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1331. Legal order free of pillars: European Courts' jurisdiction in the post-Treaty of Lisbon setting

Author:
Janne Salminen
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
From the legal point of view, the most important change ushered in by the Treaty of Lisbon concerns the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union. This was widened due to the dismantling of the pillar structure. As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the European Courts now covers previous third pillar matters as well, namely criminal law and police co-operation. The dismantling of the pillar structure did not, however, affect the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Union Courts still do not have jurisdiction in this area. This rule has two important exceptions. Although the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is communitarised and more coherent than before, the previous limits in its territorial scope, namely the opt-outs of the UK, Ireland and Denmark, did not disappear, so limits in the Courts' jurisdiction remain. The Treaty of Lisbon amendments did not change the fundamentals of the judicial doctrines, such as the direct effect and primacy of European Union law. Importantly, the application of these doctrines was widened instead, owing to the depillarisation. The Treaty of Lisbon amendments meant that the decisions of the European Council and European Union bodies, offices and agencies can be reviewed under the preliminary ruling procedure. The Treaty of Lisbon changed the much-debated criteria for the standing of non-privileged applicants in actions to review the legality of the European Union acts.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, and Law
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Denmark, Lisbon, and Ireland

1332. Going for Broke: The Budgetary Consequences of Current US Defense Strategy.

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The sharp rise in the Pentagon's base budget since 1998 (46% in real terms) is substantially due to strategic choice, not security requirements, per se. It reflects a refusal to set priorities as well as a move away from the traditional goals of military deterrence, containment, and defense to more ambitious ends: threat prevention, command of the commons, and the transformation of the global security environment. The geographic scope of routine US military activity also has expanded.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Debt
Political Geography:
United States

1333. The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward

Author:
Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
The United States can no longer afford a world-spanning foreign policy. Retrenchment -- cutting military spending, redefining foreign priorities, and shifting more of the defense burden to allies -- is the only sensible course. Luckily, that does not have to spell instability abroad. History shows that pausing to recharge national batteries can renew a dominant power's international legitimacy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, and Cold War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Washington

1334. Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age

Author:
Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Foreign Affairs
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
No sooner had NATO launched its first air strike in Libya than the mission was thrown into controversy -- and with it, the more general notion of humanitarian intervention. Days after the UN Security Council authorized international forces to protect civilians and establish a no-fly zone, NATO seemed to go beyond its mandate as several of its members explicitly demanded that Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi step down. It soon became clear that the fighting would last longer than expected. Foreign policy realists and other critics likened the Libyan operation to the disastrous engagements of the early 1990s in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, arguing that humanitarian intervention is the wrong way to respond to intrastate violence and civil war, especially following the debacles in Afghanistan and Iraq. To some extent, widespread skepticism is understandable: past failures have been more newsworthy than successes, and foreign interventions inevitably face steep challenges. Yet such skepticism is unwarranted. Despite the early setbacks in Libya, NATO's success in protecting civilians and helping rebel forces remove a corrupt leader there has become more the rule of humanitarian intervention than the exception. As Libya and the international community prepare for the post-Qaddafi transition, it is important to examine the big picture of humanitarian intervention -- and the big picture is decidedly positive. Over the last 20 years, the international community has grown increasingly adept at using military force to stop or prevent mass atrocities. Humanitarian intervention has also benefited from the evolution of international norms about violence, especially the emergence of “the responsibility to protect,” which holds that the international community has a special set of responsibilities to protect civilians -- by force, if necessary -- from war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide when national governments fail to do so. The doctrine has become integrated into a growing tool kit of conflict management strategies that includes today's more robust peacekeeping operations and increasingly effective international criminal justice mechanisms. Collectively, these strategies have helped foster an era of declining armed conflict, with wars occurring less frequently and producing far fewer civilian casualties than in previous periods.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Libya, Rwanda, and Somalia

1335. The Non-Western Challenger? The Rise of a Sino-Centric China

Author:
Andreas Bøje Forsby
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
What are the implications of China's rapid rise for international order? This report seeks to answer the question from an identity perspective. The key argument is that China is currently undergoing an identity shift towards Sino-centrism, that is, a self-centering tendency to turn narrative attention towards the internally generated, specifically Chinese hallmarks associated with China's civilizational past and cultural heritage.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Culture
Political Geography:
China and Israel

1336. Detained and Denied in Afghanistan

Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Human Rights First
Abstract:
In August 2010, General David Petraeus, Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, announced a shift in U.S. strategy. The United States “cannot kill or capture our way to victory,” he warned. Rather, we must earn the trust of the Afghan people.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, War, and Prisons/Penal Systems
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Asia

