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311. Security Scenarios for Syria in 2021-2022

Author:
Serhat Erkmen, Nicholas Heras, and Kirill Semenov
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Syria is a geographic entity divided into three main zones of control, each ruled by local actors with the strong and seemingly indefinite support of powerful foreign actors. These three zones are one zone in western, central, and eastern Syria controlled by the Syrian government, a second zone in northwest and northern Syria along the Syrian-Turkish border controlled by the Syrian opposition and supported by Turkey and a third zone in northeast Syria controlled by the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES) and its military the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - which is supported by the United States and several of its allies that are part of the global coalition to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The common perception by observers of the Syrian conflict is that it is frozen; that Syria will be indefinitely divided into these different territorial zones of control. This assumption obscures the fact though that a significant amount of fluidity on the ground within Syria's three main zones of control is possible. Each of these zones has its own unique characteristics and local customs that must be understood to draw broader assessments on how the wider Syrian conflict might be resolved one day.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Governance, and Local
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

312. Military Operations and Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Tobias Vestner
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems will most likely transform military operations. This paper explores how AI systems may affect and be affected by principal instruments for preparing and conducting military operations. Therefore, the paper analyses and discusses AI in the context of strategy, doctrine, plans, rules of engagement, and orders to situate opportunities, challenges, and open questions as well as offer overarching observations. The paper takes a broad angle of analysis that enables a general examination of the issue based on new policies and technological developments as well as the consideration of political, military, legal, and ethical perspectives. Thereby, the paper provides insights and avenues to advance further reflection, research, and policy-making on the appropriate integration, management, and use of AI for military operations.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

313. Global NATO: What Future for the Alliance's Out-of-area Efforts?

Author:
Antoine Got
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
While modest in scope, the efforts briefly discussed above illustrate a desire not to rescind NATO’s role in the promotion of international – as opposed to strictly regional – stability. Notwithstanding this, there is room for improvement. Above all, the non-kinetic nature of these initiatives signals that NATO is still hesitant to reattempt ambitious crisis-management endeavours involving large-scale troop deployments or combat operations abroad. This is coherent with previous policy, of course, considering that responsibility for security provision should remain regionally – if not locally – owned. This hesitancy is likely to endure as a consequence of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. As a result, the threshold for orchestrating military operations abroad will likely remain high. At the same time, NATO should not entirely forgo such endeavours. For while international support for SSR and capability-building are certainly vital to deliver long-term resilience, stability and the rule of law, these activities are not panaceas. Pre-crisis activities, including early preparation and prevention, are crucial in helping to reduce the known risks that can lead to or aggravate a crisis or conflict. But to conceive of prevention activities as alternatives to emergency response and management would be misguided. Crises are an unpredictable and unavoidable part of contemporary international relations, and an over- reliance on prevention activities can obfuscate the wider set of non- Article 5 instruments at NATO’s disposal to defend allied interests and protect foreign populations against violence. NATO can apply this holistic array of tools for the best possible outcome before, during and after conflict. NATO should also recognise that support for out-of-area crisis management does not necessarily require large-scale, high-risk and expensive foreign troop deployments, and that a middle ground exits between this and the political costs of inaction. With the ongoing sense of anti-interventionism in the West and the hybridisation of warfare, NATO can achieve considerable gains with low-cost, low-footprint forms of military intervention that rely on remote airpower, special operations, and the force-multiplying potential of local partners, which NATO can arm, train, and support logistically to fight against common enemies. Remote warfare and “over-the-horizon” counter-terrorism combined with local capacity-building can provide a middle ground between the costs of inaction and those of over-reaction, while constructively re-establishing the primacy of NATO as an international security provider.24 Most importantly, the alliance should not restrict the scope of its out- of-area activities because of fear that more engagement could lead to the organisation being unwillingly dragged into an Afghanistan-type conflict. NATO has drawn several lessons from this experience and is unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the past. To remain a prominent crisis- management actor, it must continue its efforts to engage proactively with the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

314. The Cyberthreat in the Contemporary Era: Challenges for the security of Pakistan

Author:
Muhammad Rizwan
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
Advancement in the field of information and communication technology (ICT) has transformed the world. In the contemporary era, digital technologies are playing an important role in performing daily life operations. This advancement and dependence on ICT also brought with it various types of vulnerabilities. Nowadays, institutions and individuals can be easily targeted by using cyberspace. Dependence on digital infrastructure is also increasing at a very rapid pace in Pakistan. Cyber networks are not only used by common people, but critical institutes like online banking, electric grids, and dams are also connected to digital networks. In the same way, military infrastructures like command and control systems and nuclear power plants are also linked to cyber networks. Due to this reliance on digital technologies, Pakistan is facing a constant threat of major cyber-attacks. So far, Pakistan does not have a proper mechanism to deal with the threat of cyber- attacks. This study analyses the impacts of the possible cyber-attack on the security of Pakistan.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Middle East

315. The U.S. Needs to Up Its Economic Game in Southeast Asia

Author:
Curtis Chin and Jose B. Collazo
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
It is important that disengagement from Afghanistan does not now foreshadow a lack of commitment to any nation in the Indo-Pacific that might be deemed by the U.S. President as not being of “vital national interest” to the U.S. With a focus on economic and trade engagement, China may well view nations differently than if it had a mindset shaped purely by military interests. Southeast Asia is at the dynamic heart of the Indo-Pacific. To America, we say, “Go Southeast, my friends.” The United States needs to up economic involvement in the region to make a sustainable and lasting presence in Southeast Asia. Then, President Biden and our U.S. Congress can say “we’re back” and “here to stay” with an all-in approach to Southeast Asia.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

316. Seizing a Historic Opportunity: the U.S.-DRC Privileged Partnership for Peace and Prosperity

Author:
Michael A. Hammer
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
The Congolese people have endured a tragic history, first at the hands of a colonial power and, since gaining independence, from its own homegrown rulers. A country with ample supplies of strategic minerals and natural resources has become dependent on considerable international humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping support to avoid a further calamity. Yet out of an imperfect electoral transition in 2019, the Democratic Republic of the Congo can break with the past and achieve substantial progress. Despite Congo’s unpredictability and legendary challenges, one constant has been clear throughout my time in Kinshasa: there is presently an opportunity for real change. One can envision how sustained good governance that channels resources toward development could rapidly transform this struggling nation. If President Tshisekedi can embody the vision he has ambitiously laid out, it is possible to achieve a rapid transformation of this struggling nation. But DRC cannot do it alone. Since the U.S. is a committed, reliable and long-term partner of the Congolese people and their government, it is incumbent on us to step up and make a difference. Still, given the enormity of the task at hand, U.S. interagency efforts in support of the DRC must be sustained over time even if there are setbacks and if progress is painfully slow. This is an investment well worth making!
Topic:
Security, Economics, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Transition, and Prosperity
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, United States of America, and Democratic Republic of Congo

317. US-Russian Contention in Cyberspace: Are Rules of the Road Necessary or Possible?

Author:
Pavel Sharikov
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
In recent years, as news of U.S.-Russian tensions in the cyber domain has dominated headlines, some strategic thinkers have pointed to the need for a bilateral cyber “rules of the road” agreement. American political scientist Joseph Nye, a former head of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, wrote in 2019 that, even “if traditional arms-control treaties are unworkable” in cyberspace, “it may still be possible to set limits on certain types of civilian targets, and to negotiate rough rules of the road that minimize conflict.” Robert G. Papp, a former director of the CIA’s Center for Cyber Intelligence, has likewise argued that “even a cyber treaty of limited duration with Russia would be a significant step forward.” On the Russian side, President Vladimir Putin himself has called for “a bilateral intergovernmental agreement on preventing incidents in the information space,” comparing it to the Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas. Amid joint Russian-U.S. efforts, the Working Group on the Future of U.S.-Russia Relations recommended several elements of an agreement in 2016, among them that Russia and the U.S. agree “on the types of information that are to be shared in the event of a cyberattack” (akin to responses to a bio-weapons attack) and prohibit both “automatic retaliation in cases of cyberattacks” and “attacks on elements of another nation’s core internet infrastructure.” Most recently, in June 2021, a group of U.S., Russian and European foreign-policy officials and experts called for “cyber nuclear ‘rules of the road.’”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

318. Takeaways From a Time of Increased Friction: South Korea-Japan Security Cooperation From 2015 to Present

Author:
Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
South Korea and Japan share common challenges and liberal democratic values but have been unable to build a close security relationship, due mainly to their political differences. This paper examines the two countries’ defense cooperation in the bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral arenas over the past six years to explore how the external security environment, as well as bilateral political problems, have affected their joint activities. The paper’s analysis shows that defense cooperation between South Korea and Japan is not always a binary choice between full cooperation or no cooperation. The two countries not only weigh external threats and bilateral problems, but also ponder such factors as U.S. encouragement to adjust the scope of their cooperation. The paper also shows that while the main constraint for security cooperation between South Korea and Japan is their historical animosity, in recent years, frictions involving the countries’ armed forces have become a new reason for limiting cooperation. As a result, grassroots military-to-military exchanges between the two countries, which in the past continued despite political problems, have largely stopped since late 2018. The paper concludes by proposing that South Korea and Japan work to restore routine bilateral working-level exchanges. It also recommends that the United States continue to urge the two countries to cooperate, and that multilateral exercises be employed as forums for cooperation between the two armed forces, as that is an area that is least impacted by bilateral problems.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

319. Iranian Public Opinion At the Start of the Raisi Administration

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Clay Ramsay, and Ebrahim Mohseni
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has been conducting in- depth surveys of Iranian public opinion on nuclear policy, regional security, economics, domestic politics, and other topics since the summer of 2014. Each survey includes a combination of trend-line questions, some going as far back as 2006, and new questions written to assess and inform current policy debates. This report covers findings from a survey fielded in late August and early September, shortly after Ebrahim Raisi was inaugurated as Iran’s new president on August 5, 2021. It provides insights into Iranian public attitudes regarding a wide range of foreign and domestic policy issues as Raisi takes office, eight months after we released a similar survey of Iranian attitudes in the early days of American president Joe Biden’s first term in office. Much has changed, and much has stayed the same since February 2021. Biden had campaigned on a pledge to rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and lift sanctions imposed by the Trump administration, as a first step toward further negotiations, so Iranians were relatively positive in February about the prospects for reviving the nuclear deal and improving U.S.-Iranian relations. It took about ten weeks for the new administration to begin indirect negotiations with Iran on a mutual return to full compliance with the JCPOA. The Iranian parliament had responded to Trump’s maximum pressure campaign by passing a law specifying that if the Biden administration did not reverse that policy within weeks of taking office, Iran would exceed JCPOA-mandated limits on its nuclear program in more consequential ways and suspend special International Atomic Energy Agency access to Iran’s nuclear sites that were called for by the JCPOA. The economic, political, and public health crises confronting the new Biden administration precluded it from moving that quickly. The Iranian government promised to r The talks in Vienna made slow, but significant progress as preparations for Iran’s presidential election intensified. Members of the negotiating teams indicated that agreement had been reached by mid-June on some key issues, including the sequence of steps that Iran would take to resume fulfilling its JCPOA commitments and the corresponding sanctions relief it would get from the United States. Some important points of disagreement still needed to be resolved, though. Iran wanted reliable assurances that the United States would not withdraw again or take other steps to preclude Iran from receiving the promised benefits if it abided fully by its JCPOA obligations through October 2025, when the JCPOA specifies that many of Iran’s special nuclear commitments would end and it would have the same rights and responsibilities as other non- nuclear weapon states party to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The United States also wanted assurance from Iran that once the JCPOA had been restored, it would start follow-on negotiations to address additional U.S. concerns.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Military Strategy, Public Opinion, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

320. Restoring and Improving Nuclear Forensics to Support Attribution and Deterrence

Author:
Steve Fetter
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Nuclear forensics is the analysis of nuclear materials, devices, emissions, and signals to determine the origin and history of those nuclear materials and devices. At the request of the Secretary of Energy, and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security, Restoring and Improving Nuclear Forensics to Support Attribution and Deterrence evaluates the U.S. government's nuclear forensics capabilities. A 2010 National Academies report, Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk, characterized the precarious state of the national technical nuclear forensics (NTNF) program at that time: NTNF relied almost entirely on staff dedicated to and residual funding from other related programs. This summary report addresses the current state of U.S. NTNF capabilities relative to the National Academies evaluation in 2010 and recommends ways to improve the NTNF program through improvements in policy, operations, and research and development efforts.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America