« Previous |
171 - 176 of 176
|
Next »
Number of results to display per page
Search Results
172. An assessment of crime related risks in the Sahel
- Author:
- Laurence Ammour
- Publication Date:
- 11-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- The Sahel, a vast belt of land covering nine million square kilometers and encompassing ten countries, has always been a transit area for constant flows of people, trade, finance and religious groups. For the past twenty years, organized crime has had ample opportunity to develop here, either by using traditional networks or by taking over areas where there is no state control. It is also a region afflicted by perennial crises and weakened states, notwithstanding its undeniable strategic importance arising from its natural resources: oil, gold, phosphates, diamonds, copper, iron, coal, nickel, zinc, bauxite, uranium, plutonium, manganese, cobalt, silver, chrome and precious timbers.
- Topic:
- Crime, Economics, Natural Resources, and Fragile/Failed State
- Political Geography:
- Africa
173. Fixing Failing States: The New Security Agenda
- Author:
- Pauline H. Baker
- Publication Date:
- 01-2007
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
- Abstract:
- Weak and failing states rank among the world’s greatest threats to international peace and security today. While major threats to world peace used to come mainly from ideological, military, or economic competition among competing states, in modern times lethal threats are growing within states from communal tensions among rival factions, extremists groups with radical political agendas, and faltering regimes clinging to power and asserting militaristic ambitions. These are the driving forces of a growing world disorder.1 Recent events highlight this paradigm shift in the strategic environment. North Korea is a failing state with an inward-looking regime and a negative view of the world. Its own insecurities, including its fear of a US invasion, are motivating it to pursue nuclear capabilities that have increased its isolation further and exacerbated tensions.2 Lebanon is a weak state that successfully cast off fifteen years of Syrian military occupation, but was unable to assert its sovereignty and fill the vacuum left behind. Hezbollah used that opportunity to assert itself as a “state within a state,” with dual power bases in the government and in the south, where its autonomous security forces launched a devastating war with Israel in July 2006. Then there is Sudan, a country with the highest risk of internal violence that has stonewalled effective international action to stop the continuing humanitarian crisis in Darfur, described by the US State Department as genocide. 3 Internal weaknesses within these states have increased the threat of nuclear proliferation, precipitated an interstate war, and worsened an ongoing humanitarian crisis, respectively. Though the origins of state weakness go back decades, the curtain was raised on the era of failing states—if one can call it that—by the tragedy of September 11, 2001. One year after the biggest terrorist attack on the US in history, the 2002 US National Security Strategy stated that America is threatened more by failing states than it is by conquering states, overturning decades of US national security thinking. Overnight, we went from looking at security through a “big power” lens to seeing it from a “small power” lens. Much of the rest of the world has come to see security challenges from that perspective as well.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, Fragile/Failed State, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus and United States of America
174. Nation-Building: The Dangers of Weak, Failing, and Failed States
- Author:
- Richard S. Williamson
- Publication Date:
- 01-2007
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University
- Abstract:
- Iraq continues to be in the throes of violent turmoil. The cost in treasury and blood is higher than anyone anticipated. Despite numerous “turning points,” milestones, and benchmarks, there is no neat solution in sight. The American people are thus understandably disheartened, discouraged and dismayed. After over a decade as the world’s sole superpower, the brief and circumscribed US military actions in the first Persian Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo, and the quick defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the American people were ill-prepared for a lengthened, bloody post-conflict engagement in Iraq. “Black Hawk Down” in Somalia was the rare exception, not the rule.1 America’s high-tech military power was capable of vanquishing foes quickly and at acceptable cost. It was also thought that once Saddam Hussein and his brutal regime were brought down, Americans would be hailed as liberators and, like Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism, Iraqi democracy would emerge like a phoenix from the ashes. However, it is clear that the history of the 1990s and the history being written in blood in Sadre City, Baghdad, and elsewhere in Iraq, are tragically different. A democratic broader Middle East would be a safer and more stable region. People desire the dignity, human rights, and opportunity granted them by their creator and promised by a freedom agenda. It also is undeniable that Saddam Hussein was a vicious dictator who victimized his own people, sought weapons of mass destruction, and threatened his neighbors. Testament to this indictment is found in Saddam’s mass graves and torture chambers, in his nuclear program in the 80s and early 90s and use of chemical weapons against Iran and Iraqi Kurds, in the long, bloody war initiated against neighboring Iran, the blitzing invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and his on-going military spectacles and bellicose rhetoric.2 The world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power. Even given all of that, should Iraq have been invaded? That matter is for the historians to debate. My purpose is not to relitigate that issue, but to recognize that any discussion of nationbuilding going forward must be informed by the chaos and conflict in post-Saddam Iraq. It is abundantly clear that we were not adequately prepared to deal with the challenges of Iraq after the fall of Saddam. We have memoirs from some of the principles that, sometimes unwittingly, describe an overly optimistic view of Iraq after Saddam, based upon meager planning and unrealistic resource allocation.3 We have a growing library of books and other reports by journalists that seem to reinforce that conclusion.4 Moreover, our most powerful indication comes from the events on the ground. These events have brought into question the wisdom of nation-building. Is it ever possible? If so, is the right sort of societal history, habits, and harmony a prerequisite for success? Is it worth the cost? If so, when and why?
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Fragile/Failed State, Iraq War, and Nation-building
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and United States of America
175. Corps et politique: Individu et société
- Author:
- Arlette Farge
- Publication Date:
- 03-2006
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- French Politics, Culture Society
- Institution:
- Conference Group on French Politics Society
- Abstract:
- In this essay, two themes––the body and the political and the individual and society––are used to reflect upon the historian's task. By focusing upon the body as represented in the police archives of the eighteenth century, for example, we learn about the lived experience of domination, and the body-as-royal subject provides us with insight into the mechanisms and preoccupations of political power. The often incoherent and chaotic efforts of thinking bodies to engage with or resist that power are at the very matrix of social relations, and it is up to the historian to reconstruct these efforts in their very incoherence in order to remain as true as possible to the reality in which our historical subjects dwelled. An emphasis on articulating the experience of the individual reinforces this ability to reconstitute the ways in which subjects defined themselves via ruptures, interrupted trajectories, and reconstructed paths, which, in turn, underscores the fact that disorder is the ordinary course of social communities. Individual choices themselves reveal the lack of coherence of the social, and it is by relating and taking account of this incoherence that a historian may provide a non-teleological interpretation of the past that emanates from the interior of a society's fragile and hesitating common fate, that allows him or her to understand and recapture for contemporary readers a world that sought only to exist.
- Topic:
- Fragile/Failed State
176. Consolidating the Palestinian-Israeli Ceasefire
- Author:
- Michael Herzog
- Publication Date:
- 02-2005
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- The February 8 Sharm al-Shaykh summit may have marked the definitive end of the Arafat era. Both Israeli and Palestinian leaders issued orchestrated parallel statements declaring cessation of hostilities and highlighted the resumption of bilateral engagement after almost four and a half years of armed confrontation. Within hours, however, militant Palestinian groups challenged these commitments through attacks on Israeli targets. To take full advantage of the opportunities now available will require active effort to consolidate the fledgling ceasefire. This includes imposing the full force of the Palestinian central authority against rejectionists, clarifying the ambiguities in the parallel commitments, and enlisting key states and international actors in the campaign to combat Iranian and Hizballah designs to undermine this fragile process.
- Topic:
- Security, Religion, and Fragile/Failed State
- Political Geography:
- Israel, Palestine, and Arab Countries