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381. Keeping the U.S. Military Engine Edge: Budget and Contract Trends

Author:
Gregory Sanders and Nicholas Velazquez
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Military aircraft engine technology is a qualitative edge for the United States, one enabled by a world-leading industrial base. However, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) faces critical decisions regarding the future of engine investments and the industrial base of the F-35. This platform dominates present U.S. tactical aircraft purchases and faces a growing engine modernization imperative. The following questions help inform key debates: How does the DOD prioritize investments in engines compared to other systems? Where is investment targeted? And how can competition best be fostered? Recent years have shown a spike in the purchase of products for military engines amid a decline in research and development (R&D) spending relative to the early 2000s. Military engine R&D is now largely dependent on the Air Force, as the Navy has taken a step back to focus funding on other service priorities. Finally, competition for military engine contract spending has been on the decline as the F-35, with its single-engine option, dominates the procurement landscape. The future of the military engine industrial base will be shaped by the DOD’s choice between spending more up front to introduce competition into the fifth-generation fighter fleet or waiting until the end of this decade as the first sixth-generation fighter is expected to enter production.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

382. A Seismic Shift: The New U.S. Semiconductor Export Controls and the Implications for U.S. Firms, Allies, and the Innovation Ecosystem

Author:
Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
On October 7, 2022, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced sweeping revisions to its export controls, which are aimed at restricting China’s ability to obtain certain high-end semiconductor devices with potential military applications, develop and maintain supercomputers, and manufacture advanced semiconductor devices. This announcement, the most expansive export control action in decades, represents a fundamental shift in the traditional strategy underlying the U.S. and allied export control regime. As National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan put it , until now, “we previously maintained a ‘sliding scale’ approach that said we need to stay only a couple of generations ahead. That is not the strategic environment we are in today. Given the foundational nature of certain technologies, such as advanced logic and memory chips, we must maintain as large of a lead as possible.” In effect, the new measures are intended to dramatically slow, if not freeze Chinese developmental capability.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Rivalry, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

383. Rudiments of a Space Security Policy Framework

Author:
Richard J. Chasdi
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
The commercial space industry is taking off, with a growing number of private companies sending people into orbit. Along with this growth in demand from businesses and consumers is the need for more space security and policy approaches to address the potential risks of space exploration. The Moon is currently the main target of future space missions because of its resources and its strategic location to support missions to Mars. International law can help mitigate threats, such as resource depletion on the Moon, which could lead to conflicts among stakeholders on Earth.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Space, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

384. A Digital Loonie among Many Digital Currencies: Prospects and Outlook

Author:
Pierre L. Siklos
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Global interest in digitalization is growing in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and driving central banks to introduce retail central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). The successful rollout of retail CBDCs will depend on each country’s institutional capacity and the scope of international cooperation and regulation. Retail CBDCs are unlikely to replace domestic currencies but instead complement notes and coins in circulation, offering greater convenience and lower transactions costs.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Digital Economy, Currency, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

385. A Two-Track Approach for Trustworthy AI

Author:
Michel Girard
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Standards and certification programs are developed to support new trustworthy artificial intelligence (AI) legislation. Recent developments point to the emergence of a two-track approach. One track would focus on the certification of AI applications embedded in tangible products using objective criteria through established conformity assessment bodies. Regarding AI interacting with humans and used in delivering services, there is a need to create a new track. This track is needed to verify and validate compliance against subjective criteria, values and ethics, seen by many as an integral part of what constitutes trustworthy AI. The practice of “assurance as a service” can be adapted to verify and validate conformance to upcoming trustworthy AI standards. This policy brief provides an update on key legislative and policy developments framing trustworthy AI. It sketches possible approaches for the certification, verification and validation of AI embedded in products and in services and looks at recent proposals regarding the creation of a new chartered profession to deliver assurance services to achieve trustworthy AI.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Regulation, Artificial Intelligence, Emerging Technology, and Trust
Political Geography:
Global Focus