1337. Pakistan 2020: A Vision for Building a Better Future

Author:
Hassan Abbas
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In recent years, Pakistan has stumbled from one crisis to another. A number of political and socioeconomic challenges threaten to further destabilize a country that already is reeling from insurgencies along its northwestern border. Pakistan's newest democratic government is struggling to maintain control over parts of its territory where militant religious groups are intent on challenging its authority and legitimacy. The country's conflict with India over Kashmir, now in its seventh decade, appears as intractable as ever, and the war in neighboring Afghanistan has deepened instability throughout Pakistan. The transition from a near-decade-long rule under a military dictatorship is slow and complicated, as rampant corruption and politicization of the bureaucracy present huge obstacles to the state-building process.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Democratization, Development, Economics, Education, and Health Care Policy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia

1338. Strategische Grundprobleme externer politischer und militärischer Intervention

Author:
Jochen Hippler
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and Peace
Abstract:
Western foreign policy is increasingly attempting to influence and reform the internal political situation and societies in target countries (for example to achieve democratization or economic reform), instead of restricting itself to inter-governmental exchange. The record of success in this regard is hardly encouraging. Does Western foreign policy have the necessary strategies and instruments to achieve these goals? This paper will analyze the mix of foreign policy interests involved, the development of strategy, and its instruments. It then focuses on the necessary preconditions for success in the target countries, both in society and the political system. In a next step the paper analyses the problems and limits of a policy of external reform by Western governments. Finally it offers a series of short policy recommendations.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Democratization, Development, Economics, Humanitarian Aid, International Security, and Foreign Aid

1339. Europe's declining role in the G-20: What role for the EU in the club of the most important powers?

Author:
Juha Jokela
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Europe and the EU have played an influential role in the development and decision-making of the Group of Twenty (G-20). Europe's influence in shaping the developments in the group and, more broadly, in global governance is, however, declining. The G-20 Summit in Cannes provided Europe with an opportunity to re-assert its leadership. Its aspirations were, however, overshadowed by internal divisions heightened by the deepening European sovereign debt crisis. Even prior to the current crisis, the increasing global competition and decrease in standing turned EU members inward-looking. Instead of a further Europeanization of foreign policy and external relations, many have observed a tendency to re-nationalize European policy-making. This tendency will make it increasingly difficult for Europe to secure its standing and adapt to the on going transition of the world's economic and political power. Europe should reinvigorate its commitment to a joint external action as a matter of priority. The key question for Europe is whether it will manage to Europeanize the G-20 and gear it towards the multilateral principles which lie at the heart of European integration; or whether we will see the opposite process, namely a 'G-ization' of the EU in the sense of major(European)powers dominating increasingly informal European and global decision-making. It is in Europe's interests to further institutionalize the G-20 and tie it to the formal multilateral architecture of the world economy and politics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Governance
Political Geography:
Europe

1340. Paradox of Power: Sino American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability

Author:
David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Book
Abstract:
The United States and China each have or will soon have the ability to inflict grave harm upon the other by nuclear attack, attacks on satellites, or attacks on computer networks. Paradoxically, despite each country's power, its strategic vulnerability is growing. Particularly since September 11, 2001, Americans have sensed this vulnerability. The extent to which the Chinese sense it is unclear. Vulnerability to nuclear attack is familiar to both countries. But the United States and China are also becoming exposed to damage in space and cyberspace because of their growing reliance on those domains for their prosperity and security, as well as each side's increasing antisatellite (ASAT) and cyber war capabilities. For China, economic integration, production, and commerce-and thus, sustained growth and perhaps political stability-depend vitally on data sharing, making networks and satellites as strategic as they are for the United States. All three strategic domains are "offense dominant"-technologically, economically, and operationally. Defenses against nuclear, ASAT, and cyber weapons are difficult and yield diminishing results against the offensive capabilities of large, advanced, and determined states such as the United States and China. Nuclear weapons are patently offense dominant because a single explosion can destroy a city. Moreover, it is easier and cheaper for China to improve the survivability of its strategic missile launchers, to multiply deliverable weapons, and to penetrate U.S. missile defenses than it is for the United States to maintain a nuclear first-strike capability. Though it has yet to admit it, the United States cannot deny the Chinese the second-strike nuclear deterrent they are determined to have. Satellites are inherently vulnerable: conspicuous, easy to track, and fragile. Destroying them or degrading their performance is easier than protecting them. ASAT interceptors are much cheaper than satellites. Likewise, defending computer networks becomes harder and more expensive as the scale and sophistication of the attacker increase. The woes of the cyber defender are compounded by integrated global markets and supply chains for digital components and equipment-in which U.S. and state-affiliated Chinese corporations are leading competitors-increasing the potential for strategic degradation of network infrastructure and disruption of services. In general, strategic offense dominance gives each country an incentive to invest in offense, which in turn spurs the other to keep pace. Apart from offense dominance, the advance of technology has slashed the costs in lives and treasure of strategic attack, as capabilities have graduated from mass invasion to heavy bombing to nuclear weapons to ASAT and cyber war. If one ignores possible deaths resulting from disruption of public services, ASAT and cyber war might even be considered "nonviolent." As the number of expected casualties from strategic attack options drops, so could international opprobrium and the inhibitions of decisionmakers. Absent deterrence, thresholds for war in space and cyberspace could become perilously low as offenses improve.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, Communism, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia