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41. The Western Balkans in Times of the Global Pandemic

Author:
Vedran Dzihic
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The global COVID-19 pandemic and the measures taken by governments around the world constitute a major rupture to the “business as usual”, and this includes the Western Balkans, too. The pandemic has been overshadowing other developments while also accelerating existing trends, and it will continue to do so. This analysis establishes the COVID-19 pandemic as a critical juncture, a crisis that can permanently shake up institutions and societies. There are considerable dangers beyond the impact of the pandemic on human lives, ranging from an economic crisis which could turn out to be worse than the one in 2008/9, to a heightened crisis of democracy and a geopolitical shift. None of these developments are inevitable and some of the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for the Western Balkans can be mitigated. By exploring nine critical fields, this analysis will highlight ways in which the pandemic and government responses pose particular challenges: 1. The Role of the State, 2. Democracy and State Capture, 3. Geopolitical Shifts, 4. New Nationalisms, 5. Social Resilience, 6. Environmental Impact, 7. Migration and Health Care, 8. Health Care and Social Security and 9. Economic Implications. With regard to all of the critical fields, the study examines the impact and outlines possible risks and opportunities before identifying specific interventions that could prevent the worst consequences for the region. In its emergency response, the EU needs to include all Western Balkans countries in assistance and post-emergency reconstruction plans, irrespective of the status of their accession talks. The full inclusion of the region is essential so as to prevent dire economic consequences and geopolitical drift. Support to overcome post-crisis economic and social effects should be conditioned on measures to reduce state capture. The pandemic cannot be an excuse for an unlimited suspension of democracy and restrictions on civil liberties must be temporary, proportional and transparent. The EU needs to identify and monitor the restrictions concerning democratic institutions and civil liberties that are permissible during the state of emergency in the Western Balkans. After the pandemic, state-society relations need to be rebuilt and the states of the region need to prioritise communication and education of the population over excessive repression. The spread of fake news is best combatted by clear and open communication, not through restrictions and censorship. Vulnerable groups, such as the Roma, need to be given access to healthcare and be protected from discrimination. The environmental crisis in the region will not be resolved or even ameliorated and faces the risk of becoming sidelined in the interest of a quick economic recovery. The combination of reduced car traffic during the lockdown and the continued record-high lev- els of air pollution have exposed the urgency of decisive action in regulating heavy industry: many large factories keep violating environmental standards and endangering the citizens’ health. To address the economic and social consequences, governments should support SMEs in particular, while also securing food supply for vulnerable groups. Finally, a temporary universal basic income could help citizens who have lost their livelihood. There is both a short- and long-term need to improve the quality of hospitals in terms of equipment, adequate supplies of medication, and reducing overcrowding of acute hospital wards, along with a raise in wages for hospital staff to secure their retention. A joint approach by governments and EU member states is required to address the shortage of medical personnel due to emigration from the region, which puts an additional strain on health care. A careful mixture of short- and long-term measures is needed to prevent the pandemic from turning into an enduring disaster for the Western Balkans. The crisis has also given greater visibility to many structural weakness- es in the region, from the weak health care systems, low trust in the state, to weak democracy and state capture, while at the same time awakening civic consciousness and serving as a backdrop for increased solidarity among citizens. Putting a spotlight on the weaknesses can help tackle them and build more resilient societies.
Topic:
Governance, Public Policy, Institutions, Services, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and Balkans

42. Iraq’s Power Sector: Problems and Prospects

Author:
Sujata Ashwarya
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Abstract:
Despite substantial efforts and investments in rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the country is still struggling to deliver on public services. Years of destruction in conflict, as well as alleged mismanagement and neglect, have taken a heavy toll on the country’s power infrastructure. Severe power cuts and rolling blackouts are endemic in Iraq today. Between 2014 and 2018, Islamic State terrorism inflicted billions of dollars in damage on the already dilapidated electricity infrastructure, causing a cumulative potential and actual loss of a whopping 7GW in generation and transmission capacities.
Topic:
Economics, Energy Policy, Infrastructure, Business, Conflict, Services, and Electricity
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

43. THE "SORROW REMAINS INSIDE": Applying A Mixed Methods Approach to Understand the Relationship between Gender-Based Violence and Mental Health, Coping and Service Seeking among Lebanese and Syrian Refugee Women in Lebanon.

Author:
The George Washington University The Global Women's Institute (GWI)
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
The Global Women's Institute (GWI), The George Washington University
Abstract:
Lebanese organization ABAAD, in coordination with the Global Women’s Institute, released their new 2020 Narrative Report, developed in part of GWI’s work to build the capacity of local organizations to conduct research on gender-based violence. This report addresses mental health among adult women survivors of gender-based violence in Lebanon in order to increase awareness among the affected population as well as educate healthcare providers about this intersection so that women and girls have greater access to quality services.
Topic:
Gender Issues, Gender Based Violence, Local, and Services
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

44. Cooperation in Trade in Services

Author:
Akshay Mathur and Purvaja Modak
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Over the past decade, there has been a shift in global trade from trade in goods to trade in services. Unlike goods, services are intangible and consumed by the user directly, without intermediate supervision. Thus, the only way to ensure the quality of a service is to enforce standards on the service provider. This is the responsibility of domestic sector-specific regulatory institutions established by the government. This paper examines the current state of services trade in India and Canada, considers India’s services trade with Canada and outlines a number of measures the countries could take to support services trade.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Services, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
Canada, India, Asia, and North America

45. Senegal: Making Domestic Resource Mobilization Work to Sustain Growth and Improve Service Delivery

Author:
Birahim Bouna Niang and Ahmadoi Aly Mbaye
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
Senegal’s recent economic performance is impressive. For the first time, Senegal has achieved a GDP growth rate of more than 6 percent for three consecutive years (2015–2017), and per capita GDP has increased at an annual average of 4.1 percent. In parallel, progress in fiscal revenues has been recorded, with the ratio of average revenues to GDP increasing by 5.7 percentage points between 2000-2002 and 2014-2017, placing Senegal above the regional average of 15 percent. Notwithstanding, the performance of the Senegalese tax system is limited by the country’s narrow tax base, largely attributable to a sizable informal sector. Despite accounting for more than half of GDP, Senegal’s informal sector makes up less than 3 percent of total tax collection. Revenue collection is also limited by the fast-growing array of exemptions, and by tax expenditures. These special dispensations mainly went to multinationals with local branches in Senegal. Tax expenditure more than doubled between 2010 and 2014, from18.4 percent of tax revenues and 3.4 percent of GDP to 40 percent of tax revenues and 7.8 percent of GDP. According to some estimates, the cumulative costs are close to 18 percent of annual GDP. Other factors deterring effective domestic resource mobilization include poor governance and the limited technical capacity of the tax administration, failures of the information system, and weak system transparency. Expenditures are often ineffective, particularly in the education and health sectors. Improving the state of public finances requires reforms to strengthen technical and institutional capacities and to adapt the management framework in view of Senegal’s entry into the hydrocarbon era. This might include setting up a public finance monitoring committee, adopting new budgetary rules consistent with those set by the West African Economic and Monetary Union, building relevant tax administration capacities. On the expenditure front, actions are needed to improve the targeting of support programs for vulnerable groups, and to implement capacity-building programs for government officials in charge of project evaluation, including in the Planning Directorate and in technical ministries. Lastly, a systematic ex ante and ex post evaluation of public investments is needed.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Economic Growth, Services, Mobilization, and Domestic Work
Political Geography:
Africa and Senegal

46. Waiting for no one: prospects and consequences of bottom-up reconstruction in Syria

Author:
Fabrice Balanche
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The Politics and Modalities of Reconstruction in Syria”, Geneva, Switzerland, 7-8 February 2019. The war in Syria has not ended, yet uncoordinated bottom-up reconstruction efforts have already taken place in many areas where the bombing and violence have stopped. The government is prioritising restoring electricity, as it is inexpensive, but water, education, and health are harder to restore cheaply and quickly. The resumption of public services, and investment in regime areas depends on loyalty, reminiscent of pre-war sectarian politics. The extent of politicisation of the reconstruction efforts led by the Syrian government is reduced because of limited funds, and government disconnection from local levels. Bottom-up efforts to reconstruction are limited to individuals rebuilding their houses using remittances, or low-level housing projects. Lack of large funding for infrastructure, industry and health will slow growth, reinforce fragmentation of industry and reproduce the root causes of the conflict.
Topic:
Government, Infrastructure, Reconstruction, Conflict, Syrian War, and Services
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

47. The Social Contract: An Analytical Tool for Countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Beyond

Author:
Markus Loewe, Bernhard Trautner, and Tina Zintl
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
The social contract is a key concept in social science literature focusing on state–society relations. It refers to the “entirety of explicit or implicit agreements between all relevant societal groups and the sovereign (i.e. the government or any other actor in power), defining their rights and obligations towards each other” (Loewe & Zintl, forthcoming). The analysis of social contracts helps the understanding of: (i) why some societal groups are socially, politically or economically better off than others, (ii) why some revolt and demand a new social contract and, thus, (iii) why a country descends into violent conflict. In addition, the concept shows how foreign interventions and international co-operation may affect state–society relations by strengthening the position of the state or of specific societal groups. It illustrates that state fragility, displacement and migration can arise from social contracts becoming less inclusive. Nevertheless, the term “social contract” has so far been neither well defined nor operationalised – to the detriment of both research and of bi- and multilateral co-operation. Such a structured analytical approach to state–society relations is badly needed both in research and in politics, in particular but not exclusively for the analysis of MENA countries. This briefing paper sets the frame, suggesting a close analysis of (i) the scope of social contracts, (ii) their substance and (iii) their temporal dimension. After independence, MENA governments established a specific kind of social contract with citizens, mainly based on the redistribution of rents from natural resources, development aid and other forms of transfers. They provided subsidised food and energy, free public education and government jobs to citizens in compensation for the tacit recognition of political regimes’ legitimacy despite a lack of political participation. But with growing populations and declining state revenues, some governments lost their ability to fulfil their duties and focused spending on strategically important social groups, increasingly tying resource provision to political acquiescence. The uprisings that took place in many Arab countries in 2011 can be seen as an expression of deep dissatisfaction with social contracts that no longer provided either political participation or substantial social benefits (at least for large parts of the population). After the uprisings, MENA countries developed in different directions. While Tunisia is a fair way towards more inclusive development and political participation, Morocco and Jordan are trying to restore some parts of the former social contract, providing for paternalistic distribution without substantial participation. In Egypt’s emerging social contract, the government promises little more than individual and collective security, and that only under the condition of full political acquiescence. Libya, Yemen and Syria have fallen into civil wars with no countrywide new contract in sight, and Iraq has been struggling for one since 2003. In addition, flight and migration also affect the social contracts of neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. All MENA countries are designing, or will need to design, new social contracts in order to reduce the current instability and enable physical reconstruction. This briefing paper informs on the status of conceptual considerations of social contract renegotiation in MENA countries and its meaning for international co-operation with them.
Topic:
Government, Governance, Legitimacy, Institutions, Services, and Social Contract
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

48. North Korea’s Economic Strategy, 2018

Author:
William B. Brown
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter takes the perspective of North Korea’s leadership as it confronts difficult economic problems in the remaining months of 2018. The major current and potential issues are listed and prioritized. Short and longer-term remedies are presented, each with trade-offs that affect other economic and policy issues. Given the absence of direct reporting from North Korea, the issues and debates presented are speculative, designed to give the reader a more comprehensive understanding of North Korea’s current problems than is ordinarily presented in western media. Kim Jong-un’s recent diplomatic offensive, reaching out to South Korea, China, and the United States is, in this view, suggestive of these internal economic troubles in addition to the nuclear security issues. The troubles are both short-term—the collapse in trade with China in just the past few months—and long-term, the slow-motion collapse of the communist country’s “command” economy. And much more than in the past, the problems relate to the regime’s unusual and dangerous monetary system, money being a normal issue for most governments but a relatively new one for this still partially rationed, or planned, oriented system. The leadership may have little choice but to let the domestic economy move further from the plan—allowing decentralized market and private activities more sway—than ever before. This would help cushion the central government from losses due to the sanctions and open the door to a much more prosperous future. Without major moves in this direction, inflation and unemployment may cascade into social crisis. It should be noted, that the recent Assembly Meetings, which annually focus on the economy, gave little official indication of policy changes, only a sense of digging in further to protect the regime from outside forces. But just a week later, Kim may have telegraphed an upcoming sea change when, in his address to the Party Central Committee plenum, that he is instituting a new Party Line, socialist economic construction, as the total focus of the Party and the country. Major changes, if they are to occur, will likely come after the upcoming important summits with South Korea and the U.S.1 There is little doubt that the economy in 2018 is in very poor condition, delivering one of the worst productivity rates—productivity in terms of labor and of capital—in the world, but it is important to recognize that this is due not to natural circumstances but to decisions the government has made over the years, and trade-offs it has already made. This suggests that astute government policy can create solutions and restore growth. Remedies of the sort expressed here, for example in liquidating, that is selling or leasing state assets to private buyers, raising fixed prices for state delivered electricity and for water and other utilities, and giving large pay raises to the millions of state workers who now rely on rations, while culling their numbers, would require difficult economic and social trade-offs; one might say there is no free lunch for Kim and his regime although no doubt they are looking for one, even in these summits. The chapter discusses just what kinds of decisions might be made and the likely consequences. Negotiations being set with South Korea and with the United States, and likely more discussions with China, may weigh heavily in how far Pyongyang will be willing to go in these respects. In my view the regime will be looking for: outright aid, payments for pushing back the nuclear weapons program, and premature relief from sanctions, which would only give the regime time to avoid the hard choices needed to permanently fix the broken economic system.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Sanctions, Services, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and Korea

