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171. Articulating the Logic of Nuclear-Sharing

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements often get bad press. This is remarkable given the fact that they have demonstrably contributed to (a) countering the proliferation of nuclear arsenals in Europe, (b) fostering alliance cohesion by giving non-nuclear weapon states a voice on the nuclear posture of the alliance, and (c) making nuclear deterrence more effective militarily by offering a wider array of force options. When the relative merits of extended nuclear deterrence are unknown, public support thereof is likely to suffer. In order to enrich the debate about NATO’s nuclear policy, this Security Policy Brief articulates the threefold logic of nuclear-sharing.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

172. NATO’s 2018 Brussels Summit: A View from the United States

Author:
Matthew Rhodes
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
NATO leaders billed their last full formal summit two years ago in Warsaw as a “break- through summit.” Speaking at a parallel experts forum, Polish President Andrzej Duda named the event the second most important in his country’s post-communist history, be- hind only NATO accession itself. In addition to the headline decision for Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the Baltic region, the Alliance adopted special declarations on strength- ening “resilience” and strategic partnership with the European Union. In contrast, the next leaders’ meeting in two weeks in Brussels is expected to be less about conceptual innovation than practical steps to implement existing commitments. At preceding ministerials and other occasions, the Alliance’s leading member, the United States, has pushed for further focus on mobility, stability, and burden-sharing in particu- lar. Nonetheless, recent tensions in other aspects of transatlantic relations have injected a measure of drama and raised the stakes for the summit’s success.1
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

173. Downsizing Defense in Development: Unpacking DOD’s Development Assistance

Author:
Sarah Rose
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
The US Department of Defense (DOD) is not a development agency, but it does manage millions of dollars of development assistance. In the early 2000s, DOD took on a significantly expanded development role, prompting a number of concerns and creating a lingering perception of intensive US military involvement in development activities. In fact, lessons learned from this era drove a reconceptualization of the Pentagon’s role in development. Today, the military controls only a tiny portion of US development funds, most of which go toward health (mainly PEPFAR) and disaster relief activities. This paper provides a brief landscape analysis of DOD’s recent development aid-funded efforts, breaking down its engagement into six key thematic areas. It concludes with five considerations related to DOD’s role in development assistance: (1) DOD has comparative advantages that make it an important actor in US development policy; (2) civilian-military coordination is hard but critical for development policy coherence; (3) adequate resourcing of civilian agencies is critical for effective civilian-military division of labor; (4) increasing the flexibility of civilian agencies’ staffing, programming, and funding could complement the military’s rapid response capabilities; and (5) incomplete transparency and limited focus on results reduces accountability around DOD’s aid investments.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Development, Military Strategy, Bureaucracy, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
United States and North America

174. Saudi Coalition “Admission” of Error in Bombing Cholera Treatment Center Implicates the United States

Author:
Oona A. Hathaway
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
In June 2018, the U.S.-supported Saudi led coalition struck a cholera treatment center run by Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) in Yemen. A recent internal investigation released by the coalition tries to lay the blame for the strike on MSF. But tucked into the report is a cryptic admission that the coalition did not “complete the necessary procedures used by the Coalition Forces” before undertaking the strike. This suggests that the coalition has not stuck to a deal it made with the United States to maintain U.S. support by properly vetting strikes, leaving the United States and its personnel legally exposed for continuing to support operations that violate international humanitarian law.
Topic:
International Law, Military Strategy, Humanitarian Crisis, and Air Force
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

175. Bolton’s Stated Predicate for War With Iran Doesn’t Work

Author:
Oona A. Hathaway
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
The President’s National Security Advisor John Bolton has long been beating the drums of war with Iran. Those drums are growing louder. In the last month, Bolton has repeatedly threatened that Iran’s support for its “proxies” could bring “a very strong response”—even military force. By threatening military action against Iran in retaliation for the acts of groups it supports, Bolton is trying to frame a war on Iran as a justified—even righteous—act of self-defense even if he cannot prove that Iran itself has participated in any attacks. Such a war would, however, be illegal.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Law, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

176. Information Warfare Between Russia and Ukraine: A Cause of War for the West?

Author:
Kazimierz Pierzchala
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
Experts on information competition between Russia and Western countries are convinced that president Vladimir Putin plans a war against the West as a long-term opera- tion. It is directed on two fronts: internal and the more effective external one. Both can be developed in every country of the World; the opponent may be a compatriot but the ally may be a foreigner. Fortunately, in the West the effectiveness of these operations is lower. Confrontation with the West the Kremlin has many advantages: parental and controlled informational space, technical implements, huge experience based on expert knowledge, likewise a longstanding practice in conducting informational operations. Those actions are strongly concentrated and there are widely used digital platforms and also, they popularise the contents in harmony with Russian Federation politics. Their aim is not only forming in- ternal and external public opinion properly and in line with the Kremlin’s interests, because as the annexation of Crimea has demonstrated that their aim is construction of a new reality of the world. Paradoxically, in the Russian Federation’s policy, media freedom and political pluralism are considered as a weakness of the West. Many communities which have different benefits are sensitive to the Kremlin’ s propaganda.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Information Age, Conflict, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

177. On the Struggle for Peace

Author:
Sergei Karaganov
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
The U.S.’S wiThdrawal from the Treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and Shorter-range Missiles (iNF) may prove useful – however, only if it gets normal people throughout the world and, most importantly, many of us russians to come out of years-long hibernation. This hibernation could be described as strategic parasitism. There has not been a large-scale war in the world for more than 70 years now. Over the past three decades, relative peace has been accom- panied by a rapid increase in living standards for billions of people. People have begun to think that this state of peace is not only normal but will also stay with us forever. Meanwhile, 95% of it is the result not of our responsibility and peacefulness, but the fear of a nuclear apocalypse and hope for mutual nuclear deterrence. however, reliance on it is becoming increasingly fragile. in recent years, strategic stability (this term usually refers to the level of the threat of nuclear war) is rapidly deteriorating. i will venture to say that the current level of threat is comparable to the time right after the Cuban missile crisis that almost led to a global catastrophe. Prior to it, in the 1950s, the situation was perhaps even worse than it is now: an uncontrolled arms race and bitter hostility. Nevertheless, the vector of development is toward the 1950s. russia’s policy needs reviewing. The struggle to avert war should become the most important vector of this policy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and INF Treaty
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

178. Back to the Russia-U.S.-China “Triangle”?

Author:
S. Trush
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
FOr SeVeral MONThS, the world expert community has been actively discussing the obvious resurgence of the russia-the U.S.-China “triangle.” This happens every time when the key, or even “sacral,” prob- lem of international interaction – the problem of security – comes to the fore. The high level of confrontation inside two of the three sides of the “triangle” – the U.S. vs. russia and China vs. the U.S. – predetermined this resurgence against the background of donald Trump’s non-orthodox and unyielding foreign policy. he brought to the white house his “no-nonsense” approach to add more prominence to the traditional efforts of american pragmatists to keep russia and China apart. his obvious preference for Moscow and his clear intention to rely on it to oppose China were defused by an unprece- dented attack launched against him by the anti-Trump opposition inside the United States. due to the internal balance of power, russia was cho- sen as the potentially most promising target with the best foreign policy dividends perfectly suited to the task of either pushing the president out of the white house or at least, narrowing down his political leeway. This attack and the fairly painful Korean issue created a pause in the america-China relations obvious in the first year of the new administra- tion that ended late in 2017 by the “tough and realistic” description in the National Security Strategy of the United States of “revisionist powers of russia and China.... that challenge american power.” This launched an aggressive trade war with China; today, it has become abundantly clear that it is part of the exacerbated systemic confrontation with China over economic, technological and military leadership.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

179. A Frank Conversation About War and Peace

Author:
S Ryabkov
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
This interview discusses the diplomacy and military affairs between Russia and the United States.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and INF Treaty
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

180. Strategic Stability in the Early 21st Century

Author:
A. Orlov
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
one hunDReD YeaRs ago, mankind entered the 20th century as the “golden age” of realized ideals of freedom and humanism. Reality proved to be different: this was the cruelest and the bloodiest period in the histo- ry of modern civilization. The new generation of political dreamers, with anglo-saxon roots in the first place, expected the 21st century to become a period of a more or less stable development of the world led by the united states with the help of its closest satellites. In his The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, Zbigniew Brzezinski (who together with henry Kissinger can be described as a “classic” of the contemporary geopoliti- cal thought) wrote that since the end of the Cold War the united states “assumed the unique global security role” and “america’s global socio- cultural celebrity makes it the world’s center of attention.”1 he arrived here at a fairly debatable (as later developments showed) conclusion that “america’s role in ensuring the security of its allies ... justifies it in seek- ing more security for itself than is predictably attainable by other states.”2 This trend of military-political thinking that dominated across the ocean in the 1990s and early 2000s has not changed in fifteen years that elapsed since the time when the maître of american political science wrote the lines quoted above. Formally a Democrat and President Jimmy Carter's national security advisor in the latter half of the 1970s, he nur- tured the ideas that differ but little from those of the present master of the White house, a conservative Republican determined to “make america great again,” that is, to restore its role of the unquestioned world leader in all trends and in all hypostases. nothing what President Trump has said so far clarifies when, in his opinion, america lost its greatness. It seems that he piles the accusations on Democrat obama whom he called a “softy” and who allegedly allowed the adversaries to push america into a tight corner from which the country is scrambling out under his guid- ance. let’s go several decades back. The end of the Cold War, the victory in which Washington arrogant- ly “appropriated” and its rise, at least in its own eyes, became a watershed of sorts in american understanding of the contemporary realities and of certain basic postulates that for a long time remained the cornerstone of the perception of the world by Washington and Moscow. This relates, first and foremost, to the strategic security concept. Brzezinski admitted: “It was until the late 1950s and perhaps not even until the Cuban Missile Crisis that america was jarred into recognition that modern technology has made vulnerable a thing of the past.”3 “The intense national debate on these issues [in the united states] eventually led to a consensus that a relationship of stable deterrence with the soviet union was attainable only through mutual restraint.”4 henry Kissinger fully agrees with the above. In his World Order, he has written: “strategic stability was defined as a balance in which neither side would use its weapons of mass destruction because the adversary was always able to inflict an unacceptable level of destruction in retalia- tion.”5 This adds special importance to what anatoly Dobrynin, soviet ambassador to the u.s., had to say in his book In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents about his talk to Robert Mcnamara, united states secretary of Defense, in april 1967: “Mcnamara explained that u.s. nuclear doctrine was grounded in the idea that the united states should be ready to absorb a surprise nuclear- missile strike while preserving its capability to hit back and cause irreparable damage to the enemy. as far as he could understand, Mcnamara said, the soviet military doctrine was based on the same prin- ciple. he was convinced that both sides possessed such capability. It was precisely this factor that in a peculiar way provided the stability and ade- quately guaranteed that neither of the two great powers would attack the other, because each well knew that an attack on the other meant suicide.”6 Colonel-general Yury Baluyevsky, a prominent soviet and Russian military theoretician who served as Chief of the general staff of the armed Forces of the Russian Federation, has pointed out the fol- lowing: “[The] term strategic stability has been used for a fairly long time to assess the situation in the world. at first it was limited to the relations between the two superpowers – the soviet union and the united states – and described them as the mutually assured destruction of the sides and the rest of the world in a global nuclear war.... This stability is a product of nuclear arms race that resulted in the parity of strategic offensive armaments of the ussR and the u.s. and the situation of the so-called nuclear stalemate.”
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America