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31. NATO and Postmodernity. An Organization not too well Understood and Geopolitically Necessary / La OTAN y la postmodernidad. Una organización poco comprendida y geopolíticamente necesaria

Author:
Federico Aznar Fernández-Montesinos
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
NATO is an organization hindered by its 20th century success; in addition, it is not well understood in a postmodern world despite having been transformed by increasing its political aspect and reduced its military weight through the simple re-reading of its founding treaty. A "Hard" power institution in a postmodern and "Soft” world. However, risks and threats have only faded and, although they have lost some of their intensity, they have gained in specter. Paradoxically, NATO dissolution with the end of the Cold War would have led to the disappearance of a forum for dialogue, to the unraveling of the security space and, thus, to the rearming of Europe. Russia is the continent nation heir to the USSR, the reason for the creation of NATO. But Russia is not the USSR in geopolitical or ideological terms, even though its recent action has brought back the shadows of the Cold War. The complexity of the approach to the problem of its relationship with the West cannot be reduced to the dichotomous and exclusive enemy friend key (it is a partner, supplier, supplier ... more than a strategic rival). Its correct definition comes from the resolution of the problem of its identity. In this context, NATO remains a geopolitically necessary organization, not in vain is today the only bridge that links exclusively Europe and the United States while contributing to the stability and structure of the West. And it serves to find a place for Russia too. His eventual tensing is a proof of the vigor of his health and the need to find channels of understanding among its members. In general, it is not good to blow up bridges already built despite it is legitimate to want to change them.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

32. Waiting for Disruption?! Undersea Autonomy and the Challenging Nature of Naval Innovation

Author:
Heiko Borchert, Tim Kraemer, and Daniel Mahon
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS)
Abstract:
This paper looks at the mechanics of military innovation to sound a cautionary note on the current and future use of undersea autonomy. It starts from the premise that undersea autonomy is not yet as inevitable and disruptive as many believe. In particular, this is because of the current threat environment, the limited scope of current missions for unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs), and the prevailing technology push. For undersea autonomy to lead to disruptive and discontinuous changes in undersea warfare, navies will need to understand how to translate technological advancements into operational advantages. This will require navies, industry and science partners to develop a better understanding of the interplay between operational needs, cultural predispositions, organisational and resource needs, and technological options.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Water, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Global Focus

33. Defense and Development Industry: Theoretical Controversies and Implications in Industrial Policy

Author:
Christiano Cruz Ambros
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The main objective of this article is to expose the debate around the relationship between military spending and economic development, as well as between defense industry and technological development. With this in mind, we have explored literature from the classical school of economics through to Marxist, Skeletal, Schumpeterian and Neoclassical writers. We argue in this paper that the strengthening of the defense industry, through a robust and focused industrial policy, is a viable strategy for the endogenization of critical technologies central to the domain of the paradigm of development of the digitization. This strategy demands the construction of a robust industrial policy focused on the development and strengthening of the national defense industry. Therefore, it is necessary to advance the research agenda of institutional arrangements and governance focused on this sector.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Development, Military Strategy, Military Spending, Defense Industry, and Digitization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

34. Against the Odds Driving Defense Innovation in a Change-Resistant Ecosystem

Author:
Jeffrey P. Bialos, Christine E. Fisher, and Stuart L. Koehl
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Transatlantic Relations
Abstract:
Generating the innovation to sustain the United States’ technology-based military superiority will, of necessity, be a core element of defense strategy for the Trump Administration. This paper identifies the challenges faced by the DoD’s large, multi-faceted research and development ecosystem in meeting that national security goal, and proposes a holistic and balanced strategy for addressing them. Fundamentally, the outgoing Obama Administration concluded that the U.S. military dominance against our near-peer adversaries is eroding in a globalized environment where commercial innovation is not only being rapidly generated through agile and fast-paced processes but is being rapidly disseminated globally and therefore available to potential adversaries. In contrast, the DoD faces the challenge of building a future force that is second to none while using internal processes that generally are overly cumbersome, somewhat antiquated and slower—processes which constrain its ability to access all available innovation, commercial and otherwise, and to rapidly transition that technology to the war fighter in order to produce robust effects on the battlefield. Notwithstanding years of studies that have highlighted well known institutional obstacles to change in both our defense R&D ecosystem and the Department more broadly, these challenges still largely remain. Numerous DoD initiatives to address these issues and incentivize change unfortunately have not moved the needle.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Cybersecurity, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
United States of America, North America, Washington, and D.C.

35. The Dispatch (Fall 2016)

Author:
David J. Bercuson, Julian Lindley-French, Alan Stephenson, Neil Desai, John Adams, Charity Weeden, Elinor Sloan, Mike Day, Stephen M. Saideman, Kyle Matthews, and David McLaughlin
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Global Exchange
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The Dispatch (later called The Global Exchange) is the Canadian Global Affairs Institute’s quarterly magazine featuring topical articles written by our fellows and other contributing experts. Each issue contains approximately a dozen articles exploring political and strategic challenges in international affairs and Canadian foreign and defence policy. This Fall 2016 issue includes articles on climate change, digital security, Brexit and more.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Cybersecurity, Brexit, Military Spending, Alliance, and Space
Political Geography:
Britain, Turkey, Canada, North America, and United States of America

36. The US Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad

Author:
Jon Wolfsthal
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) convened an event to release its latest report “The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad: US Strategic Nuclear Modernization Over the Next Thirty Years.” The report concludes that the United States will likely spend over $1 trillion during the next three decades to maintain its current nuclear arsenal and purchase their replacement systems. The necessary level of procurement spending, as a percentage of the defense budget, will peak at levels comparable to the Reagan-era build-up of nuclear forces. To date, few senior officials from the White House or Department of Defense or in the Congress have publicly acknowledged or laid out the full scale of these costs to the American public. This lack of public debate will likely lead to sticker shock as the full cost of these programs come due, leading to budget cuts and program delays. “The strategic and financial challenges facing our country are enormous,” said Jon Wolfsthal, CNS Deputy Director and former nuclear advisor to Vice President Joseph Biden. “Policy makers lack the basic information needed to make smart choices about our nuclear arsenal, putting both our deterrent and future reductions at risk.” The report cites particular concern over the pace of planned construction of strategic systems to replace systems that are set to retire starting in 2030. The United States plans, from 2024-29, to build five strategic submarines, 72 strategic bombers, and 240 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This represents more delivery vehicles than the combined nuclear forces of China, the United Kingdom, and France. It is unclear that the industrial and management capabilities in the United States are capable of this production rate in times of budget constraint.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, Budget, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

37. Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 and Its Implication to South Korean Security Policies

Author:
Young-June Park
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On December 17, 2010, the government of Japan updated its most strategically important document entitled “National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), FY 2011-” following confirmation from both the Security Council and the Cabinet. The new defense plan released along with the “Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2011-2015” addresses the objectives and the methods of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Moreover, the plan also outlines Japan’s future military strategies as well as the fundamental tenets of its defense policy. Whereas in the United States, the White House, Pentagon, and Joint Chiefs all release new guidelines each time a new administration comes to power, Japan does not have such a regular format for its defense plan. This makes the National Defense Program Guidelines a comprehensive strategic document that covers every aspect of Japan’s military defense. First introduced in 1976, the Guidelines has only been updated twice in 1995 and 2004. The NDPG in 1976 reflected Japan’s security and military strategy during the Cold War, while the 1995 and the 2004 guidelines reflected strategies for the post-Cold War era and the beginning of 21st century after 9/11, respectively. What then do these updated guidelines in 2010 signify? And in what context should this defense plan be seen? Firstly, the structural changes that have occurred in the security environment of East Asia should be taken into consideration. North Korea conducted nuclear tests twice in 2006 and 2009. In 2010, it displayed new levels of provocation by sinking the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan and shelling Yeonpyeong Island. These actions not only threaten the Korean Peninsula but also the entire region. Added to that, China surpassed Japan as the second largest economy after the United States and has become more assertive over maritime disputes with Japan. How all these military and economic changes are projected in the document deserves close analysis. Secondly, unlike previous NDPGs that were written during the long years under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the 2010 Guidelines are part of the first strategic document that reflects the strategic outlook and security approach of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Since the DPJ assumed power, it has long tried to differentiate itself from LDP in its decision making procedures and actual policies. Such tendencies are naturally reflected in its security policies as well. How do these guidelines differ from the NDPGs issued under the LDP? In short, the National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 is the best resource with which to understand how Japan perceives the changed security environment, and what strategic concepts and military capability it is preparing for in face of future security challenges.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea