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4062. The Military Balance in the Gulf: 2001-2002 Part III Weapons of Mass Destruction

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As is the case with North Korea, experts differ over the seriousness of the Iranian threat. Most experts believe that Iran continues to pursue the development of long-range missiles, and of nuclear and biological warheads. Much will depend heavily on whether President Khatami and the more moderate elements in Iran's leadership can consolidate power and rein in Iran's hardline extremists, as well as on Iran's perception of the threat the US poses once it is ready to deploy and the cost of that deployment. This creates an extremely uncertain political climate.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and North Korea

4063. If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and The Conventional Military Balance

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Despite the Gulf War, and the loss of some 40% of its army and air force order of battle, Iraq remains the most effective military power in the Gulf. It still has an army of around 375,000 men, and an inventory of some 2,200 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, and 2,400 major artillery weapons. It also has over 300 combat aircraft with potential operational status. At the same time, Iraq has lacked the funds, spare parts, and production capabilities to sustain the quality of its consolidated forces. Iraq has not been able to restructure its overall force structure to compensate as effectively as possible for its prior dependence on an average of $3 billion a year in arms deliveries. It has not been able to recapitalize any aspect of its force structure, and about two-thirds of its remaining inventory of armor and aircraft is obsolescent by Western standards. Iraq has not been able to fund and/or import any major new conventional warfare technology to react to the lessons of the Gulf War, or to produce any major equipment -- with the possible exception of limited numbers of Magic “dogfight” air-to-air missiles. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has taken delivery on over $66 billion worth of new arms since 1991, Kuwait has received $7.6 billion, Iran $4.3 billion, Bahrain $700 million, Oman $1.4 billion, Qatar $1.7 billion, and the UAE $7.9 billion, Equally important, the US has made major upgrades in virtually every aspect of its fighter avionics, attack munitions, cruise missile capabilities, and intelligence, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities. Iraq's inability to recapitalize and modernize its forces means that much of its large order of battle is no obsolescent or obsolete, has uncertain combat readiness, and will be difficult to sustain in combat. It also raises serious questions about the ability of its forces to conduct long-range movements or maneuvers and then sustain coherent operations. Iraq has demonstrated that it can still carry out significant ground force exercises and fly relatively high sortie rates. It has not, however, demonstrated training patterns that show its army has consistent levels of training, can make effective use of combined arms above the level of some individual brigades, or has much capability for joint land-air operations. It has not demonstrated that it can use surface-to-air missiles in a well-organized way as a maneuvering force to cover its deployed land forces. Iran remains a major threat to Iraq. Iran lost 40-60% of its major land force equipment during the climactic battles of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. It has, however, largely recovered from its defeat by Iraq and now has comparatively large forces. Iran now has an army of around 450,000 men – including roughly 125,000 Revolutionary Guards, and an inventory of some 1,600 main battle tanks, 1,500 other armored vehicles, and 3,200 major artillery weapons. It also has over 280 combat aircraft with potential operational status. Iran has been able to make major improvements in its ability to threaten maritime traffic through the Gulf, and to conduct unconventional warfare. Iran has also begun to acquire modern Soviet combat aircraft and has significant numbers of the export version of the T-72 and BMP. Iran has not, however, been able to offset the obsolescence and wear of its overall inventory of armor, ships, and aircraft. Iran has not been able to modernize key aspects of its military capabilities such as airborne sensors and C4I/BM, electronic warfare, land-based air defense integration, beyond-visual-range air-to-air combat, night warfare capabilities, stand-off attack capability, armored sensors and fire control systems, artillery mobility and battle management, combat ship systems integration, etc. In contrast, no Southern Gulf state has built up significant ground forces since the Gulf War, and only Saudi Arabia has built up a significant air force. Only two Southern Gulf forces – those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – have a significant defense capability against Iraq. Saudi Arabia has made real progress in improving its 75,000 man National Guard. Its army, however, lacks effective leadership, training, and organization. It now has an army of around 75,000 men –, and an inventory of some 1,055 main battle tanks, 4,800 other armored vehicles, and 500 major artillery weapons. It also has around 350 combat aircraft with potential operational status. The army has made little overall progress in training since the Gulf War, can probably only fight about half of its equipment holdings in the Iraqi border area (and it would take 4-6 weeks to deploy and prepare this strength), and has declined in combined arms capability since the Gulf War. It has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have experienced a growing readiness crisis since the mid-1990s. It has lacked cohesive leadership as a fighting force since that time and cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management.. Kuwait now has an army of only around 11,000 men, and an active inventory of some 293 main battle tanks, 466 other armored vehicles, and 17 major artillery weapons. Only its 218 M-1A2s are really operational and only a portion of these are in combat effective forces. It has only 82 combat aircraft and 20 armed helicopters with potential operational status, and only 40 are modern F-18s. It is making progress in training, but has not shown it can make effective use of combined arms above the battalion level, and has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have moderate readiness, but cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management. There has been little progress in standardization and interoperability; advances in some areas like ammunition have been offset by the failure to integrate increasingly advanced weapons systems. Showpiece exercises and purchases disguise an essentially static approach to force improvement which is heavily weapons oriented, and usually shows little real-world appreciation of the lessons of the Gulf War, the “revolution in military affairs,” and the need for sustainability. Current arms deliveries are making only token progress in correcting the qualitative defects in Southern Gulf forces, and no meaningful progress in being made towards integrating the Southern Gulf countries under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

4064. Defending America: Redefining the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defense

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
From a public policy viewpoint, these uncertainties mean the US must prepare for a wide variety of low probability attacks on the US, rather than to emphasize any given form of attack or group of attackers. The US must plan its Homeland defense policies and programs for a future in which there is no way to predict the weapon that will be used or the method chosen to deliver a weapon which can range from a small suicide attack by an American citizen to the covert delivery of a nuclear weapon by a foreign state. There is no reason the US should assume that some convenient Gaussian curve or standard deviation, will make small or medium level attacks a higher priority over time than more lethal forms.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States and America

4065. American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House

Author:
Bruce Riedel
Publication Date:
05-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for the Advanced Study of India
Abstract:
July 4th, 1999 was probably the most unusual July 4th in American diplomatic history, certainly among the most eventful. President Clinton engaged in one of the most sensitive diplomatic high wire acts of any administration, successfully persuading Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to pull back Pakistani backed fighters from a confrontation with India that could threaten to escalate into a nuclear war between the world's two newest nuclear powers. The events of that 4th accelerated the road to a fundamental reconciliation between the world's two largest democracies, India and the United States, but also set the scene for another in the series of military coups that have marred Pakistani democracy. As the President's Special Assistant for Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs at the National Security Council I had the honor of a unique seat at the table and the privilege of being a key adviser for the day's events.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, America, South Asia, India, and Asia

4066. CERI: Les relations civilo-militaires en Croatie, 1990-2001

Author:
Jean-François Morel and Renéo Lukic
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
Abstract:
In contrast to most of Eastern and Central European countries that underwent their post-communist transition peacefully, Croatia had to undergo its transition during wartime. The outbreak of the Serbo-Croatian war in Spring 1991 forced Croatia to build rapidly an army to protect its territory. However, at this time, Croatia was an emerging democracy and after the European Community recognised its independence on January 15, 1992, the parliamentary institutions were unable to exert their authority over the Croatian army (Hrvatska vojska, HV). The Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman, and the political party he presided, the HDZ, dominated the HV by way of political penetration. Tudjman, who led Croatia to independence, benefited from a triple legitimacy (political, constitutional and charismatic) that allowed him to exert his power over the HV, much the same as the legitimacy Josip Broz-Tito enjoyed over the Yugoslav National Army in Communist Yugoslavia. The result is that the civil-military regime in Croatia after 1990 suffered from a democratic deficit. After the death of President Franjo Tudjman in December 1999 and the change of majority in the January-February 2000 elections, the new Croatian leadership, particularly President Stjepan Mesic, tried to establish democratic control over the armed forces. However, this aim clashed with the opposition of the Ministry of Defense and of numerous officers still committed to the HDZ. For these reasons, a democratic civil-military regime in Croatia is not yet a reality. However, Croatia has made some progress toward the establishment of a democratic civil-military regime. By trying to join some international organizations (NATO), or by being compelled to cooperate with others (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY), Croatia is now in the process of interiorizing the norms concerning the civilian and democratic control of the armed forces upon which these organizations are based. Being a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and wishing to join as soon as possible NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP), Croatia is obliged to move in this direction.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and War
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, and Croatia

