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341. The Equilibrium of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The International Spectator
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The 2010 Strategic Concept reaches an equilibrium among different Allies' views by rejecting extreme options, combining 'regional' and 'global' elements in a new common ground, and setting up flexible guidelines for NATO's future evolution. It is the result of 20 years of transatlantic debate over NATO's role and geographic reach, and represents a significant step forward with respect to the previous Strategic Concept approved in 1999.
Topic:
NATO

342. "In Considerable Doubt"? Canada and the Future of NATO

Author:
David G. Haglund
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In so many ways, the attacks on New York and Washington of 11 September 2001 might have been expected to result in a diminution of NATO's importance to Canadian grand strategy. At the very least, the onset of what would be billed, alternatively, as the ‚Global War on Terror‛ (the GWOT) and the "Long War," heralded the beginning of a new strategic era, one in which Europe would become of even less strategic significance to Canada than during either the so-called "post-Cold War" era, which spanned the decade between the demise of the Soviet Union and 9/11, or the earlier, and long, Cold War era. And it followed that if the familiar cynosure of Canadian security and defence policy during that earlier era, namely Europe, was going to go on losing importance at an accelerated clip, then so too must the organization whose primary function had been, from its inception in 1949, the safeguarding of Western European security, and with it, of transatlantic security. That organization, of course, was and remains the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is an organization that, for two decades now, has continued to defy expectations that it must soon fade into obscurity as a vehicle for advancing Canada's strategic interests.
Topic:
NATO and War
Political Geography:
New York, Europe, Washington, and Canada

343. Will Oil Drown the Arab Spring?

Author:
Michael L. Ross
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Summary: No state with serious oil wealth has ever transformed into a democracy. Oil lets dictators buy off citizens, keep their finances secret, and spend wildly on arms. To prevent the “resource curse” from dashing the hopes of the Arab Spring, Washington should push for more transparent oil markets -- and curb its own oil addiction. MICHAEL L. ROSS is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and the author of the forthcoming book The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations. Even before this year's Arab uprisings, the Middle East was not an undifferentiated block of authoritarianism. The citizens of countries with little or no oil, such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia, generally had more freedom than those of countries with lots of it, such as Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. And once the tumult started, the oil-rich regimes were more effective at fending off attempts to unseat them. Indeed, the Arab Spring has seriously threatened just one oil-funded ruler -- Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi -- and only because NATO's intervention prevented the rebels' certain defeat. Worldwide, democracy has made impressive strides over the last three decades: just 30 percent of the world's governments were democratic in 1980; about 60 percent are today. Yet almost all the democratic governments that emerged during that period were in countries with little or no oil; in fact, countries that produced less than $100 per capita of oil per year (about what Ukraine and Vietnam produce) were three times as likely to democratize as countries that produced more than that. No country with more than a fraction of the per capita oil wealth of Bahrain, Iraq, or Libya has ever successfully gone from dictatorship to democracy. Scholars have called this the oil curse, arguing that oil wealth leads to authoritarianism, economic instability, corruption, and violent conflict. Skeptics claim that the correlation between oil and repression is a coincidence. As Dick Cheney, then the CEO of Haliburton, remarked at a 1996 energy conference, "The problem is that the good Lord didn't see fit to put oil and gas reserves where there are democratic governments." But divine intervention did not cause repression in the Middle East: hydrocarbons did. There is no getting around the fact that countries in the region are less free because they produce and sell oil.
Topic:
NATO, Government, and Oil
Political Geography:
Iraq, Ukraine, Middle East, Kuwait, Libya, Vietnam, California, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and Tunisia

344. Afghanistan's Ethnic Puzzle

Author:
Thomas Barfield
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
In late 2001,when U.S. forces expelled the Taliban from Afghanistan, the country appeared headed for a breakup. The United States and the rest of the international community feared that Afghanistan's rival ethnic groups would use their regional power bases to pull apart any unitary state, forming in its place independent ministates or aligning with their ethnic brethren across Afghanistan's borders. At the time, such fears seemed credible: NATO troops were still dealing with the fallout from the violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The Afghans themselves, however, were less concerned about their country dividing. After all, Afghanistan has been a single state for more than 250 years. If the country were going to split, it would have done so in the 1990s, during its protracted civil war. Yet it did not. No Afghan leader of any political stripe or ethnicity endorsed secession at any time during the last century. Nor did any at the start of this one. Although Afghanistan's various ethnic factions disagreed about how the country's new government should be organized and who would wield power within it, they all proclaimed their support for a unitary state. A decade later, the anxiety of Washington and its allies has reversed itself. If in 2001 the West was afraid that the absence of a strong centralized government in Kabul would prompt Afghanistan's dissolution, by 2011 the West has come to fear that a dysfunctional centralized government could cause this same outcome. Such a turn of events was caused by several factors, perhaps most of all by many Afghans' dissatisfaction with a centralized national administrative structure that cannot cope with the country's regional diversity or with expectations for local self-rule. The government in Kabul has been further undermined by the country's fraudulent 2009 presidential election, the absence of political parties, poor security, and general corruption.
Topic:
NATO and Corruption
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

345. The Libyan War: A Diplomatic History February - August 2011

Author:
Emily O'Brien and Andrew Sinclair
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
Some crises flare up and are forgotten fairly quickly. Others offer lasting insights into the global balance of power and the state of international diplomacy. The Libyan crisis falls into the second category. In a period in which serious commentators dwell on "the decline of the West" and "the erosion of the post-Cold War order", the war has been both a test of Western military might and international cooperation. There have been multiple surprises. A pundit who predicted in January 2011 that NATO was about to embark on a new war involving a Muslim country would have been dismissed. But it would have seem equally outlandish to suggest that China and Russia might permit Western military actions against an Arab leader to win a UN mandate, let alone that the Arab League would actively support this outcome. Wellestablished assumptions about the evolution of the international system in the wake of Iraq and the financial crisis have been found wanting.
Topic:
NATO, Civil War, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Libya, Arabia, and North Africa

346. The Missing Endgame for Afghanistan: A Sustainable Post-Bin Laden Strategy

Author:
David M. Abshire and Ryan Browne
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Washington Quarterly
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Within hours of President Obama's announcement of Osama bin Laden's May 2 death, pundits and politicians from both the right and left were calling for a speedier withdrawal from Afghanistan. The discovery and targeted killing of bin Laden in a compound on the outskirts of Abbottabad, Pakistan, located less than a mile from the Pakistan Military Academy, dramatically amplified concerns about elements of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence service (ISI) maintaining links with al-Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations. Many argued that the death of al-Qaeda's leader meant that our post-9/11 mission had been accomplished, and our expensive presence in Afghanistan was no longer needed amidst an era of mounting debt and budget fights.
Topic:
NATO
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and United States

347. A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan

Author:
Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Ten years ago in Bonn, Germany, the United Nations Envoy to Afghanistan, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, and U.S. Envoy to the Afghan Opposition, Ambassador James Dobbins, led a diverse group of international diplomats and warriors to consensus and charted the political course for Afghanistan well into the decade. The process that led to the Bonn Agreement (Bonn 2001, or Bonn I) reflects the best of U.S. and United Nations statesmanship and was the result of the effective application of military and diplomatic power.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, NATO, United Nations, War, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Germany

348. The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward

Author:
Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
The United States can no longer afford a world-spanning foreign policy. Retrenchment -- cutting military spending, redefining foreign priorities, and shifting more of the defense burden to allies -- is the only sensible course. Luckily, that does not have to spell instability abroad. History shows that pausing to recharge national batteries can renew a dominant power's international legitimacy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, and Cold War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Washington

349. Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age

Author:
Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
No sooner had NATO launched its first air strike in Libya than the mission was thrown into controversy -- and with it, the more general notion of humanitarian intervention. Days after the UN Security Council authorized international forces to protect civilians and establish a no-fly zone, NATO seemed to go beyond its mandate as several of its members explicitly demanded that Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi step down. It soon became clear that the fighting would last longer than expected. Foreign policy realists and other critics likened the Libyan operation to the disastrous engagements of the early 1990s in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, arguing that humanitarian intervention is the wrong way to respond to intrastate violence and civil war, especially following the debacles in Afghanistan and Iraq. To some extent, widespread skepticism is understandable: past failures have been more newsworthy than successes, and foreign interventions inevitably face steep challenges. Yet such skepticism is unwarranted. Despite the early setbacks in Libya, NATO's success in protecting civilians and helping rebel forces remove a corrupt leader there has become more the rule of humanitarian intervention than the exception. As Libya and the international community prepare for the post-Qaddafi transition, it is important to examine the big picture of humanitarian intervention -- and the big picture is decidedly positive. Over the last 20 years, the international community has grown increasingly adept at using military force to stop or prevent mass atrocities. Humanitarian intervention has also benefited from the evolution of international norms about violence, especially the emergence of “the responsibility to protect,” which holds that the international community has a special set of responsibilities to protect civilians -- by force, if necessary -- from war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide when national governments fail to do so. The doctrine has become integrated into a growing tool kit of conflict management strategies that includes today's more robust peacekeeping operations and increasingly effective international criminal justice mechanisms. Collectively, these strategies have helped foster an era of declining armed conflict, with wars occurring less frequently and producing far fewer civilian casualties than in previous periods.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Libya, Rwanda, and Somalia

350. From Inspiration to Aspiration: Turkey in the New Middle East

Author:
Sinan Ülgen
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
With democratic change struggling to take root in the Arab world even after the fall of several autocratic regimes, the question naturally arises whether Turkey can serve as a model for those who hope to usher the region through the difficult transition to a more democratic order.
Topic:
NATO, Democratization, and Regime Change
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Arabia