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32. The Power of Small EU Member States After Brexit: How Powerful Is the Visegrad Group?
- Author:
- Thomas Kajanek
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
- Institution:
- Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
- Abstract:
- The power of individual EU Member States has been changing over the past decades as a result of revisions to the voting systems and the enlargements of the European Union. The present article analyses the development of the voting power of individual Member States in the Council of the European Union before and after the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union. We use the calculation of the standardized Banzhaf power index to calculate the legislative power of the Member States. The calculations recorded in the table point to changes in the weights of national votes caused by Brexit. The article pays special attention to the Visegrad Group, which we define within the European Union as an informal group consisting of four Central European states - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. The results indicate a significant growth of the voting power in Poland and more moderate growth in the other three Visegrad Group countries which contributes to the shift in the voting equilibrium within the ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union.
- Topic:
- Regional Cooperation, European Union, Brexit, Regional Power, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic
33. Fall 2022 edition of Contemporary Eurasia
- Author:
- Levon Hovsepyan
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Contemporary Eurasia
- Institution:
- Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
- Abstract:
- CONTENTS LEVON HOVSEPYAN, TATEVIK MANUKYAN TURKISH DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS AND ANKARA’S MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SYRIA: KURDISH THREAT AND EXPANSIONIST AMBITIONS.......................................................................................................... 5 NELLI MINASYAN TURKISH INITIATIVES IN THE DIRECTION OF TURKIC INTEGRATION: PREREQUISITES AND TENDENCIES............................................................. 22 ARAKS PASHAYAN, NAZELI NAVASARDYAN SOCIO-POLITICAL PERCEPTION OF SHĪʿA ISLAM IN AZERBAIJAN: THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS ................................................ 40 GUIHUA NI TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION AND POWER TRANSITION: THE CASE OF THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY IN EAST ASIA ................................... 55 ARAM GASPARYAN THE “CIVIL CONCORD”: ATTEMPT FOR PEACE IN ALGERIA ................ 76
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Islam, Science and Technology, Syrian War, Kurds, Integration, Regional Power, Semiconductors, and Shiism
- Political Geography:
- Central Asia, Turkey, Middle East, East Asia, Algeria, Azerbaijan, and Syria
34. Burning ambition: Egypt’s return to regional leadership and how Europe should respond
- Author:
- Hafsa Halawa
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- After a decade of domestic turmoil, Egypt is looking to regain its former role as a major regional player. Growing stability at home, improving economic prospects, and recent détente across the Middle East have boosted Cairo’s feelings of self-assurance. In particular, Egypt is distancing itself from the anti-Islamist alliance it had joined with the UAE and Saudi Arabia and is engaged in dialogue with former adversaries Qatar and Turkey. Major threats along Egypt’s borders, including water security concerns to its south and the war in Libya, have prompted Cairo to re-engage with its European partners – which it expects to help on these issues. American and European fears that Egypt is “too big to fail” further boost Cairo’s confidence. The Egyptian regime has become somewhat more open to discussing matters such as human rights than Western capitals sometimes assume. Europeans should seize this opportunity as part of a wide-ranging engagement addressing European regional interests as well as ongoing concern about the domestic situation in Egypt.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economy, Political stability, Alliance, Regional Integration, and Regional Power
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North Africa, and Egypt
35. Less Than a Full Deck: Russia’s Economic Influence in the Mediterranean
- Author:
- Joanna Pritchett
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, and then subsequently in Libya, marked its return as a major actor in the Mediterranean. Much has been made of Russia’s use of all elements of statecraft, including diplomatic, ideological, military, and economic instruments, to advance its interests in this region, a vital shipping and transit corridor. A closer look at Russia’s economic tool kit in this region, however, suggests concerns about Russian economic capabilities are likely overstated. Russia’s most important economic tools in the Mediterranean are its energy resources, arms exports, and ability to launder money through corrupt networks. These tools have complemented Russia’s diplomatic and military activities, particularly in areas where economic systems and rule of law have been weaker. Where Russia has been successful, it has increased a country’s dependence on Russian money, oil and gas, and/or arms, giving it a say in a country’s policymaking, particularly on matters of importance to Russia, and a way to undermine U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) influence in the region. In particular, Russia’s unique economic tools have helped it manage its otherwise difficult relationship with Turkey, which depends on Russian oil and gas and is a new customer for Russian nuclear power and weapons systems. Turkey is a unique example in the Mediterranean where Russia already had a substantial trade and investment relationship beyond hydrocarbons, and then used these newer, more subversive tools to build its influence. These same tools have allowed Russia to gain more influence in Egypt, Algeria, and to some degree Cyprus over the last decade. These tools have proved of limited utility elsewhere, however, as they have not been backed by the traditional instruments of economic statecraft: trade in non-energy goods and services, foreign direct investment, and development assistance. Russia has trailed the United States and Europe, and in some cases China, in deploying these fundamental economic elements of foreign policy in the Mediterranean region. Based on economic data available, Russia’s bilateral trade with individual Mediterranean countries is low, its investment levels in most Mediterranean countries are insubstantial, and it is not giving large quantities of development assistance to the poorer countries along the Mediterranean’s eastern and southern rims. The lack of these traditional economic ties is surprising, given Russia’s military and diplomatic efforts to increase its influence in the region. Without them, Russia’s economic diplomacy in the region is highly based on symbolism and the relationships lack sustainability over the long term, which undercuts its geopolitical ambitions in the Mediterranean. If Russia’s ambitions in the Mediterranean region are limited to maintaining access, currying favor with key decisionmakers, and remaining a nuisance to NATO, then its current level of economic ties is likely sufficient. If Russia aims to grow its influence and clout with more countries in the region, however, its current economic tool kit does not appear to be large or sophisticated enough to achieve this. Economic statecraft is an important tool in any country’s foreign policy. Trade and investment deals link countries together in vital ways to improve living standards in each country. They also build relationships between people—politicians, business leaders, students, tourists—that promote mutual understanding and respect for each other’s cultures. The United States and the European Union (EU) have generally excelled in building these types of economic ties in the post–World War II era, and economic data show they continue to be the dominant economic powers in the Mediterranean. Continuing this leadership in the economy will likely ensure that Russian influence in the Mediterranean remains a manageable, if persistent, problem for the West.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Trade, Regional Power, and Energy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean
36. Deals, Drones, and National Will: The New Era in Turkish Power Projection
- Author:
- Rich Outzen
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Turkey has recently pushed the PKK fight from its own turf and blunted challenges in northern Syria, Azerbaijan, Libya, and the Gulf, all while strengthening its defense export sector. In 2020, military observers took note when the Turkish Armed Forces employed drones to devastating effect in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus. But this technological achievement must be regarded as just one part of a revamped Turkish approach to regional power projection—a change with economic, diplomatic, strategic, reputational, and battlefield implications. In the past five years, Turkey has notched many associated successes, such as pushing the PKK fight off its own turf and blunting challenges to its interests in northern Syria, Azerbaijan, Libya, and the Gulf. Ankara has also secured significant leverage in other disputes from the Horn of Africa to the Balkans, while strengthening its defense export sector. As military expert Col. Rich Outzen, U.S. Army (Ret.), makes clear in this tightly argued Policy Note, Turkey’s power projection does not always align with U.S. interests, a reality exemplified by anti-SDF military operations and defense industry cooperation with Russia. But ending the U.S.-Turkey military alliance over such differences is neither productive nor tenable. Instead, America can seek to work with an emergent Turkey in the many cases, from Qatar to Afghanistan, where such collaboration advances U.S. strategic interests.
- Topic:
- Security, Armed Forces, Weapons, Drones, and Regional Power
- Political Geography:
- Turkey and Middle East
37. Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib
- Author:
- Erwin van Veen
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- The trigger for the Turkish Operation Spring Shield in northern Idlib in February 2020 was to prevent the Syrian conflict – especially extremists and refugees – spilling over into Turkey as the result of a new regime offensive. A deeper driver of the operation was Ankara’s desire to draw a line against further regime advances that might jeopardise Turkish territorial gains across northern Syria. Millions of Syrian internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) were the main – although unintended – beneficiaries of the operation. Tactically, Operation Spring Shield was a success because of a surge in Turkish military resources in northern Idlib, Ankara’s willingness to use them, and the speed with which Turkey acted. Strategically, it helped a great deal that Russia decided to stand aside for a few days. Russian-Turkish diplomacy resumed after battlefield conditions had shifted in Turkey’s favour and Syrian regime forces were stopped in their tracks. In the short term, Operation Spring Shield can be considered as having brought a measure of humanitarian and geopolitical stabilisation by clarifying Turkey’s red lines to Damascus, Tehran and Moscow, and by bringing about a new equilibrium between Russiansupported forces and Turkish forces in Syria. The operation did not negatively affect Turkey’s relationship with its NATO partners, the EU or the US. This was in part because the operation highlighted the limitations of the Astana process – a diplomatic initative in which Turkey, Iran and Russia pursue opposing aims vis-à-vis the Assad regime – from which these actors are excluded. In the medium term, the impact of Operation Spring Shield will depend on the permanence of the Turkish presence, the level of Turkish developmental investment and the evolution, as well as the place, of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the future governance of northern Idlib.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Refugees, Military Intervention, and Regional Power
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria
38. Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Libya
- Author:
- Engin Yüksel
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- The strategic objectives of the Turkish military intervention in Libya in 2019–2020 in favour of the Government of National Accord (GNA) were geopolitical (establishing an entry point into Africa in addition to Somalia), geo-economical (related to gas exploration in the Mediterranean) and commercial (facilitating repayment of outstanding business debts and enabling future profits). The deeper drivers of Ankara’s intervention include a mix of more assertive nationalism based on a hegemonic conception of Turkey’s ‘near abroad’, a perceived need to counter the military campaign of the Libyan National Army (LNA)’s to conquer Tripolitania, and Turkey’s exclusion from Mediterranean gas politics. Ankara’s intervention and its institutionalisation proved effective in counterbalancing the LNA and its international backers – chiefly Russia and the UAE, but also France and Egypt – and produced a more stable political situation in the process. While Turkey has achieved its short- to medium-term objectives and is likely to retain a substantial permanent military, commercial and political presence in Libya, it also created tensions with the EU and US as well as antagonizing the LNA’s international backers. In brief, an improvement in Turkey’s geostrategic position might have come at the cost of its regional strategic relations.
- Topic:
- Politics, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Regional Power
- Political Geography:
- Turkey, Middle East, and Libya
39. Covid’s Impact on India’s Soft Power in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- Rani Mullen
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- Understanding India’s soft power in the Indo-Pacific and the possible impact of its recent decline is essential to a well-informed American strategy in the region. As the world’s second-most populous country and largest democracy, India is an important power and American partner, as highlighted in President Biden’s March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which also identified the Indo-Pacific as vital to American national interests. The Great Power competition in the Indo-Pacific and India’s hard power has been analyzed in other articles in this series. As Joseph Nye pointed out in the 1980s, successful states require both hard and soft power–the wherewithal to coerce as well as the ability to entice and influence the behavior of other countries without force. America’s partnership with India is based not only on the mutual strategic interest of countering China but also on the soft power element of shared democratic values. At the same time, India’s ability to persuade regional countries to partner with it, despite it not having China’s deep pockets or hard power, is key to keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open.
- Topic:
- Soft Power, COVID-19, Strategic Interests, and Regional Power
- Political Geography:
- China, South Asia, India, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
40. Hizballah’s Gain, Lebanon’s Pain
- Author:
- Joel Parker and Sarah Cahn
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
- Abstract:
- On August 6, Hizballah fired 20 rockets towards the Shebaa Farms area of the Golan Heights, highlighting the growing political instability in Lebanon. Hizballah's behavior should be viewed in light of the ongoing financial and political crisis that has affected every aspect of Lebanese life since late 2019 and has pushed hundreds of thousands of people into poverty. Hizballah may not be the primary or sole cause of the crisis, but it is important to understand how it may have contributed indirectly to it, how it may benefit from it, and why it may not have an interest in fully resolving it. Hanin Ghaddar, the Friedmann Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), argues that despite the collapsing economy in Lebanon, Hizballah has been able to expand its array of social-welfare institutions to deepen their Shiʿi constituency's dependence and even expand the reach of these programs by providing support to a growing number of Lebanese who are struggling to survive. Hizballah also receives funding from Iran and through its commercial activities around the world, so one might ask how much Hizballah really needs the Lebanese state. Lina Khatib, a scholar at Chatham House and SOAS University of London, contends that Hizballah benefits from its hybrid role as a part of the state and, at the same time, free to operate outside the official channels of government and public scrutiny. Michael Young, senior editor at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, however, has argued that the group might indeed benefit from a collapse of the state, which will allow Hizballah to continue to fill a growing political, economic, and social power vacuum.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Hezbollah, Regional Power, and Economic Crisis
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Lebanon