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41. On the "Gerasimov Doctrine": Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch

Author:
Ofer Fridman
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Punching above its weight is a sign of strong leadership in the Russian cultural-political-military context. As the past two decades show, the Kremlin has been quite consistent in delivering its promises, especially in the political-military sphere. The West has also been very consistent in dismissing Moscow’s promises, finding itself surprised time after time. Unfortunately, in analyzing how Gerasimov’s latest promise was discussed in the West, it is likely to follow the same path, and we all will be “surprised” in a few years when Russia will deploy an intervention force to “protect” its interests abroad.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Leadership, Military Intervention, Proxy War, and Influence
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

42. Social Capital in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Huseyin Emre Ceyhun
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
Levels of social capital, which is often operationalized by measures of trust, have changed significantly in the Middle East and North Africa over the past 15 years. The 2011 uprisings marked a critical juncture for atrophying, status-quo statesociety relations: citizens questioned the nature of governance while governments grappled with reinvigorated demands of citizenship. These demands were not fully met, however, and peaceful transitions towards democracy did not ensue. Instead, many countries experienced significant conflict, including proxy-wars resulting from interests of regional powers and sectarian differences. As of 2019, Tunisia remained as the only country that is on a democratic but fragile path toward a democratic consolidation. In this context and over a 13 year period (2006-2019), the Arab Barometer can present an overarching picture of how political and interpersonal trust in the Middle East have changed in the years surrounding the 2011 Arab uprisings. With few exceptions, political and interpersonal trust in the Middle East has been decreasing, demonstrating the extent of anti-establishment feelings nurtured in societies. However, trust in legal systems has not decreased as much as trust in political institutions such as government and parliament. These findings suggest that despite widespread lack of confidence in governments and parliaments, ordinary citizens have not entirely given up on existing systems of governance. These patterns are clearly evident in Tunisia, the only country generally considered to have fully undertaken a democratic transition after the Arab uprisings. All measures of trust show a similar declining trend for political and interpersonal trust in Tunisia since 2011. As of 2018, only 20 percent of Tunisians trust the government, compared with 14 percent who trust parliament, and only 8 percent who have high levels of interpersonal trust. However, trust in the legal system (48 percent) is virtually unchanged between 2011 and 2018, suggesting that Tunisians might still be still committed to the system brought about by the Arab Spring.
Topic:
Governance, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Citizenship, Arab Spring, Proxy War, and Social Capital
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

43. Iran's Use of Shi'i Militant Proxies: Ideological and Practical Expediency Versus Uncertain Sustainability

Author:
Alex Vatanka
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Since its 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has incited violent, radical, and often sectarian nonstate groups across the Middle East to serve as proxies in its military campaigns to influence regional and international politics. This “proxy model” has become increasingly salient since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and more recently in Iraq and Syria, and is now Iran’s primary tool for advancing its regional intersts. The U.S. and the West in general have largely paid attention only to radical Sunni groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. With a few exceptions, such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, nonstate Shi‘i militant groups have generally avoided the same intense Western scrutiny. This study compares and contrasts regional conflicts that have been shaped by Iranian proxies and Iran’s successful—and unsuccessful—attempts to recruit to its militant groups. It also identifies the key forces that have shaped Iran’s ideological and operational sponsorship of nonstate militant groups, both Sunni and Shi‘i, as well as its motivations and preferred modus operandi.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Conflict, Ideology, Shia, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and United States of America

44. Beyond the proxy powder keg: The specter of war between Saudi Arabia and Iran

Author:
Bilal Y. Saab
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
An Iran-Saudi Arabia war is unlikely, but it is now more likely than ever before. A military confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran should command respect and inspire concern because it could cause tremendous harm to an already volatile Middle East and possibly to the global economy. Iran seems to have an upper hand in a direct military confrontation with Saudi Arabia because of its combat experience, geography, manpower, strategic depth, and greater cost tolerance. However, none of these attributes give Iran any decisive advantages in a contest with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is neither helpless nor without military options. While it is easy to start a war with Iran, it is anything but to finish it. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman would have to think hard about the capabilities of the Saudi military and the resilience of Saudi society before embarking on such a risky course. In any war dynamic between Iran and Saudi Arabia, U.S. military intervention or support would be the most decisive exogenous factor for both Riyadh and Tehran. The United States has a security commitment to Saudi Arabia, but the extent to which Washington can tolerate subtle Iranian aggression against the kingdom that falls below the threshold of conventional warfare, while potentially upending Saudi stability, is unclear.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

45. Who Controls the Rimland: Competition and Rivalry in the Mediterranean

Author:
GianLuca Pastori
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The dynamics of the Mediterranean region are increasingly affected by the interplay of the US, Russian, and Chinese efforts to strengthen their respective regional positions. Since the years of the second Obama administration, the US disengagement has led to a greater Russian and Chinese presence and to the growth of their influence at political, economic, and military levels. Today, Russia is heavily involved in the Libyan struggle for power, a role that the reception of General Khalifa Haftar onboard the flagship of the Russian Fleet, the Admiral Kuznetsov, already highlighted in January 2017. Since then, Moscow’s role has progressively increased, culminating in the deployment of Russian PMC’s personnel in support of Haftar’s troops, in September 2019, during the operations on the Tripoli front. Somewhat reminiscent of the role assumed in Syria since 2016, Moscow’s activism has been, in recent years, the main source of concern for both the US military establishment and NATO. Moreover, the increase in military assertiveness has gone side by side with a greater economic presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, favored by the planned enhancement of the shipyard facilities in Tartus[1]. Moscow’s political weight has been re-affirmed in the region by the role that Russian President Vladimir Putin played as peace broker during the crisis triggered by the announcement of the US’ withdrawal from Northern Syria in October 2019. The so-called ‘Sochi agreement’ (October 22, 2019) has been, to a large extent, a product of the role that Russia has assumed as the bulwark of the Bashar al-Assad’s regime and main military force in the region.
Topic:
Security, Strategic Competition, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Libya, Syria, and Mediterranean

46. Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: Life on the Margins

Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
The outbreak of civil war in Syria led to a mass exodus of refugees to neighboring countries and beyond. Many of these refugees fled to Jordan and Lebanon where they face a myriad of challenges, including of how to provide services for such a vast population increase. Overall, while Jordan has taken a number of steps to address some of the key challenges faced by refugees,1 Lebanon has taken fewer steps. Perhaps this is due to Lebanon’s unique history and fears that a large influx of refugees could change the country’s fragile sectarian balance and even lead to a renewed civil conflict.2 Against this background, the fourth wave of the Arab Barometer reveals that refugees in Jordan and Lebanon show different feelings about the degree to which they feel secure in their host country and how they the degree to which available services are meeting their needs. Overall, the findings reveal significant differences in the degree to which Syrian refugees feel safe and secure in the two countries. For example, while a majority of refugees in Jordan (59 percent) are not very worried or not worried at all about being harassed or threatened in street, only 25 percent of refugees in Lebanon say the same. This result shows similarities with citizens of their host countries: while 58 percent of Jordanians are not very worried or not worried at all, only three-in-ten (29 percent) of Lebanese have such concerns. However, Lebanese tend to see Syrian refugees as a greater challenge to their country than Jordanians: 44 percent of Lebanese as opposed to 35 percent of Jordanian cite Syrian refugees as one of the two most important challenges that their countries face today. Perceptions of Syrian refugees toward the quality of public services also diverge to a great extent. Although the vast majority in Jordan are satisfied or very satisfied with healthcare system (86 percent) and the education system (81 percent), only 53 percent of refugees in Lebanon say the same about the educational system, and just 28 percent in Lebanon are satisfied or very satisfied with healthcare system. Economic conditions are even more challenging for refugees in both countries. Most face with difficulties in meeting their household expenses. However, Syrian refugees in Jordan are more likely to show greater optimism toward economic conditions than those living in Lebanon. Notably, support for democracy remains strong among the refugee population in both countries, with 79 percent in Jordan and 85 percent in Lebanon agreeing or strongly agreeing democracy is better than other forms of government. At the same time, refugee communities in both countries define democracy based primarily on socioeconomic terms instead of political outcomes. Moreover, most believe that political reform should be instituted gradually instead of once (85 percent in Jordan and 80 percent in Lebanon).
Topic:
Civil War, Refugee Issues, Refugees, Refugee Crisis, Syrian War, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan

47. The Human Cost of Uncontrolled Arms in Africa: Cross-national research on seven African countries

Author:
Adesoji Adeniyi
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Prolonged conflict, proxy wars, and inter-communal strife characterize many regions in Africa. This violence has caused untold atrocities, deaths, sexual violence, and displacement, as well as accelerating poverty and shattering lives and communities across the continent. Uncontrolled arms in Africa fuel this violence and are increasingly putting lives at immense risk. This report provides evidence about the human costs of uncontrolled arms: injuries and fatalities, internally displaced people and refugees, gender-based violence, and erosion of social cohesion and communal trust. Covering Mali, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Libya, it provides arms control recommendations to African states, the African Union and Regional Economic Communities, donor communities, and the private sector.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Refugees, Arms Trade, Conflict, Violence, Proxy War, and African Union
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, Libya, Somalia, Mali, South Sudan, Central African Republic, and Democratic Republic of Congo

48. Facilitating a Political Transition in Syria

Author:
Omar Sheira
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
Abstract:
The Arab Spring shook the fragile foundation of Syria, effectively highlighting the pre-existing sentiments of conflict and separatism along sectarian, ethnic and tribal lines. Refusing to respond to the calls of nationwide protests, President Bashar al-Assad responded with unrestricted force, effectively plunging the country into a fully-fledged civil war, very similar to what Hobbes described as the state of nature. Five years later, the war has all but damaged Syria's security, political, economic and social domains, causing more than $200 billion of losses (Abdul Razzaq, 2015) and spilling over to cost nearby countries an estimated $35 billion (World Bank, 2016). In terms of human suffering, it has claimed the lives of 250,000-470,000, injured over 1-2 million Syrians, and forcefully displaced 54% of the pre-war population, including 4.6 million people who fled the country and 6.6 million others who were internally displaced by violence (UNOCHA, 2016). The intensifying conflict, coupled with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has transformed Syria into an international stage for the proxy confrontation between local, regional and international powers, including the United States, Russia, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Lebanon, as each of them supports various Syrian players in the conflict. This has led to the inability of any party to achieve an absolute military victory and prolonged the conflict, risking the expansion of its military dimensions and political consequences.
Topic:
Syrian War, Crisis Management, Proxy War, and Transition
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

49. External Actors in the Syrian Civil War. Clash of Interests and Strategies / Los actores externos en la guerra civil siria. Choque de intereses y estrategias

Author:
José Luis Calvo Albero
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
The civil war in Syria has become a classic example of proxy war, in which different regional and global powers defend their interests through third parties. That explains its long duration and the high level of violence without reaching exhaustion. This article describes the motivations of the different external actors in the conflict and the strategic lines they follow to achieve their objectives.
Topic:
Syrian War, Proxy War, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

50. Plausible Deniability: Proxy Wars in Africa

Author:
Jennifer L. De Maio
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
In the decades since independence, proxy wars have frequently threatened regional security in Africa. Many interstate and intrastate wars on the continent have become increasingly complicated by the involvement of opposing nation states using third parties as surrogates for fighting each other directly. As civil wars threaten to spill across borders and destabilize entire regions, the nature and extent of states using these wars as proxies for their own agendas needs to be studied more systematically. ​ During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union relied on proxy wars as a means of engaging the enemy indirectly and advancing their foreign policy agendas, while leaving minimal visible blood on their hands. These proxy wars between the superpowers played out across Africa, from the Horn to Angola to Mozambique. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the superpower competition for regional supremacy has been replaced by new proxy wars and trans-border alliances between African states and local armed groups. As Joseph argues, the recourse to proxy wars reflects the challenges faced by the African state and its inability to institutionalize democratic structures. But the problem is much deeper. Engaging in proxy wars is a critical strategy for state-building, and develops from calculations by state leaders to advance their policy agendas. Threatened regimes wishing to maintain their hold on power may allow and enable civil tensions to spill across borders and destabilize neighboring countries. This approach can be used as a means to consolidate power domestically and spread influence internationally. A civil war thereby becomes a proxy war between states, with the advantage that governments can distance themselves from atrocities committed by their proxies by either attributing blame to rebel factions or by just claiming that they are in fact not sponsoring any group. This essay proposes that governments have an incentive to allow civil wars to spread across borders in order to engage in proxy battles with neighboring states. Governments can utilize proxy wars to strengthen their hold on the domestic state apparatus and to gain regional superiority. This strategy can include using militarily weak countries as proxies in order to assert their regional dominance and broadcast domestic power. Proxy wars can then advance domestic and foreign policy agendas while allowing states to avoid engaging in costly and bloody direct combat. The use of proxy war as a tool of statecraft is thus calculated and controlled...
Topic:
Security, War, Proxy War, and Statecraft
Political Geography:
Africa, Soviet Union, and United States of America