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21. Taiwan Strait’s Echo in Korean Peninsula Security and the US-ROK Alliance

Author:
Yerin Yoon
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In recent years, the geopolitical landscape of East Asia has undergone significant shifts, with the Taiwan Strait emerging as a pivotal point of great power competition and regional instability. This paper delves into the intricate dynamics in this evolving scenario, examining the multifaceted implications of Taiwan contingencies and their ripple effects on the security of the Korean Peninsula and the longstanding US-ROK alliance. This study highlights the need for Korea to build strategic plans for a Taiwan contingency by examining the correlation between plausible scenarios and the security challenges of the Korean Peninsula. This paper explores the broader implications of a Taiwan contingency within the context of great power rivalry and international relations. Moreover, it analyzes specific scenarios related to the Korean Peninsula that could unfold around Taiwan, such as maritime blockades and potential Chinese armed attacks on Taiwanese territory. It then emphasizes the influence of these scenarios on the Korean Peninsula, revealing a complex web of economic security, diplomatic, and military challenges. The article thereafter turns its attention to the US-ROK alliance essential to regional security in East Asia. This analysis examines the strategic ramifications of the relocation of US Forces Korea (USFK) and the possible engagement of the ROK military to assess the potential responses by the US-ROK alliance to the Taiwan crisis. It also highlights how crucial it is to comprehend each of the points of view held by the US and the ROK, underscoring the complex intricacies of the alliance. Finally, the paper proposes strategic policy recommendations to enhance Korea’s role in regional security. This includes strategies for maritime security, military readiness against conventional threats, and the strengthening of trilateral relationships with the US and Japan, providing a proactive roadmap for Korea’s foreign and defense policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Alliance, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

22. A Subdued Environment and Missed Opportunities

Author:
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Chinese diplomacy toward the Korean Peninsula in late 2023 sputtered forward, driven more by a calendar of bilateral anniversaries with North Korea and multilateral gatherings involving South Korea than any sense of strategic purpose. Both relationships seemed preoccupied with off-stage developments such as the September summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin and the momentum of US-Japan-South Korea trilateral relations, rather than any inherent dynamism of their own. Still, regular Sino-North Korean bilateral exchanges ahead of the 75th anniversary of the bilateral relationship and Sino-South Korean bilateral economic dialogues provide opportunities to overcome resistance and sustain progress in the face of deepening major power rivalries. Senior-level dialogues between China and North Korea occurred on North Korea’s 75th founding anniversary in September, with the visit of Chinese Vice Premier Liu Guozhong to Pyongyang, a visit that occurred against the backdrop of the second US-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group meeting, North Korea’s first successful indigenous satellite launch, and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong Ho’s visit to Beijing. Meanwhile, ministerial and working-level economic dialogues on issues such as supply-chain stability, export controls, and trade facilitation continued between China and South Korea, punctuated by a notable bilateral exchange between Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo in late September on the 19th Asian Games in Hangzhou. But these exchanges did not generate the traction necessary for South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to have substantive bilateral meetings with President Xi on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in San Francisco in November. Bilateral and trilateral foreign ministerial meetings in Busan between South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin and counterparts Wang Yi and Kamikawa Yoko—the first in four years—failed to generate sufficient momentum to set a date for the resumption of China-Japan-South Korea summitry. Instead, the resumption of China-South Korea or China-Japan-South Korea summitry will depend on developments in 2024.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, South Korea, and North Korea

23. Both Koreas Ditch Their Border Accord

Author:
Aidan Foster-Career
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The last third of 2023 was eventful in Korea, especially the two final months. Fall found South Koreans preoccupied with events elsewhere, and their implications for the peninsula. In September, Kim Jong Un’s Siberian summit with Vladimir Putin prompted worries as to how closer Pyongyang-Moscow military ties might affect the ROK. In October, Hamas’ shocking attack on Israel added a new layer of alarm, warranted or otherwise. President Yoon Suk Yeol was among those expressing fear that the DPRK might launch a similar surprise assault. He soon had less hypothetical concerns. In November, in response to Pyongyang’s successful launch (following two earlier failures) of a military reconnaissance satellite, Seoul partially suspended 2018’s inter-Korean military accord—whereupon the North predictably scrapped it entirely. Tensions grew as both sides rearmed at the ironically named Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and talked tough — none tougher than Kim Jong Un, who spoke openly of occupying the South. As the year ended, Kim declared a major change in DPRK doctrine. Dropping its longstanding lip service to reunification, the North now regards the peninsular situation as “relations between two belligerent states.” The implications of this shift remain to be seen.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Borders, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

24. Strategic Dynamism: 50th Anniversary of Relations and New Security Ties

Author:
Kei Koga
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Japan-Southeast Asia relations marked two milestones in 2023-24. The first was the 50th anniversary of Japan-ASEAN Relations, during which Japan and ASEAN emphasized an equal partnership by adopting the keyword “co-creation” to promote economic prosperity and security stability in Southeast Asia and beyond. The second is strengthening Japan-Philippines bilateral strategic ties, not only bilaterally, but also trilaterally with the United States and quadrilaterally with Australia. Japan continuously engages with other Southeast Asian states and strengthens ties with ASEAN to reinforce ASEAN Centrality and unity, yet a challenge remains: how Japan can design a regional architecture in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific by clarifying the roles and division of labor among those institutions.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, ASEAN, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Southeast Asia

25. Taiwan and China—Steady As She Goes

Author:
David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
As 2024 dawned, Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated in his New Year Address that Taiwan must unify with China. In her New Year Address, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, with the election of her successor only 14 days away, repeated her offer to meet China on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and without preconditions, echoing themes dating back to her first inaugural address in 2016. On Jan. 14, Tsai’s chosen successor, Vice President Lai Ching-te, won an unprecedented third successive term for the Democratic Progressive Party, promising to uphold the independence of the Republic of China, but the party lost its majority in the legislature. A month later, two Chinese fishermen operating illegally near Kinmen Island died when their boat capsized as they were pursued by the Taiwan Coast Guard. Five days later, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel boarded and inspected a Taiwanese tour boat near Kinmen. Tensions grew but they did not boil over. On Jan. 30, China unilaterally moved its M503 civil aviation flight route closer to the median line of the Taiwan Strait. Premier Li Qiang included the obligatory call for Taiwan reunification in his Work Report to China’s National People’s Congress (NPC). Some analysts found that and other NPC references to Taiwan more strident than in recent years, but any change in tone was subtle. In apparent retaliation for Lai’s electoral victory, China persuaded Nauru to switch diplomatic ties from Taiwan to China even as Taiwan continued to strengthen unofficial relations with larger powers. These Taiwan efforts were supported by US President Biden, who used a trilateral meeting with Japan and the Philippines to call for cross-Strait stability. Taiwan’s continuing negotiation with the US of a 21st Century Trade Initiative and TSMC’s decision to expand new facilities under construction in Arizona exemplified Taiwan’s continuing diversification of economic linkages away from China. President-elect Lai will be inaugurated on May 20; his inaugural speech and China’s response could portend the future course of cross-Strait relations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Regional Security, and Cross-Strait Relations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

26. Strategic Partners or Fickle Friends? Indonesia’s Perceptions of the US-Australia Defense and Security Relationship

Author:
Lina Alexandra and Pieter Pandie
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Lina A. Alexndra and Mr. Pieter Pandie, Head of the International Relations Department and Researcher at Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, respectfully, explain that "while [Indonesia] certainly considers Australia and the United States as key partners in navigating the region's security landscape... Indonesia has desired a more independent Australia, given its proximity"
Topic:
Security, Regional Security, Perception, Defense Cooperation, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Australia, Southeast Asia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

27. ​​Vietnamese Perspective on the Significance of the US-Australia Alliance in Southeast Asian Security​

Author:
Bich T. Tran
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
​Dr. Bich Tran​, ​Postdoctoral Fellow at National University of Singapore and Adjunct Fellow Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.​, ​examines the implications of the alliance for Southeast Asian security from the perspective of Vietnam, a country that has long pursued a policy of non-alignment while actively engaging with both the United States and Australia.​
Topic:
International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, Regional Security, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Vietnam, Australia, Southeast Asia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

28. The U.S.–Japan–South Korea Trilateral Partnership: Pursuing Regional Stability and Avoiding Military Escalation

Author:
James Park and Mike M. Mochizuki
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A trilateral partnership is emerging in northeast Asia. Building off last August’s Camp David summit between the countries’ leaders, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are now engaging militarily in an unprecedented fashion, shaping an alignment aimed to counter North Korea and China. Efforts to discourage North Korean and Chinese aggression are necessary, particularly considering Japan and South Korea’s physical proximity to the two countries. But the emerging trilateral arrangement between the United States, Japan, and South Korea could backfire and increase the risk of conflict if it focuses exclusively on military deterrence. The United States, Japan, and South Korea should instead pursue a more balanced arrangement — one that promotes stability on the Korean peninsula, credibly reaffirms long standing policy over the Taiwan issue, and disincentivizes China from pursuing its own trilateral military partnership with North Korea and Russia. To deter North Korea, the United States, South Korea, and Japan are relying on strike capabilities and military coordination to retaliate against North Korean aggression. This approach, however, will likely induce North Korea to increase its nuclear weapons and upgrade its missile capabilities. With this in mind, the three countries should roll back policy rhetoric and joint military exercises that might further provoke rather than deter North Korea, especially anything geared towards regime destruction. At the same time, the United States, Japan, and South Korea have in recent years become more reluctant to endorse the original understandings they each reached with China about Taiwan. For the sake of reassurance, the three countries together should clearly confirm in official statements their One China policies and declare that they oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by any side, do not support Taiwan independence, and will accept any resolution of the Taiwan issue (including unification) achieved by peaceful and non–coercive means. Each country’s respective relationship with Taiwan should also remain strictly unofficial. Another concerning aspect associated with this trilateral is the possibility of a corresponding alliance formation of Russia, China, and North Korea. To disincentivize this development, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should leverage their blossoming relationship to assuage Chinese fears of strategic containment, particularly through economic and diplomatic engagement that rejects the creation of a broadly exclusionary bloc in the region.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, Escalation, Regional Security, Great Powers, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

29. Paths to Crisis and Conflict Over Taiwan

Author:
Michael D. Swaine and James Park
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint for a U.S.–China conflict, unmatched in its combustible mix of conflicting interests, high stakes, and eroding trust and assurances. A full–blown war over Taiwan has become a startling possibility. Suspicion, threat inflation, zero–sum framing, and worst–casing are increasingly dominant factors in U.S.–China interactions over Taiwan, driven by preconceived ideas of the other’s intentions based on history and ideology, and domestic pressures in each country to prioritize military deterrence and even aggression. Amidst this emerging threat of direct conflict, numerous scholars, experts, and military strategists have focused on how to discourage China from invading Taiwan through military force alone — warfighting perspectives that typically share glaring and mutually reinforcing faults that, if overlooked, may only help to pave the path toward conflict. Analysts’ emphasis on military deterrence tends to obscure the utmost importance of political reassurances to avert conflict, particularly the United States reaffirming and recommitting to its original understanding of the One China Policy; this fixation on the military dimension feeds into the destabilization of the Taiwan issue, brought about by heightened suspicions of the other side’s intentions. Policymakers and pundits, in turn, tend to underestimate the possibility of inadvertent escalation, driven by an environment of distrust, pressure in Washington and Beijing to appear tough on the other, and a lack of comprehensive crisis management mechanisms. By examining the common analytical blindspots regarding a conflict over Taiwan, this report sheds new light on how the political and social dynamics fueling mutual hostility between Beijing and Washington could play a much more decisive role in a future crisis over Taiwan, rather than factors that earn far more attention, such as calculations about military capability and resolve. Averting a destructive crisis will require the United States and China to build off recent diplomatic progress to restore a deeper mutual understanding concerning Taiwan through policies and actions including: Mutual recognition of the interactive nature of the growing crisis over Taiwan, to which Beijing, Washington, and Taipei contribute. A clearer, more credible U.S. commitment to its successful, long–standing stance on Taiwan: the One China Policy and strategic ambiguity. Continued U.S. rejection of both unilateral Taiwan independence and any unambiguous commitment to Taiwan’s defense. A credible Chinese affirmation of its continued commitment to peaceful unification without any specific deadline. The development of a broad–based crisis communication mechanism that includes both military and civilian dialogue.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Crisis Management, Joe Biden, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

30. Militarism, Insecurity, and the Non- Sovereign Pacific

Author:
Van Jackson
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
This moment is an opportunity for us islanders of the Pacific to shape a common destiny built around peace...” asserted Fiji’s Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka on 10 November 2023.1 Addressing his counterparts at the 52nd Pacific Islands Forum, he advocated for the Pacific to become a “zone of peace,” echoing an ambition he had declared before the United Nations General Assembly only two months earlier.2 Island leaders today dub their region a “Blue Pacific,” a strategic identity that conceives of their people as a mega-continent bound together not just by geography and common cultural referents, but also by shared threats ranging from climate change to great-power competition. Due to its sheer size and deep connections with Asia and the Americas, war in this region would inevitably implicate much of the globe—so would peace. “Our nations,” Rabuka reminded his islander brethren, “...have sovereign rights over 32 million square kilome- ters... only slightly smaller than the combined land areas of Russia, China, and the United States.” Leaders attending the Pacific Islands Forum endorsed Rabuka’s call for establishing a zone of peace, building on a long tradition of peace activism in the Pacific.3 Rabuka and Pacific Island leaders rightfully see their very survival as contingent on the region becoming a beacon of light in a dark world. But foreign continental powers have previously ensured that the Blue Pacific does not act as the expansive, unified, strategically vital site that it must be in order to foster peace. The geopolitical circumstances facing the Pacific directly threaten Rabuka’s vision. This essay argues that the security-first fixation driving the continental powers’ engagement with the Pacific makes the region both less secure and more vulnerable to outside predation. Contrary to Western rhetorical visions of a “free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific,” a large area of the Blue Pacific region does not even exercise national sovereignty.4 This Non-Sovereign Pacific—which includes Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), American Samoa, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and the semi-sovereign “freely associated” states of Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia—is a reality reproduced and exploited by great-power rivalry.5
Topic:
Security, Sovereignty, Regional Security, and Militarism
Political Geography:
Asia-Pacific and Pacific Islands