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11. Restoring the Eastern Mediterranean as a U.S. Strategic Anchor

Author:
Jon B. Alterman, Heather A Conley, and Donatienne Ray
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
U.S. strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean is long overdue for revision. Policies, priorities, and activities girded by U.S.-led alliance structures were developed to stabilize Europe and deter Soviet aggression at the dawn of the Cold War. Seventy years later, they are no longer fit for purpose. However, the region remains a linchpin for an array of vital U.S. interests. In the last decade alone, regional conflicts and state fragmentation have caused millions of migrants and internally displaced to flee their homes, creating one of the largest migration crises since World War II. The arrival of an unprecedented number of migrants has triggered political backlash and polarized domestic politics in Europe and in the Eastern Mediterranean. Many of the littoral states in the Eastern Mediterranean have faced destabilizing economic crises that have created deep political and strategic vulnerabilities. Significant natural gas deposits discovered off the coasts of Israel, Cyprus, and Egypt could boost regional economic prospects as a potential energy-producing region, but a divided Cyprus, historical animosities, as well as a lack of infrastructure connectivity hinder this regional economic potential.
Topic:
Imperialism, Military Strategy, Infrastructure, Fragile/Failed State, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, Middle East, Israel, Egypt, Cyprus, and Mediterranean

12. Don’t Give Up Yet: There’s Still a Chance to Salvage Eastern Syria

Author:
Melissa Dalton
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
As Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton assemble their own senior Middle East teams, a number of U.S. interests hang in the balance in Syria: the enduring defeat of ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Levant; the vulnerability of neighboring Iraq to extremist disruption; the return of Syrian refugees; the mitigation of Iranian influence; the need to both compete and cooperate with Russia to end the civil war; and the security of regional partners and allies. U.S. values are also at stake: the conflict has precipitated a humanitarian catastrophe of epic proportions, with over 500,000 civilians dead and 12 million displaced. The U.S. ability to shape high-level outcomes in Syria is limited. Russia and Iran have outmaneuvered the United States there. With their backing, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is extending his control throughout Syrian territory—most recently via an offensive on southwestern Syria, previously the site of a “de-escalation zone” agreed between the United States, Russia, and Jordan, precipitating immense civilian displacement. Assad’s consolidation of extremists in Idlib amongst civilians raises the specter of another slaughter like Aleppo in 2016. The UN-backed Geneva process is moribund, though still worth supporting, while the United States has limited influence in the Astana and Sochi processes, which are also demonstrating limited returns. More broadly, Assad is already also brutally shaping the facts on the ground regarding “reconstruction” through forcible movement of populations, demographic engineering, constricting property rights, and predatory governance that favors loyalists. In his meeting with President Putin, President Trump reportedly discussed Syria, although there was no official joint summary of the summit. The discussion may have included options for drawing down U.S. forces in Syria in exchange for Russia convincing Iran to minimize its presence in Syria. However, Russia lacks the will and leverage over Iran to fulfill such a bargain. The national picture is bleak. Zooming into the Syrian map more closely, one subnational enclave currently outside of Assad’s control has taken some steps towards stability. Eastern Syria still offers leverage to salvage a marginally but meaningfully better outcome for U.S. interests and the Syrian population. In the weeks ahead, the United States should: take stock of the sources of leverage in eastern Syria; articulate its goal for translating these sources of leverage into a defined political endstate; develop this stated goal into a broader stabilization operational framework; and then execute “the art of deal” in developing a burden-sharing plan to support these objectives.
Topic:
Civil War, Fragile/Failed State, Al Qaeda, Refugees, ISIS, and Displacement
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

13. Turkey at the Heart of the Storm

Author:
E. Fuat Keyman
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
More than two decades ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski alerted the world to a “global turmoil” steadily eroding the West’s ability to respond to major global challenges. Since then, the West has been gripped by multiple crises of globalization, manifested in myriad security, economic, humanitarian, and environmental challenges. The most recent additions to this litany include the dire refugee problem and the brutality of the Islamic State, or IS. Both the refugee crisis and IS have emerged from failed states, particularly Syria and Iraq, and are exacerbated by geopolitical power games, a lack of hegemonic leadership in the region, sectarianism, and the absence of inclusive and rules-based institutions of good governance. Yet while the crises interact and have similar root causes, they are driven by different actors with different intentions. While the European Union has focused on addressing the symptoms of the refugee crisis, the war against IS is driven by the United States, Russia, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states, which are less affected by the refugee crisis. Only Turkey has a place at the heart of both crises. It is affected by the security and economic fallout of the current regional instability and will be a pivotal actor in any effective responses to the two crises. Western leaders—most crucially in Washington, D.C., and Ankara—should not think of Turkey as a buffer state used simply to manage the spillover from Syria and Iraq but rather as a proactive partner in any effort to address the root causes of these crises. But Turkey faces its own domestic and foreign challenges, which undermine its ability to respond to the turmoil. The Turkish government should take four steps to help improve its response
Topic:
Fragile/Failed State, European Union, Refugee Crisis, ISIS, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, and Saudi Arabia

14. Warlords, Intervention, and State Consolidation: A Typology of Political Orders in Weak and Failed States

Author:
Romain Malejacq
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security Studies
Institution:
Security Studies
Abstract:
Despite efforts to bolster failed states over the past two decades, many states in the international system still exhibit endemic weakness. External intervention often leads to political instability and in most cases fails to foster state consolidation, instead empowering and creating ties with the ones it aims to weaken. Using the case of Afghanistan, I develop a typology of political orders that explains variation in degrees of state consolidation and provides the basis for more systematic comparative analysis. I demonstrate the resilience of a political logic according to which non-state armed actors (warlords) “shape-shift” and constantly reinvent themselves to adapt to changing political environments. This article, based on extensive field research in Afghanistan, shows why failed states are unlikely to consolidate and exhibit Western-style state building, as a result of intervention or otherwise.
Topic:
Fragile/Failed State, Non State Actors, State Building, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Middle East

15. The Collapse of Saudi Arabia and the Cataclysmic Power Shift in the Middle East

Author:
Elihugh M. Abner
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Abstract:
This article points out the cataclysmic power shift that would take place in the event of Saudi Arabia’s descent into political turmoil, and briefly covers some of the catalysts that could bring about such an event. Overall, the oppressive policies towards the Shia minority carried out by the Sunni-dominated Saudi monarchy are detrimental to the country’s national security. The religious disparities in the country have given the monarchy’s enemies—primarily Iran and Russia—a weakness to exploit. This article does not give evidence of any clandestine operations taking place within the Kingdom; however, it gives evidence that Iran and Russia have much to gain and virtually nothing to lose if the country was to spiral into violence like so many others in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Fragile/Failed State, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

16. Afghanistan’s Age of Transformation

Author:
Hamdullah Mohib
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
The Afghanistan of today would surprise most outsiders, even those who closely follow developments in the country. We are often wrongly branded as a failing state with a struggling government whose young people are fleeing en masse for Europe and whose military has lost control of the security situation. While anecdotal evidence can always be found to lend isolated support to such claims, this sweeping characterization offers a distorted picture of reality. Afghans have always valued and cherished their freedom and sovereignty, as evidenced by our years of fighting off foreign and domestic enemies who sought to take both. Now we are reaching for new goals: freedom from dependence on foreign aid, freedom from corruption, freedom from outdated thinking that justifies the oppression of half our population, and freedom from sclerotic bureaucracy that prevents everything from citizens’ access to justice to the smooth functioning of a free market. Afghans overwhelm­ingly want a modern, sustainable, and self-reliant country whose government serves and is accountable to its people. Yes, the past 15 years have seen war, but they have also produced remarkable growth. Afghan society is thriving, which is a testament to the incredible resilience of the Afghan people. You might be familiar with the progress Afghanistan has made in the areas of education and on women’s rights, but there have also been advances in health, infrastructure, in media and telecommunication, and in sports and culture. 2001 to 2016 has been a time of hardship and sacrifice, but also one of innovation and hope. Today, 25 percent of our cabinet ministers are women, and there are scores of female deputy ministers, ambassadors, district governors, members of parliament, and civil servants. Afghan telecommunication companies cover some 90 percent of the population, which has an estimated 20 million cell phone users. Our media sector is thriving and can rightly be called the freest in the region. When President Ashraf Ghani—a former World Bank economist with an expertise in the causes of and solutions for fragile states—and CEO Abdullah Abdullah led the National Unity Government to power less than two years ago, their first priority was to diagnose the nature and size of the myriad problems facing the country. Then President Ghani designed a strategic roadmap of reforms to take Afghanistan forward. When that plan, “Realizing Self Reliance,” was presented in November 2014 to Afghanistan’s partners, funders, and allies, it was enthusiastically endorsed. Today, Afghanistan is 18 months into an era of unprecedented, sweeping changes—an era President Ghani has named “the transformation decade.” The government is taking innovative approaches to solving Afghanistan’s unique problems, as seen in its national priority programs such as the Citizen’s Charter and the Economic Empowerment Plan for Rural Women. There are early, promising results everywhere you look. Infrastructure projects for roads, rail, and electric and fiber optic connectivity are underway. Public finance has been improved through aggressive anti-corruption measures, with internal revenue increasing by a record breaking 22 percent in 2015. The customs and revenue departments, where corrupt practices have traditionally thrived, have undergone sweeping changes that have sent revenues to historic highs. Our new Procurement Commission reviews all contracts and has saved hundreds of millions of dollars for the government. We are rediscovering and reinvesting in the revival of our ancient past with the launch of the new cultural heritage trust fund this year. Last November, Afghanistan was accepted as a member of the World Trade Organization and is now taking strong steps to improve its ranking in the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators, such as a new office in the Ministry of Commerce and Industries to monitor how reforms to reduce obstacles for business are being implemented on the ground, and streamline licensing procedures. The “Jobs for Peace” program that took effect late last year in 12 provinces is already providing food security for nearly 100,000 families by creating 5.5 million labor days. Eventually, it will cover all 34 provinces of Afghanistan, and is already performing above expectations. Highlights of major regional economic development deals that have been closed in the last 18 months include the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, which will bring Afghanistan thousands of jobs and $400 million annually, and the four-nation Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA 1000). This progress is all the more remarkable when you consider that in the short span of just one year—between the end of 2013 and the end of 2014—Afghanistan underwent cataclysmic changes. Following our first peaceful democratic transition of power in history, we installed an untested new form of government led by former rivals who agreed to come together for the benefit of the country, and our brave national security forces assumed full responsibility for national security despite lacking close air support, available medevac, and other essential capabilities. We also managed to make these gains against some steep odds that continue to work against us. Afghanistan’s economy has yet to recover from the crisis caused by the departure of more than 600,000 foreign military personnel and contractors, which sent revenue plunging and unemployment soaring to 40 percent. We have struggled to implement sweeping governance reforms and address urgent citizen needs while being constrained by budget austerity measures. And we continue to fight a war against two enemies simultane­ously, the Taliban and Daesh. But despite the grim headlines that emphasize enemy attacks, our security forces have exceeded expectations, risking and losing their lives in a fight we did not ask for against invading militant groups who threaten not just Afghanistan, but the region and rest of the world. Throughout our journey toward self-reliance, a key element of our continued success will be the strength and endurance of key partnerships, particularly with the United States. Our international partners, including the United States and NATO, have pledged to maintain a significant troop level to train, assist, and advise our security forces at least through 2017. This is invaluable support because it gives the government the breathing room it needs to solve urgent problems that, when remedied, will mean a more stable country. The Afghan people and government are grateful for the continued friendship of the United States and for the fact that both our nations realize that we are united against a shared threat. We honor everyone who has made the ultimate sacrifice in this fight. A captain in the United States Navy who served with the British Royal Marines in Afghanistan once told me that the greatest show of appreciation we can make for that sacrifice is to protect and build on the progress and freedoms for which so many troops fought, died, and were wounded. And so we are. Fiscal independence is a top priority. We need to create more employment opportuni­ties for Afghans so they can be prosperous inside the country, instead of risking their lives trying to find better lives that are not likely to materialize in Europe. Despite gains in women’s participation in all facets of society, it is completely unacceptable that many women still face the threat of violence and are discriminated against with impunity. More girls need to be in school, laying the foundation to pursue their dreams later in life. Peace is urgently needed, but we acknowledge that the process of achieving sustainable security is long, complex, and requires much more than just reconciliation with insurgent groups. Our government institutions need much more reform so that they are efficient, effective, and transparently in service to the Afghan people. Fortunately, we have a formidable engine for our momentum: Afghanistan’s massive, energetic youth population. Three-quarters of Afghans are under the age of 35, and although this generation has known only war and violence their whole lives, they are not cynical and pessimistic. Rather, they are determined to break with the past and change Afghanistan’s story. They are educated, ambitious, and they want peace and prosperity for themselves and their families. In business, education, government, civil society, and culture, they are pushing boundaries of “what is” and leading us forward to “what can be.” Afghanistan has only just started its transformation. The world should not doubt that we are determined to finish it.
Topic:
Communications, Fragile/Failed State, Governance, Democracy, and Modernization
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Middle East

17. Afghanistan’s Age of Transformation

Author:
Hamdullah Mohib
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Ambassadors Review
Abstract:
The Afghanistan of today would surprise most outsiders, even those who closely follow developments in the country. We are often wrongly branded as a failing state with a struggling government whose young people are fleeing en masse for Europe and whose military has lost control of the security situation. While anecdotal evidence can always be found to lend isolated support to such claims, this sweeping characterization offers a distorted picture of reality.
Topic:
Security, Fragile/Failed State, Governance, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Europe

18. Toward a More Perfect Union: The Struggle for Security in Libya

Author:
William Danvers
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Libya’s militia problem—which is a primary source of political and economic instability—is more complicated than defeating IS because it is more widespread. Dealing with it is a fundamental part of any effort to build a unified Libyan state. There are said to be as many as 2,000 militias across Libya, and while most are independent, they do fall into three general categories.10 There are those militias aligned with the GNC, many of which are Islamist but not necessarily jihadi. There are those that are generally anti-Islamist, loyal to the HoR and its military strongman supporter General Khalifa Haftar. Then there are those that are radical jihadis, such as IS and Ansar al-Shariah, which have ties to Al Qaeda.11 These militias form coalitions when it suits their purpose and at other times are at odds with each other. Regardless, they have helped create a failed Libyan state with no central authority or security structure.12 The criminal underground in Libya has been functioning since the time of Gadhafi. There are a number of groups, but there is no real central power structure similar to the mafia. Instead, these criminal groups operate independently, and they traffic in a variety of things, including guns, drugs, and people. They work with whoever serves their purpose, including IS. The role of the criminal underground has increased as the Libyan economy continues to crumble. In a very real sense, these criminal groups are the connective tissue between the jihadis and the militias, with all three impeding efforts to rebuild Libya.13 If Libya devolves into further instability—in effect becoming a failed state—it creates a threat to the region; a threat to Europe because of the increased flow of refugees and migrants from Libya; and a threat to both the United States and European Union because of the presence of IS and Al Qaeda affiliates. While addressing Libya’s security crises is an essential piece of the effort to build a functioning state, it will certainly be a difficult and complicated process. Nonetheless, there are things that can be done that will help make Libya more secure.
Topic:
Security, Fragile/Failed State, Peace, and State Building
Political Geography:
Africa and Libya

19. Las «nuevas guerras»: una propuesta metodológica para su análisis

Author:
Victor-Mario Bados Nieto and Marién Duran Cenit
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Hoy día existen numerosos conflictos con características diferentes y singulares difícilmente encuadrables en los arquetipos de los conflictos armados tradicionales o guerras convencionales. De los muchos y variados apelativos surgidos principalmente desde el Fin de las Guerra Fría y como contraposición a las guerras clásicas, fue el concepto de "nuevas guerras" el que tuvo una mayor acogida. Sin embargo, como muchas otras denominaciones, consideramos que no podemos apreciarlo como una herramienta enteramente práctica para el estudio de toda la tipología de conflictos que existen. Por ello, el presente trabajo, mediante la revisión de la literatura más importante sobre estos temas, tiene como objeto proporcionar una herramienta teórico-metodológica, para que mediante la operacionalización de las variables identificativas de las "nuevas guerras", se puedan estudiar de forma más pormenorizada los conflictos contemporáneos para poder establecer comparaciones que arrojen luz sobre las similitudes y las diferencias.
Topic:
Ethnic Conflict, War, Fragile/Failed State, and Violence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

20. Strategic Insights: Fragile States Cannot Be Fixed With State-Building

Author:
Dr. Robert D. Lamb
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The problem with the way the international community thinks about and responds to fragile states is not that we do not understand “fragility,” its causes, and its cures, but that we think of them as “states,” as coherent units of analysis. As a result of this strategic level mistake, efforts to build state capacity to contain violence and reduce poverty are at least as likely to destabilize the country as they are to help. The U.S. military should consider the destabilizing potential of its efforts to build capacity, train and equip security forces, and provide support to diplomacy and development when its partners and beneficiaries are officials of fragile states. State formation has always been an exceedingly bloody endeavor. Most stable countries worthy of the term “state” that are stable, including wealthy, Western, liberal, or democratic nation-states, came into being through complicated social processes, including war, ethnic cleansing, or genocide. That violence was followed by an institutionalization of the values and social priorities of the victors, combined with some degree of accommodation for the vanquished across and within the new state’s borders. State formation, in other words, has always been a matter of violent exclusion followed by pragmatic inclusion. In all successful states today, those processes have resulted in stable formal political systems, with a significant degree of internal consensus over how those systems should be governed. Today, a quarter of the world’s population, and half of the world’s poor people by some estimates, live in places commonly referred to as “fragile states,” beset by conflict, poverty traps, low social cohesion and, in many cases, cycles of violence and terror. These pathologies are not contained within the borders of fragile states, however. As it is ritually noted in most articles on state fragility, these are places that often generate dangerous spillovers: regional tensions, international terrorism, transnational organized crime, an inability to contain outbreaks of disease, and other problems generally associated with the term “instability.” But fragile states are not “states” in the same sense as those that are stable. They developed differently. They went through periods of tribal governance and warfare and, in some cases, territorial consolidation, as European states did, but then most were subjected to colonization by distant powers or severe domination by regional hegemons, in both cases with foreigners imposing borders and manipulating local politics, elevating one set of elites at the expense of populations with whom they did not share a tribal, ethnic, or national identity. When those foreign powers left (or reduced their footprint), the empowered elites either held on to power or were removed from power by their former subjects. In both cases, the internal fragmentation of views about governance—who should govern and how—remained and in all fragile states continues to be one of the most important determinants of fragility. The most common international responses to these pathologies tend to be exploitation by regional powers, containment by developed countries concerned about spillovers of violence, and capacity building of national institutions by international development agencies attempting to address the “root causes” of fragility by building state structures capable of governing the way “states” are supposed to govern. Looking at these two sets of countries—well governed, legitimate, and stable on one side, with poorly governed, illegitimate, and unstable on the other—it is understandable to conclude that, if only fragile states were more legitimate and better governed, they would also be more stable, peaceful, and prosperous. Post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization, poverty reduction, and other efforts to improve the quality of life for people living in fragile and conflict environments tend, therefore, to focus on building the legitimacy and capacity of state institutions, both military and civilian. Efforts to reduce the spillover of violence and terrorism likewise have key elements of state-building. When, however, has state-building ever worked? That is, when has foreign assistance to formal state institutions and civil society over an extended period of time, in places whose borders were drawn by, and whose elites were elevated by, foreign powers but where local populations do not agree with each other over basic questions of legitimate governance, ever resulted in the establishment of a stable state, one that is no longer “fragile” (in the usual definitions) or at significant risk of a return to violent politics? Consider the places often cited as state-building success stories. When I have asked proponents of state-building to name unambiguous successes, the responses most commonly include Germany and Japan after World War II, East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and sometimes Rwanda. But Germany and Japan were already states with highly developed bureaucracies that were largely left in place after their military forces were defeated. These were not cases of state-building but of state recovery and, in truth, they have little to teach us about how to stabilize fragile states. The borders of East Timor and Kosovo came into being as a result of wars; they are clear examples of state formation still in progress, and it is difficult to call Kosovo a success story when that country’s stability continues to depend so much on an international presence. Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Rwanda have made progress, but they have not been stable long enough to be considered stabilized, and certainly they continue to appear on lists of fragile states. Moreover, some post-conflict countries that have done things “right” according to the typical state-building script have dramatically regressed into violence—El Salvador is an excellent example—whereas some that have done things “wrong,” such as Laos, have managed to remain stable for more than 40 years. As a thought experiment, consider the following two possibilities. A fragile state is territorially fragmented along ethnic and sectarian lines, there are frequent civilian attacks between identity groups, the parliament and ministries are dominated by one group at the expense of the others and, as a consequence, there is constant low-level violence punctuated by periods of intense internal war and repression by the majority ethnic group, which nevertheless enjoys international recognition and assistance as “the” government and the “partner” whose “capacity” is to be built. Years of pouring resources into that government and its security forces serve only to strengthen one group at the expense of the others, providing counsel (and few incentives) to treat the other groups better while giving them the capacity to treat the other groups worse, thereby increasing the potential for conflict. Yet, even in such places, there are some stable, reasonably well-governed territories and communities that maintain a great degree of independence from the central government, with consensus on how they want to be governed, capable of collecting the resources they need to do so (in some cases democratically), and able to defend themselves against external aggression. Somaliland is an excellent example, but most fragile states have similar communities (large percentages of Afghans, for example, have reported that the conflict this past decade simply never affected their community). Such places look suspiciously like they are engaging in classic state formation, and doing so with neither support from their national governments nor recognition from the international community—whose support of their national governments often undermines local, successful state formation. I am not arguing that the international community should try to break up fragile states into more stable territories. Outsiders are not likely to be any more effective at redrawing the borders of fragile states today than the outsiders who drew the modern borders of those counties in the first place. But when a country falls apart in a civil war such that the state can no longer be said to be relevant in some areas of the country, or when the elites in control of national governing institutions fail to support or recognize the legitimacy of large segments of their own populations, due consideration should be given to those areas of the country that manage to stabilize on their own and govern the areas they control in ways that are more consistent with international norms than the central government is or had been. State-building is ineffective, and breaking up states is dangerous. International support to (if not recognition of) subnational state formation in fragile states is, therefore, among the more promising ways to think about how best to respond to fragile states. ***** The views expressed in this Strategic Insights article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This article is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Organizations interested in reprinting this or other SSI and USAWC Press articles should contact the Editor for Production via e-mail at SSI_Publishing@conus.army.mil. All organizations granted this right must include the following statement: “Reprinted with permission of the Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College.”
Topic:
Security, Democratization, Development, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:
El Salvador and United States of America