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421. Current Realities and Future Possibilities in 74/Myanmar

Author:
Dan Glickman (Co-Chair) and M.S. Swaminathan (Co-Chair)
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In September 2009, the United States announced a new course in its policy toward Burma following a seven-month review undertaken by the Barack Obama administration. Recognizing that decades of pursuing policies of isolation and sanctions had done little to influence change among Burma's military leaders, the United States introduced a policy of “pragmatic engagement.” Under this new policy, the United States will maintain its sanctions on Burma while simultaneously undertaking direct dialogue with senior leaders of the Burmese regime. Dialogue, according to the United States, will “supplement, rather than replace,” decades of U.S. sanctions policy. These talks have already begun, and the United States has indicated that any improvement in relations between the two countries is possible only when Burma's military regime enacts meaningful and concrete reforms in the country, particularly in the areas of democracy and human rights.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
United States, Burma, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar

422. Moving From a North Korean Nuclear Problem to the Problem of North Korea

Author:
Chaesung Chun
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
North Korea, in conducting its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, is repeating its earlier pattern of nuclear diplomacy: raising the level of military tensions by launching a long-range rocket and performing a nuclear test, and then searching for the most favorable position once negotiations resume. This vicious circle, composed of North Korea's brinkmanship and other countries’ multilateral sanctions will continue without any prospect of solving the North Korean nuclear problem in the near future. The so-called action-to-action paradigm cannot succeed, because the most fundamental principles of North Korea and the countries conflict with each other. Japan, South Korea, and the United States hope that a "stick and carrot" approach will elicit concessions from North Korea during the process of negotiations, but North Korea will not take steps toward giving up its nuclear program, unless its leaders feel sure that they are being given reliable, material guarantees for the survival of their entire regime, system, and state. Because their nuclear program is their ultimate bargaining chip, “sticks and carrots” focusing only on specific issues of the negotiations will be fall far short of solving the problems of North Korea as a whole. Sixteen years have passed since the outbreak of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993. The Geneva System, based on the Agreed Framework signed by the United States and North Korea in Geneva in 1994, lasted for eight years (from October 1994 to October 2002), but failed to manage the problems of nuclear proliferation and the normalization of relations. The success or failure of the new system of Six-Party Talks is yet to be seen, but as of now in 2009, negotiations based on the approach of the George W. Bush administration and, more specifically, the February 13 agreement of 2007 seem to be in a stalemate. The North Korean problem is older than the North Korean nuclear problem. From the perspective of North Korea, the latter is its desired solution to the following questions: How will North Korea survive in the post-Cold War world, in which most socialist countries are no longer socialist? What kind of regime and system can North Korea sustain in this environment? How will North Korea compete with South Korea and resist absorption by the South? North Korea developed a nuclear program and pursued militaristic diplomacy as the most plausible shortcuts to solve the problems indicated by these questions. For countries outside of North Korea, diplomacy has failed to solve either the North Korean nuclear problem or the more general North Korean problem. The Six-Party Talks that have been held by South Korea, the United States, Japan, China, and Russian Federation, and North Korea are stalled at the last phase of the second stage of what is termed “disablement,” and participants are now struggling to find a way to get into the third stage of the agreement of February 13. Reaching the issue of North Korea’s declaration and verification of its nuclear program is critical, because it will demonstrate a genuine intention to begin the process of giving up its program. Yet North Korea is desperately trying to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis the Obama administration by first launching a long-range rocket and then by testing a nuclear weapon for the second time, reversing the achievements of the disablement stage and rejecting the Six-Party Talks altogether. North Korea desires to strike a comprehensive deal with the Obama administration through bilateral talks, and seeks a variety of political, economic, and diplomatic rewards such as a peace treaty, diplomatic normalization, economic assistance, the lifting of international economic sanctions, and possibly light-water reactors. The five countries in the Six-Party Talks except North Korea have tried to evade facing up to the North Korean problem, because it is difficult to know how best to influence the future orientation of the North Korean regime, system, and diplomatic position. The structure of the Six-Party talks has also been narrowly focused on the problem of the nuclear program, leaving broader questions aside. The Northeast Asian international order, which is based on a strict and competitive balance of power, will be gravely influenced by the future orientation of North Korea, and therefore it is appropriate for the five countries most affected to deal with the North Korean problem directly. But by focusing so narrowly on the North Korean nuclear issues, these countries have maintained only minimal agreement on how to manage the nuclear problems that are involved, sometimes showing strategic and tactical differences on various specifics. In spite of the five countries’ agreement on the Six-Party presidential statement criticizing North Korea's rocket launch on April 9, they have had a hard time finding common ground to deal with future North Korean problems. The United States has been determined to impose economic sanctions on North Korean firms by using a specifically targeted list, as well as to punish North Korea diplomatically by refusing to give serious and close attention to the North Korean nuclear problem. South Korea and Japan have maintained a policy of neglecting North Korea for different reasons. The two countries seem to continue minimal interactions with North Korea even if the North fails to meet the conditions suggested by these countries. China and Russia do not want to take the initiative either to punish or to side with North Korea, and only reluctantly facilitate cooperation among the other countries.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

423. Assessment and Future Challenges of the U.S.-ROK Summit: From a Policy of Sanctions to a Policy of `Coevolution`

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-ROK alliance has gone through the greatest and most rapid changes in its fifty-six-year history. Yet the United States and South Korea have both failed to establish any strategic "Joint Vision" for the alliance in this new era. The Roh Moo-hyun administration dealt with many issues of alliance transformation. These included the relocation of U.S. military bases, the transfer of Wartime Operational Control (WOC) from the United States to South Korea, and efforts to facilitate the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. None of these changes, however, were fully based on any shared strategic vision between the two countries; rather, the alterations were limited bottom-up approaches. The Lee Myung-bak administration has managed to restore the previously damaged U.S.-ROK relations with the Bush administration in 2008. It also dealt with many issues affecting the future of the alliance. But an overall reenvisioning of the alliance only came about under the current Lee-Obama partnership. The culmination of the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Summit was the joint statement released by the two presidents entitled "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the U.S. and the ROK." This statement has been long overdue. It set out clearly the security problem confronting the two countries, and established their shared strategic interests. In a simple and concise way, the "Joint Vision" laid out the future direction of the alliance in a wide range of areas, including not only military issues but also international values, the economy, the environment, and human rights. Fundamentally, the document recognized that the geographic range of the alliance has expanded globally, beyond both the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region. The future of the alliance is significant not just for the United States but also for South Korea. Korea’s diplomatic outlook can no longer be limited to the Peninsula, because its national power has matured enough to warrant a new diplomatic strategy in its approach to its region and the world. As part of this vision, the Lee administration has issued a new strategic motto, "Global Korea." But the government still has a long way to go. It needs a more complete set of specific policies supported by a strong domestic consensus. The new vision for the U.S.-ROK alliance will help facilitate South Korea’s diplomatic leap forward. At this critical time, the United States needs assistance from its allies, including South Korea. Currently, global leadership faces numerous transnational problems such as the unprecedented global economic crisis, an insurgency in Afghanistan that is at its highest levels since the U.S. invasion in 2001, and a weakened U.S. global leadership in need of revitalization. If these major challenges are to be met, the "Joint Vision" needs to be converted into specific policies. The recent summit allowed a comprehensive discussion of both the new vision’s principles and the issues related to those principles, including the North Korean nuclear crisis, provisions for the global role of the alliance, and nonmilitary issues like the KORUS FTA (Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement). Naturally, given today’s circumstances, the North Korean nuclear program dominated the meetings. President Obama and President Lee have found considerable common ground in setting the strategic goals and policy direction that will be required to resolve the nuclear issue.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

424. Patterns of Implementation: Do Listing Practices Impede Compliance with UN Sanctions? A Critical Assessment

Author:
David Cortright
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:
The salience of the due process issue varies considerably among states. Concerns are highest among European states that are constitutionally and politically bound to the enforcement of rigorous human rights standards. Many of these states also have concerns about broader UN reform issues related to the representativeness of the Security Council and the legitimacy of its working methods. For other states the controversy over due process reinforces a general skepticism about sanctions, and may serve as an excuse for inaction.
Topic:
United Nations, Sanctions, Policy Implementation, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

425. Human Rights and Targeted Sanctions: An Action Agenda for Strengthening Due Process Procedures

Author:
David Cortright, George A. Lopez, Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf, Eliot Fackler, Sarah Persinger, and Joshua Weaver
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:
International sanctions intended to counter terrorism have been criticized for violating human rights and failing to comply with due process legal standards. Blacklisting practices have impeded the work of certain civil society groups and charities. The resulting controversy has eroded the credibility of UN Security Council counterterrorism sanctions and made it more difficult for some states and regional organizations to comply with these measures. Action is urgently needed to reform current listing and delisting procedures through a strengthening of due process procedures.
Topic:
Human Rights, United Nations, Sanctions, Counter-terrorism, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Global Focus

426. The (Non) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea

Author:
Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
02-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
This study finds that North Korea's nuclear test and the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions have had no perceptible effect on trade with its two largest partners, China and South Korea. Before North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, it was widely believed that such an event would have cataclysmic diplomatic ramifications. However, beginning with visual inspection of data and ending with time-series models, no evidence is found to support the notion that these events have had any effect on North Korea's trade with its two principal partners.
Topic:
International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, International Security, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
South Korea and North Korea

427. Sanctioning North Korea: The Political Economy of Denuclearization and Proliferation

Author:
Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
As a small country dependent on foreign trade and investment, North Korea should be highly vulnerable to external economic pressure. In June 2009, following North Korea's second nuclear test, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1874, broadening existing economic sanctions and tightening their enforcement. However, an unintended consequence of the nuclear crisis has been to push North Korea into closer economic relations with China and other trading partners that show little interest in cooperating with international efforts to pressure North Korea, let alone in supporting sanctions. North Korea appears to have rearranged its external economic relations to reduce any impact that traditional sanctions could have.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
China, North Korea, and United Nations

428. Polling Saudis and Egyptians: Iran, Jihad, and the Economy

Author:
David Pollock
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
New data from credible private polls of the Egyptian and the urban Saudi public show strikingly high levels of support -- especially among Saudis -- for tough action against Iran's nuclear program. At the same time, these findings demonstrate clearly that economic concerns, rather than foreign policy or domestic political issues, dominate the popular agenda in both countries.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Iran, Arabia, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt

429. A Comprehensive and Inclusive Peace Process for Chad

Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Africa Policy Information Center
Abstract:
Analysts, policy makers and experts are now accepting that the conflicts in Chad and Sudan have mutually reinforcing dynamics. Chad's internal political instability is having devastating consequences on the peace processes in Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR). The U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts on Sudan stated that Chad supports Sudanese insurgent groups with arms, ammunition, vehicles, food, training and safe haven. Violations of humanitarian law and international human rights continue unabated in the region and violators in eastern Chad operate in an environment of almost total impunity. A new U.S. Government strategy must be created to stabilize Chad and bring to an end the continued degradation of conditions in the region. This strategy must work in parallel with the peace process for Sudan and with the efforts led by the “Contact Group” to normalize Chad-Sudan relations.
Topic:
Environment, Government, Human Rights, United Nations, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
United States and Sudan

430. PolicyWatch #1253: Navigating the Sudan Sanctions Regime

Author:
Michael Jacobson
Publication Date:
06-2007
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On May 29, 2007, the Bush administration unveiled a long-anticipated package of sanctions against Sudan, designating thirty Sudanese companies for their ties to the regime of President Omar al-Bashir, as well as two government officials, a rebel leader, and a transportation company for their role in the Darfur genocide. In announcing the targeted companies and individuals, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson stated that Washington was "calling attention to their horrific acts" and attempting to "further isolate them from the international community." Although these sanctions do not impose significant additional legal restrictions on business dealings with Sudan, they could nevertheless have some impact if they are effectively implemented.
Topic:
Genocide and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, Washington, and Sudan