4067. The New Transatlantic Security Network

Author:
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat
Publication Date:
07-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Transatlantic Relations
Abstract:
The United States and its European allies often found themselves at loggerheads in the 1990s. Disputes over arms control, peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, the environment, and the role of the United Nations (UN) were frequent. European governments repeatedly accused the United States of being disengaged and not living up to its responsibilities as a global power. When it did, they feared U.S. power and its disdain for multilateral approaches to international problems.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Balkans

4068. Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime: the emerging nexus

Author:
Tamara Makarenko
Publication Date:
06-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, St. Andrews University, Scotland
Abstract:
The end of the Cold War and subsequent demise of the Soviet Union ushered in a new international security environment that can no longer be explained by the dominant security paradigms utilised by most Western governments and analysts since World War II. Our understanding of security falling under the rubric of high politics, and focused on maintaining the territorial sovereignty of state actors has been questioned by several ongoing international dynamics. For example, inter-state conflicts have been replaced by rising occurrences of intra-state violence; the state as the central focus of international affairs has given way to a host of non-state actors; and, it has become increasingly evident that the greatest threat to security emanates from the rapidly evolving phenomena of terrorism and transnational organised crime (TOC). In actuality, national, regional and international experience with insecurity over the past decade has confirmed that terrorism and TOC deserve paramount attention precisely because they both span national boundaries, and thus are necessarily multi-dimensional and organised; and, because they directly threaten the stability of states by targeting economic, political and social systems.
Topic:
Security, Crime, Economics, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Soviet Union

4069. The Combat of Drug Trafficking in Mexico under Salinas: The Limits of Tolerance

Author:
Jorge Chabat
Publication Date:
10-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
Abstract:
The combat of drug trafficking in Mexico under the Salinas Administration showed some signs of improvement in terms of the indicators required by the U.S. government to grant certification every year: a) budgetary resources dedicated to fighting drug trafficking; b) seizures of shipments and eradication; c) police and military casualties in the drugs war; d) arrests; e) legal and institutional reforms; f) signing international agreements; and g) acceptance of U.S. collaboration, as well as the presence of DEA agents in Mexican territory. Even when the improvement in these indicators was very evident during the Salinas administration, the degree of final commitment of the Mexican government to fight drugs remains unclear. However, the interest of President Salinas in getting NAFTA approved provoked a reduction in the limits of tolerance to drug trafficking. All this suggests that international interests constituted an important factor to propel governments into a more confrontational approach with the drug trafficking.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, and Crime
Political Geography:
North America and Mexico

4070. Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver

Author:
Jorge Chabat
Publication Date:
10-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
Abstract:
Illegal drugs pose a threat to Mexico in many aspects: consumption, and violence and corruption provoked by the traffic of drugs in Mexican territory. However, even when consumption is a growing problem in Mexico, the main threat to Mexican stability comes from the corruption generated by the production and transportation of drugs in Mexico. Violence is also a problem, but it is difficult to assert that it constitutes right now a serious threat to Mexican governance. The Mexican government has been fighting this phenomenon for years in a context of institutional weakness and strong pressures from the United States. The fact that Mexico is a natural supplier of illegal drugs to the biggest market in the world, the United States, places the Mexican government in a very complex situation with no other alternative than to continue fighting drugs with very limited institutional and human resources. In this process, Mexico has no margin for maneuver to modify the parameters of the war on drugs.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, and Crime
Political Geography:
United States, North America, and Mexico