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52. Capability and Resolve: Deterrence, Security and Stability in the Baltic Region
- Author:
- Heinrich Brauss, Kalev Stoicescu, and Tony Lawrence
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, NATO has revitalised its core business of deterrence and defence and adapted it to today’s political and geostrategic circumstances. In the Baltic region, the most visible expression of this effort has been the deployment of the enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups in Poland and the three Baltic states. These are, in turn, backed up by a readiness and reinforcement strategy, which NATO has also strengthened through the adoption of a number of measures agreed by the Allies. But deterrence is a complex matter that involves political, diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, information-related, and other aspects. In the Baltic region, the constraints of geography coupled with the proximity of the region to Russia pose particular challenges to NATO’s approach. The region remains a focus of tensions between Russia and the West and the three Baltic states are still NATO’s most vulnerable members. Moscow, meanwhile, pretends that it is particularly threatened in the Baltic region, where it regards the territory of the Baltic states as a potential bridgehead of American power projection and presents NATO’s deterrence measures as a deliberate, unprovoked and unjustified build-up of forces around its periphery. Two interdependent developments in the period since 2014 have pointed to a particular need to re-examine the credibility of NATO’s posture as it pertains to the Baltic region: first, Russia’s continued programme to achieve conventional military superiority in its western direction; and second, its recent deployment of new mobile, land-based, intermediate-range, nuclear-capable missiles. The former has given Russia has a substantial numerical advantage in ground forces in the Baltic region which give Moscow the option of executing a rapid land-grab attack before NATO could react. The latter could be used to try to decouple Europe from the extended nuclear deterrence provided by the US, paralysing NATO decision making and undermining the Allies’ resolve. Full and expeditious implementation of all decisions taken at Warsaw and Brussels to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture is therefore imperative. In this policy paper, we recommend some steps that NATO should take in order to strengthen the deterrent effect of NATO forces and to ensure that timely reinforcement of its peripheries is feasible. In the light of a US Congressional request for a detailed assessment from the Pentagon on whether to expand US military presence in the Baltic states, we pay particular attention to the role of US forces in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Political stability, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Baltic States
53. Until Something Moves: Reinforcing the Baltic Region in Crisis and War
- Author:
- Ben Hodges, Tony Lawrence, and Ray Wojcik
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- NATO’s ability to efficiently move large and heavy armed forces into and across Europe is a key aspect of its deterrence and defence posture. In establishing the enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and the three Baltic states, NATO leaders acknowledged that credible deterrence would also require these small multinational forces to be underpinned by a robust reinforcement strategy. In this report, we examine this key aspect of NATO’s defence and deterrence posture as it relates to the Baltic region. In a crisis, military movement in Europe is likely to be confronted by legal and procedural obstacles, by the limited capacity of infrastructure, and by issues related to coordination, command and control. The severity of these problems would vary according to the type of crisis. For an operation to restore Alliance territory following an armed attack, the sheer scale and breadth of NATO’s requirements for military movement would present a major challenge to Europe’s transport infrastructure, and to prioritisation and coordination efforts. NATO has had little practice in reinforcing Allies at scale since the end of the Cold War. A preventative deployment to respond to a potential crisis, meanwhile, would put a premium on speed of movement. In this case, legal and procedural obstacles may be more problematic as timescales for dealing with the bureaucracy would be similar to the timescales for the movement itself. NATO and the EU have cooperated widely to mitigate the legal and procedural challenges of moving armed forces across the European continent, but the processes in place remain numerous and complex. NATO and the EU have also collaborated on the harder task of ensuring that transport infrastructure is suited to military needs. Movement would be challenged by both physical constraints, such as weight limits on roads and bridges and traffic volume restrictions for rail transport, and procedural ones, such as the limitations of the contractual arrangements necessary to enable the use of civilian railway wagons and heavy equipment transporters for military purposes. Such constraints, while manageable in peacetime, may make it difficult to meet the armed forces’ requirements for large-scale movement during crisis. Furthermore, the Baltic region also lacks supporting logistics infrastructure, for example for receiving and staging (and sustaining for extended periods) forces that have arrived in the region. A third set of challenges arises from the need for coordination among the multiple agencies involved in the movement of armed forces. Even amongst movement specialists there is no clear picture of how these agencies would work together during crises or of how movements would be prioritised to serve the operational needs of the Joint Force Commander.
- Topic:
- NATO, War, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Political Crisis
- Political Geography:
- Poland and Baltic States
54. Dilemmas of Arms Control: Meeting the Interests of NATO’s North-Eastern Flank
- Author:
- Artur Kacprzyk and Lukasz Kulesa
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- While the countries of NATO’s north-eastern flank—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland—are correctly putting emphasis in their security policy on strengthening deterrence, they need to take a more proactive stance on arms control. Although current prospects are not promising in the light of Russian violations and circumventions of existing treaties, demand for greater engagement with Russia on arms control is growing among NATO nations. Without a constructive input from the flank countries, NATO’s arms-control agenda and the actions of individual European Allies could become detached from deterrence efforts and weaken NATO cohesion. The north-eastern countries should thus identify and promote balanced solutions that can be used to increase the region’s security.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia
55. Russian Naval Forces in the Syrian War
- Author:
- Igor Delanoe
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- Since the late 2000s, the Russian Federation has expanded its naval footprint in the Eastern Mediterranean, and even resurrected its Mediterranean Squadron in 2013. The backbone of this operational squadron is provided by units coming from the Black Sea Fleet, complemented by vessels from other Russian naval formations (namely, the Northern, Baltic, and Pacific Fleets, as well as the Caspian Sea Flotilla) on a rotational basis. As the Russian State Armament Program for the period 2011-2020 was implemented, the Black Sea Fleet received new warships and new diesel-powered submarines. Consequently, by the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, Moscow’s naval footprint in the Mediterranean had already been reconstituted. Yet, since the mid-2010s, a structural change occurred in the Mediterranean Squadron’s order of battle. The Squadron has morphed qualitatively and quantitatively, and has become more capable. Featuring fewer ex-Soviet large platforms and more modern green water units, this naval task force has been assigned mainly a defensive objective: locally counterbalance navies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and protect Russia’s southern flank from perceived instability emanating from the Mediterranean’s southern shore, in the context of the Arab Spring. Moreover, Moscow’s direct military involvement in the war in Syria has provided the Mediterranean Squadron with a new purpose while highlighting a conventional deterrence mission.
