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32. Renewed Arms Race, the NPT, and the New Start Treaty After the End of the INF Treaty
- Author:
- Elif Beyza Karaalioğlu
- Publication Date:
- 06-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Global Political Trends Center
- Abstract:
- The U.S. decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty left world observing about what might happen next. Indeed, the demise of the INF Treaty points out to an uncertainty on arms control and it brings new questions regarding international security. In the light of recent developments on the INF Treaty, this study attempts to make an analysis on the possible impacts of the end of the INF Treaty on international security. This study argues that the collapse of the INF Treaty raise concerns for renewed arms race and the withdrawal from the INF Treaty inevitably brings other treaties such as the NPT and the New START into close consideration.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- Russia, North America, Global Focus, and United States of America
33. Does the New Saudi Reactor Justify Proliferation Fears?
- Author:
- Basel Ammane
- Publication Date:
- 05-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Council on International Policy (CIP)
- Abstract:
- In early April 2019, Saudi Arabia’s progress in constructing its first nuclear reactor with the assistance of Argentine firm INVAP was the subject of considerable media attention that speculated on the dangers of this development. This was made all the more alarming given the reported nuclear technological assistance to the kingdom that the American administration approved. In fact, a cursory review of events surrounding this development reveals that there are at least two indicators that can be seen as cause for concern. First, Saudi leadership rhetoric pertaining to proliferation has not been reassuring, as crown prince Mohammed bin Salman signaled his country’s resolve to pursue the path of nuclear armament in the event that Iran, its regional rival, moves in that direction too. Second, the construction of this reactor is seen as the first step toward acquiring the knowledge and experience necessary for developing a sizeable nuclear power infrastructure that will supply the kingdom’s needs in the future. The kingdom has plans to build two large nuclear reactors to diversify its energy sources and meet its electricity needs, as well as a number of small reactors for desalination purposes. As these plans begin to materialize, the importance of Saudi compliance under a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) will become indispensable and equivocation on the matter unacceptable. Having said this, speculation that is largely focused on a handful of events reported by the media is not good at providing a clear picture. Grounding analysis in an understanding of regional politics and global nonproliferation dynamics is likely to capture a clearer picture of the situation. There are at least two factors should be grounds for concern about potential Saudi nuclear proliferation.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Infrastructure, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Saudi Arabia
34. Russia and China in the Middle East: Playing their best cards
- Author:
- Marco Siddi and Marcin Kaczmarski
- Publication Date:
- 11-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Russia and China share a number of interests in the Middle East: limiting US power and maintaining good relations with all players in the region while remaining aloof from the key conflicts, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Iran and Israel. Russia’s position has been based on political support for particular states, arms sales and the provision of civilian nuclear energy technology. Moscow has boosted its role by intervening militarily in the Syrian civil war. China has been strengthening its political position in the region for the last decade and its presence is more substantial from a financial-economic perspective. The current Chinese and Russian regional posture further marginalises the influence of the EU in MENA. In the Middle East, the EU is already a weaker economic actor than China and a weaker military player than Russia. However, the EU can cooperate with Russia and China on upholding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear programme.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Power, Military Intervention, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, and Asia
35. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015) on Restricting Iran’s Nuclear Program and Russia-Iran Relations Century | İran’ın Nükleer Enerji Programı’nın Sınırlandırılmasına İlişkin Kapsamlı Ortak Eylem Planı (2015) ve İran-Rusya İlişkileri
- Author:
- Nurhan Hacıoğlu
- Publication Date:
- 12-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics & International Relations
- Institution:
- Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University
- Abstract:
- After 11 September, Iran's nuclear energy program turned into an international crisis. However, Iran did not give up its nuclear energy program despite the pressure on it in the world public opinion. This crisis, which occurred in the early 2000s, did not cause a negative impact on relations between Iran and Russia. Russia continued to help Iran to develop its nuclear program. One of the main points of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed between P5+ 1 countries and Iran in 2015 is that Iran limited its nuclear energy development for ten years. However, Iran could be a regional rival for Russia, especially in terms of energy and gas exports, after a decade. In this context, the focus of the study is to analyse whether there was any change in the good relations between the two countries after JCPOA. The study seeks answers to specific questions: How does Russia look at JCPOA? Why does Russia stand for a rival Iran? Are there any changes in the relations between Russia and Iran in the post-2015 period? According to the results, JCPOA did not have any negative effect on Russia-Iran relations. | 11 Eylül sonrası İran’ın nükleer enerji programı uluslararası bir krize dönüşmüştür. Ancak İran, uluslararası kamuoyunda kendisine yönelik baskılara rağmen nükleer enerji programından vazgeçmemiştir. 2000’li yılların başlarından itibaren ortaya çıkan bu kriz Rusya İran ilişkilerinde olumsuz bir etkiye neden olmamıştır. Rusya İran’a nükleer programını geliştirmesi için yaptığı yardımlara devam etmiştir. 2015 yılında P5+1 ülkeleri ve İran arasında imzalanan Kapsamlı Ortak Eylem Planı’nın (KOEP) temel noktalarından biri İran’ın nükleer enerji gelişimini on yıllık bir süre için sınırlandırmış olmasıdır. Ancak İran on yılın sonunda kendisine yönelik yaptırım ve ambargolardan kurtulmuş bir ülke olarak Rusya’ya özellikle enerji ve gaz ihracı noktasında bölgesel bir rakip olabilecektir. Bu bağlamda çalışmanın odak noktası, bütün bunlar göz önünde bulundurularak iki ülkenin KOEP sonrası iyi ilişkilerinde değişme olup olmayacağını analiz etmektir. Çalışma belli sorulara cevap aramaktadır: Rusya KOEP’e nasıl bakmaktadır? Rusya neden kendisine rakip olabilecek bir İran’ı göze almaktadır? 2015 sonrası dönemde Rusya-İran ilişkilerinde değişiklik olmuş mudur? Ortaya çıkan sonuçlara göre KOEP'in Rusya-İran ilişkilerine herhangi bir olumsuz etkisi olmamıştır.
- Topic:
- Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East
36. Can North Korean Nuclear Missile Crisis Be Resolved?
- Author:
- G. Ivashentsov
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- East View Information Services
- Abstract:
- TENSION around the Korean Peninsula is one of the main threats to international security. North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear and missile weapon systems has become a new serious factor in global strategic sta- bility. Previously, during the cold war era, the only tool of control over strategic weapons was the relationship between Moscow and Washington. At present, the international situation has radically changed. New nuclear powers – India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea – regard- less of whether or not the original five members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) acknowledge them as such, are not under the control of either Washington or Moscow or Beijing: they act at their own discretion, as they see fit. The current polycentrism of nuclear proliferation is based on region- al rivalry. India has created its nuclear arsenal as a counterweight to China; Pakistan, as a counterweight to India; and Israel, as a shield against Arab states. None of these states, however, are seeking global supremacy and so their nuclear status is taken by the world community more or less in stride.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula
37. Project on Nuclear Issues A Collection of Papers from the 2017 Conference Series and Nuclear Scholars Initiative
- Author:
- Mark F. Cancian
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- The role that nuclear weapons play in international security has changed since the end of the Cold War, but the need to maintain and replenish the human infrastructure for supporting nuclear capabilities and dealing with the multitude of nuclear challenges remains essential. Recognizing this challenge, CSIS launched the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) in 2003 to develop the next generation of policy, technical, and operational nuclear professionals through outreach, mentorship, research, and debate. PONI runs two signature programs—the Nuclear Scholars Initiative and the Annual Conference Series—to engage emerging nuclear experts in debate and research over how to best address the nuclear community’s most pressing problems. The papers in this volume include research from participants in the 2017 Nuclear Scholars Initiative and PONI Conference Series. PONI sponsors this research to provide a forum for facilitating new and innovative thinking and a platform for emerging thought leaders across the nuclear enterprise. Spanning a wide range of technical and policy issues, these selected papers further discussion in their respective areas.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
38. Russia's New Nuclear Weapons: Whoever Dies with the Most Toys Wins?
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 03-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Whatever his other limitations, Vladimir Putin has shown he is a master in exploiting Russian nationalism and American and European sensitivities. His latest gambit—publicizing new Russian nuclear systems—several of which are still developmental, may have key components that are untested, or do not yet exist—give him political credibility in asserting Russian national strength in a Russian election year, and emphasize the one key area where Russia remains a leading global super power: its possession of nuclear weapons. The key question is whether they represent any real change in the nuclear balance, Russian and U.S. ability to pose an existential threat to the other state, and mutual assured destruction. If they do not, they are more technological status symbols or “toys” than real threats, although the proliferation of such weapons might allow smaller nuclear powers like Iran and North Korea to defeat today’s missile and air defense systems and technologies. An analysis of the actual content of his speech, the changing nuclear and conventional balance between the superpowers—the U.S., Russia, and China, the global balance of deployed nuclear weapons, the shifts taking in US and Russian balance since the Cold War, and as a result of START, the full range of new U.S. and Russian nuclear programs, and of what Putin did and did not say about Russia's new programs, provides a very different picture from the one Putin portrayed in his speech. It shows that Putin focused on the "toy factor" in emphasize technology over any real world aspects of the balance, arms control, and war fighting.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nationalism, Military Strategy, Authoritarianism, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia
39. Back from the Brink: A Threatened Nuclear Energy Industry Compromises National Security
- Author:
- Michael Wallace, Amy Roma, and Sachin Desai
- Publication Date:
- 07-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- The U.S. commercial nuclear energy industry helps the U.S. government meet several key national security objectives. But the industry is struggling to survive. We are not the first to say this and we will not be the last. We are also not the first to call for U.S. government support for this struggling industry—but this call to action is different. We are urging U.S. government action—not with the focus of protecting the commercial sector, but with a focus to protect U.S. government interests impacted by the decline in the commercial nuclear energy sector. This is a key distinction and warrants attention at the highest level of government. This paper is not intended for those in the nuclear energy industry. They know the issues. It is intended for the U.S. government and the U.S. public—to explain the reasons why U.S. government action is critical at this moment, and to explain how we can move forward in a manner that best protects our country’s national security. But what are these national security objectives and how are U.S. government and national security interests undermined by a decline in the commercial nuclear energy sector? In this paper we explain the critical importance of the U.S. commercial nuclear energy industry in support of U.S. defense, research, economics, geopolitics, and international nonproliferation. We walk through how the U.S. commercial nuclear energy industry arose out of and with the support of the U.S. government—and how President Eisenhower’s reasons for bringing nuclear energy to the world in the 1950s are the very same reasons that the United States needs to continue to do so today. We unravel the web of interconnections between the commercial nuclear energy industry and achieving U.S. government and national security goals. And we explain the impact that a declining commercial nuclear energy sector has on achieving those crucial goals. Moreover, we set forth a recommended path forward to come “back from the brink” and preserve critical commercial nuclear energy sector assets—including technology, knowhow, people, and influence—before they are lost forever, and U.S. national security is damaged as a result. This industry must survive—and it can if the U.S. government and private industry work together, recognizing the government and civilian integrated nuclear infrastructure moving forward. Notably, the response must be U.S. government led to take the approach that is best for the country, rather than any particular company or technology. We recommend five core U.S.-government-led actions to move forward that focus.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, National Security, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- United States and North America
40. Talks, Markets, and Recognition? Addressing the North Korean Nuclear Conundrum
- Author:
- Ramon Pacheco Pardo
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
- Abstract:
- North Korea has become a de facto nuclear power. Regardless of one’s views about the regime and its treatment of the country’s ordinary citizens, its nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and its illegal activities ranging from proliferation of WMD to currency counterfeiting, the international community has to accept that it is dealing with a nuclear North Korea. This means that stopping and rolling back Pyongyang’s nuclear programme is no longer a realistic goal, at least in the short term. Both in public and in private, the regime has clearly indicated that the program itself is not a bargaining tool. Rather, the Kim Jong-un regime considers a nuclear deterrent the best means to avoid the same fate as the Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein regimes: military strikes led or supported by the U.S., followed by the execution of their leaders at the hands of their former citizens. The debate has to now shift towards how to deal with a nuclear North Korea. Sanctions have clearly not worked. The current round of UN and bilateral sanctions implemented from July 2006 onwards has failed. Pyongyang had not even conducted a nuclear test when sanctions were first implemented. Today, it is believed to be in possession of dozens of nuclear devices.3 Isolation of the Kim Jong-un regime has not worked either. Two consecutive South Korean conservative governments led by Lee Myungbak and Park Geun-hye dismantled many of the cooperation mechanisms set up by their predecessors. The Barack Obama administration refused to countenance diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang unless it changed its behavior. Xi Jinping is yet to meet with Kim Jong-un, even though they sit less than two hours away from each other. In return for sanctions and isolation, North Korea has pressed ahead with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Deterrence is a useful way to prevent a North Korean attack on Seoul, Tokyo or the U.S. mainland. Nevertheless, few experts think that Pyongyang would strike first.4 Engagement thus seems to be the only viable option to deal with Pyongyang.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, and Engagement
- Political Geography:
- Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America