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3891. Beyond the ABM Treaty: A Plea For a Limited National Missile Defense System

Author:
Tom Sauer
Publication Date:
03-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
With approval rates higher than ever thanks to the war against terrorism, President George W. Bush finally did in December 2001 what he had threatened to do on different occasions but what many others thought - or hoped - was only bluff: withdrawing unilaterally from the 1972 Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Regardless of the rationale or emotions behind or against this decision, it ended a period of uncertainty. Although in principle the Bush administration can still change its mind until June 2002 when the six months withdrawal period expires, most observers believe that this will not happen. Indeed, there are already plans on the table to start building a new test site at Fort Greely in Alaska in the Summer of 2002 that from 2004 onwards could be used as a base for a small ground-based mid-course National Missile Defense (NMD) launch site if needed.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States and Alaska

3892. The Prospects for Peace in Chechnya (Event summary)

Author:
Ilias Akhmadov
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Observers of the situation in Chechnya know that the "prospects for peace" that Akhmadov's title refers to are virtually nil, as Russian president Vladimir Putin and Chechen rebel leaders continue to lock horns on how to end the hostilities that broke out in war over two years ago. Akhmadov devoted considerable time in his discussion to the problems confronting Chechnya since the development of a Bush-Putin alliance to combat "Islamic fundamentalism." He also challenged Putin's insistence that the conflicts in Chechnya are domestic and therefore not subject to international monitoring or mediation. Akhmadov opened his talk with the assertion that the destruction he had discussed at the Davis Center in January 2000 had grown more serious, with levels of physical devastation and civilian casualties on the rise and the world community more supportive than ever of armed Russian intervention. To illustrate his point that the Russian Federation is unfairly using the international war on terror to justify actions in Chechnya, Akhmadov said that two days after FBI agents found diskettes containing flying instructions which had belonged to the terrorists responsible for the Sept. 11 terror attacks on the US, Russian FSB agents reported finding similar diskettes belonging to Chechen terrorists in the woods near a pilot-training school. Akhmadov considered the presence of such a school in those woods unlikely. He added that a high casualty rate among Chechen civilians is now officially connected to the search for members of Al Qaeda. Akhmadov reminded the audience of a speech made by Putin on September 24, 2001, in which the Russian president expressed support for the United States' war on terror and urged Chechen rebels to disarm and abandon their separatist fight. Akhmadov's response to that speech was that disarmament could not be a condition for starting peace talks. As for the November meeting between Viktor Kazantsev, Putin's envoy to Chechnya, and Akhmed Zakayev, a prominent representative of Chechnya's rebels, Akhmadov said it "left no room for illusions about their relations, or about the Russian government's position on Chechnya." The talk ended when Zakayev refused to comply with Kazanstev's request that the rebels disarm. Akhmadov addressed allegations of ties between the rebels and Osama bin Laden in the question-and-answer session, restricting himself during his talk to criticism of what he considers unwarranted BBC and CNN reports about the "thousands of Chechens fighting in Afghanistan." While Akhmadov allowed for the possibility that a few Chechens could be fighting for the Taliban, he stressed the unlikelihood that Chechens played a critical role in Taliban efforts and reported that nobody yet had been able to provide any "concrete facts to verify that Chechens are fighting for the Taliban." Putin's affirmations that Chechnya belongs to Russia apparently strike Akhmadov as oxymoronic, as indicated by his remark that "the Russian Federation wants to integrate the territory of Chechnya but not the people." To convey the extent of destruction wrought by the Chechen-Russian conflicts, Akhmadov cited data culled by Russians showing that before the first war in 1994, there were 1 million Chechens; 100,000 people were killed between 1994-6; that casualty figure has been greatly exceeded during the fighting that started in 1999. In addition, 400,000 Chechens have emigrated or become displaced persons. Akhmadov pointedly remarked that "we don't count as refugees, because that only happens during a war . . . What is happening in Chechnya is, according to Russia, 'a small, minor anti-terrorist operation.'"Finally, Akhmadov stated that impartial monitoring groups were needed to observe the conflict. He also asserted that a one-on-one dialogue with Russians was not a realistic solution and that intermediaries were needed to promote discussion between Russian and Chechen leaders. Following his prepared talk, Akhmadov replied to questions from the audience about issues including Chechen rebel fighting in Abkhazia, hostage-taking, and Russian bombing of civilian and industrial areas. In response to a question about Maskhadov's ability to rebuild the war-torn region, Akhmadov said that "neither Maskhadov nor any other Chechen can do anything with Chechnya's meager resources." He also said that the international community should aid Chechnya in future attempts to rebuild the war-torn republic and that visiting Ground Zero in New York had given him the "feeling that I had seen that [kind of devastation] somewhere before, only on a larger scale." Finally, Akhmadov answered an audience member's question about Russian and Chechen military strategy by saying that it was hard forhim to believe that "someone is sitting at a map plotting points . . . We're [Russians and Chechens] just killing each other . . . Russians see us, they kill us, and vice versa. It's a snowball effect."
Topic:
Security, Democratization, and Government
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

