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1. Untangling the Transatlantic Knot: Germany, France, and the United States

Author:
Gesine Weber and Jacob Ross
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
France’s and Germany’s reactions to Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine reveal their significantly different relationships with the United States. Their interpretations regarding the European security architecture are almost diametrically opposed. While Berlin concluded that European security must be constructed transatlantically, Paris saw confirmation of its interpretation that Europeans must be able to address security challenges independently of Washington. Donald Trump’s reelection constitutes a challenge for the two countries because both need to fundamentally rethink their respective relationships with the United States and Europe-US relations more generally. The scope of the US withdrawal from European security remains to be seen, but it will be similarly challenging for Paris and Berlin.
Topic:
NATO, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

2. Costly Incrementalism: U.S. PKK Policy and Relations with Türkiye

Author:
Richard Outzen
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
U.S. policy towards the PKK, a designated Foreign Terror Organization, has varied significantly over four decades, reflecting a clear periodization based on pragmatic policy interests and the interplay of U.S. actions and Turkish responses. Washington has over time supported Turkish counter-PKK actions without direct involvement; actively supported Turkish counter-PKK efforts; tolerated or tacitly supported PKK activities; and directly instrumentalized and supported the PKK in Syria and regionally. Washington’s evolving stance toward the PKK coincided with the rise of Al Qaeda (AQ) and its offshoot, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as the focus of U.S. Middle East policy. The evolution reflected an incremental approach that subordinated U.S.-Turkish relations and other regional problems to the campaign against AQ/IS. Bilateral cooperation suffered as incrementalism, low trust, and transactionalism came to characterize the relationship. This paper examines the history, current dynamics, and possible future trajectory of U.S. PKK policy as a problem in U.S. Turkish bilateral relations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, Terrorism, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

3. Challenging Friends: Türkiye-U.S. Relations

Author:
Lenore G. Martin
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
This article analyzes the underlying wellsprings for the major strains that disrupt the U.S. - Türkiye relationship. These strains arise from the U.S. support of the PYD/YPG/YPJ in Northern Syria as boots on the ground against ISIL; Türkiye’s purchase of the Russian S400 missile defense system; Türkiye’s energy imports from Russia and Iran; the U.S. refusal to extradite Fetullah Gülen; and Washington’s complaints about the AKP government’s anti-democratic tendencies. This article analyzes why and how some of these issues have evoked strong ire and distrust on both sides and others much less so by employing a paradigm based on five integrated variables: Türkiye’s military and economic capabilities; the availability of its natural resources, particularly energy; as well as threats to the legitimacy of the AKP regime and to the society’s ethnic and religious cohesion. Utilizing the paradigm, the article proposes measures that will increase the opportunities to build a firmer partnership between the U.S. and Türkiye.
Topic:
International Relations, NATO, National Security, Terrorism, Bilateral Relations, YPG, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

4. A Three-year War and Four Lessons for Europe

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The tragic third anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022 witnesses the start of diplomatic talks between Russia and the United States on the possible end of the conflict. Three years of large-scale, high-intensity war of attrition in Europe, with over a million dead or injured soldiers, offers at least four politico-military lessons for European countries, the EU and NATO. Lessons to bear in mind through this negotiation for the future not only of Ukraine but of the security of the whole continent.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

5. Can France Provide European Allies with Nuclear Deterrence?

Author:
Roberto Zadra
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In his speech to fellow citizens on 5 March, French President Emmanuel Macron announced the opening of a “strategic debate on the protection of our allies on the European continent by our (nuclear) deterrent”.[1] It is not the first time: already in the 1990s then-president François Mitterrand alluded to a vocation européenne of French nuclear deterrence.[2] Macron himself proposed, already in February 2020, the opening of a dialogue on the matter.[3] The initiative was not very successful at the time, essentially because European allies considered the security guarantees provided by the United States to Europe through NATO sufficient, together with the repeated reassurances of NATO communiqués that the British and French nuclear forces “have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance”.[4] This time, however, the reactions by many European allied countries to the French initiative will probably be different. For a simple reason: excluding the deployment of its own forces to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire and denying security guarantees to Kyiv, the Trump administration fuels the fears of European allies that Washington’s commitment to collective defence is less solid than in the past. Indeed, the Ukraine crisis has shown the limitations of the traditional NATO distinction between Article 5 and non-Article 5 – that is, between those who are members of NATO and therefore protected by collective defence, and those who are not because collective defence is not valid for NATO partners – as it has laid bare how crisis management and cooperative security are having a direct impact on (the perceived lack of US commitment to) collective defence in Europe.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and France

6. NATO-Europe-US Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: Challenging Times Ahead

Author:
Gabriele Abbondanza
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
As the Indo-Pacific gradually becomes the world’s geopolitical and geoeconomic epicentre, states and regional organisations are progressively pivoting to it. Due to a combination of drivers – chiefly US pressure, economic opportunities, strategic interests and politico-normative priorities – European and Indo-Pacific actors have increased cooperation with Washington and NATO in the region. However, the second Trump administration looks considerably less aligned with the conventional pillars of US foreign policy. In light of the unfolding fracture between the US and its European allies over Ukraine, what lies ahead for NATO-Europe-US cooperation in the Indo-Pacific?
Topic:
NATO, International Cooperation, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

7. Exploring options for advancing Kosovo-NATO relations

Author:
Ramadan Iazi and Jeta Loshaj
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
NATO’s role in Kosovo has been vital since the 1999 intervention and KFOR remains integral for guaranteeing security and stability not only in Republic of Kosovo but also the wider Western Balkans. Public sentiment for full NATO membership is extremely high in Kosovo—over 90% support—reflecting Kosovars’ enduring trust in the NATP alliance. However this overwhelming public support can be affected if Kosovo’s aspirations for closer ties with NATO are not addressed. While, Kosovo’s formal progress toward full membership is politically constrained by the fact that four NATO member states have yet to recognize its independence, there are other options that NATO can pursue to advance relations with Kosovo. In this context, this paper explores options how can Kosovo and NATO advance relations and cooperation. The 1995 study provides core principles for options that are examined in this paper. These principles remain highly relevant for Kosovo. While formal membership is stalled by non-recognizing NATO member states, the paper argues that an inclusive, step-by-step approach can be adapted for a flexible, deeper engagement with Kosovo. A central recommendation is the creation of a “Kosovo Enhanced Cooperation Initiative,” a tailored version of NATO’s partnership mechanisms (e.g., Partnership for Peace, Planning and Review Process, and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre). KECI would aim to strengthen Kosovo’s defense institutions, enhance interoperability, support civil emergency preparedness, and develop broader crisis-management capabilities. Crucially, it would not force any change in the political stance on recognition among NATO member states. The EU-facilitated normalization dialogue between Republic of Kosovo and Serbia is one of the essential elements especially for Kosovo to build the confidence of both skeptical NATO member states and international partners when it comes to Euro-Atlantic integration process of the country. Regular coordination with NATO and the EU, particularly concerning sensitive actions in the north, would affirm that Kosovo’s leaders prioritize strategic partnerships and diplomacy over moves that risks and undermine support for Kosovo. Nevertheless, without any concrete carrots such as anything close to a guarantee that Kosovo gains an open perspective for NATO’s PfP, it is rather difficult for Kosovo to be encouraged to deliver on either an agreement with Serbia or any other agreement.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Partnerships, Normalization, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

8. U.S. Interest in Greenland Reflects the Ongoing Competition in the Arctic

Author:
Kinga Dudzińska and Paweł Markiewicz
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
President Donald Trump has repeatedly suggested his intention to attach Greenland to the U.S., a move that has met with opposition from the Greenlandic and Danish governments. The pressure from the U.S. is one manifestation of its aspirations to strengthen its position in the North Atlantic, both because of the strategic importance of the island and the growing international rivalries in the Arctic. The situation will require greater EU and NATO involvement in the High North, as well as consideration of this perspective by countries outside the region, such as Poland.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Donald Trump, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Greenland, Arctic, and United States of America

9. Baltic and Nordic States Assess the Russian Military Threat

Author:
Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The newest intelligence reports by the Baltic and Nordic states jointly warn about the aggressive intentions and reconstitution of Russia’s armed forces. All of the documents assume the successful implementation of plans for larger Russian land and airborne forces till the end of 2026. However, these reports differ in the estimates of when the political moment and Russia’s conventional capabilities may permit it to initiate open conflict with NATO. Despite their informational and analytical contents, these reports may affect the Baltic region states’ capabilities development plans and their decisions about whether to increase defence spending.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

10. When sleepwalkers awake: German plea for a new European security architecture - a German point of view

Author:
Stéphane Beemelmans
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
For three years, a war has been raging on Europe's borders between two geographically connected states – a conflict that originated in Russia's occupation of Crimea and Donbass almost 11 years ago. Since then, every political and military decision-maker in our part of Europe should have realized that there is a (great) power on our continent that is ready at any time to put ‘war as a continuation of politics by other means’ (Clausewitz) into practice. The deterrent mechanism between the former blocs, which had been effective for almost 50 years and thus prevented war, has evidently given way to a ‘laissez-faire’ on the part of the European states, which has allowed Russia to attack and partially occupy Ukraine with complete impunity, using a crude mix of historical and political justifications that violate international law. What should not have happened could not be seen and therefore could not be addressed appropriately. Our and NATO's ‘laissez-faire’ was based on the for malistic argument that no NATO member country had been attacked and on the lack of strategic foresight disguised as ‘hope’, the expression of which under international law was the ‘Minsk Peace Agreement’ of 2015. The hope, namely, that this attack could be localized and thus geographically restricted or ‘frozen’.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany