4551. Nuclear Arsenal Games: Size Does Make a Difference
- Author:
- Carolyn C. James
- Publication Date:
- 03-2000
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Studies Association
- Abstract:
- The purpose of this article is to present and establish the significance of the Nuclear Arsenal Game (NAG). The NAG investigates behavior within dyads experiencing a crisis. It assumes that nuclear and quasi-nuclear states act according to the size and potential of their own nuclear force structure and that of their opponent. This paper will argue that the size and potential damage an arsenal poses, set in relation to an enemy state's second strike capability, determines actor preferences within a crisis situation. These preferences include the option of launching a first strike and risking retaliation in kind. The specific objective of this study is to propose a nuclear index for use in empirical studies and offer a game-theoretic model of crisis interaction based on the Theory of Moves (TOM) that encompasses these respective types of nuclear states; and indicates whether preferences and predicted behavior adhere to the assumptions of Classical (or Rational) Deterrence Theory.
- Topic:
- Security and Nuclear Weapons