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1. Lessons for the European Central Bank from the 2021–23 Inflationary Episode

Author:
Pablo Hernández de Cos
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Since mid-2021, the euro area economy has gone through several shocks, leading to the highest inflation since the creation of the European Monetary Union. A forceful and persistent response from the European Central Bank, grounded in the monetary policy framework it agreed in 2021 ahead of the inflationary episode, has succeeded in bringing inflation down and delivering on the central bank’s price stability mandate. The framework will be reviewed in 2025, and it might conclude that there is no need for a drastic change. Nevertheless, this assessment should be compatible with identifying some areas for improvement. In particular, the 2021 review was primarily focused on the effective lower bound. The recent inflationary episode, together with high ongoing uncertainty, indicate that the articulation of monetary policy strategy frameworks should be robust to very different scenarios. Likely persistence of high levels of uncertainty over the next few years will also require an emphasis on flexibility to adapt to the magnitude, origin, and persistence of shocks. Unconditional forward guidance should be avoided. In addition, there might be a need to more clearly distinguish in the future, when possible, between quantitative easing for market functioning versus monetary stimulus, which could incentivize a careful assessment of the amount, duration, and structure of any asset purchase program. Communication also needs to be improved in relation to the level of uncertainty and its consequences for monetary policymaking with, for instance, greater use of scenarios and sensitivity analyses as appropriate. Improving forecasting/modeling tools, in particular when dealing with large supply shocks, and understanding the roles of different measures of inflation expectations should also be priorities.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Inflation, and European Central Bank
Political Geography:
Europe

2. The European Central Bank’s operational framework and what it is missing

Author:
Giulia Gotti and Francesco Papadia
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In March 2024, the European Central Bank published the results of a review of its operational framework. After discussing how the ECB operational framework has changed since the Great Financial Crisis, we provide an assessment of the review, which we deem as premature and highlight some gaps it has not resolved. First, the choice of a hybrid system is attractive, but needs a precise specification. Second, the review did not specify the timing of the introduction of structural long-term refinancing operations and a structural portfolio of securities. We find that these measures should be implemented when the level of excess liquidity reaches between €1.3 trillion and €2 trillion, projected between mid-2026 and late 2027. Finally, as the introduction of a digital euro could impact bank liquidity, it is crucial to design a framework that can flexibly increase the supply of central bank liquidity.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Governance, European Union, Macroeconomics, Fiscal Policy, European Central Bank, and Banking
Political Geography:
Europe

3. What can central banks do to take the Paris Agreement seriously?

Author:
Dirk Schoenmaker and Hesse McKechnie
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Since the Paris Agreement on climate change was signed in 2015, its 195 signatories have seen financial instability resulting from the climate transition increase by approximately one third, in the context of still-increasing global emissions. In the European Union, emissions have fallen but banks have not fully internalised the costs of transitioning to net-zero. Banks continue to finance the expansion of the fossil-fuel industry. At the systemic level, this is trading a pretence of financial stability now for a more disorderly transition scenario with greater financial instability later. Central banks are increasingly using microprudential supervisory tools to address climate-related financial risks. These tools include reviewing banks’ risk-management processes and giving warnings over shortcomings in banks’ risk models. This approach is helpful, but has so far failed to address the build-up of climate-transition-related imbalances in the financial system. This situation echoes the run-up to the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, when supervisors were busy reviewing the implementation of the latest Basel risk models by individual banks, while failing to see increased imbalances in the financial system caused by rising housing prices. This Policy Brief proposes that central banks should take a macro approach to managing system-wide risks stemming from the climate transition. It is necessary to treat climate as an endogenous, and in many jurisdictions legally-mandated, transition, rather than an exogenous risk. The policy aim for central banks, in their macroprudential supervision capacity, should be to minimise financial instability during that transition. This Policy Brief argues that, all other things being equal, the steadiest path towards net-zero offers the greatest amount of financial stability. Current proposals to impose systemic risk buffers for climaterelated concentration risk may fail to provide such a steady reduction. A guided transition is recommended for banks that have been reluctant to hive off profitable loans to high-emitting companies. A requirement for the financial sector to reduce financed emissions by four percentage points annually from 2025 to 2050 would deliver net-zero with the least amount of financial instability.
Topic:
Climate Change, Monetary Policy, European Central Bank, Paris Agreement, Banking, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

4. Excess liquidity in the euro area: developments and implications

Author:
Marek Dabrowski
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:
The excess liquidity in the euro area is a product of a long period of quantitative easing. It changed the operational framework of the European Central Bank (ECB)’s monetary policy from the scarce reserves system (SRS) to the abundant reserves system (ARS). To eliminate excess liquidity and return to the SRS, the ECB must intensify quantitative tightening, which is also essential for successful disinflation. Fiscal adjustment can help in this process and mitigate the risk of financial instability. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 25 September 2023.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Finance, European Central Bank, and Liquidity
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Completing Europe’s banking union: economic requirements and legal conditions

Author:
Thorsten Beck, Jan Pieter Krahnen, Philippe Martin, Franz Mayer, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Tobias Tröger, Beatrice di Mauro, Nicolas Veron, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union’s banking union project started in mid-2012 in response to the euro-area crisis, with the goal of breaking the bank-sovereign vicious circle. The objective was also to restore private liability in banking and to move towards an integrated supranational market for banking services. For all the progress achieved in the past decade, particularly in banking supervision, these aims have not yet been accomplished. This Policy Contribution analyses the deficiencies of the current framework and identifies possible responses, in line with three levels of reform ambition. We label these ‘incremental’ (broadening the scope for private-sector burden-sharing in future cases of bank failures), ‘real’ (effectively breaking the bank-sovereign vicious circle), and ‘cosmic’ (a single, seamlessly integrated banking market). European policymakers should set their sights on the second level, which we view as achievable within the current decade, requiring new EU legislation but no change to the European treaties.
Topic:
Regulation, Economy, Crisis Management, European Central Bank, and Banking
Political Geography:
Europe

6. An analysis of central bank decision-making

Author:
Maria Demertzis, Catarina Martina, and Nicola Viegi
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The process by which central banks take decisions has evolved over the years, with a tendency towards independence and decisions taken by committees rather than individuals. Monetary policy committees can be set up formally in different ways, traditionally falling into one of two categories: individualistic or collegial. Individualistic committees reach decisions by voting and publish the votes of each of their members, while in collegial committees, decisions are typically reached collectively. The European Central Bank is an example of the latter, while the Bank of England follows an individualistic approach. Focusing on decision-making, a relevant question is whether the formal set-up in practice leads to different ways of deliberating and reaching monetary policy decisions. We look at decisions taken by the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank over more than 20 years to evaluate how different the decision-making process is in these three central banks. The results indicate that, irrespective of the committee type, their approach to consensus building when they take decisions is similar. The three central banks seem to value reaching decisions by unanimity, both on interest rates – the prime monetary policy instrument by definition – and on asset purchases. Decisions to tighten monetary policy are more often taken unanimously than decisions to ease monetary policy. When maintaining policy unchanged, decisions are usually backed by most committee members.
Topic:
Federal Reserve, Finance, Central Bank, European Central Bank, Decision-Making, and Bank of England
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Global Focus, and United States of America

7. The European Central Bank’s Monetary Policy Strategy Review: the key to a return to sustainable growth in Europe

Author:
Nicolas Goetzmann
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
On 23 January 2020, a few weeks before the Covid19 pandemic began, Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), announced that a "strategy review" would be held with the aim of evaluating the monetary policy conducted since May 2003, the date of the last "review". Faced with an inflation rate significantly below 2%, whereas its objective is "below but close to 2% over the medium term", the ECB had no choice but to carry out such a procedure.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Economic Growth, European Central Bank, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Europe

8. Eurozone Reform: A Victim of Political Economy

Author:
Linda Zeilina
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
With a new European Commission and a new head of the European Central Bank (ECB), the Eurozone is set to have new leadership and an opening for positive change. As Eurozone faces old and new challenges, it is in dire need of improved capability to tackle both legacy and new problems.
Topic:
Political Economy, Reform, European Union, and European Central Bank
Political Geography:
Europe

9. Interaction between monetary policy and bank regulation: lessons for the ECB

Author:
Marek Dabrowski
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:
The European Central Bank (ECB) recently became engaged in macro-prudential policies and the micro-prudential supervision of the largest Euro area banks. These new tasks should help complete financial integration, and make the Euro area more resilient to financial instability risks. However, the multiplicity of mandates and instruments involves a risk of their inconsistency which could compromise the ECB’s core price-stability mandate as well as its independence. The experience of central banks during the recent global financial crisis confirms that such risks are not purely hypothetical.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Economic Growth, Banks, Macroeconomics, Innovation, Trade, and European Central Bank
Political Geography:
Europe and European Union

10. Sovereign Bond Purchases and Risk-Sharing Arrangements – Implications for Monetary Policy

Author:
Monika Blaszkiewicz
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:
The design of the euro area Quantitative Easing (QE) programme raises the question of whether insufficient liquidity in the bond markets will reduce the impact of the programme and lead to market volatility. While estimates suggests that scarcity of around €102 billion may arise over the life of the programme, to date the QE programme has met its monthly targets and bond market volatility has been managed. Questions also arise in respect of the fact that risk is not fully shared on up to €738.4 billion to be purchased over the life of the programme. Partial risk sharing raises the spectre of defaulting central banks exiting the euro system, and existing members being unwilling to bear associated costs, and thus the future of the euro area. However, estimations suggest that, at present, all national central banks should be able to bare losses stemming from sovereign debt purchases under the current round of QE. This report was prepared within a research project entitled Sovereign bond purchases and risk sharing arrangements: Implications for euro-area monetary policy, which received funding from the European Parliament.
Topic:
Finance, Economic Growth, Banks, Trade, and European Central Bank
Political Geography:
Europe and European Union