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62. Erdogan’s Dilemma
- Author:
- Jonathan Spyer
- Publication Date:
- 09-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Turkey faces few good options as the Idlib offensive looms.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria
63. The American Interpretation of Russia’s Conduct: The Case of Syria
- Author:
- Micky Aharonson
- Publication Date:
- 09-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The US is failing to appreciate the significance of the leverage points that the Syrian arena provides for Russia. This leverage allows Russia to exact a heavy toll for the measures the US is demanding.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America
64. Iran’s Lies – A Tool for Concealing its Policy Contradictions in Syria
- Author:
- Yossi Mansharof
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Iran is hiding its efforts to establish a presence in Syria, for both internal and external reasons. This policy involves numerous internal contradictions and to avoid admitting to them, the IRGC and Hezbollah are conducting a propaganda campaign.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hezbollah, Armed Conflict, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria
65. Complications in Russian-Israeli Relations: Israel’s Aerial Freedom of Operation in Syria will be Preserved
- Author:
- Omer Dostri
- Publication Date:
- 10-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s accusations against Israel that it is responsible for the downing of its plane is meant primarily for a domestic audience. Until now, Russia has made sure to behave with restraint in the Syrian arena and to operate based on its strategic interests. One of those interests is the Russian desire to minimize Iranian involvement in Syria.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria
66. An Evaluation of the United States’ Electoral Process
- Author:
- Chad Vickery and Heather Szilagyi
- Publication Date:
- 11-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
- Abstract:
- he 2016 elections brought into view serious threats to the United States’ (U.S.) electoral process, though much recent attention has focused on cybersecurity and foreign interference. The U.S. has traditionally benefited from high levels of trust in the electoral process and its outcomes, but that inherent trust has been declining in recent years. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) routinely conducts comprehensive assessments and offers advice on how countries around the world can reform their elections to better align with international standards and best practices. However, more established democracies like the U.S. are rarely scrutinized by the election practitioner community in the same manner.
- Topic:
- Elections, Cybersecurity, Foreign Interference, and Election Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and North America
67. A Long Way To Go: Analyzing Facebook, Twitter, and Google’s Efforts to Combat Foreign Interference
- Author:
- Bradley Hanlon
- Publication Date:
- 12-2018
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Two years after the Russian government manipulated social media to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, online information platforms continue to serve as mediums for such operations, including the 2018 midterm elections. Under intense public criticism and congressional scrutiny, the three most prominent online information platforms – Facebook, Twitter, and Google – have taken steps to address vulnerabilities and to protect their users against information operations by actors linked to authoritarian regimes. However, given the ongoing nature of online authoritarian interference, the steps taken by these companies continue to fall short. This report reviews and analyzes the steps taken by online information platforms to better defend against foreign interference since 2016, adopting the framing of the Senate Intelligence Committee by focusing on the largest and most influential online information platforms of Facebook, Twitter, and Google. The platforms’ efforts to combat foreign interference have focused primarily on three key lines of effort: preventing or suppressing inauthentic behavior, improving political advertising transparency, and investing in forward-looking partnerships. Measures to limit user interaction with inauthentic behavior include content removal, labeling, and algorithmic changes. The platforms have also taken steps to improve advertising through policies to publicize advertiser information and improve verification standards for those hoping to publish political advertisements. Investments in forward-looking measures have included internal initiatives to critically assess vulnerabilities and external partnerships with civil society, academia, and fact-checking organizations. They have also led to increased transparency about the behavior and content of accounts linked to the Russian operation against the 2016 and 2018 elections, as well as other nation-state operations targeting Americans. Though all of these steps are important, ongoing vulnerabilities demand more urgent action by the platforms to secure the online information space against foreign manipulation, while ensuring American’s ability to engage freely in robust speech and debate.
- Topic:
- Elections, Partnerships, Social Media, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia and United States of America
68. Responsible Reporting in an Age of Irresponsible Information
- Author:
- Heidi Tworek
- Publication Date:
- 03-2018
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- In Brief: Disinformation and misinformation seem to be everywhere. They are often spread by foreign actors like the Russian government who aim to stoke tensions within the United States. Other state or non-state actors may already be starting to copy these tactics. The problem of disinformation is exacerbated by two deeper and longer-standing crises within the American media system: a crisis of business model and a crisis of norms. Though issues of disinformation are not new, their appearance in new forms of weaponized information and social media call for new best practices within media organizations. This brief suggests some simple solutions to help journalists and editors avoid playing an unintentional role in information warfare and to increase trust in journalism. The recommendations fall into three categories: how to detect disinformation; how to increase literacy about foreign interference; how to anticipate future problems today.
- Topic:
- Social Media, Norms, Disinformation, Misinformation, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia and United States of America
69. It’s Not Just Facebook: Countering Russia’s Social Media Offensive
- Author:
- Bradley Hanlon
- Publication Date:
- 04-2018
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Russian influence operations exploit the vulnerabilities of social media platforms to disseminate false narratives and amplify divisive content in order to undermine democracies, divide societies, and weaken Western alliances. In conducting these operations, the Kremlin employs a variety of tools across the social media space, including fake accounts/personas, political advertisements, bot networks, and traditional propaganda outlets. Additionally, Russian influence operations utilize a range of social media platforms, each with a different role, to distract public discussion, foment social unrest, and muddle the truth. In order to successfully counter the Kremlin’s online offensive, Western policymakers will need to understand and address Moscow’s use of the social media ecosystem as a whole. Further, politicians will need to partner with the private sector and civil society organizations to help construct effective, sustainable, and forward-looking responses to Russian influence efforts. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg testified on Capitol Hill this week following the recent exposure of his company’s failures to protect up to 87 million Facebook users’ data. Facebook has been at the center of a whirlwind of revelations regarding the Kremlin’s manipulation of social media since the site first announced that it had shut-down several hundred Kremlin-linked accounts in September 2017. Facebook announced last week that it deleted an additional 135 Facebook and Instagram accounts, as well as 138 pages, linked to Kremlin influence efforts. We have also learned that Russian trolls used the social media site to create events that reached over 300,000 Americans. The House Intelligence Committee last fall revealed a slew of Kremlin-linked political ads that were published on Facebook in an attempt to exacerbate divisions in American society. Investigations into the Russian cooptation of Facebook and Twitter have unveiled a network of social media influence efforts operating at the Kremlin’s behest. These efforts utilize a range of social media platforms to dispense Kremlin narratives and sow division and discord abroad. As important as Facebook is in the information space, it is just one of many platforms actively being exploited by Russian information operations. As Putin seeks to project influence and weaken institutions abroad, Moscow makes use of a wide range of tools including disinformation, cyber-attacks, illicit finance, support for fringe political groups, and the weaponization of energy. Putin’s foreign policy efforts are often characterized by decentralized ad-hocracy, encouraging Kremlin-affiliated actors to apply tools if and when they are applicable to pursue the state’s larger strategic goals. The flexibility and synthesis of these operations allows the Kremlin to seize on opportunities and adapt to local contexts in order to maximize the impact of its efforts. Russia uses similar tactics in its social media campaigns, deploying simultaneous operations across a range of platforms in order to multiply effects and undermine Western efforts to counter and defend against this activity. As Clint Watts describes, “Within the Kremlin’s playbook, each social media platform serves a function, a role in an interlocking social media ecosystem where Russia infiltrates, engages, influences and manipulates targeted American audiences.” As new platforms and technologies emerge, the Kremlin will seek to coopt and integrate them into this network of online influence.
- Topic:
- Social Media, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Global Focus
70. Ten Legislative Proposals to Defend America against Foreign Influence Operations
- Author:
- David Salvo and Brittany Beaulieu
- Publication Date:
- 04-2018
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s February 16 indictment of the Internet Research Agency, along with 13 key individuals and two related entities, was another reminder for Americans of the coordinated attack mounted on our country’s democracy. In addition to the use of information operations outlined in the indictment, the U.S. intelligence community has documented Russia’s use of hacks on campaign related entities, with stolen information weaponized and released via Wikileaks and other outlets, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has confirmed that at least 21 states had parts of their electoral infrastructure probed in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election. The Internet Research Agency purchased political advertisements and sponsored organic content on social media platforms aimed at amplifying socially divisive issues. This content reached over a hundred million Americans, and the trend of exacerbating social divisions has continued on Twitter, in particular, over the past year and a half. Meanwhile, Russia and China are investing in advanced technology companies in the United States, acquiring both technical know-how and vast amounts of data that could facilitate the targeting of Americans. Director of National Intelligence Coats recently testified, “There should be no doubt that Russia perceives its past efforts as successful and views the 2018 midterm elections as a potential target for Russian influence operations.” And other governments like China are learning lessons from Russia’s success. Americans were caught off guard by Russia’s actions, but now that we know the breadth and scope of their malign influence operations, we must plug vulnerabilities that Russia and other foreign actors will continue to exploit if we are to defend our democracy against foreign interference. Yet, more than a year after the 2016 presidential election, and with midterm elections looming on the horizon, Congress and the Trump administration have not taken any clear action to increase U.S. defenses against the foreign interference threat. Many Americans remain unwilling to even admit that this interference occurred and many members of Congress have decided to use this issue for partisan attacks instead of uniting to secure our democracy. There are important steps we can, and must, take to defend our institutions against adversaries who seek to undermine them. Many of Russia’s tactics have exploited vulnerabilities in our societies and technologies, and loopholes in our laws. Some of the steps necessary to defend ourselves will involve long-term work to reduce polarization. Others will require clear action by the Executive Branch — including strategic messaging to ensure Americans are united against the threat we face, and steps to both deter and raise the costs on such actions. Congress does not have to wait for action by the Trump administration. Many of these steps are ones that Congress has the power to take. And particularly in the face of President Trump’s failure to lead an effort to counter this threat, Congress must step up and take steps within its power to patch the holes that congressional investigations and the intelligence and law enforcement communities have revealed. The good news is a number of legislative steps have already been proposed in both chambers on a bipartisan basis to improve the United States’ ability to defend against and deter these external threats, and there are other measures that could be added to those to close gaps in our defenses. These steps would close loopholes in current law and strengthen our institutional capacity to defend against foreign influence campaigns. We believe these are common sense steps that every member of Congress — on both sides of the aisle — should support.
- Topic:
- National Security, Elections, Internet, Legislation, Foreign Interference, and Influence
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America