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81. What is Kosovo’s position in regional security cooperation?

Author:
Dorjeta Rukiqi
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
Regional Cooperation is central to stability of the Western Balkans (WB), which is also recognized by the European Union (EU), and it is a key condition in the European integration process of all six countries of the region. Regional cooperation is included in different chapters of the acquis, including chapters 23 and 24 of the acquis. For Kosovo, regional cooperation is part of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, which constitutes a contractual obligation. In the context of the European integration, the main platform for regional cooperation has been the Berlin Process, launched in 2014 and Kosovo has actively participated in this platform. In 2012, in the context of the normalization dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, the parties agreed with the so-called ‘’footnote agreement’’ which is meant to facilitate participation of Kosovo in regional cooperation initiative. However, the agreement is seen as controversial in Kosovo, and the country faces challenges to fully participate and integrate in regional cooperation initiatives. Of particular relevance for Kosovo in regional cooperation, is security. Kosovo's representation in regional security cooperation initiatives is limited, and often facilitated by organizations like NATO, EULEX, and UNMIK. In addition to the political hurdles for participation and integration in regional security cooperation initiatives, even in those organizations or initiatives that it has managed to secure membership, Kosovo is often under represented, particularly in leadership roles. For instance a study from 2021 shows that only nine percent of staff in regional organizations hailed from Kosovo. Consequently, despite being part of multiple regional security cooperation initiatives, Kosovo's position remains unequal compared to other member states of the WB.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, Political stability, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

82. How the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation IF IMPLEMENTED changes relations between Kosovo and Serbia?

Author:
Ramadan Ilazi and Adelina Hasani
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
• The Agreement on the Path to Normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia (APN), creates a possibility for a new state of relations between the two countries, albeit a new status-quo. Through the APN Serbia practically recognizes statehood attributes of Kosovo, by accepting national symbols, as well as the obligation to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Kosovo, and treat Kosovo on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), and the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). The APN also makes Kosovo and Serbia responsible to preserve the peace and “contribute to fruitful regional co-operation and security in Europe”. • The new state of relations (new status-quo), is dependent upon effective implementation of the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation. Without effective implementation, the APN becomes another conflict management tool, rather than an instrument for affirmative normalization of relations. The current trends are not optimistic for implementation and suggest that both parties, especially in Serbia, are focused on undermining the APN and its impact; • The Agreement on the Path to Normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia, while introduces significant affirmative changes in the Kosovo-Serbia relations – if implemented – it also includes elements that can potentially create legal and political hurdles for the Kosovo government. The APN marks the first time, that a Kosovo government accepts Serbia’s position on the status question. The preamble of the APN includes the following sentence: “[…] without prejudice to the different view of the Parties on fundamental questions, including on status questions”, but there is not reference to the ICJ advisory opinion on the declaration of independence of Kosovo. Based on the precedents set by previous agreements/arrangements between Kosovo and Serbia in the framework of the EU-facilitated normalization dialogue, whenever the phrasing “without prejudice to the status” was used, a reference to the ICJ advisory opinion on declaration of independence was also included; • The Agreement on the Path to Normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia has been welcomed by the European Council, which marks the first time that all 27 Member States of the European Union (EU) have endorsed an agreement from the normalization dialogue. The European Council conclusions note that APN puts “the relationship between both parties on a new and sustainable basis as a historic chance that should be seized by both parties” and urges implementation • In other words, if the optimistic scenario of all five recognizing Kosovo fails, then Spain and Cyprus should move towards the current Greek position on Kosovo, while Greece itself, alongside Slovakia and Romania, should move to formal recognition. In Kosovo there are concerns about the position of Romania, which is seen as moving further away from constructive engagement with Kosovo and recognition and closer to the position of Spain. • The role of the European Union (EU) as a facilitator in the dialogue for normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, has arguably evolved into an arbiter, as a result of the Agreement on the Path to Normalization (APN), and the implementation roadmap. This means that for Kosovo and Serbia implementation of the provisions from the APN is a contractual obligation towards the EU in the framework of the European integration process. This arrangement was necessitated by the refusal of Serbia to sign the APN, although it agreed to it verbally. In this context, when neither side has signed the APN, the role of EU as an arbiter is a must, in order to guarantee implementation by both countries. • The transparency of the process of the dialogue for normalization of relations with Serbia has declined in Kosovo. The Kosovo government has limited its reporting on the normalization dialogue both to the public as well as to the Kosovo Assembly. In addition to this, Kosovo government has acted against previous precedents of asking the Kosovo Assembly for consent when accepting a high-level agreement with Serbia, such as the case from 2013 with the “First agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations”. • The implementation annex to the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia agreed in Ohrid in March, is vague, and lacks concrete measures to ensure implementation of the agreement, including sequencing of actions.
Topic:
Security, Sovereignty, Bilateral Relations, Normalization, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