49. Sources of Comparative Advantage in Services: Institution vs. Social Capital

Author:
Nakgyoon Choi and Soonchan Park
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Previous studies that have identified the impacts of institutions or cultural traits on comparative advantage focused on goods trade, but not services trade. In contrast to the rapid increase in trade in services, empirical examina-tion on sources of comparative advantage in services trade remains limited. This paper attempts to fill this gap by investigating empirically the impacts of institution as well as social capital on comparative advantage in services trade. Services are exposed to relatively more pre-choice risks than goods, because it is difficult to obtain information on the quality of services before the con-sumer decides to purchase. In addition, trade in services involved in global value chains possibly takes on the risks of contract breach by other firms along the same value chains. As a result, the transaction risks for trade in ser-vices are higher than for trade in goods. Using the World Input Output Da-tabase, we estimate the importance of social capital for comparative ad-vantage in services. We find that countries with more social capital tend to specialize in the production of contract-intensive services. We also find that social capital rather than institution matters for comparative advantage in ser-vices.
Topic:
Economic Policy, Institutions, Services, Trade, and Social Capital
Political Geography:
Global Focus

50. Citizens in Training: Conscription and Nation-building in the United Arab Emirates

Author:
Jon B. Alterman
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
n 2014, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) embarked on a bold experiment: It began drafting young men into the military. This move was not only a departure for the Emirates, it was a departure from world trends. Governments have been moving away from national service requirements for decades as military missions have changed and governments have sought to create highly skilled all-volunteer armies. But the UAE move to press young men into military service was meant to build the country, not just the army. Several factors contributed to the decision to adopt conscription. One was a deeply unsettled regional environment. Another was a drive to promote a stronger sense of shared Emirati identity. A third was a growing fear that young Emirati men were becoming lazy and “soft” just as the government eyed an increasing imperative to shape its workforce for a world less centered on oil. A fourth consideration was the UAE’s resolve to blunt the forces that contributed to the Arab uprisings in 2011. Staring down all of these factors, the UAE leadership decided a bold intervention was needed. The leadership constructed a program combining intensive physical fitness training with military training, national education, and character education. It did not only reach 18 year-olds. Everyone 30 years of age and younger is required to register, pulling men from their jobs and families to live with their peers in barracks, perform predawn calisthenics, and clean toilets. Those lacking the fitness for military training—nearly one in five—are not exempted, but rather are trained for civilian roles in vital sectors. The UAE drew from careful studies of other national service programs around the world—especially in Finland, Singapore, and South Korea—and had indirect knowledge of Israel’s program. Compared to these countries, the UAE has made innovations in its approach to citizenship education, workforce development, and public health. Women can volunteer, but fewer than 850 have done so, compared to 50,000 male conscripts. Women are cast largely in a supportive role as relatives of conscripts.
Topic:
Civil Society, Women, Citizenship, and Services
Political Geography:
Middle East, Persian Gulf, and UAE