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641. Russia: Grasping Reality of Nuclear Terror

Author:
Simon Saradzhyan
Publication Date:
03-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The likelihood of a catastrophic terrorist attack against Russia is growing, as radical separatists in troubled Chechnya increasingly become more desperate, and security at many of Russia's civil nuclear facilities remains insufficient. They have already demonstrated their capability and willingness to inflict massive indiscriminate casualties by organizing an apartment bombing in the southern Russian city of Buinaksk. They have acquired radioactive materials, threatened to attack Russia's nuclear facilities, plotted to hijack a nuclear submarine, and have attempted to put pressure on the Russian leadership by planting a container with radioactive materials in Moscow and threatening to detonate it. These incidents occurred between 1994 and 1996, during Russia's first military campaign in Chechnya at a time when separatists were so overwhelmed and outmanned they believed that acts of terrorism employing nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) materials—if not weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—could be the only way to force Russian troops to retreat from Chechnya.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

642. Nuclear Conflicts of the Twenty-First Century

Author:
A.A. Kokoshin
Publication Date:
02-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The author proceeds from the definition, that nuclear conflict is a situation involving one or more possessors of nuclear weapons, and in the course of which escalation reaches a level at which the practical possibility of using nuclear weapons begins to be considered. The higher phase of nuclear conflict means the use of nuclear weapons at various scales—from single nuclear explosions to the mass use of nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction

643. Prospects for U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Cooperation Under Bush and Putin

Author:
Andrea Gabbitas
Publication Date:
01-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Since September 11, the relationship between the United States and Russia has evolved significantly. At the Crawford summit in November 2001, President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin officially declared a “new relationship” between the United States and Russia. A significant portion of this new relationship has centered on nonproliferation matters, which have been declared a priority by both presidents. In fighting terrorist threats, Bush and Putin have “agreed to enhance bilateral and multilateral action to stem the export and proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological materials, related technologies, and delivery systems as a critical component of the battle to defeat international terrorism.”
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

644. Beyond Arms Control: How to Deal with Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Rose Gottemoeller
Publication Date:
02-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Nuclear arms control is often considered not worth the effort now that the Cold War is over. But the nuclear threat is anything but over. Several thousand strategic nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert in U.S. and Russian arsenals. Many more are insecurely stored. Though the arms control problem needs to be faced by both countries, neither one has the stomach for another Cold War–style, 500-page treaty like START I. The new model is the 2002 Moscow Treaty—a simple, three-page commitment to reduction. Such short treaties now make sense because both countries have many ways to know what is going on inside each other's nuclear arsenal. START I is still very important, but it is no longer the only tool in the box. Today, Washington and Moscow can relegate negotiated treaties to a few essential fronts and pursue exciting, innovative arms control efforts involving threat reduction and technical cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, Washington, and Mexico

645. Verifying North Korean Nuclear Disarmament

Author:
Jon B. Wolfsthal, Fred McGoldrick, and Seongwhun Cheon
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
This chapter examines North Korea's plutonium infrastructure and production capabilities, as well as how a freeze over that capability might be reconstituted and verified if an agreement to do so can be reached. The chapter, which also discusses several issues related to the possible final elimination of North Korea's nuclear capability—a stated goal of U.S. policy—does not prejudge what form a freeze might take, how it might be negotiated, or by what bodies it might be implemented. This chapter is meant to provide a broad view of what hurdles anyone trying to reestablish a freeze might encounter and what uncertainties might remain under such a freeze.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Israel, East Asia, and North Korea

646. Missile Defense: Defending America or Building Empire?

Author:
Charles V. Peña
Publication Date:
05-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The rationale for missile defense put forward by its advocates is often a “doom and gloom” picture: America and its citizens are defenseless against the threat of ballistic missiles, and missile defense is supposed to protect the American people. The administration's vision of missile defense is not just a global system that protects the United States against long-range missiles but a global system capable of engaging all classes of ballistic missiles to protect U.S. forces deployed worldwide, U.S. allies, and other friendly countries. Thus, the purpose of missile defense is extended well beyond protecting America and Americans.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and America

647. All the Players at the Table: A Multilateral Solution to the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Author:
Doug Bandow
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
There is no easy answer to the prospect of a nuclear Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A preemptive war against Pyongyang, even if the strikes were initially directed only at the North's nuclear facilities, would create an unacceptable risk of full-scale war on the peninsula. Sanctions would create their own set of risks. Current punitive economic measures have increased the suffering of millions of North Koreans but have not succeeded in altering President Kim Jong-il's behavior. Further sanctions would certainly not work without the support of the surrounding countries.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Korea, and Southeast Asia

648. Options for Dealing with North Korea

Author:
Ted Galen Carpenter
Publication Date:
01-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
North Korea's recent actions in violation of the clear intent of the agreement it signed in 1994 to freeze its nuclear program have ignited a crisis in northeast Asia. Unfortunately, all of the frequently discussed options for dealing with this crisis have major drawbacks.
Topic:
International Political Economy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

649. Addressing the North Korea Nuclear Challenge

Author:
Michael H. Armacost, Daniel I. Okimoto, and Gi-Wook Shin
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
North Korea's renewed bid for nuclear weapons poses an urgent, serious foreign policy challenge to the United States. The current situation—though it bears a resemblance to the events of 1993–1994—is far more dangerous and difficult. North Korea has developed longer-range ballistic missiles; South Korea's growing nationalism has put its U.S. relations on shakier ground; and the United States is distracted by the wars on terrorism and for regime change in Iraq.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Israel, East Asia, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Palestine

650. New Priorities in South Asia

Author:
Frank G. II Wisner, Nicholas Platt, and Marshall M. Bouton
Publication Date:
10-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
South Asia may be halfway around the globe from the United States, but in the age of the Internet and globalization, what happens there—as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda tragically underscored—can affect all Americans. The challenge to U.S. policy over the medium term (through 2010) is to design and implement a stable and sustained approach that will solidify bilateral ties with three of the key countries of the region—India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan—and give the United States an opportunity to influence major regional developments. This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and recommends how U.S. policy can best take advantage of the opportunities while addressing the dangers that they present. Success in dealing with South Asia will require sustained and highlevel attention, sensitive diplomacy, a realistic view of what is possible, and, especially with Pakistan and Afghanistan, investment of substantial resources.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, South Asia, and India