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591. Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union

Author:
Mark Hallenberg and Jürgen. von Hagen
Publication Date:
02-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of European Studies
Abstract:
Large government budget deficits are a concern in most industrialized countries. Two literatures in political economy argue that differences in political institutions explain much of the variation in the success of counties in their efforts to run small deficits. One group of authors considers how differences among electoral systems affect the size of budget deficits, while the second group concentrates on the governmental institutions which structure the formation of the yearly budget. Among the "electoral institutionalists", a consensus is beginning to emerge which treats proportional representation systems as a cause of high levels of public debt. In contrast, "fiscal institutionalists" argue that the presence of certain institutions in the decision-making process at the cabinet level, such as a strong finance minister or negotiated spending targets, lead to smaller deficits than in cases where such institutions are missing. We indicate that these two literatures complement one another. Electoral institutions matter because they restrict the type of budgetary institution at the governmental phase which a state has at its disposal. A strong finance minister is feasible in states where one-party governments are the norm, and such states usually have plurality electoral systems, while negotiated targets provide an alternative in multi-party governments. In multi-party governments, which are common in states with proportional representation, the coalition members are not willing to delegate to one actor the ability to monitor and punish the others for "defections" on the budget. The empirical section of the paper indicates a strong relationship between one-party governments and strong finance minister solutions within the European Union states on the one hand and multi-party or minority governments and targets on the other. Pooled time series regression results also support our contention that it is the presence or absence of one of these budgetary institutions, rather than the plurality/proportional representation dishotomy, which has the greatest impact on debt levels.
Topic:
International Organization and International Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

592. The Cost of International Justice

Author:
Cesare P. R. Romano
Publication Date:
02-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
The issue of the financing of international justice has been generally neglected by international research. Legal scholars have rarely ventured beyond generic calls for the widening of the jurisdiction of international courts or for the creation of new courts. The financing of international justice has usually been conceived as an essentially political and technical issue and, therefore, as outside of the scope of legal discourse. Economists, on their side, have never taken a hard look at the way international law works, aside from decisions that effect the functioning of the international economic system per se. It is not surprising, therefore, that there does not exist any serious study on how much international rule of law costs, how and if efficiency could be enhanced, and where and if additional resources could be tapped to enhance the functioning of the courts themselves and allow a greater use of existing means. Hopefully, the data presented in this paper, together with some general observations proposed in the conclusions, will elicit constructive criticism and new thoughts on these much neglected aspects of this particular area of international cooperation.
Topic:
International Law, International Organization, and International Trade and Finance

593. Balancing Positive and Negative Integration: The Regulatory Options for Europe

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
11-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
During the golden years from the 1950s to the mid-1970s, the industrial nations of Western Europe had the chance to develop specifically national versions of the capitalist welfare state - and their choices were in fact remarkably different (Esping-Andersen 1990). In spite of the considerable differences between the "Social-Democratic", "Corporatist" or "Liberal" versions, however, all were remarkably successful in maintaining full employment and promoting economic growth, while also controlling, in different ways and to different degrees, the destructive tendencies of unfettered capitalism in the interest of specific social, cultural, and/or ecological values (Scharpf 1991a; Merkel 1993). It was not fully realized at the time, however, how much the success of market-correcting policies did in fact depend on the capacity of the territorial state to control its economic boundaries. Once this capacity is lost, countries are forced into a competition for locational advantage which has all the characteristics of a Prisoner's Dilemma game (Sinn 1994). It reduces the freedom of national governments and unions to raise the regulatory and wage costs of national firms above the level prevailing in competing locations. Moreover, and if nothing else changes, the "competition of regulatory systems" that is generally welcomed by neoliberal economists (Streit/Mussler 1995) and politicians may well turn into a downward spiral of competitive deregulation and tax cuts in which all competing countries will find themselves reduced to a level of protection that is in fact lower than that preferred by any of them.
Topic:
Economics, Government, International Organization, and International Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

594. The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy

Author:
Richard Whitman
Publication Date:
10-1996
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster
Abstract:
The Treaty on European Union (TEU, or 'Maastricht Treaty'), which came into force on 1 November 1993, established a 'three pillar' structure for the new European Union. Pillar one consists of the European Communities - the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC); and the European Community (EC). Pillars Two and Three were introduced by the TEU and consist of, respectively, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and co-operation in Home and Judicial Affairs (HJA).
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and International Organization
Political Geography:
Europe

595. Denmark's Fifth EU-Referendum

Author:
Lykke Friis
Publication Date:
12-1996
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
For a short period in May 1998, Denmark once again found itself in the European limelight. After the Danish no to the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992, European governments held their breath when the Danes were called to the ballot box on the 28th of May to accept or reject the Treaty of Amsterdam. A quick glance at the actual debate and the final result could easily leave the impression that everything was business-as-usual. Just like in 1972, 1986, 1992 and 1993 the debate largely centered around broad issues, such as the pros and the cons of Danish EU-membership and the danger of 'little Denmark' being swallowed by the 'big EU'. The final outcome of the referendum also looked familiar: Although 55.1 per cent of the Danish population voted in favor of the Treaty, a large minority continued to give an EU-Treaty their thumbs-down.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and International Organization
Political Geography:
Europe

596. Norden: A Community of Asecurity

Author:
Pertti Joenniemi
Publication Date:
06-1996
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
Traditionally regarded as a fairly stable configuration, Norden has in recent years become one of the more uncertain cases on the European agenda. Obviously, it cannot remain unaffected once a new and different logic sets in and drastically reshapes the political landscape also in the northern part of Europe. The range of options is quite broad. Norden might establish itself as a central acronym or, on the contrary, develop into one of the more problematic configurations with a rather bleak future.
Topic:
Security and International Organization
Political Geography:
Europe

597. Supranational Governance: The Institutionalization of the European Union

Author:
Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet
Publication Date:
11-1996
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
We posit a continuum of modes of governance, anchored at the poles by intergovernmental and supranational politics. Movement from intergovernmental politics toward the supranational pole implies the increasing importance of three factors in EU policymaking: EU rules, EU organizations, and transnational society. We propose that an increase in one of the three factors creates conditions that favor growth in the other two. We also offer a theory as to what drives initial movement toward supranational governance: increasing levels of cross-border transactions and communications by societal actors will increase the perceived need for European-level rules, coordination, and dispute resolution mechanisms. The theory provides a coherent answer to the question of why integration proceeds faster in some domains than in others. We expect movement toward supranational governance in sectors where the intensity and value of cross-border transactions is rising.
Topic:
Government and International Organization
Political Geography:
Europe

598. From Free Trade to Supranational Polity: The European Court and Integration

Author:
Alec Stone Sweet and James A. Caporaso
Publication Date:
11-1996
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
In this paper, we propose a dynamic theory of legal integration, test the model quantitatively, and then cross-check it by way of process tracing. We show that transnational exchange, litigation, and the production of Euro-rules have evolved interdependently, and argue that this interdependence provokes and reinforces the spillover effects that partly drive the construction of supranational governance. In case studies of the impact of the legal system on outcomes in two areas, the free movement of goods and European social provisions, we show that our model outperforms the dominant framework for understanding how the EC legal system operates - intergovernmentalism. In each of these areas, the data show that the legal system functions to reduce member-state government control over policy outcomes, and to enhance the influence of supranational institutions, national judges, and private actors.
Topic:
Government, International Law, International Organization, and International Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

599. The Institutional Terrain of the European Union

Author:
Neil Fligstein and Jason McNichol
Publication Date:
11-1996
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of European Studies
Abstract:
One of the central issues in making sense of the European Union is the question of the degree to which it functions as an autonomous state. One pole of this debate conceives of the EU as a supranational entity while the other argues that it remains an intergovernmental bargain. Here, we propose to analyze the EU in terms of the structuring of its policy domains. 12 of 17 domains appear organized by nongovernmental organizations. We conclude that while the governments retain direct control over important parts of the EU, they have allowed most policy domains at the EU level to become autonomous.
Topic:
International Relations and International Organization
Political Geography:
Europe

600. The Path to European Integration

Author:
Paul Pierson
Publication Date:
11-1996
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of European Studies
Abstract:
Many European and American observers of the EC have criticized "intergovernmentalist" accounts for exaggerating the extent of member state control over the process of European integration. This essay seeks to ground these criticisms in a historical institutionalist" account that stresses the need to study European integration as a political process which unfolds over time. Such a perspective highlights the limits of member state control over long-term institutional development. Losses of control result from member state preoccupation with short-term concerns, the ubiquity of unintended consequences, and processes that "lock in" past decisions and make reassertions of member state authority difficult. Brief examination of the evolution of EC social policy suggests the limitations of treating the EC as an institutional "instrument" facilitating collective action among sovereign states. It is more useful to view integration as a path-dependent process that has produced a fragmented but still discernible multi-tiered European polity.
Topic:
International Organization, Politics, and Sovereignty
Political Geography:
America and Europe