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151. North Korea’s Plutonium Declaration: A Starting Point for an Initial Verification Process

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On December 27, Japan’s Tokyo Shimbun newspaper quoted U.S. and North Korean officials saying that North Korea had declared a plutonium stockpile of about 30 kilograms. The report was subsequently picked up by several wires, including AFP and UPI. Based on discussions with a knowledgeable official, this roughly 30 kilograms of plutonium apparently refers to a stock of plutonium that North Korea separated from irradiated fuel produced in the five megawatt-electric reactor at Yongbyon. The separation of the plutonium occurred at the Radiochemical Laboroatory at Yongbyon. If this quantity refers to separated plutonium (and not the total quantity of plutonium produced in the spent fuel of several reactor cores), it does fall inside the lower bound of the range of the amount of separated plutonium that ISIS has assessed North Korea could now possess.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Plutonium
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

152. Disabling DPRK Nuclear Facilities

Author:
David Albright and Paul Brannan
Publication Date:
10-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The October 3, 2007 Six-Party Talks accord outlines a roadmap for the disablement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) core nuclear facilities. While an agreement on “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” has been secured, the specific details of the nuclear disablement process are still being developed. The primary goals of this Working Paper are twofold. First, to establish a definition for the term “disablement” which has only recently achieved widespread usage in the disarmament and nonproliferation community. Second, to outline the types of steps that will or could be taken at key facilities in the DPRK to achieve various disablement objectives. This Working Paper was commissioned by the Korea Working Group (KWG) at the U.S. Institute of Peace. The KWG brings together the leading North Korea watchers from the government and think tank communities to discuss pressing policy issues in the political, security, social, and economic fields.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

153. Engaging a Nuclear India: Punishment, Reward, and the Politics of Non-Proliferation

Author:
Richard Bruneau
Publication Date:
05-2006
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
This paper addresses India’s claim that it is a “responsible nuclear power” and assesses recent changes in the international response to India’s nuclear status. It fi nds that despite India’s outsider status with respect to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and various export control regimes, it has maintained a very strong non-proliferation record. The decisions by the United States and Canada in 2005 to renew nuclear cooperation with India have recognized this, but, in so doing, have potentially undermined the legitimacy of the NPT. In reality, however, the primary mechanisms for infl uencing states’ decisions to cross the nuclear threshold lie outside the NPT and can be strengthened through Indian participation. The path set by renewed cooperation with India is an uncertain one, but its pragmatic approach based on compliance behavior is likely a more credible and effective foundation than the illusions of the NPT.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nonproliferation, and Compliance
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

154. Revisiting Goldwarter v. Carter: The Executive’s Right to Rescind Treaties in Light of President Bush’s 2002 Termination of the ABM Treaty

Author:
Howard A. Wachtel
Publication Date:
05-2005
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
This paper examines the constitutional power of the President to terminate treaty obligations. It centers on President Bush’s recent renunciation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union. It focuses on the balance of power between the legislative and executive branches in light of the Goldwater v. Carter and Kucinich v. Bush decisions. The paper is divided into six sections: (1) the international legal ramifications of unilateral executive treaty rescission; (2) the role of standing; (3) the impact of the political question doctrine; (4) arguments for and against permitting the President to terminate treaties; (5) a discussion of the process that should be used to terminate treaties, as between the President and Congress; and, finally, (6) an examination of alternative strategies that Congress may employ when the President chooses to rescind a treaty. The paper concludes that the decision to terminate a treaty should not be one-sided, and that joint action from both branches should be required whenever the United States wishes to relieve itself of treaty obligations.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

155. Combating Proliferation: Addressing the Russian Nuclear Threat

Author:
Amy M. Seward
Publication Date:
05-2005
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
Fifteen years after the initiation of U.S. threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union and some four years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, more than half of Russia’s vast stockpile of weapons-usable fissile materials remains to be secured, and is thus vulnerable to diversion by terrorists for use in a nuclear device. This paper assesses the state of fissile material security in Russia today, taking as a case study the security of nuclear materials involved in the operations of the Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet. Recommendations are made drawing on the successes and shortcomings of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Material Protection Control and Accounting Program at the Fleet’s naval facilities. This analysis leads into a broader examination of the effectiveness and adequacy of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

156. White Elephants: Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb and the Implications for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy

Author:
Maria Babbage
Publication Date:
05-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
This article examines why the South African government chose to dismantle its indigenous nuclear arsenal in 1993. It considers three competing explanations for South African nuclear disarmament: the realist argument, which suggests that the country responded to a reduction in the perceived threat to its security; the idealist argument, which sees the move as a signal to Western liberal democratic states that South Africa wished to join their ranks; and a more pragmatic argument—that the apartheid government scrapped the program out of fear that its nuclear weapons would be misused by a black-majority government. The article argues that the third explanation offers the most plausible rationale for South Africa’s decision to denuclearize. Indeed, it contends that the apartheid South African government destroyed its indigenous nuclear arsenal and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to “tie the hands” of the future ANC government, thereby preventing any potential misuse of the technology, whether through its proliferation or use against a target.
Topic:
Apartheid, Nuclear Weapons, History, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa