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1582. NATO and the new US "Af-Pak" Strategy
- Author:
- Christopher M. Schnaubelt
- Publication Date:
- 09-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- Operations in Afghanistan pose a strategic challenge for NATO, not only because it is the largest and longest duration combat operation in the history of the Alliance, but also because of the fissures that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has exposed among NATO members. These difference include questions on how to characterize and approach the violence in Afghanistan and the relative military contributions by member states to the first and thus far only operation conducted by NATO under Article V. Allegations that some members have not been carrying their fair share of the burden have raised the specter of a "two-tier" alliance.
- Topic:
- NATO, International Security, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and Asia
1583. The Great Game in Space: China’s Evolving ASAT Weapons Programs and Their Implications for Future U.S. Strategy
- Author:
- Ian Easton
- Publication Date:
- 06-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Project 2049 Institute
- Abstract:
- If there is a great power war in this century, it will not begin with the sound of explosions on the ground and in the sky, but rather with the bursting of kinetic energy and the flashing of laser light in the silence of outer space. China is engaged in an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons drive that has profound implications for future U.S. military strategy in the Pacific.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Weapons, Space, and Satellite
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America
1584. China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability: the anti-ship ballistic missile challenge to U.S. maritime operations in the Western Pacific and beyond
- Author:
- Mark Stokes
- Publication Date:
- 09-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Project 2049 Institute
- Abstract:
- China’s anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) challenge could alter the strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. An effective ASBM and supporting maritime surveillance network would diminish the effectiveness of carrier-based assets, such as the F/A-18 E/F.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Weapons, and Maritime
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America
1585. Dysfunction and Decline
- Author:
- Brian Fishman
- Publication Date:
- 03-2009
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- Al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) is a shadow of its former self, primarily because broad sectors of Iraq’s Sunni population rejected it after more than three years of active and tacit cooperation. That AQI’s ideological extremism alienated many Iraqis is well understood, but radicalism alone does not fully explain AQI’s decline: poor leadership, vulnerable communication mechanisms, tension between Iraqi and foreign members, and weak indoctrination efforts contributed to strategic and tactical blunders that alienated even other Sunni insurgents. In lieu of major social and political shifts (which are possible) that offer AQI a sustained safe-haven, these dynamics are unlikely to change dramatically; they serve as important obstacles to AQI’s resurrection. Conversely, al-Qa`ida elements elsewhere, primarily along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, are hindered less by these weaknesses. There are lessons from the fight against AQI that are applicable in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but al-Qa`ida’s operations there are likely to be much more durable than those in Iraq. Section I of this paper traces al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s transition from welcome partner to mortal enemy of Iraq’s Sunni insurgents, focusing particularly on the Islamic Army of Iraq. Section II draws on declassified internal AQI correspondence and open sources to describe how external pressures from U.S. forces and tribal sources exacerbated AQI’s fallout with other insurgents while rending the movement from within. Section III assesses AQI’s prospects in Iraq and the impact of AQI’s failure on the future of the global jihadist movement. Section IV offers recommendations for containing AQI in the future and for applying the lessons of AQI’s demise to other elements.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Military Strategy, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and History
- Political Geography:
- Iraq
1586. What NATO can learn from "the surge" in Iraq
- Author:
- Christopher M. Schnaubelt
- Publication Date:
- 10-2008
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- What a difference 30,000 additional troops and a new strategy make. A few years ago, Afghanistan was commonly viewed as the model of a successful intervention while many politicians, military analysts, and pundits believed that the war in Iraq was being irretrievably lost. Yet today— although conditions still have a long way to go before normalcy has been achieved—the progress in Iraq following “the surge” directed by President Bush in January 2007 is widely recognized. All the indicators of violence: attacks against Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations; small arms, mortar and rocket attacks, and casualties among Iraqi civilians, Iraqi Security Forces, and Coalition Forces have sharply declined since July 2007. The situation has gone from being generally perceived as on the brink of disaster to being a success story (albeit belated and costly).
- Topic:
- NATO, Terrorism, War, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq
1587. The Fight for Diwaniyah: The Sadrist Trend and ISCI Struggle for Supremacy
- Author:
- Patrick Gaughen
- Publication Date:
- 01-2008
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for the Study of War
- Abstract:
- Even as U.S. operations to co-opt large elements of the Sunni insurgency and target irreconciliable al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters resulted in lower levels of violence during the summer, U.S. forces have simultaneously pursued rogue elements of Muqtada as-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). These operations, often in collaboration with Iraqi Security Forces friendly to Sadr's main Shi'a rival, the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI), took place within the broader context of a violent struggle between ISCI and the Sadrist Trend for supremacy within the Shi'a community, the lucrative income from control of the Shi'a shrines, and control of southern oil fields. This struggle has increasingly centered on the city of Diwaniyah, located in southern Iraq, approximately halfway between the capital of Baghdad and the southern port city of Basrah.