83. Legal and Political Mechanisms for Peacemaking: How These May Apply to the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Process

Author:
Rodrigo Labardini
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Despite various tensions that have been going on for some time, there have been a number of indications that a formal peace treaty may be signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the time ahead. This expectation became even sturdier after a significant increase in the number of meetings between the leaders of both countries, particularly during May and July 2023 (Brussels on 14 May, Moscow on 25 May, Chișinău on 1 June, and Brussels again on 15 July). These meetings were parallel to several others by the Deputy Prime Ministers and Foreign Affairs Ministers of both countries in diverse cities ranging from Brussels and Chișinău to Washington and Moscow and on the bilateral border. Statements and readouts from these meetings evidence a complex negotiation and an interrupted conversation mechanism with the EU’s facilitation, the U.S.’s support, and Russia’s mediation, including encouragement from Türkiye and, to some extent, France and Germany. The conversations have been very complicated. Not only do they deal with very thorny issues having to do regional security, the restoration of transport links between the two South Caucasus states (this would assist and further develop regional linkages in the Silk Road region and points beyond), the delimitation of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, the future of Karabakh’s ethnic-Armenian population and Azerbaijan’s internally displaced persons (IDPs), and a possible peace treaty. But, at least implicitly, they also deal with overcoming a protracted animosity—that is to say, the question of reconciliation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Peacebuilding, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus

84. The Pashinyan Conundrum: Predictably Unpredictable, Consistently Inconsistent

Author:
Onnik Krikorian
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Resolving the conflict in Karabakh requires a careful assessment of the roles of Russia, the EU, and the United States—states that have been involved as mediator, facilitator, and supporter of the peace process, respectively. Moscow believes two things: one, that the EU and the U.S. are hoping to edge Russia out of the region; and two, that there is a particular interest in removing the Russian peacekeeping contingent from Karabakh when its first and possibly last five-year term expires at the end of 2025. Ultimately, finding a solution to the conflict over Karabakh and the broader Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict will require a delicate balancing act among the various stakeholders involved, with a focus on promoting peace, stability, and security in the region. But in the absence of such an environment, there are concerns that competition between the actors involved could disrupt what progress has reportedly been made to date. Regardless of that rivalry, however, it should be remembered that any peace deal will be signed by the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders—and nobody else. But here, too, the situation is unclear. Despite Azerbaijan’s decisive victory over Armenia in the 2020 Karabakh war, a final peace treaty remains elusive nearly two and a half years after the trilateral Armenia-Azerbaijan-Russia ceasefire statement was announced on 10 November 2020.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, European Union, Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, United States of America, and Nagorno-Karabakh

85. Turkish - Egyptian Relations under Erdoğan in the Light of the Regional Security Complexes Theory

Author:
Martin Dudáš
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
AKP's rise to power in Turkey brought economic development and the reexamination of the country's self-perception. Erdoğan's foreign policy aimed to develop relations with Middle Eastern countries so that Turkey could become the region's leader. This article focuses on Turkey's relations with Egypt within the Regional Security Complexes Theory framework. It argues that the rise of Turkey's influence and power led to new alignments between the region's countries. Following the coup led by General el-Sisi, Egypt became hostile to Ankara and sought allies to help it counterbalance Turkey. Thus, it began cooperating with Greece and Cyprus, states that do not belong to the Middle Eastern RSC. This new alignment then slowed down the process of normalisation of ties between Cairo and Ankara, which became possible only after both countries experienced economic problems, and the regional climate changed after the blockade of Qatar ended.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, AKP, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Egypt

86. [Global NK Update] July 2023

Author:
Minah Kang
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Key Updates: 1) North Korea’s launch of the ICBM Hwasongpho-18 on July 12th, with an unprecedented 74-minute flight time, drew condemnation from the US, South Korea, and Japan, as discussions were ongoing at a NATO summit. 2) North Korea marked its 70th War Victory Day with a grand ceremony attended by Chinese and Russian officials, including a military parade showcasing their armed forces and strategic weapons, such as the ICBM Hwasongpho-18.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Regional Security, ICBM, and Armistice
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and North Korea

87. [Global NK Update] August 2023

Author:
Minah Kang
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
1) The recent developments in military cooperation between Russia and North Korea resulted in sanctions on entities that facilitated their arms deals. 2) The South Korea-U.S.-Japan Summit at Camp David laid a strong foundation for continuous and stable trilateral cooperation to address North Korean threats and bolster regional security. 3) North Korea’s second “satellite launch” has raised regional concerns and prompted trilateral action.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Weapons, Cooperation, Military, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Asia, and North Korea

88. Thе Onе-Day War: Analyzing how Azеrbaijan's control of Karabakh is rеshaping gеopolitical equilibrium in thе South Caucasus

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On Sеptеmbеr 19, 2023, Azеrbaijani forcеs launchеd a nеw military campaign against thе sеparatist rеgion of Nagorno-Karabakh, citing countеr-tеrrorism as a prеtеxt following thе dеaths of sеvеral of its soldiеrs in thе arеa. This action has raised concerns about thе potential for a rеnеwеd all-out war in thе South Caucasus. Azеrbaijan dеclarеd complеtе control ovеr thе rеgion just onе day after commеncing its military opеration. This dеvеlopmеnt has promptеd significant spеculation about its potential rеpеrcussions on thе gеopolitical balancе in thе rеgion.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and Nagorno-Karabakh

89. Making Collective Deterrence and Defense Work in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
David Santoro and Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The Indo-Pacific security architecture is undergoing fundamental transformation to address rising challenges, most notably those posed by an increasingly confident, assertive, and capable China. Pacific Forum has started a multi-year unofficial dialogue with experts and officials from the United States and key allies and partners to share views of this evolving regional security environment and identify common interests and concerns as well as areas of divergence. The inaugural Pacific Forum Defense and Deterrence Dialogue, which included participants from the United States, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, took place in Tokyo on February 2-3, 2023. It was run at the Track 2 level, although diplomatic officials and military officers from each country also attended as observers. Pacific Forum’s goal is to identify ways to shape this evolution to ensure that it meets U.S. national security needs, particularly integrated deterrence of, and defense against, regional adversaries—with China as the foremost concern. Responses to these changes have taken several forms. Bilateral alliances are being modernized. Other security relationships are being strengthened, such as those between Japan and Australia and Japan and the United Kingdom. There is also talk of new coordination among Five Eyes and other partners. In other cases, new initiatives have been launched, such as the Australia-United Kingdom-United States “enhanced trilateral security partnership” (AUKUS) or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Recent developments, such as the election of conservative Yoon Yuk-soul as president in South Korea, are hopeful signs of the revitalization of currently moribund defense and security arrangements, notably U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation. There is also reportedly talk of renewed interest in the Trilateral Security Dialogue that includes the United States, Australia, and Japan. All these initiatives are designed to better compete with, deter, and, if necessary, defend against adversaries determined to rewrite the regional order in ways that align with their interests. While the notion of an Asian equivalent to NATO is out of sync with regional needs (and there is broad recognition of that fact among key allies), current momentum could herald the emergence of an Indo-Pacific defense community reminiscent of the one created by trans-Atlantic nations after the Second World War. That community was forged to defend against the Soviet Union. Today, the nascent group in the Indo-Pacific is focused on China, although it is not the only threat. Understanding how regional governments see and rank those diverse threats is a critical step in ensuring that the new arrangements are most effective. One thing is certain: the current situation—in which there is no coordination mechanism among the existing and emerging arrangements—is not tenable in view of the mounting China challenge. To succeed, this process must be nurtured. The United States must better understand the forces at play and the views driving national action, and it must work to ensure that those changes are effective to counter China and other challenges. Work is needed to understand how all these pieces fit together in a coherent regional deterrence and defense architecture, particularly to deal with strategic conflict. This is not easy. The above- mentioned initiatives and relationships are new and evolving. It is difficult to appreciate each on its own, much less the overlap between them, and their convergences and divergences. Plus, in some cases, governments are also focused on other ways to deter. DTRA’s chief concern is the warfighter, who must be prepared to address a range of threats that extends from “strategic” military problems (including those related to nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and other domains) to gray zone issues, but some regional initiatives also address other issues, notably climate change, vaccine diplomacy, and emerging technologies. It is critical that the United States understand how allies and partners see this menu of items and their goals and priorities, even as the focus of our proposed effort is strengthening regional deterrence and defense. Plainly, a cumulative, comparative assessment is critical because effective deterrence and defense demand a comprehensive analysis and there needs to be shared understanding of how these mechanisms can be coordinated to ensure that needs are met and that participating governments maximize and make the most efficient contributions. From a U.S. perspective, building a collective deterrence and defense architecture in the Indo-Pacific is urgent and the only realistic way to compete effectively against China. As a landmark report from the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney has found, “a strategy of collective defence is fast becoming necessary as a way of offsetting shortfalls in America’s regional military power and holding the line against rising Chinese strength.”1 Failure to build an effective Indo-Pacific deterrence and defense architecture would shift the regional balance of forces to the detriment of the United States as it addresses the China challenge.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

90. Anchoring the U.S.-Philippines Alliance

Author:
Mico Galang, April Arnold, Japhet Quitzon, Brynn Park, Thomas Shattuck, and Jeffrey Ordaniel
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The U.S.- Philippine Alliance has advanced significantly over the past two years. The period of transition, from Duterte to Marcos, and the renewed American commitment to the Indo-Pacific under Joe Biden were key determinants. Institutionalizing this progress in ways that allow the alliance to better withstand political changes, both in Washington and Manila, and to better deal with emerging regional security challenges is imperative.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Philippines, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America