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31. Transcript: The Warren and Anita Manshel Lecture in American Foreign Policy by Robert O. Keohane

Author:
Robert O. Keohane
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Centerpiece
Institution:
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
n this talk, I will revisit a question that Joe has asked in his work over the last twenty-five years: “Is the American century over?” Joe has given this question a consistently negative answer, and has recently, in a book with this title, extended his expected time frame for the American century to 2041. Before reaching this conclusion, Joe directly addressed the question that seems central to me: Will its internal cultural and political divisions decisively weaken the United States in world politics? He pointed out that “culture wars could adversely affect American power if citizens become so distracted or divided by domestic battles over social and cultural issues that the United States loses the capacity to act collectively in foreign policy” (ACO: 73). But in his answer he claimed that “past culture battles over slavery, prohibition, McCarthyism, and civil rights were more serious than any of today’s issues” (ibid). He did not expect disruption of American power as a result of internal social divisions.
Topic:
Nationalism, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Populism
Political Geography:
United States and North America

32. After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order

Author:
Amitav Acharya
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Carnegie Council
Abstract:
“The dominance of a single great power,” wrote American scholar Robert Keohane in his widely acclaimed book After Hegemony, “may contribute to order in world politics, in particular circumstances, but it is not a sufficient condition and there is little reason to believe that it is necessary.”1 This proposition has never been put to a greater test as it is now. Since the election of Donald J. Trump as U.S. president in November 2016 there has been a vast outpouring of anxiety over the future of the liberal world order.2 But the myths, limitations, and decline of this order have been anticipated and forewarned for some time, even though its proponents have not acknowledged it. The “first myth” about the U.S.-led liberal hegemonic order, as I have written elsewhere, is “how far it extended for much of its history, especially during the Cold War period.” I pointed out that “the Soviet bloc, China, India, Indonesia, and a good part of the ‘third world’ were outside of it . . . . Despite the exalted claims about its power, legitimacy, and public goods functions, that order was little more than the US-UK-West Europe-Australasian configuration.”3 Noting that the liberal order was hardly benign for many countries in the developing world, I argued that it should be seen as a limited international order, rather than an inclusive global order. Joseph S. Nye, one of the staunchest champions of the liberal order, made a similar point when he wrote in the January/February 2017 issue of Foreign Affairs that the liberal order “was largely limited to a group of like-minded states centered on the Atlantic littoral” and “did not include many large countries such as China, India, and the Soviet bloc states, and . . . did not always have benign effects on nonmembers.”4 The liberal order did expand and strengthen with the economic reforms in China and India, and with the end of the cold war. And while the champions of that order celebrated its expansion, they still generally assumed that the main challenge to it would come from the rising powers, led by China. Their assumptions notwithstanding, precisely at a time when many of these powers today are not doing all that well, the liberal order appears to be imploding. Trump’s victory and Brexit suggest that the current challenge to the liberal order is as much, if not more, from within as from without. Precisely at a time when many of the rising powers are not doing all that well, the liberal order appears to be imploding. The domestic challenges to the liberal order led by Trump and his supporters could be overstated, however. After all, Hillary Clinton won a majority of the popular vote, and the Brexit referendum only passed by a slim margin. More importantly, however, the crisis of the liberal order has deeper roots, owing to long-term and structural changes in the global economy and politics. As such, Trump’s ascent to power is a consequence—not a cause—of the decline of the liberal order, especially of its failure to address the concerns of domestic constituents left behind by the global power shift. Given these factors, Trump is unlikely to reverse the decline of the liberal order even if he wanted to. Instead, he may well push it over the precipice. In what follows, I first describe the foundations of the liberal order, and show that the ground on which it was built has been eroding for some time, though Trump’s rhetoric and policies are also damaging. Next, I argue that for now the rising powers are not in a position to overturn the current order completely, and in fact they may wish to preserve some elements of it in the near and medium term. I describe a “multiplex world” in which elements of the liberal order survive, but are subsumed in a complex of multiple, crosscutting international orders. Finally, I offer some suggestions on how scholars and policymakers can manage the transition to such a multiplex world.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Hegemony, Reform, and Liberal Order
Political Geography:
Global Focus

33. From Eastward Pivot to Greater Eurasia

Author:
S. Karaganov
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
The current stage of russia’s pivot to the east is the product of the second half of the 2000s largely as a belated economic response to the rise of asia, which opened new opportunities for the country’s devel- opment, especially for it eastern part. That rise made it possible to turn the ural region and the russian Far east from a mainly imperial burden – or a logistics base in confrontation with the West, sometimes a front line in rivalry with Japan or china – into a potential territory of develop- ment for the entire country. The expediency of making the pivot was substantiated by the fore- casted imminent economic slowdown of its main traditional partner, europe, and the deterioration of relations with europe and the West as a whole. The need for the diversification of economic ties and outside sources of development was becoming increasingly obvious. These assessments were backed up by a number of pronounced trends in the recent decade. First, these are the disintegration and crisis of the global order that the West has been trying to impose on the world since what it saw as its final victory. second is the process of relative de- globalization and the regionalization of the global economy and politics. and the third is the accelerating trend – related to the previous one – toward the politicization of economic ties, which made interdependence and dependence on one market comparatively less beneficial, if not sim- ply dangerous. Finally, the “asia for asia” trend prevailed over the “asia for the world” trend. Development in asia, especially in china, began to be increasingly oriented toward domestic and regional markets. Meanwhile, the process of spiritual and ideological emancipation of the formerly great asian civilizations, which in the past two centuries had been in colonial or semi-colonial dependence on the West, began to gain momen- tum. asian countries gained access to many achievements of the West, took advantage of the liberal global economic order that it created, became stronger, and began to claim a more appropriate place for them- selves on the world’s ideological and strategic map. The inevitability of the u.s. moving away (at least temporarily) from the role of a global hegemon, which came with a hefty price tag, became evident. Barack Obama set a course for domestic revival. however, old elites and inertia did not allow him to abandon costly and ineffective interventionism. Donald Trump strengthened the “self-isolation” trend. The u.s. has turned into a dangerous amalgam of residual intervention- ism and semi-isolationism. It is becoming increasingly evident that the u.s. seeks to create its own center, casting off some of its disadvanta- geous global commitments. a trend has evolved toward the formation of a hypothetically bipolar world through a multi-polar world with its inevitable chaos. One of its poles is based around the u.s. and the other is in eurasia. china seems to be its economic center, but the eurasian center will only materialize if Beijing does not claim the role of hegemon. however, whatever the case may be, it has turned out that once it has finally made a pivot to the east, russia has discovered many unexpected opportunities for itself.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Hegemony, Empire, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

34. The Watercourses Convention, Hydro-hegemony and Transboundary Water Issues

Author:
Joyeeta Gupta
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The International Spectator
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The 2014 entry into force of the UN Watercourses Convention of 1997 could institutionalise water law globally, thereby countering hydro-hegemonic approaches. However, since the Convention is out of date; has been ratified by only 36, mostly downstream countries; does not require amendments of pre-existing treaties; and has no Conference of the Parties to ensure that it becomes a living treaty, its actual influence in addressing the evolving problems in transboundary river basins remains minimal. Nevertheless, it is not unimaginable that with an appropriate follow-up to this Convention, it could be converted into a living and relevant framework convention in the future.
Topic:
Politics, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Water, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
Global Focus

35. Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia

Author:
G. John Ikenberry
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
For more than half a century, the United States has played a leading role in shaping order in East Asia. This East Asian order has been organized around American military and economic dominance, anchored in the U.S. system of alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other partners across Asia. Over the decades, the United States found itself playing a hegemonic role in the region—providing security, underwriting stability, promoting open markets, and fostering alliance and political partnerships. It was an order organized around “hard” bilateral security ties and “soft” multilateral groupings. It was built around security, economic, and political bargains. The United States exported security and imported goods. Across the region, countries expanded trade, pursued democratic transitions, and maintained a more or less stable peace.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
Japan, East Asia, and South Korea

36. Realism under Hegemony: Theorizing the Rise of Brazil

Author:
Kurt Weyland
Publication Date:
08-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
What light can international relations theory shed on how developing countries such as Brazil have achieved regional leadership and international influence? This comprehensive examination of Brazili- an foreign policy over the last few decades argues that Realism provides a better account of Brazil’s strategy than Liberalism and Constructivism. Despite changes of government and regime, Brasília has persistently pursued relative political gain, especially international influence. Howev- er, because this rising country has faced an established hegemon in the form of the United States, it has not been able to employ conventionally Realist instruments and tactics. Its subordinate position in the current power constellation has forced Brazil to forego political or military con- frontation and instead use economic cooperation, both with the hegemon and its weaker neighbors. Through this collaboration, Brazil hopes to derive disproportionate benefits that will enhance its relative power. By elucidating these complex calculations, the present essay ex- plains the Realist strategy that ambitious nations such as Brazil have pursued and helps design a version of Realism that captures recent pow- er dynamics in the international system.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, and Realism
Political Geography:
Brazil, South America, and Latin America

37. Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China

Author:
Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis argue that the United States has responded inadequately to the rise of Chinese power. This Council Special Report recommends placing less strategic emphasis on the goal of integrating China into the international system and more on balancing China's rise.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, and Hegemony

38. The Silk Road, Sand Castles and the U.S. China Rivalry

Author:
Alan Guidetti
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Rumours in American media and within policy circles in Washington hint at a shift in the making in US policy towards China. Accordingly, the carefully managed balance between cooperation and constraint, which was designed to accompany and guide the rise of China, might give way to a more confrontational US posture. The cause for a reorientation in US policy is ascribed to the assertiveness of Beijing in the territorial disputes and land reclamations in the China Seas. However, the growing US nervousness about China, as illustrated by blunt warnings to Beijing by Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, goes beyond the Chinese build-up of artificial islands, which fuels the current dispute. Washington recently opposed Chinese efforts to set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a central pillar of the “New Silk Road” project that will advance the centrality of China within the Eurasian space and beyond. As competition rises between the two powers, sources of tension multiply, thereby increasing risks of conflict.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Power Politics, and Hegemony

39. Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin's War in Ukraine

Author:
Maksymilian Czuperski, John Herbst, Eliot Higgins, Alina Polyakova, and Damon Wilson
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Russia is at war with Ukraine. Russian citizens and soldiers are fighting and dying in a war of their government's own making. Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to deny Russian involvement in the fighting, but the evidence is overwhelming and indisputable. Drawing upon open source information, Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin's War in Ukraine provides irrefutable evidence of direct Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine.
Topic:
Political Violence, War, Hegemony, and Self Determination
Political Geography:
Ukraine and Eastern Europe

40. China’s Rise and Reconfiguration of Central Asia’s Geopolitics: A Case for U.S. "Pivot" to Eurasia

Author:
Roman Muzalevsky
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
China’s emergence as a global actor has questioned the position of the United States as the strongest power and the future of the Washington-led global order. To achieve the status of a truly global player wielding influence in all dimensions of power would require China to leverage its regional influence in Central Asia. This region is increasingly representing China’s western leg of economic expansion and development, and is of a growing strategic importance for Beijing. It is also a region that should be of greater strategic importance to Washington, which seeks to preserve its leading position in the international system and ensure China’s peaceful integration in the global political, security, and economic architecture.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Global Markets, and Global Security
Political Geography:
China, Eurasia, and Asia