- Topic:
- NATO, Armed Forces, Navy, and Syrian War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria
56. Hard security dynamics in the Baltic Sea region: From turbulence to tense stability
- Author:
- Matti Pesu
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- This Briefing Paper looks into the fundamentals of the Baltic Sea security landscape in the early 2020s. It argues that three interconnected security dynamics shape the present, ‘post-2014’ security environment in Northeastern Europe. That is to say, Russia’s assertive behaviour in the region and in Europe more broadly, NATO’s reassurance and deterrence measures in the area, and Finland’s and Sweden’s closer integration into the Western defence network all affect hard se- curity dynamics in the Baltic Sea region. These three dynamics underlie the tense regional stability that emerged after a period of alarmism and turbulence in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s ac- tions in Ukraine. Fundamentally, the stability is the product of the interplay between the three dynamics. In other words, NATO’s reassurance and deterrence measures accompanied by Finland’s and Sweden’s in- tegration into the Western security and defence system act as a counterweight to Russia’s actions in the region, creating a balance of power holding Russia’s ambitions in check. Investigating the sources of regional balance is rele- vant for multiple reasons. The region remains a poten- tial hotspot between Russia and the West and, thus, it merits close and continuous attention. Moreover, the word ‘stability’ frequently features in foreign policy parlance in Northern Europe, particularly in Finland and Sweden. Given this rhetorical proclivity, attention needs to be paid to the factors that actually constitute stability and the state of hard security in the Baltic Sea area. The paper consists of three analytical parts. First, it provides a brief historical overview of the twists and turns in the regional security landscape from the early post-Cold War era to today. The second part introduces the three dynamics in detail, followed by an analysis of how they are interconnected. The paper concludes by contemplating how regional stability could best be preserved in the 2020s.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Baltic Sea
57. Trump, the Middle East, and North Africa: Just Leave Things to the Proxies?
- Author:
- Sven Biscop
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- When Trump says that he wants NATO to take more responsibility in the Middle East, what he means is that he wants the European allies to do more. He is campaigning for re- election and has promised to bring the boys (and girls) home for Christmas. And of course, in Iraq American troops are less than welcome these days, after the targeted assassination of Iranian General Soleimani near Baghdad airport (3 January 2020). In late 2019, Trump had already withdrawn most troops from Syria, and now the peace agreement with the Taliban (29 February 2020) will allow him to draw down the US military presence in Afghanistan too. And the US is considering pulling its troops out of the Sahel as well. What does this mean for Europe?
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Assassination
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and North America
58. Will a European Security Council Bring Strategic Relevance?
- Author:
- Jo Coelmont
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- Europe is looking to be a global player rather than just a global playground. To achieve this, it needs a security council. This is essential for gaining strategic relevance. Europe needs to have recourse not only to international fora but also to a series of instruments of hard and soft power. Swift decision making at the appropriate level is of paramount importance. Such a security council should meet a number of requirements: it must be representative, be able to both achieve unity of vision and undertake action smoothly, and keep going until the desired end-state has been achieved. Several proposals have been made as to the composition of such a body. I will look into the four most discussed options. Are we spoilt for choice?
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North Atlantic, and North America
59. Reducing Russia-NATO Tensions: Codes for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
- Author:
- Liselotte Odgaard and Sune Lund
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- This report first analyzes the use of CUES in the South China Sea, which is the region they initially were designed for as an instrument to prevent unwanted escalation. In what sense have CUES in the South China Sea set a precedent for reassurance measures in other regions? Second, we discuss whether CUES could be useful to lower tension levels between Russia and NATO in their ongoing conflicts over spheres of interest, strategic space, and appropriate deterrence measures in maritime Europe. The analysis draws on the first-hand experiences of personnel engaged in implementing the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). This allows us to go beyond rhetorical announcements of intention and understand how de-escalation instruments are used at the level of implementation and whether they have any effect. Third, we conclude by discussing the caveats to and advantages of adopting CUES in the Euro-Atlantic area and how they should be designed to take the specific strategic context of this area into account.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, International Relations, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and United States of America
60. Nixon’s Watergate Scandal and NATO
- Author:
- Bob Baker
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- American Diplomacy
- Abstract:
- In a November 1973 nationally televised press conference, President Richard Nixon denied his involvement in the Watergate cover-up and declared “I am not a crook.” In the U.K., where I was working in the U.S. embassy, British television showed the scene repeatedly as part of its daily coverage of the Watergate break-in scandal. As an assistant cultural affairs officer in the London embassy, part of my job was to improve the U.S. image and British understanding of our policies. I did not agree with all of our policies, but focused my work on the best in U.S. policy and culture. That included keeping British support for NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, our main alliance in the cold war with the Soviet Union. For months, President Nixon twisted on television every day as investigations led toward him. He wanted to avoid blame for his role in the burglary at Democratic Party headquarters in the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C. His almost daily interviews on television had eroded British trust in the United States. How could Brits trust the U.S. as a strategic partner in NATO if the President was a crook?
- Topic:
- NATO, Diplomacy, Memoir, and Richard Nixon
- Political Geography:
- Europe and United States of America