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1. Safeguards and Verification in Inaccessible Territories

Author:
Chen Kane
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The paper aims to assist the international community and international organizations (IOs), such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to better prepare for challenges related to verification and safeguards of nuclear materials, chemical weapons, and facilities in inaccessible territories. The paper identifies lessons from past and ongoing cases (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Fukushima/Japan, and Crimea/Ukraine) and presents policy, legal, and technical recommendations to the IAEA, OPCW, and their member states to overcome some of these challenges. The challenges in verifying and safeguarding nuclear materials in inaccessible sites have existed for decades. Past cases include Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Serbia during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the number of cases in which international organizations such as the IAEA and the OPCW had to verify the status of declared materials in territories they could not access increased significantly since 2010. This report discusses three categories of situations from which the IAEA and the OPCW have been barred from accessing sensitive materials or facilities. One category consists of locations that are insecure or unsafe and thus involve high risk to IO staff such as in Libya, Iraq, and Fukushima (Japan). The other two categories involve territory over which the state responsible for securing access does not have de facto control. This occurs when the site is controlled by either nonstate actors, such as some sites in Iraq and Syria, or by another state, as in Crimea, Ukraine. In many of these instances, securing access involves a range of political sensitivities, such as civil war, occupation, or natural disaster, which has broader implications and complexities beyond nuclear or chemical nonproliferation, further complicating an IO’s ability to gain access to the site or use other means to gather required information. Each of these situations poses different political, legal, and technical challenges and limitations, but they also offer potential novel solutions.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, Chemical Weapons, Nuclear Safety, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. From Washington to Seoul: Advancing Nuclear Security Objectives

Author:
Olexander Motsyk
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Diplomatic Courier
Abstract:
lexander Motsyk is Ambassador of Ukraine to the U.S. Being a career diplomat, Mr. Motsyk has worked for more than 30 years in the field of foreign relations. Prior to his assignment in the U.S. he served as Ambassador of Ukraine to Turkey and Poland. His diplomatic career also includes such positions as First Deputy Foreign Minister as well as Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of Ukraine. His work was marked by the Commander Cross and Star of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland (2010), The Order of Merit, II Degree (2006) and The Order of Justice, I Degree, of the World Jurist Association (2005). In this op-ed Mr. Motsyk discusses Ukraine’s contribution to global nuclear safety and security and importance of international cooperation to make the world a safer place to live in.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Safety
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. US-Russian Partnership for Advancing a Nuclear Security Agenda

Author:
Anton Khlopkov
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the United States and the Russian Federation have engaged in bilateral and multilateral nuclear security efforts to secure nuclear materials and facilities in the region. This cooperation contributed to nuclear security globally and developed various tools, mechanisms, and approaches that need to be fully utilized by the international community. As new nuclear security challenges emerge, the implementation of sustainable nuclear security measures is constrained by limited expertise and resources, particularly in some key regions. For this reason, the application of US-Russian expertise and experience in cooperative threat reduction is essential to successful implementation of the global nuclear security agenda. Researchers investigate nuclear security challenges in other countries and regions—specifically in Southeast Asia and the former Soviet states of Central Asia—and examine possible ways by which the lessons learned from US-Russian nuclear security cooperation over the past two decades can be a
Topic:
Security, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Nuclear Safety
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Post-Soviet Europe