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1591. A Solution for the US–Iran Nuclear Standoff

Author:
William Luers, Thomas R. Pickering, and Jim Walsh
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
The recent National Intelligence Estimate’s conclusion that Tehran stopped its efforts to develop nuclear weap- ons in 2003, together with the significant drop in Iranian activity in Iraq, has created favorable conditions for the US to hold direct talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The Bush administration should act on this opportunity, if for no other reason than that its current position is growing weaker, and without such an initiative, Iran will continue its efforts to produce nuclear fuel that might, in the future, be used to build nuclear weapons. Currently, Iran has approximately three thousand centrifuges, which it has used to produce small test batches of uranium that has been enriched to a low level (which cannot be used for nuclear weapons). Until now, Iranian engineers have not successfully operated a centrifuge cas- cade (a collection of centrifuges working together) at full capacity—which, as a practical matter, would be needed to enrich nuclear fuel to the level necessary either to establish an effective nuclear energy program or to manufacture nuclear weapons. But the Iranian government has declared its ambition to build more than 50,000 centrifuges, and recent reports also suggest that Tehran is testing a modified “P-2” centrifuge, a more advanced version of its existing centrifuge technology, which can produce a larger volume of enriched uranium. We propose that Iran’s efforts to produce enriched uranium and other related nuclear activities be conducted on a multilateral basis, that is to say jointly managed and operated on Iranian soil by a consortium including Iran and other governments. This proposal provides a realistic, work- able solution to the US–Iranian nuclear standoff. Turning Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities into a multinational program will reduce the risk of proliferation and create the basis for a broader discussion not only of our disagreements but of our common interests as well.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Peace
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

1592. Wilson and the Founders: The Roots of Liberal Foreign Policy

Author:
Ted Widmer
Publication Date:
04-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
We can’t do much better than reclaiming the Declaration of Independence as a fundamental foreign policy document in American history. We have a tendency to read it in a simplistic way, and to think of it only as a sort of airy declaration of what were then human rights, and a declaration of separation from England. But, in fact, the founders had a fairly well-articulated sense of what they were doing with foreign policy, and a fairly revolutionary sense of their foreign policy. So I’m quite interested in how Woodrow Wilson rediscovers the founders and makes them relevant for his time. This thinking about Wilson began for me about ten years ago when I came to be a speechwriter in the second term of Bill Clinton’s presidency. I was quite interested in which presidents were considered historically interesting to Clinton and quickly figured out it was John F. Kennedy, obviously, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. a little less obviously, and Teddy Roosevelt, who was a huge influence on Bill Clinton, and always has been. It was a time in the 1990s when a lot of very favorable books were coming out about Teddy Roosevelt, and it was an attractive time to be thinking about him. At the same time, I felt Wilson was completely ignored. I don’t remember Clinton ever talking about Wilson. In the collected speeches of Bill Clinton—it’s something like eighteen very fat volumes, the man enjoys speaking—if we looked up Wilson, I’m sure we could find a few references, but very few.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Liberalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1593. Wilson, Bush, and the Evolution of Liberal Foreign Policy

Author:
Tony Smith
Publication Date:
04-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
The first subject to discuss in considering the future of the liberal inter- nationalist agenda is the importance of the democratization project to the definition of Wilsonianism. The second is the meaning of multilat- eralism. In the first case, Thomas Knock and Anne-Marie Slaughter argue in a forthcoming volume that democratization was never an important part of Wilsonianism; that, instead, multilateralism is the key to liberal interna- tionalism. On the basis of this argument, they come to the conclusion that the Bush Doctrine is not in the Wilsonian tradition. In my contribution to this volume,1 I object to this denigration of the place of democracy in liberal internationalism as being fundamentally illogical. Accordingly, I find the Bush Doctrine easily identifiable as Wilsonian. I argue for the centrality of democracy to the Wilsonian project because it seems clear that the microfoundations for a regime in society are critical to the ability of those states that participate in multilateral organizations to do so effectively. That is, in order to function effectively, ultimately to provide for a peaceful world order, a multilateral organization needs to be dominated by democratic states, known for their rule-abiding behavior, their transparency, predictability, and accountability. Wilson wanted the League of Nations to be a League under the control of democracies and concerned with expanding this form of government,2 but then in late February 1919 at Versailles, he abandoned that idea. From a liberal internationalist perspective, the result of the League’s character was that it was undermined not only by the failure of the United States to join, but also by the role played in it by autocratic states. It is worth adding that in his drafts of the Pan American Union some three years earlier, Wilson had also looked forward to a community of American states based on the consent of the governed. In a word, a world of peace was necessarily a world dominated by what today is often called “market democracies,” a type of social, economic, and political order that Wilson argued was fundamentally different from and better than any alternative order. In such an order the place of democratic governments was central.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Leadership, and Liberalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1594. Much ado about nothing: the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Author:
Anat Biletzki
Publication Date:
05-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
One could say that we have been in the midst of some sort of peace process since the 1991 Madrid conference. Erstwhile movers and shakers can, in fact, point to earlier attempts at peace-making—clandestine efforts at give-and-take, less or more secret track-2 initiatives, various collaborations (between teachers, students, doctors, lawyers, et al, from “both sides”)—that have had sporadic success and perhaps even some achievements. But the starting point of a grand-scale peace process, one with official authorities of Israel and Palestine, can be pinpointed in Madrid. Then fol- lowed the Oslo 1 and 2 accords, the Wye River Memorandum, the Taba Summit, the Road Map to Peace, and finally the Annapolis Conference. Each of these housed almost an identical set of ceremonies, rituals, icons, and discourse (and several identical players as well). Almost all had the expected preliminary (honest?) deliberations, the requisite early (prefabricated?) suspense, the accompaniment of (objective?) third-party American pressure, the moments of (manufactured?) crisis, and the final fanfare regarding an (historic?) announcement.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Peace, and Territory
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

1595. Does the “Surge” Explain Iraq’s Improved Security?

Author:
Jon R. Lindsay
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Sen. John McCain has long advocated “sustained and substantial” troop increases,1 attacking Sen. Barack Obama’s position on drawing down forces. Obama for his part recently stated that the surge has “succeeded in ways that nobody anticipated” and “beyond our wildest dreams.”2 Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of Multi- National Corps Iraq during the surge, told a Heritage Foundation audience in March 2008, “I think it’s safe to say that the surge of Coalition forces—and how we employed those forces—have broken the cycle of sectarian violence in Iraq.”3 While the surge was quite controversial in its inception,4 it now seems that “success has a thou- sand fathers.” Indeed, since the deployment starting in January 2007 of an additional 30,000 troops (five addi- tional Army brigades primarily in and around Baghdad and 4,000 Marines in Anbar Province, rising to a high-water mark of 171,000 U.S. troops in Iraq by October 2007), the drop in vio- lence has been remarkable. From December 2006 to August 2008, monthly insurgent-initiated attacks have dropped from over 5,600 to 800, U.S. troop fatalities from 112 to 23, and Iraqi civilian fatalities from 3,500 to 500. Even though we’re hardly out of the woods, the troop surge is clearly correlated with a major decrease in violence.5 Correlation, of course, is not causation. Lt. Gen. Odierno is right to highlight the employment of surge forces in addition to the increase in their numbers. The renewed focus on providing security to the Iraqi population—by pushing troops out of sprawling Forward Operating Bases and proactively controlling movement within major cities—has truly been a change for the bet- ter. Nevertheless, there are factors above and beyond additional troops and better counter-insur- gency tactics that may account for the drop in violence. These include the Sunni Awakening movements that emerged in Anbar province prior to the surge, the tragic efficacy of sectarian killing in 2006, the Shia Mahdi Army cease-fire announced and renewed by Moqtada al-Sadr, and operations by other U.S. organizations not associated with the surge.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

1596. The U.S. and Iran in Afghanistan: Policy Gone Awry

Author:
Barnett R. Rubin and Sara Batmanglich
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Afghanistan is one of several contexts in which the long-term common interests of the U.S. and Iran have been over- shadowed by the animus originating in the 1953 CIA-led coup in Iran and the Iranian revolution of 1979, to the detriment of the interests of the U.S., Iran, and Afghanistan. This confronta- tion has served the interests of the Pakistan military, Taliban, and al-Qaida. Re-establishing the basis for U.S.-Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan would provide significant additional leverage over Pakistan, on whose territory the leadership of both the Taliban and al-Qaida are now found. During the first half of the Cold War (until the 1978 coup in Afghanistan and the 1979 revolution in Iran), Afghanistan was a non-aligned country with a Soviet-trained army wedged between the USSR and U.S. allies. In the 1970s, under the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. supported efforts by the Shah of Iran to use his post-1973 oil wealth to sup- port efforts by Afghan President Muhammad Daoud to lessen Kabul’s dependence on the USSR. This ended with the successive overthrow of both Daoud and the Shah in 1978 and 1979. A U.S. close partnership with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan emerged as the primary means of maintaining U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf and its eastern flank. Support for Sunni Islamists in Afghanistan and an Islamist-oriented military regime in Pakistan formed parts of this strategy to repulse the USSR from its occupation of Afghanistan, begun in late 1979, and to isolate Iran.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

1597. U.S. and Colombia: A Growing Military Intervention?

Author:
Jenny Manrique Cortes
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Colombia is one of the closest friends of American foreign policy. A country of 44 million, Colombia has been fighting for years against two scourges that have turned into primordial interests for the US: drug trafficking and terrorism.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, Narcotics Trafficking, Military Intervention, and Drugs
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

1598. Troop Levels in Stability Operations: What We Don’t Know

Author:
Peter Krause
Publication Date:
02-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Troop levels in Iraq have been one of the most hotly contested issues om American foreign policy over the past three years, from debates over the initial deployment in 2003 to those surrounding the troop surge in 2007. The Bush administration has faced significant criticism for ignoring the conventional wisdom regarding the number of soldiers required to secure Iraq, and recent attempts to change course in this area are seen by some as too little, too late. Specifically, the Pentagon’s deployment of only 120,000 American troops for the invasion and the decision by Paul Bremer, U.S. Administrator in Iraq, to disband the Iraqi army and police has kept the ratio of security forces to Iraqi civilians well below the 20 per 1,000 seen as the basic ante required to play the high stakes stabilization game. Many supporters of higher troop levels blame these missteps for the emergence of the robust insurgency and the coalition’s failure to defeat it. But where exactly does the 20 per 1,000 figure come from, how strong is the evidence sup- porting it, and what steps are being taken to assess and improve the conventional wisdom in this area? While the answer to the first part of the question is relatively accessible, the latter are more difficult. They address a daunting problem, but unveil a disconnect between the objectives and methods of policy and social science.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Iraq War, and Troop Deployment
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and North America

1599. North Korea: Negotiations Work

Author:
Leon V. Sigal
Publication Date:
02-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
In a laudable about-face, President Bush has decided at last to accept North Korea's longstanding offer to suspend production of plutonium by shutting down and sealing its reactor and reprocess- ing plant at Yongbyon, halting construction of a larger reactor and not restarting a newly refurbished fuel fabrication plant. In so doing, he is rejecting the counsel of American hardliners who have kept the United States from making and living up to earlier agreements while managing to convince much of America that it is North Korea that has been the one at fault. By negotiating in earnest, Bush has achieved an important goal for U.S. and Asian security.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

1600. Can Scientific Codes of Conduct Deter Bioweapons?

Author:
Jeanne Guillemin
Publication Date:
04-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
At least since the First World War, when the German army sabotaged the Allies’ pack animals with anthrax and glanders, worldwide concern about biological weapons has focused on how to improve legal restraints against biological weapons (BW). Over these same years, the major powers have vacillated in their willing- ness to promote international treaties and laws against BW programs. At the end of the Cold War, hopes were high for a global consensus to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), making it a standing organization comparable to that of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and an expanded man- date to ensure compliance. Instead, in the name of national security, the United States has recently promoted an emphasis on voluntary measures. One of these, the international adoption of biosecurity codes of conduct, puts the burden on elite scientists to solve a prob- lem of weapons proliferation that can be better addressed by effec- tive legal restraints.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Biological Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus