Search

Begin New Search Topic Nuclear Weapons

701. Defending America: Redefining the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defense

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
02-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Chemical weapons have not been used effectively in attacks on the American homeland. Reports that the bombers of the World Trade Center considered trying to add a chemical weapon like sodium cyanide to their explosives seem to be untrue, and led to an unsubstantiated assertion by the trial judge. There have, however, been a number of attempts to use chemical weapons by domestic extremists and individuals. For example, in 1997, members of the KKK plotted to place an improvised explosive device on a hydrogen sulfide tank at a refinery near Dallas, Texas. There is a well-established, low-level risk that such weapons will be used in the future, although there is no way to predict the frequency of such attacks, their scale, potential success, or lethality.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States and America

702. French Military Doctrine in the 1990s

Author:
Sten Rynning
Publication Date:
08-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the strategic rationale for territorial nuclear deterrence have raised fundamental questions in relation to French military doctrine. Significant territorial threats have disappeared, and the main role for military instruments now lies on the peripheries of Europe or further beyond. For those who had invested faith in nuclear deterrence and strategic stability—and that concerns most actors not only in France but also elsewhere among NATO allies—this change of events has been a severe challenge. President Mitterrand symbolizes the pains of adjustment in many ways as he never seriously considered changing track and became instead an ardent opponent of profound reform.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, and Reform
Political Geography:
Europe and France

703. Iraq's Weapons Of Mass Destruction: An Emerging Challenge For The Bush Administration

Author:
Michael Eisenstadt
Publication Date:
01-2001
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are emerging as one of the first major foreign policy challenges of the Bush administration. Free of weapons monitors and with sanctions eroding, Iraq has resumed its aggressive policies. After the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada last September, it briefly moved elements of four to five divisions toward its border with Syria in a show of solidarity, and on several occasions since then, Saddam Husayn has threatened to destroy Israel. Then, earlier this month, his older son Uday reasserted Iraq's claim to Kuwait. With its conventional military capabilities hobbled by two bloody wars and more than a decade of sanctions, Iraq's retained WMD capabilities assume renewed salience.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, Kuwait, and Syria

704. START II Nears Ratification, Implementation Still at Risk

Author:
Jon Wolfsthal and Joseph Cirincione
Publication Date:
04-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Seven years after President's George Bush and Boris Yelstin signed it, the Russian Duma is on the verge of ratifying the START II arms reduction treaty. The agreement, ratified by the United States Senate on January 26, 1996, would cut the number of U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 3,000-3,500.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

705. The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material

Author:
Matthew Bunn
Publication Date:
03-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Nothing could be more central to U.S. and world security than ensuring that nuclear warheads and their essential ingredients—plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—do not fall into the hands of terrorists or proliferating states. If plutonium and HEU become regularly available on a nuclear black market, nothing else we do to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons will succeed. Similarly, unless stockpiles of nuclear warheads and fissile materials can be secured, monitored, and verifiably reduced, it will be impossible to achieve deep, transparent, and irreversible reductions in nuclear arms. Measures to control warheads and fissile materials, therefore, are central to the entire global effort to reduce nuclear arms and stem their spread. The tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of plutonium and HEU that remain in the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles represent a deadly legacy of the Cold War, and managing them securely must be a top U.S. security policy priority.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

706. Arms Control and Missile Defense: Not Mutually Exclusive

Author:
Charles V. Peña
Publication Date:
07-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Traditionally, strategic offensive arms control and ballistic missile defense have been viewed as mutually exclusive. During the Cold War, the general belief was that anti–ballistic missile (ABM) systems would call into question the ability of the superpowers to successfully survive a first nuclear strike and inflict sufficient damage with a second strike. That is, missile defense could allow one superpower to launch a first strike and then use its defenses to intercept a second strike with the other superpower's surviving warheads—thereby undermining deterrence and stability. Furthermore, the thinking was that this situation would result in a dangerous offensive arms race as each side sought to counter the effects of the other's defenses.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

707. China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment

Author:
Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts
Publication Date:
04-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Historically, U.S. nuclear strategists and arms control experts have paid little attention to the People's Republic of China (PRC). China has not been a major factor in the U.S. nuclear calculus, which has remained centered on U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals as the principal framework for arms control and arms reductions. Yet today China is the only one of the five de jure nuclear weapons states qualitatively and quantitatively expanding its nuclear arsenal.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

708. Nuclear Arsenal Games: Size Does Make a Difference

Author:
Carolyn C. James
Publication Date:
03-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Studies Association
Abstract:
The purpose of this article is to present and establish the significance of the Nuclear Arsenal Game (NAG). The NAG investigates behavior within dyads experiencing a crisis. It assumes that nuclear and quasi-nuclear states act according to the size and potential of their own nuclear force structure and that of their opponent. This paper will argue that the size and potential damage an arsenal poses, set in relation to an enemy state's second strike capability, determines actor preferences within a crisis situation. These preferences include the option of launching a first strike and risking retaliation in kind. The specific objective of this study is to propose a nuclear index for use in empirical studies and offer a game-theoretic model of crisis interaction based on the Theory of Moves (TOM) that encompasses these respective types of nuclear states; and indicates whether preferences and predicted behavior adhere to the assumptions of Classical (or Rational) Deterrence Theory.
Topic:
Security and Nuclear Weapons

709. Overthrowing Saddam Hussein: The Policy Debate

Author:
Max Singer
Publication Date:
03-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
Abstract:
Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator, has biological weapons capable of killing hundreds of thousands of Israelis with infectious diseases such as anthrax. These weapons could be delivered either by missiles, by small pilotless planes, or by infecting the passengers of a plane landing at Ben-Gurion Airport with less than an ounce of agent spread through the plane's air conditioning system. Saddam also has at least several nuclear weapons that are missing only highly enriched uranium which he is likely to be able either to make himself or to buy this year.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and Middle East

710. Preventing a Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia

Author:
David Cortright and Samina Ahmed
Publication Date:
01-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame
Abstract:
The United States must unequivocally demand that India and Pakistan join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states. The United States should retain punitive sanctions which target Indian and Pakistani institutions and policymakers responsible for their nuclear weapons programs. Targeted incentives should be provided that seek to diminish internal support for nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. The United States should fulfill its obligation under Article VI of the NPT to achieve global nuclear disarmament.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and South Asia