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11. Latin American Brotherhood? Immigration and Preferences for Redistribution

Author:
Julian Martinez-Correa, Leonardo Peñaloza Pacheco, and Leonardo Gasparini
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)
Abstract:
The effect of immigration on preferences for redistribution has been recently studied in the context of developed countries receiving migrants from poorer coun- tries with very different cultural backgrounds. In this paper we explore this issue in the context of migration across similar Latin American countries. To this aim, we exploit data at the provincial level from a large attitudinal survey (LAPOP) and match it to immigration data from different sources. We follow three approaches: first, we implement an instrumental variables approach in a cross-section of cen- suses; second we estimate fixed effects models with data from a large sample of harmonized national household surveys, and third we exploit the massive inflow of Venezuelan refugees into the border country of Colombia with an instrumental vari- ables methodology. Our results suggest a significant, negative and non-monotonic relationship between the share of immigrants at the provincial level and the sup- port for redistribution policies. This anti-redistribution effect is larger among those individuals with higher income.
Topic:
Migration, Immigration, Refugees, Inequality, and Redistribution
Political Geography:
Latin America

12. Immigration and Preferences for Redistribution in Europe

Author:
Alberto Alesina, Elie Murard, and Hillel Rapoport
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
We examine the relationship between immigration and preferences for redistribution in Europe using a newly assembled data set of immigrant stocks for 140 regions in 16 Western European countries. Exploiting within-country variations in the share of immigrants at the regional level, we find that native respondents display lower support for redistribution when the share of immigrants in their residence region is higher. This negative association is driven by regions of countries with relatively large Welfare States and by respondents at the center or at the right of the political spectrum. The effects are also stronger when immigrants originate from Middle-Eastern or Eastern European countries, are less skilled than natives, and experience more residential segregation. These results are unlikely to be driven by immigrants' endogenous location choices, that is, by welfare magnet effects or by immigrants' sorting into regions with better economic opportunities. They are also robust to instrumenting immigration with a standard shiftshare approach or to controlling for regional growth prospects.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Immigration, Welfare, and Redistribution
Political Geography:
Western Europe

13. Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules

Author:
Vincent Anesi and T. Renee Bowen
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:
We study conditions under which optimal policy experimentation can be implemented by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose to implement either a risky reform or a safe alternative with known returns each period. We find that when no redistribution is allowed the unique equilibrium outcome is generically inefficient. When committee members are allowed to redistribute resources (even arbitrarily small amounts), there always exists an equilibrium that supports optimal experimentation for any voting rule with no veto players. With veto players, however, optimal policy experimentation is possible only with a sufficient amount of redistribution. We conclude that veto rights are more of an obstacle to optimal policy experimentation than constraints on redistribution.
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Voting, and Redistribution
Political Geography:
Global Focus

14. The Value-Extracting CEO: How Executive Stock-Based Pay Undermines Investment in Productive Capabilities

Author:
William Lazonick
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
The business corporation is the central economic institution in a modern economy. A company’s senior executives, with the advice and support of the board of directors, are responsible for the allocation of corporate resources to investments in productive capabilities. Senior executives also advise the board on the extent to which, given the need to invest in productive capabilities, the company can afford to make cash distributions to shareholders. Motivating corporate resource- allocation decisions are the modes of remuneration that incentivize and reward the top executives of these companies. A sound analysis of the operation and performance of a modern economy requires an understanding of not only how much these executives are paid but also the ways in which the prevailing system of executive pay influences their decisions to allocate corporate resources. In the United States since the last half of the 1980s the overriding goal of U.S. corporations has been to “maximize shareholder value,” with corporate performance measured by a company’s “total shareholder return”: percentage stock-price appreciation plus dividend yield. Also since the 1980s, the most important components of the total compensation of senior executives have been modes of stock-based pay in the forms of stock options and stock awards. This stock-based pay is structured to incentivize executives to make corporate allocation decisions that will boost the stock prices of the companies that employ them and reward them for achieving that objective. There are three drivers of stock prices: innovation, speculation, and manipulation. The first critical question that this paper addresses is which of these drivers, individually or in combination, contribute to a company’s stock-price performance. Then we can ask the second critical question: Does executive compensation reflect the success of the company in value creation, or the power of senior executives to engage in value extraction? The “value- extracting CEO” hypothesis posits that, in the United States, a significant portion of senior executive compensation rewards them for making decisions that foment speculation and manipulate stock prices, and thereby extract value for their own personal gain. In section four of the paper, I invoke the theory of innovative enterprise to support this hypothesis and debunk the dominant ideology that companies should be run to “maximize shareholder value.” Finally, I elaborate the policy implications for controlling the power of the value-extracting CEO, including a) banning stock buybacks, b) requiring executive compensation that rewards innovation rather than speculation and manipulation, and c) placing stakeholders representing households as taxpayers, workers, and consumers on boards of directors of publicly listed companies, along with shareholders who represent households as savers. An intellectual precondition for these reforms is the rejection of the ideology that companies should be run to maximize shareholder value, which means replacing agency theory with innovation theory as a mode of analyzing how the operation of an economy, supported by the strategies and structures of the business enterprises within it, can attain the objectives of stable and equitable economic growth.
Topic:
Leadership, Investment, Corporations, Redistribution, Stock Markets, and Wage Growth
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

15. Economic Recessions and Congressional Preferences for Redistribution

Author:
Maria Carreri and Edoardo Teso
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:
We analyze the roots of politicians’ preferences for redistribution by exploring whether early life experiences have persistent, long-run effects on U.S. Members of Congress’ voting records. We study whether having experienced an economic recession during early adulthood affected their positions on redistribution-specific bills during the period 1957–2012. We find that politicians who experienced a recession hold more conservative positions on redistribution, even compared to members of the same party in the same legislature. We rule out alternative accounts and show that experiencing a recession directly affects future politicians’ personal preferences. In light of recent empirical evidence showing that voters become more supportive of redistribution following a recession, our findings suggest that macroeconomic shocks have a polarizing effect: recessions can create an ideological wedge between voters and their future representatives.
Topic:
Politics, Economy, Redistribution, and Recession
Political Geography:
United States of America

16. Labor Market Participation, Political Ideology and Distributive Preferences

Author:
Simona Demel, Abigail Barr, Luis Miller, and Paloma Ubeda
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:
Using a political-frame-free, lab-in-the-field experiment, we investigate the effects of employment status and political ideology on preferences for redistribution. The experiment consists of a real-effort task, followed by a four-player dictator game. In one treatment, initial endowments depend on participants’ performance in the real-effort task, i.e., they are earned, in the other, they are randomly determined. We find that being employed or unemployed affects revealed redistributive preferences, while the political ideology of the employed and unemployed does not. In contrast, the revealed redistributive preferences of students are strongly related to their political ideologies. The employed and right-leaning students redistribute earnings less than windfalls, the unemployed and left-leaning students make no such distinction. We conclude that, when people are not exposed to the sometimes harsh realities of the labor market, their redistributive preferences depend on their political ideology but, when they are exposed, the effect of those realities overrules their ideology.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Employment, Ideology, Labor Market, and Redistribution
Political Geography:
Global Focus

17. Preferences on Redistribution in Fragmented Labor Markets in Latin America and the Caribbean

Author:
Sarah Berens
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
This study investigates the extent to which labor market duali- zation polarizes preferences on redistribution between formal and in- formal sector workers in Latin America and the Caribbean. Differences in welfare state costs and benefits for these labor market groups are likely to fuel diverging incentives regarding welfare consumption. The article tests whether or not informal workers are driven mainly by eco- nomic self-interest to increase gains from public welfare goods. The study employed a hierarchical model on pooled survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008 and 2010 to analyze the risk exposure of formal and informal workers and, subse- quently, their preferences on redistribution. The analysis reveals that while economic self-interest is an influential factor for formal workers, it is (unexpectedly) much less so for informal workers. Also, an increased economically insecure environment, reflected by high unemployment rates, does not motivate informal workers to an exceptional degree to turn towards the state for redistribution, despite greater exposure to economic risk. Labor market dualization does not translate into polariza- tion at the individual level regarding redistributive preferences in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Topic:
Inequality, Welfare, Labor Market, and Redistribution
Political Geography:
South America, Latin America, Caribbean, and North America

18. Veiled Repression: Mainstream Economics, Capital Theory, and the Distributions of Income and Wealth

Author:
Lance Taylor
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
The Cambridge UK vs USA capital theory debates of the 1960s showed that the workhorse mainstream growth model relies on unsustainable assumptions. Its standard interpretation is not consistent with the last four decades of data. Part of an estimated increase in the ratio of personal wealth to income in recent years is due to higher asset prices. The other side of the accounts reveals that financialization and growing business debt partially offset the greater net worth of households. Attempts to interpret growth in wealth principally as a consequence of capitalization of rents are misleading. An alternative growth model based on Cambridge ideas can help correct these misinterpretations.
Topic:
Economics, Income Inequality, Economic Theory, Repression, Capital, Redistribution, and Wealth
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

19. Networks and Misallocation: Insurance, Migration, and the Rural-Urban Wage Gap

Author:
Kaivan Munshi and Mark Rosenzweig
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
We provide an explanation for the large spatial wage disparities and low male migration in India based on the trade-off between consumption-smoothing, provided by caste-based rural insurance networks, and the income-gains from migration. We provide an explanation for the large spatial wage disparities and low male migration in India based on the trade-off between consumption-smoothing, provided by caste-based rural insurance networks, and the income-gains from migration. Our theory generates two key empirically-verified predictions: (i) males in relatively wealthy households within a caste who benefit less from the redistributive (surplus- maximizing) network will be more likely to migrate, and (ii) males in households facing greater rural income-risk (who benefit more from the insurance network) migrate less. Structural estimates show that small improvements in formal insurance decrease the spatial misallocation of labor by substantially increasing migration.
Topic:
Migration, Income Inequality, Urban, Rural, Caste, Insurance, Redistribution, Wage Growth, and Wealth
Political Geography:
India and Asia

20. Wealth Concentration, Income Distribution, and Alternatives for the USA

Author:
Lance Taylor, Özlem Ömer, and Armon Rezai
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
US household wealth concentration is not likely to decline in response to fiscal interventions alone. Creation of an independent public wealth fund could lead to greater equality. Similarly, once-off tax/transfer packages or wage increases will not reduce income inequality significantly; on-going wage increases in excess of productivity growth would be needed. These results come from the accounting in a simulation model based on national income and financial data. The theory behind the model borrows from ideas that originated in Cambridge UK (especially from Luigi Pasinetti and Richard Goodwin).
Topic:
Inequality, Income Inequality, Tax Systems, Redistribution, and Wealth
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America