EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
When they meet at NATO's Wales Summit in Newport on 4-5 September, the European Heads of State and Government should not see this as the first chapter of a new book, but as the next chapter of an existing one. The previous chapter was their meeting in Brussels last December for the European Council. The title of the book is European defence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, and International Cooperation
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
If a set of investors plan a grand apartment building in which they can each afford just one apartment, they need an architect to design a building that is both affordable and that meets all their needs, to negotiate with the constructor, and to ensure follow - up. When building capabilities for European defence, the sole possible architect is the European Defence Agency (EDA). Those who have to reach consensus and invest are the EU Member States. And there is even a European Investment Bank (EIB) to assist them.
In the post-Cold War era the main purpose behind developing defence capabilities in NATO countries has been to achieve a technological advantage over the potential enemy. While it is reasonable in its own right, the complexity and the cost of newly developed military equipment are becoming an issue at both strategic and operational levels. Taking into account all the potential threats in the near future, I will argue that this struggle for ultimate technological superiority might actually decrease the overall effectiveness of the modern armed forces. To analyse this notion, I will describe and assess the current trends in developing armament and, based on the outcome, try to predict the long term effects.
Russia is not likely to resort to overt political pressure on Georgia in the run-up to Georgia's signing of the Association Agreement with the EU (27 June), and the NATO Summit in Wales (4-5 September). This is partly due to its weak levers and the fact that they cannot be strengthened within a short time span. Instead, Russia is likely to apply a dual strategy by strengthening its indirect 'influence tools' that are operating within Georgian society, as well as by continuing dialogue and pragmatic cooperation with the Georgian leadership - at least for the time being. Moscow is likely to stand firm on the issue of the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In all likelihood, Russia will seek to increase its control over the territories, and to hamper any rapprochement between Georgia and the separatist territories. Despite the fact that the Russian intervention in Ukraine is likely to deter and delay substantial progress in the cooperation between Georgia and Russia, both sides seem to be willing to continue on the path of 'normalisation'. A practical compromise on the Georgian westward course seems to be emerging: in all likelihood Georgia will sign the Association Agreement with the EU without much Russian interference, but NATO will not offer Georgia a Membership Action Plan at the Summit.
As the complex global security environment faced by NATO members continues to evolve in the coming years, terrorism – waged by actors both in and outside of their borders – will remain a vexing challenge. For over a decade, NATO's counterterrorism strategy has been built on taking the fight abroad. Member nations have been intimately involved in this effort as contributors to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, to the Multi-National Force in Iraq and in a variety of smaller missions around the globe. In recent times, however, there has been growing attention to the threat posed by “homegrown” terrorism and foreign fighters returning from Syria and elsewhere to their home countries throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and International Security
Roger McDermott, Brooke Smith-Windsor, and Heidi Reisinger
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia's behaviour in the Ukrainian crisis has been described by some as giving rise to “the most dangerous situation in East-West relations since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.” For one, NATO's recently retired Supreme Allied Commander has called for immediate action in response. This could include, for example, bringing the NATO Response Force – a sea, air, land, special forces capability – to a higher state of alert, and sailing NATO maritime forces into the Black Sea.
On 27 January 2014, the NATO Defense College Research Division hosted its Russia Roundtable, where international experts from various research institutions meet senior practitioners from the International Staff and International Military Staff from NATO HQ.
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
When U.S. President Barack Obama cancelled a scheduled September 2013 summit meeting with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, “lack of progress on issues such as missile defense” was cited as the primary justification. Despite widespread and well founded assumption that the real trigger for the cancellation was the Russian decision to offer temporary asylum to Edward Snowden, the citing of missile defense was indicative. The comment marked one of the periodic plateaus of mutual frustration between the United States and Russia over U.S. attitudes to missile defense capability, stemming from a continued failure to achieve meaningful dialogue over U.S. plans and Russian fears.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Imagine a dystopian future in which NATO, struggling against Islamist terrorism, has to deploy troops on a constant basis across Africa and the Middle East. Then all of a sudden it is struck by a series of calamities: more than 40 personnel are taken hostage in the Middle East, soldiers start dying on a weekly basis on the edge of the Sahara and an operation to handle an outbreak of ebola begins to spiral out of control. NATO, you might expect, would give up in exhaustion. After Afghanistan, western powers have little appetite for quagmires.