-Pacific Region

Author:
Zhao Yun
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Space cooperation is already taking place in the Asia-Pacific region. At the moment, there are three ongoing space cooperation platforms in this region. Japan and India host two regional forums respectively: the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) (1993) and the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP) (1995). The APRSAF is a loose platform for voluntary information exchange on an annual basis. It does not pursue any legally binding agreements, but rather provides a flexible framework “to promote regional cooperation in space development and utilization through voluntary cooperative efforts of participating countries and organizations.”
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, and Space
Political Geography:
United Nations and Asia-Pacific