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41. The advantages and uncertainties of gas in Europe's energy transition

Author:
Clémence Pèlegrin
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
During the high-level conference organised in Paris in September, the International Energy Agency (IEA), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) hailed the speed with which the European Union has freed itself from its energy dependence on Russia. According to the three institutions, the task now will be to consolidate and perpetuate this autonomy, which was achieved so quickly and to the surprise of many observers. The IEA also recalled the staggering amounts of annual investment needed to implement the energy transition, and the budgetary efforts required by the European Union in this area, in reference to the commitment to devote at least 30% of its 2021-2027 budget to climate action. The Covid-19 pandemic had already disrupted European discourse on the energy transition, just a few months after Ursula von der Leyen's inaugural speech on the The European Green Deal in 2019 and the advent of a just transition in Europe. Despite the health context and strong political opposition in the Member States over the place to be given to the energy transition in regard to short-term economic recovery, the European Union has maintained the course of an ambitious energy transition and strengthened its intermediate objectives for 2030, (Fit for 55 - The EU's plan for a green transition - Consilium), with a 55% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions). In February 2022, the war in Ukraine sparked a new energy crisis: faced with the risk of disruption to gas supplies, the need to simultaneously decarbonise the economy and the energy mix, once again became a political imperative for the European Union. Energy efficiency and the promotion of energy-saving policies were identified as necessary and complementary ways of securing the continent's gas supplies. At the heart of long-standing political debates in Europe, the future of gas is inevitably being shaped by a downward trend: even in the scenario of complete substitution of fossil gas by green gas, the decarbonisation scenarios in Europe all point to a reduction in the use of the latter by 2050. Structural effects, such as global warming and the resulting tendency for milder winters, and cyclical effects, such as the energy crisis and the recent rise in prices experienced by households, are already pointing to a decline in the demand for gas, as a result of efforts to economise or consumers switching from gas. However, gas continues to provide services to the European energy system, in particular to satisfy heating requirements and energy for cooking by producing electricity during peaks in demand, or in the industrial sector where its complete substitution is not yet possible. This article provides a summary of three of the main issues surrounding the future of gas in the European Union: changing energy dependency; competition between gas and other energies in the European energy mix; and the development of green gas and its political future in a context of electrification.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Gas, Crisis Management, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

42. Scaling Investment in Renewable Energy Generation to Achieve Sustainable Development Goals 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy) and 13 (Climate Action) and the Paris Agreement: Roadblocks and Drivers

Author:
Mithatcan Aydos, Perrine Toledano, Martin Dietrich Brauch, Ladan Mehranvar, and Theodoros Iliopolous
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
The zero-carbon energy transition is the solution to the 2022 energy crisis and a fundamental part of the solution to the global climate crisis. Yet, there are relatively low levels of investment in renewable energy in developing countries, hindering their achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and contribution to the Paris Agreement goals. In 2021, the Asia–Pacific region (excluding China) accounted for less than 8% of investments in energy transition technologies, Latin America and the Caribbean for less than 4%, and Africa and the Middle East for less than 2%. Annual investment in zero-carbon energy in developing economies other than China has stagnated since the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015. To put the world on track to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, annual capital spending on zero-carbon energy in developing countries must increase by more than seven times, to more than USD 1 trillion, by the end of the 2020s. There is therefore an urgent need to address the drivers of public and private finance for investment in renewable electricity generation, network infrastructure, and enduse sectors to meet the Paris Agreement and two complementary SDGs: ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all (SDG 7); and taking urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts (SDG 13). This report sheds light on roadblocks to scaling up investments in renewables while distilling solutions from international experience and brings clarity to where international and national efforts should urgently be focused to address the deterrents of investment in renewables and enable zero-carbon energy security and prosperity.
Topic:
Climate Change, Investment, Renewable Energy, Carbon Emissions, Paris Agreement, Energy Transition, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
Global Focus

43. Is International Climate Finance Unfair and Inefficient?

Author:
Thibaud Voïta
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Finance is arguably the most sensitive climate negotiation topic. Different studies have shown that rich countries emit the majority of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, while the climate footprint of the poorest countries is much more limited. In addition, the countries that emit the less often turn out to be among the most vulnerable to climate change, with high needs in terms of adaptation finance. According to some analysis, the 46 least-developed countries suffer from a high risk of loss and damage, and the countries that are the least at risk are in Europe. Therefore, developing countries are demanding contributions from the developed world to address their climate finance needs (both in terms of mitigation and adaptation). These demands have been somehow met with a pledge made at COP 15 in 2009, where developed countries announced a yearly contribution of 100 billion dollars (USD) by 2020. However, this pledge has not been honored. Meanwhile, climate change is accelerating and, as a result, countries’ needs in terms of adaptation are increasing, as well as their loss and damage. The finance gap is widening and though the 100 USD billion pledge is expected to be achieved in 2023, analysis from the think tank Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) shows that it will not be enough to address the current needs. According to their analysis, the current flows need to be increased by at least 590% annually. This briefing will show that, in addition, climate finance is not accessible to the poorest and therefore increases inequalities and the exclusion of the most vulnerable countries. The Prime Minister of Barbados, Ms. Mia Motley, complains that the “international financial system […] is broken, outdated, infested with short-termism and downright unfair. In parallel, the multilateral climate finance governance is evolving: new multilateral banks and donors are gaining ground and could be the first step of a power shift in climate finance from Western countries to emerging economies. Meanwhile, the Bretton Woods institutions are being reformed, and new mechanisms may bring promising developments (e.g., under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement). The Paris Summit for a New Global Financial Pact on June 22-23, 2023 is an opportunity to address these issues, though it also risks highlighting the North-South tensions further.
Topic:
European Union, Climate Finance, Energy Transition, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Asia, and France

44. A Framework for a Win-Win Europe-Africa Energy and Climate Partnership

Author:
Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
North-South tensions are exacerbated at a time of unprecedented turmoil for both Europeans and Africans. European polycrises (geopolitical, energy-related and economic) echo the systematic vulnerability of Africans, which is reinforced by external shocks. Following a dialog of the deaf, with rising discontent, tensions, and misunderstandings on both sides, there is now a new phase of discussion, coordination, and cooperation to achieve very concrete, high-impact actions. Europeans and Africans need each other to advance the European energy transition on the one hand and make decisive and rapid progress toward achieving the SDGs on the other. The urgency and issues at stake are such that this opening window to change the dynamics and achieve major and rapid advances should not be missed. Key priorities for action include debt restructuring, reinforcing funding, de-risking investments into SDGs segments, new priorities for the energy and mining sectors, and fostering private investment. There has been progress on financial and economic issues at recent COPs, and at the June 2023 summit in Paris, calling for a New Global Financial Pact. But Europeans still need to reconsider and consolidate their approach to hydrocarbons, electricity, mining, and biodiversity, taking into account the expectations and needs of the countries concerned. The widespread electrical and energy poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is a mounting factor of instability and now requires a breakthrough and a careful balance between fossil fuels and low-carbon solutions. Would sub-Saharan Africa develop as Europe, Russia, China, or the United States did in the 20th century, all efforts to preserve the planet would be vain. In the electricity sector, given the immense hurdles that lie ahead, a key issue at stake is to de-risk investments, strengthen concessional finance and target it more effectively. Tools can be put in place quickly. States, for their part, need to strengthen their regulatory frameworks and modernize their national companies. Networks are a weak link and deserve to be supported by international financial institutions. In the field of hydrocarbons, where major upstream activity is taking place, increasingly to the benefit of resource holding nations, the challenge is to avoid any new resource curse, to multiply development opportunities, and to minimize social and environmental impacts. Solutions do exist, and all actors must now assume their responsibilities. The mining sector requires infrastructure of all kinds, as well as the progressive implementation of demanding ESG criteria to protect the environment and workers, while fostering local and national development. Europeans need to mobilize capital, build industrial alliances, help train workforces, and structure win-win projects which create jobs and infrastructure. In the field of biodiversity, a huge opportunity for action and development is opening up, provided that the integrity of certification mechanisms and governance at the local level are strengthened, involving all stakeholders in a transparent way. The energy transition envisaged in Europe is in no way transposable to sub-Saharan Africa, where the main challenges concern access to affordable energy and clean cooking, development, youth employment, and adaptation to climate change. A challenge for Europeans is to speed up processes and reinforce the ability to accompany multidimensional projects, and not to be too prescriptive, so as not to lose influence and attractiveness further. The taxonomy, non-financial disclosure rules, or ESG criteria matter of course, but require some flexibility, and to be included in a process or progressive convergence. Priorities should be refocused on rapidly ensuring overall access to clean cooking, which is the mother of all battles and a key to development and environmental preservation. All the required technologies and solutions are available, and Kenya, alongside a few other countries in the region, showcases strong progress. With relatively modest resources, this existential challenge could be decisively addressed. Then comes the issues of transmission and distribution grids, and the wider infrastructure. Against this backdrop, providing public support for hydrogen export projects in the region appears less of a priority for European capitals at this stage. Finally, the success of the current re-engagement between Europeans and Africans will very much also depend on the European Union’s ability to foster the decrease of its greenhouse gas emissions so as to make room for the inevitable rise of emissions in sub-Saharan Africa. Countries in the region need to improve governance and their investment frameworks to foster inclusive, sustainable, and stable economic growth and development, and avoid that all stops soon again. Yet these governments also need to raise the same demands and issues of climate justice to China, Russia, Middle East, or North American countries, which are the world’s largest polluters and are less committed than is Europe.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Ecology, Energy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Africa and Europe

45. How to Meet the Industrial Challenge of Electric Mobility in France and in Europe

Author:
Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega, Diana-Paula Gherasim, Clémentine Vannier, and Adam Contu
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
How to Meet the Industrial Challenge of Electric Mobility in France and in Europe Notes de l'Ifri, November 2023 The deployment at scale of electric mobility in France and in Europe withholds significant industrial, societal, geopolitical, and financial challenges, against the backdrop of strategic dependencies along the value chain of the electric vehicle (EV). A certain lack of vision of the value chain as a whole, of the needs and objectives at each stage, and of how to ensure consistency and follow-up over time adds up to the concerns of industry players, who not only need to catch up from a technology point of view, but also to innovate, to secure the value chains, the workforce, the supply in low-carbon affordable energy and to scale up production and recycling capacities. Gigafactories are a major industrial step forward but should not obscure the complex and much broader nature of the battery value chain, and more generally of EVs’ value chain. This note summarizes the key findings of Ifri’s extensive study with the same name and its ten key recommendations for overcoming the industrial challenges of electric mobility deployment in France and Europe: Developing a holistic approach to the supply of critical raw materials, focusing on five key areas: domestic extraction, refining, mining diplomacy and environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards and recycling. Ensuring the stable and competitive supply of low-carbon electricity. Building integrated partnerships with European players at all stages of the EV value chain, with a view in particular to rapidly securing a certain number of cathode and anode active material (CAM and AAM) and precursor cathode active material (PCAM) production capacities, and supporting innovation in battery chemistry, which is the only way for Europeans to distinguish themselves from China. Planning in order to acquire an integrated mastery of the value chain, to develop the skills and train the workforce. Moderating the demand in critical raw materials as a key to resilience, as alternative means of transport, fewer car sales and smaller batteries, contribute to reduce the future increase in raw material needs. Re-imagining mobility to make it more sustainable, accessible, and fair. Setting up and calibrating a support system for the deployment of the different stages of the electric mobility value chain in France, whose cost to the national budget could be in the region of €8-9 billion a year, over the next few years. Protecting industries from unfair and less virtuous practices. Exploiting the growth of electric mobility to strengthen the integration of variable renewable energies into power systems. Ensuring that the European Union (EU) has the appropriate resources to meet the multiple industrial and technological challenges linked to EVs in the context of polycrises. Only some of these have been covered in this study, as EVs cannot be reduced to batteries alone, and involve many other key equipment and issues, hence the need to have an EV based approach, as opposed to one centered around battery-cells.
Topic:
Mobility, Transportation, Energy, Electric Vehicles, Energy Transition, and Greenhouse Gas
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Global Focus

46. A Bank of Actions: Making Good on Losses and Damages

Author:
Arunabha Ghosh
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
Egypt assumed the presidency of the Conference of the Parties (COP) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) during a devastating year of heat waves, droughts, lost crops, and extreme floods. These events made it impossible to ignore climate-related damages to lives and livelihoods. They also made clear that the long-held assumptions that the rich would escape the impact and the poor would need to adapt to it no longer held true. The undeniable truth is that the climate crisis is impacting vulnerable communities across the world. The agreement on a loss and damage finance facility was the most consequential outcome from the twenty-seventh round of negotiations (COP27) held in Sharm El-Sheikh. But the goal of keeping temperature rise to levels that could minimize loss and damage continues to slip away. Egypt, which will hold the COP presidency until November 2023, has an opportunity to orient COP away from conversation and commitments and toward action and accountability. To do so, it will need to implement a suite of reforms based on protecting vulnerable populations, ensuring party compliance, increasing transparency, and democratizing the energy transition.
Topic:
Climate Change, Accountability, Conference of the Parties (COP), and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
India, Egypt, and Island States

47. Technological and policy pathways to accelerate US industrial decarbonization

Author:
Joseph Webster
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Industrial decarbonization in the United States will be an important element in lowering global emissions. US industry released 1.4 gigatons of carbon in 2021, about 28 percent of all US emissions. Lowering these greenhouse gas contributions and modeling effective strategies to achieve reductions will go a long way toward not only lowering the US carbon footprint, but also leading global decarbonization efforts. To accelerate US industrial decarbonization, policymakers should start with the lowest hanging fruit, such as electrification or cleaning hydrogen for existing use cases, and then expand to more difficult areas. Greening the electricity sector would sharply curtail emissions from electricity-intensive industries, while switching to clean hydrogen in refineries will likely accelerate hydrogen’s relevance for other promising but unproven use cases, such as in steelmaking. By targeting “easier” challenges, policymakers can achieve decarbonization gains as quickly as possible. The most effective paths to accelerate industrial decarbonization will require permitting reform and pursuing a comprehensive understanding of clean energy deployment, including in transmission. While the United States has enhanced fiscal support for clean energy development, policymakers across the country at all levels of government should reduce permitting review times and ensure that projects are not stuck in regulatory limbo indefinitely. The United States should also research methods of decarbonization, including nuclear energy development, and wires-vs-pipeline transportation costs for green hydrogen. To limit the consequences of climate change, the United States must urgently advance a suite of efforts to guarantee the domestic and international industrial emissions reductions the world needs.
Topic:
Environment, Carbon Emissions, Decarbonization, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

48. Transitioning to the clean energy grid: A deep dive into the levelized cost of electricity

Author:
Ken Berlin and Frank Willey
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The climate crisis requires the world to transition rapidly from fossil fuel-based to renewable-based electricity generation. Studies of the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE)—the average price at which a power plant must sell each megawatt-hour of electricity to recover its costs—show that renewable electricity generation is well-positioned to meet energy transition goals because it is cost-competitive. LCOE suggests that on-shore wind and solar generation are the cheapest power options in the United States and for two-thirds of the world population. But LCOE does not tell the full story.
Topic:
Electricity, Energy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

49. Human security and energy transition in NATO's South

Author:
Eckart Woertz
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Energy lies at the heart of human security and development challenges facing the arid and energy rich Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. While risks such as water shortages, food insecurity, political instability and forced migration have received ample attention from analysts, energy transitions have comparatively received less scrutiny. Energy transitions present more development opportunities than risks for external actors, and these risks transcend borders by entangling the MENA within a broader geography that ultimately affects European security. Within this entanglement lie opportunities that could be harnessed to improve cooperation, sustainability and human security for NATO and Partners in the MENA. Framing energy and climate change as security threats has a long history in international cooperation with the MENA. As NATO responds to the war in Ukraine and rethinks its crisis management tools, raising awareness of new risks while grasping potential opportunities becomes all the more important given the return of strategic competition to the MENA. The implementation of the 2022 Strategic Concept and its focus on “resilience” requires Allies to go beyond traditional securitized views of development. This Policy Brief highlights two trends that will likely impact energy transitions in the MENA for the coming years: transnational critical infrastructure; and the development of new hydrocarbon and alternative energy resources. The first will influence regional geopolitics while the second will impact energy security in the MENA and Europe. Concerning energy resources, we examine two developments: growing supplies of natural gas and green hydrogen – a zero emissions * Director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) and Professor of contemporary history and politics of the Middle East at the University of Hamburg. process of generating hydrogen from water. Cooperation with MENA countries on energy transitions can enhance European security by contributing to socio- economic development in MENA countries. To this end, NATO can play a
Topic:
NATO, Development, Human Security, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and North Africa

50. Leveraging IBSA for the G20 Troika Presidencies

Author:
Rajiv Bhatia and Manjeet Kripalani
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
On December 1, 2023, India will hand over the G20 Presidency to Brazil. The G20 troika will now comprise the three IBSA countries – India, Brazil, South Africa – till November 2025. This trio has an agenda in common and with the G20, such as multilateral reform, energy transitions and digitalisation. IBSA should use its mechanisms and natural solidarity to advance the interests of the Global South.
Topic:
Reform, G20, Digitalization, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, Brazil, and South America