3893. Assessing Russian Democracy (Event Summary)

Author:
Grigory Yavlinsky
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Mr Yavlinsky began by thanking the Belfer Center for the invitation and said that the main topic of his talk will be to explore the progress of Russian Democratization. According to Mr. Yavlinsky, the process of democratization involves not only creating some set of democratic procedures, like free elections or free press. It is necessary to look behind the formal democratic institutions to ask what people applying and using them have in mind. Only after analyzing such motivations is it possible to understand how essentially democratic and legitimate institutions produce results contrary to their nature. The value of freedom of speech is nonexistent, if people have nothing to say, the freedom of action is needless if people are only willing to march in military ranks. Hence democracy can only work if the society enacting it has some basic democratic values, education, beliefs or moral principles. The democratic institutions and procedures per se are merely tools, able to transform these ideas and beliefs into reality. That is why the benefits of mere democratic procedures are so limited. It is for this reason that the economic base of any democracy is one of its crucial elements, providing for independent individuals as its basic members. In Mr. Yavlinsky's opinion, these facts represent the main challenge for Russian democracy. Russia's small and middle business enterprises are important for its democracy. Mr. Yavlinsky called them a "conditio sine qua non" for any democratic society. Only if the economy of the country can ensure the independent economic behavior of its citizens and only if these citizens have a certain level of democratic education and democratic values, only in this case the democratic procedures can work for the common benefit. From Yavlinsky's point of view the main challenge for the Russian reforms is that the country has to perform an acrobatic act, similar to riding a bicycle, where it must accomplish two operations simultaneously: the Russians have to engage in actions preparing democracy and at the same time practice this democracy with no reference to any previous historic democratic record. After presenting these general thoughts Mr. Yavlinsky moved on to a deeper analysis of the present Russian situation. He assumed that the present political elite consists of people coming from the Soviet administrative system and still thinking in Soviet categories. To achieve their goals they use a democratic cover "quasi democracy," a somewhat modernized version of the famous "Potemkin villages." Just like Stalin's constitution, which was considered to be one the most progressive democratic constitutions, the present formally democratic institutions in Russia do not constitute real democracy. Yavlinsky described the present state of political life in Russia as a controlled or managed democracy. This is a state where the democratic tools are used to achieve any result desirable for the leader of the country. The most recent example of this type of manipulation was a recent proposal drawn up by the parties close to the Russian president. According to this proposal, elections should only be considered valid if voter participation was at least 50 percent and only if one of the candidates was able to achieve more then 50 percent of the votes. In the opinion of Mr. Yavlinsky such a regulation would easily lead to an election deadlock, which would benefit the president. Mr. Yavlinsky underscored the difference between this type of controlled democracy and a totalitarian rule. While the latter destroys all the democratic institutions directly and openly, the main strategy of controlled democracy is not to destroy, but to adjust the institutions to serve the goals of the ruling elite. If any adjustment of institutions is impossible, the government prefers to replace the people controlling these institutions (like replacing the owners of the free TV stations) or substitute these institutions with new, more easily manageable organizations (as happened in the case of the Media Union, which was created to weaken the influence of the Union of Journalists). Speculating on the future of the Russian democracy, Yavlinsky stressed the special and very important role of bureaucracy in implementing this new "vertical of power." However as any bureaucracy, it will lead to more corruption. In order to keep the corruption under control, the government will have to use intense enforcement mechanisms, which might go as far as creating a police state. Of the three core democratic elements — free press, free elections, and an independent judiciary — Mr. Yavlinsky specifically spoke about the press. Yavlinsky said that the situation with the press in today's Russia is certainly not comparable to the situation in the Soviet Union. Everyone can read anything in the press, even the most incredible and slanderous information about most prominent political figures. Restricted is any systematic explanation or critical analysis of the political events. For example, state television stations have a list of people who are not to be shown on the air. The same is true for the list of forbidden topics. Certainly there still are a some newspapers who still cover critical topics (e.g. Obschaya Gazeta and Novaya Gazeta). However, they unfold their activities in a kind of a glass box, their presence is not really essential, and is only useful for the government in order to demonstrate to foreign observers that free press exists. As a result of such media control, the Russian population is subject to the management and manipulation of human choice. According to Mr. Yavlinsky this ability to manipulate and control is actually one of the main results of the last 10 years: it is not hard to manipulate the choice of the Russian public. Just like one could convince it to vote for Yeltsin or vote for a totally unknown newcomer Putin, you can always manipulate the public opinion. In the question and answer section Yavlinsky addressed various issues. In speaking about the best way western countries could assist Russia on its way towards democracy, Yavlinsky rejected any form of financial credits or subsidies. He is convinced that the help must be conducted in a smart way and this means in the first place the west should give up any policy of double standards towards Russia and address Russia as an honest and valuable ally. Regarding Putin's intentions, Yavlinsky mentioned two of them: the intention to make Russia a strong state and to protect his own power. The question is not whether these goals are good or bad, but rather which instruments Putin is prepared to use to implement those goals.
Topic:
Security and Human Rights
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

3894. Assessing the Department of Homeland Security

Author:
Michael E. O'Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag, James B. Steinberg, Ivo H. Daaldar, James M. Lindsay, Robert E. Litan, Paul C. Light, and I. M. Destler
Publication Date:
07-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
President Bush's June 6 proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would constitute the largest reorganization of the federal government in fifty years. Given the urgency of the terrorist threat, Congress has pledged to act rapidly. It aims to have a bill ready for the President's signature in time for the one-year anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Government, and Terrorism

3895. The Bush National Security Strategy: An Evaluation

Author:
Ivo H. Daaldar
Publication Date:
10-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
President Bush's first National Security Strategy presents his vision of “a distinctly American internationalism.” Media reports focused on the Strategy's support for preempting emerging threats militarily, but the 31-page document covers a far broader set of important issues. At its core, the Strategy calls for the United States to use its “unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence” to establish “a balance of power that favors human freedom” and to defeat the threat posed by “terrorists and tyrants.” These are themes that will likely resonate with the American people, who believe that the United States should play a leading role in making the world a safer and better place.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Government, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States

3896. The Business of Congress After September 11: A Look Back and at What's Ahead for 2002

Author:
Sarah Binder and Bill Frenzel
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
The terrorist attacks on September 11, which caused plane crashes in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C., resulted in thousands of deaths, billions of dollars in damage, and an American public that was stunned by the events it had watched unfold on television. In addition to the heavy emotional toll, federal, state, and local governments scrambled to address new policy problems, including massive clean-up efforts, compensation for victims, and homeland security.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, China, New York, America, Washington, and Pennsylvania

3897. Kashmir: Redefining the U.S. Role

Author:
Navnita Chadha Behera
Publication Date:
10-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
India and Pakistan have fought three wars against each other since 1947, the first two of which were over Kashmir. In the past fifteen years, the two countries have been embroiled in four military crises, which the United States has played an increasingly assertive role in managing and resolving. A chief component of recent American administrations' foreign policy goals in South Asia, including the current Bush administration, has been to avert the fourth war in the subcontinent. However, attitudes in India and Pakistan are changing, and the internal situation in Kashmir is more fluid than it has been for years. After September 11, America has been able to maintain close ties to both countries. Washington should move beyond managing the crisis and help develop a road to peace in the region.
Topic:
Security and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, America, South Asia, Washington, India, and Kashmir

3898. Reducing Collateral Damage to Indo-Pakistani Relations from the War on Terrorism

Author:
Polly Nayak
Publication Date:
09-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
One of the major challenges facing Washington is how to limit unintended consequences of the war on terrorism in South Asia that could otherwise imperil both the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and the goal of preventing further conflict between India and Pakistan. Senior U.S. officials understandably hoped last fall that the war on terrorism would provide a new opportunity to draw in both India and Pakistan, to strengthen U.S. ties to each, and to nudge them to resolve their differences. Washington expected to expand cooperation with a rising India on a host of issues, while succoring a fragile Pakistan as a reward for abandoning an Afghan policy inimical to the war on terrorism.
Topic:
Security and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, South Asia, Washington, and India

3899. A New Agenda for Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Ivo H Daalder and James M Lindsay
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
George W. Bush promised on the campaign trail “to leave the cold war behind” and “rethink the requirements for nuclear deterrence.” Last November, he unveiled an arms reduction proposal that purports to do just that. It would have the United States reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal over the next ten years from its current level of 7,200 warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads. Equally important, the United States would achieve that goal not by negotiating a new Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreement, but through unilateral action.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

3900. Should the War on Terrorism Target Iraq?

Author:
Michael E O'Hanlon and Philip H Gordon
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
As Afghan opposition groups and U.S. armed forces continue their successes in the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda, the American debate has quickly turned to the question of where the fight against terrorism should go next. In numerous public statements, President Bush has talked about a wide-ranging campaign against global terrorism. He has not committed to military operations against any other countries or terrorist organizations, but he has made it clear that the broader struggle against terrorism will be a long-lasting effort that could include the use of military force in regions beyond Afghanistan.
Topic:
Security and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, America, Middle East, and Taliban