386. The Pacific caught in the World Wide Web? Geopolitics of submarine cables in Oceania

Author:
Camille Morel
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
This article provides a review of the digital connectivity of the Pacific Islands nations (Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia) and the main challenges and prospects arising from it, at a time when the submarine cable market is undergoing profound change and a growing politicization of this technology on the international scene. In 2022, the 450 fiber-optic cables stretching across the world’s seabed carry more than 98 percent of international data and have become essential to the proper functioning of our societies. Submarine cable connection is all the more important to the geographically isolated Pacific islands because it enables them to digitize various sectors of the economy and society (industry, education, health, etc.) and to maintain a virtual link to the rest of the world. When a submarine cable is disabled, satellite links cannot completely offset this loss. The topic of submarine cables in Oceania is inextricably tied up with the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific and rivalries between powers. Because of the long distances separating them from the rest of the world and the high cost of cables, the island territories of the Pacific are more liable to be dependent on other countries and subject to outside influence. Cables are also involved in the escalation of maritime competition between states, in a context of military, economic, demographic, and environmental issues, including seabed warfare. Against the backdrop of growing connectivity in the Pacific region since 2011 and the rise of China, the Pacific Ocean has become one of the three main routes for data in the twenty-first century. Within the region, the insular Pacific has several distinguishing features: Because of its particular geography, it appears under-meshed compared with the northern trans-Pacific route and the inter-Asia links. It looks more like a transit zone than a genuine space for investment. Its ecosystem and the methods used by public and private actors to commission, manage, and operate submarine links in the region have been adapted to local constraints and challenges. The main winners in this scenario are Australia and the United States, while the main loser is China, whose growing ambitions in the region are continuously thwarted. As a stage for Sino-American rivalry, the insular Pacific has to adapt to circumvent political difficulties and respond to its population’s urgent need for digital resilience. This challenge seems likely to result in a number of alternative cable projects emerging, offering new opportunities in the digital domain.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Geopolitics, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Australia, United States of America, and Pacific Ocean

387. Open Innovation in Defense. Passing Fad or New Philosophy?

Author:
Raphaël Briant
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The use of civilian technologies on the battlefield—one of the lessons that can be drawn from recent conflicts—is attracting growing interest from the armed forces of France and other nations. The growing number of examples of effective integration of civilian technologies into the armed forces, including during conflict, shows the importance of open innovation and the acceleration of the international race toward innovation in the defense industry. The war in Ukraine offers several practical examples of the operational added value that open innovation can offer. A case in point is the GIS Art for Artillery smartphone app, the deployment of which was speeded up after Ukraine was invaded by Russian forces, and which enables Ukrainian soldiers to order an artillery strike by entering the GPS coordinates from their phones. Under certain conditions, open innovation in defense can therefore reset or even reverse the balance of power. Its goal is to detect, stimulate, and capture civil society innovations and, via short cycles, integrate them into force structures so as to seize opportunities or respond to challenges on the ground. For states, this mode of innovation now seems to be the norm, without raising questions about the way armament operations are conducted. More than just a passing fad resulting from the development of “agile methods” imported from the civilian world, open innovation in defense has become vital to ensuring operational superiority. It strengthens arguments in favor of a “new philosophy” for France’s Defense Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB).
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Defense Industry, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe and France

388. Localization and China’s Tech Success in Indonesia

Author:
Gatra Priyandita, Dirk Van Der Kley, and Benjamin Herscovitch
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
On average, Indonesians distrust China and many Chinese firms. Yet Huawei and to a lesser extent ZTE have successfully positioned themselves as trusted cybersecurity providers to the Indonesian government and the Indonesian nation. This has been no easy feat given long-held Indonesian animosity toward China. Many Chinese companies have faced protests over concerns they were taking local jobs. Huawei and ZTE have suffered no such fate. Nor has there been a broad coalition of Indonesian voices against using Chinese technology in critical telecommunications infrastructure. In short, Indonesians care a lot more about Chinese cement plants than they do about Huawei involvement in 5G networks. Gatra Priyandita Gatra Priyandita is an analyst at the International Cyber Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, where he leads a project researching cyber-enabled intellectual property theft. He is a political scientist by training and specializes in the study of foreign policy and security in Southeast Asia. He holds a PhD in political science from the Australian National University. This is a vastly different conversation to those happening in rich liberal democracies. Huawei and ZTE have been able to achieve success in Indonesia, despite a sense of ambivalence among the Indonesian political and defense establishment about Chinese intentions and growing Western scrutiny over the use of Chinese technology in broadband networks. As other papers in this series have demonstrated, Huawei and ZTE needed to localize their strategies. Like elsewhere in the world, available evidence suggests that part of Huawei’s and ZTE’s value proposition is cheaper prices (compared to those of competitors) for high-quality technology. But that is only part of the story. Huawei has positioned itself as Indonesia’s cybersecurity provider of choice by offering enormous cybersecurity and other related training programs across the country for groups ranging from senior government officials to students in rural Indonesia. Much of this training is technically focused on practical vocational skills with a hope that students one day will become customers. In addition, the company offers an attractive maintenance and upkeep package. Since the mid-2000s, Chinese information and communications technology (ICT) firms have created training centers in partnership with local Indonesian telecoms companies and universities to train the next generation of Indonesian engineers and tech specialists. Government agencies are also increasingly targets of training and capacity-building programs, with Huawei claiming that 7,000 government officials have participated in its training programs. The Indonesian government, corporations, and ordinary citizens alike have welcomed Huawei and ZTE as essential partners in their efforts to build both the infrastructure and human capital necessary to prosper in the twenty-first century’s digital economy. What Huawei and ZTE offer is knowledge transfer, not technology transfer. The technology is still being built in China by Chinese firms. Huawei’s role in training relates instead to capacity building. Indonesians will install, maintain, and use the networks. China will build the hardware. There is also evidence that China has had some rhetorical success in pushing its version of cyberspace governance. Beijing’s preferred cyberspace governance language was inserted into a memorandum of understanding between Indonesia’s National Cyber and Crypto Agency and the Cybersecurity Administration of China. However, it is difficult to see how the memorandum has influenced Indonesia’s cybersecurity governance in practice. One of the concerns often leveled by rich liberal democracies is that reliance on Chinese tech will end up aligning the political interests of countries like Indonesia with those of China. Other key worries are China’s pervasive espionage and the enduring (though as yet unrealized) risk that Chinese companies with a dominant role in an ICT ecosystem could be used by Beijing to apply coercive political pressure. Despite Indonesia’s embrace of Huawei and ZTE, political leaders in Jakarta have not simply disregarded the hard security questions posed by upgrading ICT equipment, especially when foreign suppliers are involved. Indonesian officials simply rate the need for development and cybersecurity-related capacity building higher than the risk of using Chinese ICT hardware in their critical infrastructure systems. If rich liberal democracies are concerned about this trend, then they need to offer workable alternatives that place Indonesia’s enormous digital development needs at the heart of any value proposition. It is unlikely that Indonesia will stop using Chinese hardware in its infrastructure, but alternatives could prevent overreliance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Telecommunications, and Localization
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, and Asia

389. Understanding and Responding to Global Democratic Backsliding

Author:
Thomas Carothers and Benjamin Press
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Over the past two decades, democratic backsliding has become a defining trend in global politics. However, despite the extensive attention paid to the phenomenon, there is surprisingly little consensus about what is driving it. The most common explanations offered by analysts—ranging from the role of Russia and China and disruptive technologies to the rise of populism, the spread of political polarization, and democracies’ failure to deliver—fall short when tested across a wide range of cases. A more persuasive account of backsliding focuses on the central role of leader-driven antidemocratic political projects and the variety of mechanisms and motivations they entail. This paper identifies and analyzes three distinct types of backsliding efforts: grievance-fueled illiberalism, opportunistic authoritarianism, and entrenched-interest revanchism. In cases of grievance-fueled illiberalism, a political figure mobilizes a grievance, claims that the grievance is being perpetuated by the existing political system, and argues that it is necessary to dismantle democratic norms and institutions to redress the underlying wrongs. Opportunistic authoritarians, by contrast, come to power via conventional political appeals but later turn against democracy for the sake of personal political survival. In still other backsliding cases, entrenched interest groups—generally the military—that were displaced by a democratic transition use undemocratic means to reassert their claims to power. Although motivations and methods differ across backsliding efforts, a key commonality among them is their relentless focus on undermining countervailing governmental and nongovernmental institutions that are designed to keep them in check. As international democracy supporters continue to refine their strategies of responding to democratic backsliding, they must better differentiate between facilitating factors and core drivers. Such an approach will point to the need for a stronger focus on the nature of leader-driven antidemocratic projects, identifying ways to create significant disincentives for backsliding leaders, and bolstering crucial countervailing institutions. Moreover, they should deepen their differentiation of strategies to take account of the diverse motivations and methods among the three main patterns of backsliding. Only in this way will they build the needed analytic and practical capacity to meet the formidable challenge that democratic backsliding presents.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Populism, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Global Focus

390. A CERN Model for Studying the Information Environment

Author:
Alicia Wanless and Jacob N. Shapiro
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
After the Second World War, European science was suffering. Scientists were leaving Europe in pursuit of safety and work opportunities, among other reasons. To stem the exodus and unite the community around a vision of science for peace, in 1949, a transatlantic group of scholars proposed the creation of a world-class physics research facility in Europe.1 The grand vision was for this center to unlock the mysteries of the universe. Their white paper laid the foundation for the European Center for Nuclear Research (CERN), which today supports fundamental research in physics across an international community of more than 10,000 scientists from twenty-three member states and more than seventy other nations.2 Together, researchers at CERN built cutting-edge instruments to observe dozens of subatomic particles for the first time. And along the way they invented the World Wide Web, which was originally conceived as a tool to empower CERN’s distributed teams. Such large-scale collaboration is once again needed to connect scholars, policymakers, and practitioners internationally and to accelerate research, this time to unlock the mysteries of the information environment. Democracies around the world are grappling with how to safeguard democratic values against online abuse, the proliferation of illiberal and xenophobic narratives, malign interference, and a host of other challenges related to a rapidly evolving information environment. What are the conditions within the information environment that can foster democratic societies and encourage active citizen participation? Sadly, the evidence needed to guide policymaking and social action in this domain is sorely lacking. Researchers, governments, and civil society must come together to help. This paper explores how CERN can serve as a model for developing the Institute for Research on the Information Environment (IRIE).3 By connecting disciplines and providing shared engineering resources and capacity-building across the world’s democracies, IRIE will scale up applied research to enable evidence-based policymaking and implementation. Where CERN “exists to understand the mystery of nature for the benefit of humankind,” IRIE will exist to understand the mystery of the information environment for the benefit of democracies and their citizens.4 While the laws of physics change slowly, the conditions within the information environment are little understood and changing rapidly through the addition of new technology. Additionally, studying the information environment will require analysis of personal and at times sensitive data of internet users, increasing the need for international collaboration. As CERN did by inventing new collaboration tools, IRIE will leverage those same technologies to unlock the collective genius of researchers and practitioners from a variety of fields to strengthen democracy, alongside interested citizens who contribute their own data and expertise. While there are obvious differences between the field of physics and those emerging to study the information environment, aspects of CERN’s development can guide the creation of IRIE, an institution that can uniquely address the growing needs of researchers.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Research, Collaboration, Information, and CERN
Political Geography:
Global Focus