- Topic:
- Religion, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Armed Struggle
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Middle East, Yemen, and Syria
1588. Sons of Iraq and Awakening Forces
- Author:
- Farook Ahmed
- Publication Date:
- 02-2008
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for the Study of War
- Abstract:
- The United States' Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq has laid out a goal to achieve security in Baghdad and other critical parts of Iraq by the summer of 2008 and then extend a self-sustaining security environment to the rest of the country by the summer of 2009. To that end, the United States surged its combat troops and changed to a counter-insurgency strategy that focused on providing population security. This coincided with an opportunity provided by the discontent Iraq's Sunni Arab population felt towards al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) militants and their draconian rule. The United States took advantage of the situation by striking political deals with the disaffected local populations, most of whom are Sunni Arab.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iraq, and Arabia
1589. The Growing Threat of Special Groups in Baghdad
- Author:
- Marisa Cochrane Sullivan
- Publication Date:
- 03-2008
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for the Study of War
- Abstract:
- While al-Qaeda in Iraq remains the primary threat in northern Iraq, violence by Special Groups—Shi'a extremist elements funded, trained, and armed by Iran—remains a key challenge to stability and security in central and southern Iraq. Despite reports in late 2007 that Iranian sponsorship of Special Groups had declined, the trend in Special Groups activity in January and February 2008 suggests otherwise. In a recent briefing, Admiral Gregory Smith, the Deputy Spokesman for Multi-National Force-Iraq, explicitly stated, “The Special Groups' activity has not decreased in recent months. They continue to be probably the most violent of the extremist groups that we're seeing from Shi'a sects. [The] intent of Iran in supporting the training and financing we believe continues.” Other officials from both the Departments of State and Defense have also cited an increase in Special Groups activity since the beginning of 2008.The use of highly-lethal explosively-formed penetrators (EFP), a hallmark of Iranian-backed groups, has risen since the start of 2008.Indeed, the month of January saw twelve EFP attacks, which was the highest monthly total of such attacks in over a year. This meant that, on average, from early January to early February, there was an EFP attack every three days.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Armed Struggle
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Iran, and Middle East
1590. Iraq's Three Civil Wars
- Author:
- Juan Cole
- Publication Date:
- 02-2008
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- MIT Center for International Studies
- Abstract:
- All war situations are a little bit opaque, but from reading the Iraqi press in Arabic, I conclude that there are three major struggles for power of a political and violent sort. What’s striking is how little relevant the United States is. It is a superpower, and it is militarily occupying the country, but it appears most frequently to be in the position of going to the parties and saying, “Hey, guys, cut it out. Make nice. Please.” It’s odd that it should be so powerless in some ways, but let me explain. Then, there’s a war for Baghdad. This is the one that Americans tend to know about because the U.S. troops are in Baghdad, and so it’s being fought all around our guys, and we are drawn into it from time to time. The American public, when it thinks about this war, mainly thinks about attacks on U.S. troops, which are part of that war because the U.S. troops were seen by the Sunni Arabs as adjuncts to the Shiite paramilitaries, and they have really functioned that way. Most American observers of Iraq wouldn’t say that the U.S. is an enabler of the Mahdi Army and the Badr Corps paramilitaries of these Shiite fundamentalist parties, but you could make the case that, functionally speaking, that’s how it’s worked out. The U.S. has mainly taken on the remnants of the Ba’ath party, the Salafi jihadis, and other Sunni groups, and has tried to disarm them, tried to kill them, and has opened a space for the Shiite paramilitaries to claim territory and engage in ethnic cleansing and gain territory and power. So that battle between the Sunni Arabs and the Shiite Arabs is going on in Baghdad, is going on in the hinterlands of Baghdad, up to the northeast to Diyala Province, and then south to Babil and so forth. And finally, as if all that weren’t enough, there is a war in the north for control of Kirkuk, which used to be called by Saddam “Ta’mim Province”. Kirkuk Province has the city of Kirkuk in it and very productive oil fields, in the old days at least. Kirkuk is not part of the Kurdistan Regional Authority, which was created by melding three northern provinces together into a super province; however, the Kurdistan Regional Authority wishes to annex Kirkuk to the authority. Regional governments are super-provinces or provincial confederations. Try to imagine what happened—Iraq had 18 provinces in the old days, but it now has 15 provinces and one regional authority. It would be as though Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana got together, erased their state borders, elected a joint parliament and a prime minister, and then told the Federal leaders in Washington that if they would like to communicate with any of those states, they need to go through the regional prime minister, and by the way, we’re not sending any more money to Washington. And don’t even think about keeping federal troops on our soil. So, this is what the Kurds have done. They’ve erased the provincial boundaries that created one Kurdistan government that had -- it has its own military. They’re giving out visas independent of Baghdad. They’re inviting companies in to explore for oil independent of Baghdad. They’re the Taiwan of the Middle East. They’re an independent country. They just don’t say that they are because it would cause a war.
- Topic:
- Civil War, Religion, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Destabilization
- Political Geography:
- Iraq and Middle East