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191. Dealing with tools of political (dis)order: Coercive organisations in the Levant

Author:
Erwin van Veen and Feike Fliervoet
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Militancy is a common method to exercise influence in a given political order. It has become a widespread tactic and necessity across the Levant, especially since 2011. While militancy is sometimes downright violent and destructive, it can also be a force for positive change and even emancipation. Much of the time it sits in between these extremes. But the use of confrontational methods almost always requires organisation and possession of coercive capabilities. This report examines the purpose, nature and development of five types of organisation through which coercion is exerted across the Levant - namely, governmental coercive organisations, quasi-governmental coercive organisations, hybrid coercive organisations, anti-regime coercive organisations and anti-state coercive organisations. The analysis focuses on hybrid coercive organisations because of their paradoxical tendency to work with and against the state at the same time. Consider Iraq's Peshmerga or Badr Corps, for example. The report makes a strong case for being more cautious with the near-automaticity of peacebuilding efforts to focus on coercive organisations representing 'the state'. More precisely, the evidence-base underpinning the report suggests that effective peacebuilding efforts should: Assess the demerits and merits of coercive organisations based on their interests, constituencies and behaviours in relation to the legitimacy of the political order they seek to realise. View the violence mobilised by coercive organisations as a manifestation rather than a cause of the breakdown of political order. Influence coercive organisations on the basis of their behavioural incentives. These incentives are grounded in the domestic political economy interests of coercive organisations, the nature and level of foreign support they receive, and the expectations of their social constituencies. Ensure that the aim of external interventions corresponds with the prevailing interaction dynamic between a particular hybrid coercive organisation and governmental coercive organisations (this point only pertains to hybrid coercive organisations). The report provides a range of basic ideas for how external parties might nudge the interaction between hybrid coercive organisations and the government in a direction that helps to reduce violence.
Topic:
Government, Non State Actors, and Violence
Political Geography:
Middle East and Levant

192. From soldiers to politicians? Iraq’s Al-Hashd Al-Sha’abi ‘on the march’

Author:
Nancy Ezzeddine and Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
It has become clear since Iraq’s May 2018 elections that many of the armed groups that make up the country’s Al-Hashd al-Sha’abi (aka Popular Mobilization Forces) intend to fully integrate into the Iraqi Security Forces and/or disband at some point now that the fight against the Islamic State (IS) has reached a much lower level of intensity. Several groups are less likely to do so, however, including those linked with Iran. Although all 50+ Hashd groups have been brought under the legal purview of the Iraqi state, in practice a number continue to operate autonomously. The fragmented nature of both the Iraqi state’s coercive capabilities and the country’s political landscape will make it difficult, in the short term, to compel reluctant groups to integrate into state security forces or disband. Pushing for enforcement of such compliance risks violence and is best avoided. At the same time, using a broad set of indicators to monitor Hashd-related events and incidents based on open, online sources, this policy brief provides substantial evidence that some Hashd groups are using their autonomy to strengthen their power base in ways that will complicate achieving greater integration in the future. Our research suggests that policy makers in Baghdad and Western capitals should support four initiatives that can help limit this risk without triggering large-scale violence: Gradually establish a direct, incentive-based relationship between Hashd fighters and the state to shift the loyalties of fighters over time. Tighten local command, control and coordination mechanisms of all state security actors to compartmentalise the way in which Hashd groups operate, especially locally. Ensure that (international) reconstruction funds have strong in-built safeguards and standards that reduce corruption and do not contribute to the growing penetration of the Iraqi economy by armed actors, e.g. by contracting them. Address the root causes of the emergence of IS to remove the rationale for some Hashd groups to retain arms (and to make Iraq safer).
Topic:
Non State Actors, Conflict, and Militias
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

193. Cyber Deterrence in Singapore: Framework & Recommendations

Author:
Eugene Eg Tan
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
As a small state, Singapore’s ability to create deterrence against cyberattacks is very limited. There is limited value in pursuing classic deterrence through denial and punishment because: (i) technology is relatively cheap and widely available; (ii) there is difficulty in accurately attributing blame; and (iii) there is difficulty in identifying and punishing attackers. If there is no detection or ability to punish, Singapore’s credibility suffers. The report suggests six ways that Singapore can improve its cyberattack deterrence: 1. Develop a response mechanism to guide deterrence 2. Create resilient systems 3. Share collective responsibility in cybersecurity 4. Increase capabilities through the improvement of penetration detection 5. Create norms with enforcement capabilities 6. Strengthen international law enforcement, cooperation, and legislation It is also not feasible to measure deterrence in cyberspace the same way as nuclear deterrence, where a no-attack scenario denotes that deterrence is successful. Rather, deterrence should be seen as a mitigating effort that leads potential attackers to believe it is not in their best interest to attack. These efforts at deterrence can be further enhanced by improving the accuracy of attribution, the detection of cyber incidents regardless of size, and ensuring that timely action is taken against cyberattackers.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Law Enforcement, Cybersecurity, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Asia and Singapore

194. Hezbollah’s Missiles and Rockets

Author:
Shaan Shaikh and Ian Williams
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Hezbollah is a Lebanese political party and militant group with close ties to Iran and Syria’s Assad regime. It is the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor—aptly described as “a militia trained like an army and equipped like a state.”1 This is especially true with regard to its missile and rocket forces, which Hezbollah has arrayed against Israel in vast quantities. The party’s arsenal is comprised primarily of small, man-portable, unguided artillery rockets. Although these devices lack precision, their sheer number make them effective weapons of terror. According to Israeli sources, Hezbollah held around 15,000 rockets and missiles on the eve of the 2006 Lebanon War, firing nearly 4,000 at Israel over the 34-day conflict. Hezbollah has since expanded its rocket force, today estimated at 130,000 rounds.2 Hezbollah asserts that its rocket forces are primarily for deterrence—a means to retaliate against Israel in the event of conflict. In May 2006, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah explained “The purpose of our rockets is to deter Israel from attacking Lebanese civilians…The enemy fears that every time he confronts us, whenever there are victims in our ranks among Lebanese civilians, this will lead to a counter-barrage of our rockets, which he fears.”3 Indiscriminate rocket fire, particularly from small, easily transportable launchers makes the suppression of fire with airpower more challenging. This forces Israel to rely more heavily on ground forces in a conflict. Lacking any air force of its own, Hezbollah prefers ground wars in its own territory to bombardment from the skies. As Human Rights Watch notes, however, none of these arguments justifies targeting civilians under international law.4 The continued growth of Hezbollah’s missile and rocket forces is undesirable for several reasons. It may, for example, embolden the party to overstep Israeli red lines. Hezbollah’s push to acquire longer-ranged and precision-guided munitions could likewise spur Israel into preemptive action. Hezbollah’s weapons acquisition also raises the prospects for the proliferation of missile technology and know-how. According to Saudi and UAE officials, Hezbollah militants have worked with their Houthi forces in rocket development and launch divisions in Yemen.5 Hezbollah forces in Syria and Iraq similarly operate with various Shiite militias. Growing relations among these groups presents risks for the dissemination of missile technology and knowledge. The following is a summary compilation of Hezbollah’s missile and rocket arsenal. It is limited by the availability of public source information and does not cover certain topics such as rocket strategies, evolution, or storage locations. This brief instead focuses on the acquisition history, capabilities, and use of these forces.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Missile Defense, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon

195. Perils of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Proliferation: Preventing Non-State Acquisition

Author:
Philip Chartoff
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Throughout the late 90s, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda allegedly made numerous attempts to acquire nuclear material from illicit actors. Starting in 2004, Hezbollah has been deploying Iranian-made, military-grade drones for surveillance and engagement. Terrorist groups, illicit organisations, and other non-state actors have a long fascination with advanced weapons technologies. In the early 90s, the Japanese death cult Aum Shinrikyo pursued multiple avenues to develop chemical, nuclear and biological weapons, eventually succeeding in the creation and deployment of Sarin gas. Throughout the late 90s, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda allegedly made numerous attempts to acquire nuclear material from illicit actors. Starting in 2004, Hezbollah has been deploying Iranian-made, military-grade drones for surveillance and engagement. Despite the relative success of less sophisticated weapons, and the substantial expense and difficulty of acquisition for more advanced systems, non-state actors continue to pursue advanced weapons for two significant reasons. For less funded, less powerful non-state actors, advanced weapons substantially increase the scale of the force they can wield against enemies—they promise to “level the playing field”. Advanced weapon systems also offer a significant reputational and symbolic benefit to non-state actors, as the ownership of such weapons confer a status limited to only a handful of powerful nations. States have long recognized these risks, and established numerous arms and export controls to restrict and regulate the transfer of massively destructive weapons. However, international efforts to restrict proliferation of such weapons are currently lagging behind the emergence of new, possibly as-destructive, technologies. In particular, the last few years have marked the rapid development of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). Considering their potential to escalate conflicts and inflict massive collateral damage, the international community has long been debating necessary restrictions on the implementation of autonomy in weapons systems, even considering a ban on fully-autonomous systems. However, such conversations have largely been limited to state use. The international community has been painfully slow to address the possible acquisition and use of LAWS by non-state actors.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

196. Transferring the Win-Win Approach of the JCPOA to Other Areas of Cooperation in the Middle East/Gulf

Author:
Bijan Khajehpour
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Based on his rich experience since 1994 as a strategy consultant for major international companies investing in Iran, the author makes the case for using the achievement-oriented approach of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as a model for tackling all major regional challenges in a cooperative way, especially by non-governmental actors.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Non State Actors, Business, and Trade
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

197. Contemporary Questions on Eco-Terrorism: A Conversation with Dr. Michael Loadenthal

Author:
Michael Loadenthal and Fletcher Security Review Staff
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Dr. Michael Loadenthal, a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology & Social Justice Studies at Miami University of Oxford, discussed with FSR his extensive work on eco-terrorism. His research looks to provide nuance to the way eco-terrorism has been studied and written about, and how it is understood by government entities. He uses this perspective to assess the threat, or lack of threat, eco-terrorism poses today.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Non State Actors, Social Movement, and Eco-terrorism
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

198. Iran's Use of Shi'i Militant Proxies: Ideological and Practical Expediency Versus Uncertain Sustainability

Author:
Alex Vatanka
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Since its 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has incited violent, radical, and often sectarian nonstate groups across the Middle East to serve as proxies in its military campaigns to influence regional and international politics. This “proxy model” has become increasingly salient since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and more recently in Iraq and Syria, and is now Iran’s primary tool for advancing its regional intersts. The U.S. and the West in general have largely paid attention only to radical Sunni groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. With a few exceptions, such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, nonstate Shi‘i militant groups have generally avoided the same intense Western scrutiny. This study compares and contrasts regional conflicts that have been shaped by Iranian proxies and Iran’s successful—and unsuccessful—attempts to recruit to its militant groups. It also identifies the key forces that have shaped Iran’s ideological and operational sponsorship of nonstate militant groups, both Sunni and Shi‘i, as well as its motivations and preferred modus operandi.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Conflict, Ideology, Shia, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and United States of America

199. Understanding Nonstate Actor Behavior: The Determinants of Mass Atrocities

Author:
Cyanne E. Loyle
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
In 2014, the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) began a pattern of systematically targeting the Yezidi population in northern Iraq.1 That aggression involved violent attacks on civilians, forced relocation, starvation, and large-scale massacres. In its 2016 report on this topic, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum argued that this behavior by the IS is genocide (Kikoler 2016). What explains the IS’s tactical decision to engage in such behavior? How representative is this action across other rebel groups and violent nonstate actors? The recent surge in violence by groups such as IS and Boko Haram, along with their deliberate targeting of civilians, has intensified the need to understand the conditions under which nonstate groups choose to deliberately and systematically target civilians for extermination. To date, most of our research into genocide and mass atrocities has focused on those actions perpetrated by state actors. Yet current events have increased the need to understand this behavior across nonstate groups as well. Furthermore, although a well-developed academic literature exists on the civilian targeting behavior of rebel groups, that work has not addressed the tactical variation of groups that choose to systematically target civilians for extermination through large-scale, repeated attacks. In other words, although we have considered the strategy and rationale for civilian targeting, we have yet to systematically investigate the conditions that lead nonstate actors to commit mass atrocities. This paper sets out to address the question of the conditions under which nonstate actor (NSA) groups commit mass atrocities. That is, when do NSAs choose to deliberately, and on a large scale, target civilians? Understanding the use of this tactic across NSA groups has important implications for how we understand NSA behavior, as well as how we design and implement policy to prevent that behavior. This paper provides an overview of the data collection, research design, and data analysis completed for the 2016–17 Leonard and Sophie Davis Fellowship at the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide. This project aims to address the structural conditions, conflict, and group characteristics that make mass atrocity behavior by nonstate actors more likely with the intention of developing policy prescriptions to reduce or halt this behavior in the future.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Islamic State, Atrocities, and Boko Haram
Political Geography:
Global Focus

200. Silent Partners: Organized Crime, Irregular Groups, and Nation-States

Author:
Shima D. Keene
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The U.S. Army increasingly faces adversaries that are difficult to define. The threat landscape is further complicated by the silent partnership between criminal organizations, irregular groups, and nation-states. This collaboration, whatever its exact nature, is problematic, because it confounds understanding of the adversary, making existing countermeasures less effective, and thus directly challenging U.S. national security interests. Military action taken without full appreciation of the dynamics of the nature of these relationships is likely to be ineffective at best or suffer unintended consequences. This monograph provides a comprehensive assessment of the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by the silent partners, as well as how the vulnerabilities of the relationships could be exploited to the advantage of the U.S. Army.
Topic:
Security, National Security, War, Military Strategy, Non State Actors, Organized Crime, Non-Traditional Threats, Society, and Nation Building
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America