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191. Scenarios for a peace mission for Syria

Author:
Alvaro Vasvoncelos
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
This policy brief reviews the current political and humanitarian situation in Syria and analyses possible scenarios for a peace mission for Syria. The brief argues that the most likely scenario for an end to the conflict would require a regionally led solution involving Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, with the eventual backing of the US and Russia. Four preliminary conclusions have been identified: There is a highly fragmented military situation and any peace deal will face armed opposition. There will probably be a need for a peace mission. One option may involve limited missions to secure local ceasefires. A second option could involve a two-tier mission that, following a peace deal, is able to perform a mix of tasks that includes peace enforcement and peacekeeping. A coalition of EU states should assume the hard military core of any two-tier mission within a “Berlin Plus” framework that allows for the use of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assets and capabilities. They should act, however, with the participation of a wider grouping of states, including BRICS countries such as Brazil, Russia and India, as well as members of the Arab League. There is no solution to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) challenge in isolation from the broader issues at the root of the conflict. A democratic political process with elections and a new constitution must be the end game for any peace mission.
Topic:
NATO, ISIS, Islamic State, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Syria, and North America

192. Bracing for Cold Peace. US-Russia Relations after Ukraine

Author:
Ondrej Ditrych
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The International Spectator
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The crisis in Ukraine has turned the tables of the post-Cold War relationship between the United States and Russia. The ongoing transformation can result in a number of outcomes, which can be conceived in terms of scenarios of normalisation, escalation and 'cold peace' - the latter two scenarios being much more probable than the first. NATO ought to shore up its defences in Central and Eastern Europe while Washington and its allies engage in a comprehensive political strategy of 'new containment'. This means combining political and economic stabilisation of the transatlantic area with credible offers of benefits to partners in the East and pragmatic relations with Russia which are neither instrumentalised (as was the case with the 'reset') nor naïvely conceived as a 'partnership'.
Topic:
International Relations, NATO, Cold War, and Economics
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Washington, and Ukraine

193. NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force - Can the VJTF give new élan to the NATO Response Force?

Author:
Jan Abts
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
As ethnic Russian separatists, backed by disguised Russian troops, occupied the Crimean Peninsula in the last days of February 2014 and Russia subsequently annexed a part of Ukraine against the international rule of law, NATO witnessed further proof of a more assertive Russian foreign policy. In the following months, this policy led to numerous other breaches of international law. Almost overnight, NATO's agenda changed drastically, including its plans for the Wales Summit. NATO needed a new focus on collective defence and one question overshadowed all the other themes in Newport: how to react to Russia's aggression and hybrid warfare model? The new geopolitical circumstances stirred some cynical reactions by political scientists: “It gives the aging alliance something to do.” Others urged the Alliance “not to squander the opportunity the crisis provides to address some fundamental problems.”
Topic:
NATO
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

194. Nuclear Arms Control: Implications from the Crisis in Ukraine

Author:
Dániel Bartha and Anna Peczeli
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The current crisis in Ukraine pushed US-Russia relations to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War, and it also terminated the collaboration between NATO and Russia. After Russia's annexation of Crimea and the infiltrations in Eastern Ukraine, NATO suspended all practical day-to-day cooperation with Moscow (although the Alliance decided to keep the door open for high-level dialogue, and maintained the channels of communication within the NATO- Russia Council as well as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council). Besides these measures by NATO, the G8 also suspended Moscow's membership, the work of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction 3 was disrupted, and the 2014 US Compliance Report officially accused Russia of being in violation of its obligations under the Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. In response, the new Russian military doctrine, adopted in December 2014, named NATO's military buildup as one of the top threats to Russian national security. It also listed “ the creation and deployment of global strategic antiballistic missile systems that undermines the established global stability and balance of power in nuclear missile capabilities, the implementation of the 'prompt strike' concept, intent to deploy weapons in space and deployment of strategic conventional precision weapons ” among the major military threats to the strategic stability between the United States and Russia.
Topic:
NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Ukraine, and Moscow

195. TSG IntelBrief: Ukraine at a Crossroads

Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Soufan Group
Abstract:
It has been 348 days since Russia moved into Crimea, kicking off an increasingly serious threat not just to the Ukrainian people but to wider European stability In the nearly one year since the armed fighting began, Russian President Vladimir Putin has pushed aside assumed psychological barriers of behavior that the EU and NATO had hoped would bolster their decreased military deterrent towards armed aggression A meeting this Wednesday between Russia and its armed proxy Ukrainian separatists, Germany, France, and Ukraine shows how serious the crisis has become, with real concerns as to what happens when talks can\'t stop the shooting Russia will insist any agreement make official the rebel gains of the last year, which would then mark the second time European borders have been remade by force in this conflict, since Russia has demonstrated it will escalate more so than the EU or NATO.
Topic:
NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

196. Preserving Ukraine's Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do

Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
We face a critical juncture in Ukraine. There is no real ceasefire; indeed, there was a significant increase in fighting along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine in mid-January, with Russian/separatist forces launching attacks on the Donetsk airport and other areas. Instead of a political settlement, Moscow currently seeks to create a frozen conflict in eastern Ukraine as a means to pressure and destabilize the Ukrainian government. Russians continue to be present in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in substantial numbers and have introduced significant amounts of heavy weapons. This could be preparation for another major Russian/ separatist offensive.
Topic:
NATO and Government
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Ukraine, and Moscow

197. From Wales to Warsaw: NATO's Readiness Action Plan

Author:
Douglas Lute
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Wales on September 4-5, 2014, NATO leaders were clear about the security challenges on the Alliance's borders. In the East, Russia's actions threaten our vision of a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace. On the Alliance's southeastern border, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's campaign of terror poses a threat to the stability of the Middle East and beyond. To the south, across the Mediterranean, Libya is becoming increasingly unstable.
Topic:
NATO
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and Libya

198. A Look Back at NATO’s 1999 Kosovo Campaign: A Questionably "Legal" but Justifiable Exception?

Author:
Ralph R. Steinke
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
It was the last European war in a bloody century of European wars. Less than ten years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the 1999 Kosovo War—Operation Allied Force, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) referred to it—was unique in many respects. From the perspectives of both international law and the law of armed conflict, it significantly challenged the limits of jus ad bellum, the international laws of war governing the circumstances under which nations are permitted to use force, as well as jus in bello, the laws of war relating to proper conduct in war.[1] After decades of a NATO-Warsaw Pact standoff in Europe and proxy wars elsewhere it was not self-defense, but rather humanitarian considerations, that drew the NATO Alliance, with the United States in the forefront, into this conflict. While the seventy-eight-day NATO bombing campaign captured the world’s attention, not long after its conclusion this military operation began to fade from the public memory. Beyond the Balkans, a little more than two years after the Kosovo War’s conclusion, the traumatic events of September 11, 2001, would virtually remove global examination and recollections of the Kosovo conflict from the agenda. The United States and much of the world embarked on an entirely new, 21st century ideological and combative struggle: fighting the scourge of terrorism. Nevertheless, the Kosovo War has alternatively been referred to as a reference point by Americans who have sought a response to the Syrian conflict as well as by Vladimir Putin as justification for his claims to Crimea and the “protection” of Russian nationals. Some sixteen years after the Kosovo conflict and Operation Allied Force, it is worth asking: are there any insights to be recalled and gained from this conflict? What has been the war’s effect on the law of international armed conflict to date? Is Mr. Putin right to refer to the Kosovo campaign as his justification for the use of force, either implied or explicit, in Crimea or greater Ukraine? It will be argued here that in spite of significant concern and warnings then that the Kosovo campaign would provide a dangerous precedent for international law and even global stability,[2] it has had a nominal if not negligible effect on the body of international law as informed by jus ad bellum. In spite of Mr. Putin’s attempts to try to identify it as a precedent, the Kosovo campaign was indeed an exception. While it was characterized as a messy and “ugly” affair,[3] it did accomplish what it intended to do: stop the killing of potentially tens of thousands of Kosovar Albanians and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands more from Kosovo, ultimately providing them with a better and more secure life than was possible in the pre-Kosovo campaign period.
Topic:
NATO, War, Conflict, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Kosovo, and Syria

199. Kosovo 1999 and Crimea 2014: Similarities and Differences

Author:
Pál Dunay
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
Since the so-called Kosovo conflict of 1999 the views of states, including those of major players, have been divided as to whether it was a humanitarian intervention or the collective aggression of NATO member states. In 2014 the Russian Federation annexed Crimea and Sevastopol (formally separate entities) to its territory. Since then the argument has shifted and the current disagreement centers around how we should assess these two changes of territorial status quo (Kosovo and Crimea) in Europe. The situation is further complicated as states wish to present their actions as moral and legal (the general expectation is that they do so). This results in a situation where the dominant discourse is supposed to support the aspirations of states both in the east and in the west. The main effort of each party goes in countering the other’s position. It is difficult to get hold of a reliable set of facts, as these are presented selectively by the different parties. A further challenge arises in that different fields are not kept distinct from one another, and hence the legal and political analyses are often used interchangeably and with insufficient differentiation. This is aggravated by the fact that the so-called normative approach to international (and domestic) politics prevails in the analysis. Every state feels compelled to prove that it acts in full accordance with international norms, including legal rules and moral predicaments. However, any attempt to correctly analyze the change of the territorial status quo in the two cases mentioned above requires the contrary: keeping the different aspects strictly separate and only synthesizing the results in the conclusions. In this article I endeavor to keep the legal analysis separate from the political and moral assessment and wish to state in advance that they do not necessarily manifest in the same direction. Moreover, when the topic of analysis is as politically heavy-loaded as the change of territorial status quo in Europe, the international legal assessment must be disaggregated further. Namely, there is the positive international law as it exists, de lege lata, as adopted by the states or as it appears as jus cogens. There is also international law that does not exist, yet about which we speak as de lege ferenda with a view to its future evolution. Such differentiation will be particularly relevant in this case due to the swift evolution of norms in the area of humanitarian intervention relevant as point of reference in the case of Kosovo and the ambiguous content of the right to self-determination in the case of Crimea. International law has a further characteristic feature. Namely, its development cannot flexibly follow historical changes. This is particularly noticeable when major historical changes occur at a rapid pace. This was the case before and during World War II and more recently as the Cold War came to an end. The international system changed and international law in some areas did not follow. The gap between the international system and international law, where the latter forms part and parcel of the former, has widened. Furthermore, universal international law most often requires the consent of states in various regions of the world. This presents a challenge as states often profess different values and their value judgment serves different interests. It is the purpose of this article to present the legal situation that underlies the two cases, the position of the main actors, and attempt to draw separate conclusions as regards the assessment de lege lata and de lege ferenda.
Topic:
NATO, Imperialism, Conflict, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Kosovo, and Crimea

200. Soldiers, Civilians, and Multilateral Humanitarian Intervention

Author:
Stefano Recchia
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security Studies
Institution:
Security Studies
Abstract:
Approval from the United Nations or NATO appears to have become a necessary condition for US humanitarian military intervention. Conventional explanations emphasizing the pull of legitimacy can- not fully account for this given that US policymakers vary consider- ably in their attachment to multilateralism. This article argues that America’s military leaders, who are consistently skeptical about humanitarian intervention and tend to emphasize its costs, play a central role in making multilateral approval necessary. As long as top-ranking generals express strong reservations about intervention and no clear threat to US national security exists, they can veto the use of force. In such circumstances, even heavyweight “humani- tarian hawks” among the civilian leadership, who initially may have wanted to bypass multilateral bodies to maximize US freedom of action, can be expected to recognize the need for UN or NATO approval—if only as a means of mollifying the generals by reas- suring them about the prospect of sustained multilateral burden sharing. Two case studies drawing on interviews with senior civil- ian and military officials illustrate and probe the plausibility of the argument.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Humanitarian Intervention, Multilateralism, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and North America