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301. Iran Sanctions at the Halfway Point

Author:
Sarah Ladislaw and Frank A. Verrastro
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
On May 8, President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear agreement endorsed by Iran, the United States, France, Germany, China, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Concurrent with that action, Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2012 (NDAA) was reactivated, along with other U.S. sanctions under the Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act (IFCA), the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRSHRA). Departments and agencies are implementing these sanctions with 90-day and 180-day wind down periods, after which time the applicable sanctions come back into full effect.1 Since May, administration officials from several agencies have been travelling around the world to explain the rationale for the decision to pull out of the JCPOA and persuade countries to comply with the sanctions program. Earlier this week (following the end of the first 90-day wind down period), the administration announced that on August 7 sanctions would be reimposed on: Iran’s automotive sector; Activities related to the issuance of sovereign debt; Transactions related to the Iranian rial; Iran’s trade in gold and other precious metals; Graphite, aluminum, steel, coal, and software used in industrial processes; The acquisition of U.S. bank notes by the government of Iran.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

302. Talks, Markets, and Recognition? Addressing the North Korean Nuclear Conundrum

Author:
Ramon Pacheco Pardo
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
Abstract:
North Korea has become a de facto nuclear power. Regardless of one’s views about the regime and its treatment of the country’s ordinary citizens, its nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and its illegal activities ranging from proliferation of WMD to currency counterfeiting, the international community has to accept that it is dealing with a nuclear North Korea. This means that stopping and rolling back Pyongyang’s nuclear programme is no longer a realistic goal, at least in the short term. Both in public and in private, the regime has clearly indicated that the program itself is not a bargaining tool. Rather, the Kim Jong-un regime considers a nuclear deterrent the best means to avoid the same fate as the Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein regimes: military strikes led or supported by the U.S., followed by the execution of their leaders at the hands of their former citizens. The debate has to now shift towards how to deal with a nuclear North Korea. Sanctions have clearly not worked. The current round of UN and bilateral sanctions implemented from July 2006 onwards has failed. Pyongyang had not even conducted a nuclear test when sanctions were first implemented. Today, it is believed to be in possession of dozens of nuclear devices.3 Isolation of the Kim Jong-un regime has not worked either. Two consecutive South Korean conservative governments led by Lee Myungbak and Park Geun-hye dismantled many of the cooperation mechanisms set up by their predecessors. The Barack Obama administration refused to countenance diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang unless it changed its behavior. Xi Jinping is yet to meet with Kim Jong-un, even though they sit less than two hours away from each other. In return for sanctions and isolation, North Korea has pressed ahead with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Deterrence is a useful way to prevent a North Korean attack on Seoul, Tokyo or the U.S. mainland. Nevertheless, few experts think that Pyongyang would strike first.4 Engagement thus seems to be the only viable option to deal with Pyongyang.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

303. Art of Economic Statecraft: When Pain Matters

Author:
Dimitriy Nurullayev
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
When employing economic sanctions, what are the best practices to induce desired outcomes for the sending state(s)? Broad economic sanctions have been shown to be ineffective. Recognizing that sanctioning as a diplomatic strategy is unlikely to be abandoned, scholars have focused on making the case for smart timing and targeting of sanctions. Their arguments stem from deciphering the internal drivers of decision making within targeted states. Unlike work that is reliant on solely internal mechanisms, this paper enhances the understanding of targeted states by examining cost-benefit strategies of (1) individual leaders and (2) nation states that are in pursuit of strategic goals. This paper argues that when sanctions create large costs (anticipated or inflicted) on the target, those sanctions have a higher likelihood of producing successful outcomes regardless whether the sanctions are “smart” This study utilizes TIES data on sanctioning and Polity scores on democracy. I use ordinal logit and ordinary least squares regression to estimate the models and find strong support for the hypothesis
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Nationalism, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Global Focus

304. Going nowhere alone: US sanctions on Iran and the afterlife of the JCPOA

Author:
Fridtjof Falk
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
On November 5th, 2018, the Trump administration re-imposed severe sanctions on Iran. These sanctions, which President Obama called the “toughest sanctions ever faced by the Iranian government,” were lifted by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Deal. The JCPOA was signed with a view to blocking Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons, allowing international inspectors into Iran in return for sanctions relief. Withdrawing the United States (US) from the deal was a prominent promise of Donald Trump leading up to the presidential elections of 2016. In a May 2018 speech that described the deal as rooted in “fiction,” President Trump made good on his promise to leave the JCPOA and to move to unilaterally re-impose sanctions on Iran.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, and Economy
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

305. The US Oil Embargo on Iran: A New Oil Shock?

Author:
Olivier Appert
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The 14 July 2015 Vienna agreement on Iran’s nuclear activities (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPoA) was a game changer on the geopolitics in the Middle East and for the oil market. The oil sanctions were lifted and Iran increased significantly its production and exports. On 8 May 2018, President Trump announced that the United Stated (US) would withdraw from the agreement. Financial sanctions were reintroduced. From 5 November 2018 onwards, further sanctions will be re-imposed more specifically on petroleum related transactions, including the purchase of petroleum, petroleum products and petrochemical products. What could be the impact of this new embargo? Is there a risk of a new oil supply and price shock?
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Global Markets
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

306. International Collaboration Efforts to Denuclearize the Korean Peninsula

Author:
George Hutchinson
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
The international community’s confrontation with North Korea reached crisis proportions in 2017, following Pyongyang’s ballistic missile launches and its sixth nuclear test. In the wake of a series of high-level summits, tensions began to thaw in 2018. At the inter-Korean summit in Panmunjom on April 27, 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un agreed to seek support from the international community to denuclearize. But the international community, led by the U.S. in concert with the United Nations Security Council, has already worked tirelessly over the past 26 years to coordinate efforts to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. Successive U.S. administrations have worked through the cycle of confrontation, crisis, discussions and agreements with North Korea. Nonetheless, all these agreements have ultimately fallen apart, allowing North Korea to advance its nuclear program. This paper focuses on two key questions: How has the international community contributed toward denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, and what is its role in facilitating the complete, verifiable dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program? Ultimately, the success of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula will be measured by whether North Korea completely dismantles its nuclear program. Fortunately, the international “tools” are on the table, but successfully denuclearizing North Korea will, in the end, be a matter of effectively enforcing existing international measures.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

307. U.S. sanctions on Russia and its impact on India

Author:
Amit Bhandari and Chaitanya Giri
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
President Vladimir Putin is in India on a two-day state visit to India, his third trip to India during Prime Minister Modi’s term. A key agreement that has just been signed is the $5 billion deal for the S-400 air defence system. However, U.S. sanctions on Russia’s top defence manufacturers will be a hurdle in closing this agreement, making payments to Russia difficult and scaring away potential Indian partners, especially those with investments in the West. Gateway House looks at India’s options for successfully concluding this agreement without falling foul of American sanctions
Topic:
International Relations and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Russia and India

308. Lifting US Sanctions on Sudan: Rationale and Reality

Author:
Emile LeBrun and Claire McEvoy
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
In October 2017 the United States lifted three of the most significant components of its sanctions regime against Sudan as part of a shift in bilateral relations with Khartoum. Lifting US Sanctions on Sudan: Rationale and Reality describes the specific sanctions changes, their stated rationales, and their documented and likely future effects on Sudan’s internal conflicts, particularly in Darfur. It finds that although the sanctions themselves had a broad impact on Sudan’s economy, they did not consistently hinder key regime functions, including government institutions’ ability to transact in US dollars, obtain US-origin goods and services, and acquire military and dual-use materiel. The sanctions-easing process has improved the Sudanese government’s immediate adherence to its international humanitarian obligations in Darfur and the Two Areas, and its dialogue with diplomats and humanitarians. In the longer term, however, the easing of sanctions effectively reflects international acceptance of Sudan’s longstanding strategy of seeking militarized counter-insurgency solutions to its internal conflicts while largely ignoring efforts to achieve negotiated settlements. On the ground this approach is currently reflected in the government’s neglect of formal peace processes in favour of moving directly to ‘post-conflict’ civilian disarmament—which is being implemented by a militia, in violation of the UN arms embargo, and being used as a counter-insurgency instrument—and placing pressure on internally displaced persons to return home. The easing of sanctions is likely to legitimate these tactics.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, Economy, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, and United States of America

309. CAN ECONOMIC SANCTION ACTIVITY IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES?

Author:
K. Chad Clay
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Governments often use economic sanctions for the expressed reason of curbing poor human rights practices by targeted states. However, previous research on the topic (e.g. Peksen 2009; Wood 2008) has found that the imposition of economic sanctions is regularly followed by increases in the use of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and enforced disappearance (also known as physical integrity rights abuses) by the targeted government, even when the sanctions are imposed over the target’s human rights practices. This raises a question: if sanctions produce worse human rights outcomes in the states targeted with them, why do governments continue to use them to try to improve human rights? There are many possible answers to that question, but in my recent article at the Journal of Global Security Studies, I focus on two in particular. First, while the imposition of economic sanctions may very well lead to increased abuse in targeted states, the threat of human rights-related economic sanctions may lead to improvements in the targeted government’s human rights practices (e.g. Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004). Second, targeted states may not be the only, or even the most important, audience for the signal sent by sanction activity (Baldwin 1985). As such, by showing observing leaders around the world that there is a possible additional cost associated with human rights abuse, rights-related sanction activity may cause some governments that were not targeted with sanctions to think twice before engaging in rights violations.
Topic:
Economics, Human Rights, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
China, Burundi, and Global Focus

310. ALL STICK, NO CARROTS: THE SHORTSIGHTED GEOPOLITICS OF THE IRAN SANCTIONS

Author:
Cullen S. Hendrix
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The Trump administration, having withdrawn the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action last May, is threatening US trading partners over doing business with Iran and attempting to freeze Iran out of global oil markets. The attempted freeze-out began with the re-imposition of US sanctions against Iran and businesses operating there, and the Trump administration set November 4 as the target date for US allies to zero out their purchases of Iranian crude. With some arm-twisting, NATO allies like Turkey and Asian security partners South Korea and India have agreed to curb Iranian imports, though it will be difficult for India to zero out its Iranian imports. Fearful of being caught up by US sanctions, major European firms like Total, Allianz, and Maersk have begun winding down operations in Iran in advance of the November 4 deadline. This whole episode reflects a fundamental misunderstanding, on the part of the Trump administration, of both the conditions under which sanctions can hope to be successful in winning policy concessions and the geopolitical realities of pursuing said course of action.
Topic:
NATO, Oil, Sanctions, Geopolitics, and Barack Obama
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, India, and United States of America