Search

Begin New Search Topic International Trade and Finance

171. China will further open up but not due to US pressure

Author:
Dong Yan
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
China will take measures to further open up to the outside world, Xi said in his highly-anticipated keynote address at the Boao Forum for Asia. But amid the escalating China-US trade conflict, some people have wrongly assumed Xi made the remarks with the Trump administration's accusations in mind. But a review of China's policies shows the country will deepen reform and opening-up because of its practical development needs, not because of any other country's demand or coercion. And more importantly, if the US insists on starting a trade war, China's further opening-up policies will not apply to any US enterprises. To people concerned about China's development, Xi's speech must have sounded inspiring, but not surprising, as opening-up has been a development theme for China for the past 40 years.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, Economy, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

172. Who Can Win the Possible China-US Trade War?

Author:
Li Chunding
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
This paper uses a multi-country global general equilibrium (GE) model to numerically simulate the effects of possible China-US trade wars. We introduce an endogenous trade imbalance structure with trade cost into the model which helps to explore both tariff and non-tariff trade war effects. Our simulation results show that China will be significantly hurt by the China-US trade war, but negative impacts are affordable. The US can gain under unilateral sanction measures to China, but will lose if China takes retaliation measures. Comparing the effects under mutual trade war, China will lose more than the US. Introducing non-tariff barrier trade wars will intensify the negative effects, and comparatively negative effects to China are larger than to the US. Mexico’s involvement in trade war with the US will strengthen the negative effects and comparatively hurt the US more. Under non-cooperative and cooperative Nash bargaining equilibrium, the US can gain more than China in trade war negotiation, which means the US has stronger bargaining power than China. Additionally, trade wars between China and the US will hurt most countries and the world especially in GDP and manufacturing employment, but benefit their welfare and trade.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Tariffs, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

173. Can We Prevent A Full-Blown Trade War Speech Delivered at CF40-PIIE Conference

Author:
Yu Yongding
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Abstract:
On March 8, President Trump fired the first shot of a trade war by threatening to impose 25 percent of tariff on steel imports. On March 22, the Trump administration released the report of Section 301 investigation into China’s trade practices, and on the same day President Trump signed a memo slapping China with tariffs on some1300 Chinese products, totaling about $50 billion. On April 4, US Trade Representative (USTR) published the list of 1333 Chinese products of $50 billion that will be subject to the additional 25% tariffs. On April 16, US Ministry of Commerce declared a ban on U.S. companies selling goods and software to Chinese telecommunication equipment maker ZTE for 7 years. Trade friction has been a serious problem between China and the US for long time. But few people had expected that the friction would escalate to a trade war. So how did we get to this point, and can we turn back before it’s too late? This is the biggest question currently we are facing.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Business, Tariffs, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

174. Adapting International Trade Institutions to New Realities

Author:
Felix Pena
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
The institutional order governing world trade is going through a critical period. Debate over its future form and design will be a dominant theme on the global agenda for the coming years. The Donald J. Trump administration has questioned the benefits of the multilateral trading order and is pulling the United States back from its traditional leadership role. In December 2017, the Eleventh Ministerial Conference (MC11) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) ended in disappointment with no substantive multilateral achievements. The shift in economic power from the West to the East and the growth of nonstate actors further complicate the search for consensus on international trade rules, leading to a so-called multiplex world. In a multiplex world, actors with different cultural values and relative power inequalities—such as nation-states, international and regional institutions, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations—compete against each other. To ensure a resilient trading system, multilateral trading rules and institutions need to be adapted to these new realities of trade, investment, and the distribution of global power. Unlike the international system as it functioned after World War II, today’s trading system does not reflect the interests of a single power or an alliance of powers with sufficient clout to impose their will on others in a sustained way. This is not a Group of Twenty (G20) or Group of Seven–led world: it is a G-Zero world, with no established lineup of who should be invited to the table where decisions are made. In this vacuum of global leadership it is increasingly difficult to identify who will create the new rules of international competition. Actors pursue their own self-interest, which results in less certainty for the international trade system.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Multilateralism, Trade Wars, and WTO
Political Geography:
Global Focus

175. Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for U.S.-China Cooperation

Author:
Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Emerging challenges to international order require cooperation between the United States and China, two countries that share a common interest in preventing the world from becoming more dangerous and disorderly. U.S.-China relations are becoming more strained and antagonistic, however, and the prospects for cooperation appear to be receding. To explore whether there are still grounds for cooperation on issues of common concern between the two countries, in March 2018 the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations convened a group of fifteen experts from the United States and China for the workshop “Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for U.S.-China Cooperation.” CPA partnered with Peking University’s School of International Studies in Beijing for the workshop and also met with experts at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies in Shanghai. During the workshop, President Donald J. Trump announced plans to impose about $60 billion in new tariffs on Chinese imports. While trade was a major topic of discussion, it was by no means the only area discussed. Workshop participants assessed conflicting views of the sources of global disorder and examined areas of global governance such as international trade, development, the environment, and the future of various multilateral institutions. They also discussed the most pressing security challenges in East and Southwest Asia. Participants highlighted the need for a greater understanding between the United States and China on the evolving international order. No major transnational problems will be solved without some cooperation between the two powers. It is therefore imperative that the two countries avoid a further deterioration of the relationship and instead identify areas of potential cooperation.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Tariffs, and Social Order
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

176. The U.S.-Southeast Asia Relationship: Responding to China’s Rise

Author:
Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Although the Barack Obama administration rhetorically made Southeast Asia a centerpiece of its “rebalance to Asia” strategy, the administration still largely focused on the Middle East and Europe, and Southeast Asia remained a low U.S. policy priority. The Obama administration did try to boost U.S. economic ties with Southeast Asia in 2016 by forging the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but that trade deal was broadly unpopular in the United States. The following year, the Donald J. Trump administration ended U.S. participation in the TPP, and it also suggested launching punitive economic measures against Southeast Asian states currently running trade surpluses with the United States. Many Southeast Asian leaders now worry that Washington has no clear security or economic strategy for the region, other than applying pressure on Beijing to respect freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. In this perceived void of U.S. leadership and strategy, workshop participants assessed how Southeast Asia might change as China becomes an increasingly dominant regional security and economic actor. They also discussed the future of U.S. strategic and economic relationships with important partners in the region, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Participants further considered how China might use its growing leverage in Southeast Asia, and whether Beijing’s tactics could backfire. Finally, several workshop participants posited that the United States, China, and Southeast Asian states could cooperate on at least some nontraditional security issues, such as combating piracy and terrorism.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

177. Global Monetary Policy Divergence and the Reemergence of Global Imbalances

Author:
Daniel Gros
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Developed economies are paying remarkably little attention to coordinating their monetary policies. This is an unavoidable consequence of the independence of central banks, which faithfully follow their purely domestic mandates except in times of crisis. As a result, global monetary policies have reached unprecedented levels of divergence. This divergence is set to widen—primarily due to differences in the relative strength of labor markets—while global current account imbalances return. Meanwhile, exchange rates have not reacted as economists expected; the dollar has weakened even as policy rates have increased. Economic tensions will likely become more disruptive the longer global imbalances go uncorrected. Likewise, the global economy will become more vulnerable to shocks. Yet by focusing on bilateral trade imbalances, the United States has mistakenly singled out China when the global imbalances between the United States and the eurozone is the more critical issue. The growing global imbalances are reflected more in the eurozone current account surplus and U.S. fiscal policy than in China’s shrinking surplus.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Monetary Policy, Exchange Rate Policy, and Economic Inequality
Political Geography:
Global Focus

178. Global Governance to Combat Illicit Financial Flows

Author:
Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
International efforts to curb illicit financial flows (IFFs) resemble post–Cold War collaboration in other issue areas that have risen on the global agenda: climate change, global health, internet govern- ance, and cybersecurity. Nongovernmental actors, including private corporations and nongovern- mental organizations (NGOs), have often driven agenda-setting in those domains. The focus has shifted over time, as new issues have been added and as older issues have assumed renewed im- portance. That reshaped agenda has in turn affected the institutional ecosystem of global action, which is captured only in part by formal and informal intergovernmental institutions. These new is- sue areas are characterized not by a single dominant institution or core set of institutions but by mul- tiple clusters of institutions that have each claimed a segment of the agenda and the instruments of cooperation. The result is a fragmented landscape with disjointed actors and organizations that often compete, collaborate, and act in parallel in pursuing their collective ends.1 The term of art for such an institutional landscape, one with several institutional or legal founda- tions, is “regime complex.”1 The regime complex for combating IFFs differs in its complexity from other, similar issue areas. Defining IFFs produces disagreement among researchers, activists, and policymakers. “Illicit” captures a normative judgment perhaps broader than “illegal.” For law en- forcement, IFFs are framed by predicate crimes, activities that are illegal in one jurisdiction or anoth- er and often of greater interest to authorities than IFFs. For those interested in broader global out- comes, such as the effects of IFFs on economic development, “illicit” could include cross-border fi- nancial flows associated with activities that they believe should be forbidden, such as tax avoidance by multinational corporations (MNCs). Those activities may not be illegal, however.2 These categories shift over time: bribery of foreign officials by corporations based in Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) countries was made illegal in the United States well before it was criminalized in other industrialized countries. Variations in national treatment of both IFFs of certain kinds and the underlying predicate crimes have made harmonization of national policies and their implementation in many IFF domains difficult. IFFs are also one of the most important features of globalization’s dark side. Unlike other illicit or dangerous cross-border flows, however, IFFs bear almost no markers in and of themselves: pecunia non olet. Tainted food, endangered species, and dangerous individuals all present fewer problems of identification. For IFFs, it is suspicious activity rather than a characteristic of the funds themselves that generates the attention of those attempting to curb the flows. These definitional and identification problems make measuring the effectiveness of counter-IFF policies more difficult than assessing the effectiveness of policies in other issue areas. As many skep- tics and critics have pointed out, without a clear grasp of the scale of underlying flows, the scale of effects, though perhaps not the direction, of policies to counter those flows cannot reliably be deter- mined.3 If the costs of enforcement and compliance or unintended negative effects are included in estimates, the balance sheet becomes even more uncertain. International collaboration to curb IFFs and domestic measures to support that collaboration are directed to a wide array of predicate crimes that produce IFFs (drug trafficking, terrorism, or tax eva- sion) or to negative externalities (global “bads,” such as corruption) that both support IFFs and are sustained and promoted by them. This diversity of IFF sources and effects, and the public policy goals that follow, mobilize an unusually large number of actors: law enforcement agencies, financial super- visors and ministries, private financial institutions, and NGOs. These actors are interested more in certain IFFs and predicate crimes than in others. The links between specific crimes or categories of crime and larger global outcomes of interest, whether economic development or international securi- ty, are often second or third order. As a result, political attention to these issues—and willingness to bear the costs of implementation—fluctuates over time and across jurisdictions. As Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman observed in their classic 2004 account, the anti–money laundering (AML) regime (a subset of the complex countering IFFs) “reflects shifting priorities, compromises, and trade-offs.”4 This variation over time is particularly important in combating IFFs, because enforcement depends largely on national governments and both their incentives and their capacity to enact anti-IFF poli- cies. Financial markets and naming-and-shaming campaigns can strengthen those national efforts; they can also direct attention and effort against particular IFFs. However, they cannot substitute en- tirely for government action. What follows is a summary and introduction to organized international efforts to combat IFFs. In order to limit the policy universe, the narrower definition of IFFs used by the World Bank—“money illegally earned, transferred, or used that crosses borders”—will be used to define the wider interna- tional regime complex to combat IFFs.5 Mapping the institutions and actors involved in this issue area over time will capture the evolution of the global IFF agenda and the politics surrounding its de- velopment and implementation.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Governance, Institutionalism, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus

179. The Legal Dimensions of Rule of Law Promotion in EU Foreign Policy: EU Treaty Imperatives and Rule of Law Conditionality in the Foreign Trade and Development Nexus

Author:
Till Patrik Holterhus
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law
Institution:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law
Abstract:
This article demonstrates that Arts. 21 and 3 (5) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as well as Arts. 205, 207 (1), 208 (1), 209 (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), legally oblige the European Union (EU) to promote the rule of law in its foreign trade and development policy. Furthermore, it is shown that, in the context of such promotion, the EU applies not a rudimentary but a sophisticated concept of the rule of law – quite similar to the concept of the rule of law that has developed within the Union. To fulfill the legal obligation to promote the rule of law abroad, the EU employs, as a key instrument, the legal mechanism of conditionality, not only through autonomous instruments but also in its contractual international relationships (carrot-and-stick policy). The EU’s foreign policy in the trade and development nexus, in particular when it comes to the promotion of the rule of law, can, therefore, be considered a process, to a large extent, determined and organized the of law.
Topic:
International Law, International Trade and Finance, Sovereignty, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

180. International Investment Law and the Rule of Law

Author:
Peter-Tobias Stoll
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law
Institution:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law
Abstract:
International investment law appeals to a lawyer’s appetite for the rule of law by disciplining the exercise of power between States and foreign investors through legalization and judicialization. Originally supposed to serve as a fix to promote foreign investments in developing countries in times of legal uncertainties, now, thousands of bilateral investment agreements exist, and the number of cases in investment arbitration has exploded in the last decade. Further, there is a tendency of generalization, as investment protection now features as a standard element of international trade agreements, far beyond the original focus on developing countries. A number of flaws and shortcomings of the rules and procedures became apparent in the course of the more frequent use of the system and resulted in much discussion within the expert community, which resulted in some changes. Furthermore, the long neglected possibility became apparent, that investment claims could be directed against industrialized countries and that the conduct of their authorities could be subjected to review by international arbitration tribunals. This sparked heated public debates, particularly so in the EU. These two developments have in common, that they implicitly as well as explicitly raised the issue of the rule of law. This paper will assess the system of international investment law as it stands, its critique and its reform, through the lens of the rule of law. It will also make a highly idealistic proposal on the further development of international investment protection. In concluding, it will reflect on the proper use of the rule of law in legal analysis, by setting out the different perspectives in which the term may be employed, and the methodological consequences.
Topic:
International Law, International Trade and Finance, Rule of Law, and Investment
Political Geography:
Global Focus