Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Businesses throughout the US economy continue to transform even after the technology boom has faded. The key sources of this continuing transformation are investment in the information technology (IT) package (hardware, software, and business-service applications) and reorientation of business activities and processes to use both information and technology effectively.
Topic:
Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, and Science and Technology
Economics has treated technological standards creation as an outcome of network externalities and decisions on the demand side. They pay little attention to the supply side, where firms make strategi choices on which standard to support. These choices can ignite a contest between adherents to the different proposed standards. This case study examines the contest btween the Ethernet and Token Ring standards for local area networking. We find that the critical difference in explaining the success of Ethernet vibrancy was the nature and strategy of the standard's sponsors in assisting the growth of a community of firms supporting the standard.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, and Science and Technology
For a brief period in the early 1990's the U.S. Department of Defense pursued an R policy that was explicitly “dual-use,” funding projects aimed at simultaneously developing both military and civilian applications of the same underlying technologies. The policy emerged from more than a decade of bipartisan agitation in Congress and segments of the military-industrial establishment, spurred by a shared belief that more advanced technologies now “spun on” from civilian to military applications than “spun off” in the other direction (US Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary for Acquisition, 1987; Gansler, 1989; Alic et al., 1992; Stowsky 1992, 1999). With the end of the Cold War and mushrooming budget deficits constraining defense spending, Pentagon planners saw dual-use development as a strategy for improving efficiency and lowering costs as well as enhancing quality by enabling the construction of sophisticated weapons systems off a more integrated civil-military technology base (US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1995; US Department of Defense, 1995).
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, and Science and Technology
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) develops the Strategic Master Plan (SMP) as the capstone document of the command's Integrated Planning Process (IPP). The SMP presents the AFSPC Vision, outlines a strategy to implement that Vision, and defines a 25-year plan. That plan is integrated across the AFSPC mission areas to provide the space capabilities required to achieve the Vision.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, and Science and Technology
In political Washington, one can get the impression that everything is “spin”, that there are no real truths. In the news media different views are aired and debated, but one view is said to be no better than another, and certainly political views cannot be proven the way we learn mathematical proofs in school.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Science and Technology
The American Physical Society's July 16 study on boost-phase intercept missile defense programs provides an exhaustive and objective analysis of the science and technology behind the programs. However, it lacks one key element: the cost of boost-phase intercept.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Science and Technology
North Korea's military threat and somewhat peculiar approaches to international relations have been a central difficulty in dealing with the isolated regime during the past decade. In the early 1990s, North Korea, formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), was expected by many observers to collapse, just as communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union did.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Asia, North Korea, and Soviet Union
John Bolton, U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, triggered a furor when on May 6, 2002, he stated, “The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort.” Two days later, I was meeting with a representative from the Cuban Interests Section on an unrelated matter when I posed the question, “How would Cuba respond if CDI asked to bring a group of experts down to learn more about these charges?” I had no expectations of hearing any more about it. But less than two weeks later, I was told that not only was there an interest, but that we were invited to bring anyone, come anytime, and visit anywhere we wanted. Clearly, Bolton's comments had struck a nerve in Havana.
Topic:
Security, Human Welfare, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:
This report describes the results of some calculations on the effectiveness of penetrating nuclear weapons of yield 1 and 10 kilotons against targets containing biological agents. The effectiveness depends in detail on the construction of the bunkers, on how the bio-agents are stored, on the location of the explosions with respect to the bunkers, the bio-agent containers and the surface of the ground, and on the yield of the explosion and the geology of the explosion site. Completeness of sterilization of the bio-agents is crucial in determining effectiveness. For most likely cases, however, complete sterilization cannot be guaranteed. Better calculations and experiments on specific target types would improve the accuracy of such predictions for those targets, but significant uncertainties regarding actual geology, actual target layouts, and knowledge of the position of the explosion with respect to the target would remain. Aboveground effects of the nuclear explosions, all of which would vent to the surface, are estimated. They include intense local radioactivity and significant fallout, air blast, and seismic effects to kilometers distances. It is likely, however, that casualties from those effects would be less than the casualties that would result from the dispersal of large quantities of bio-agents.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:
During the week of August 18–23, 2002, the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) of the Institute for International Studies (IIS) at Stanford University hosted four summer studies sponsored by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. One of these studies, the Container Security study, examined how to apply existing technology and resources most effectively to prevent the transport of illicit nuclear materials for use in terrorist activities by means of international commercial shipping.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology