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41. Sudan Uprising: Popular Struggles, Elite Compromises, and Revolution Betrayed

Author:
John Young
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
In response to wider economic decline and uneven development, youth-led protests broke out in Khartoum in December 2018. Following this, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) brought together political parties and armed groups to form the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), committed to removing Omar al-Bashir from power. A report from the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) project, Sudan Uprising: Popular Struggles, Elite Compromises, and Revolution Betrayed, analyzes the 2018–19 uprising in the country, what led up to it, and what happened next. Trailing the history of rebellion in Sudan, the reign of the National Islamist Front (NIF)/ National Congress Party (NCP), the dynamics of the uprising, the attack on the sit-in outside the military headquarters in Khartoum, and the power-sharing agreement, the report finds that since the primary grievances underlying the uprising were not resolved, instability is likely to continue.
Topic:
Social Movement, Political stability, Protests, Revolution, and Elites
Political Geography:
Africa and Sudan

42. The Structure of Government Elites within the Regime of Alaksandar Lukashenka

Author:
Francisak Viacorka
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Belarus under the authoritarian rule of President Alaksandar Lukashenka claims the status as the last free country in Europe1. In contrast to neighboring Ukraine, Russia, and the Baltic States, no structural reforms have been implemented in Belarus: the system of power remains strictly centralized; the government replicates the Soviet vertical system with its multiple bureaucratized ministries and departments; the economy is mainly state- owned, and the opposition is excluded from all state institutions and the government. The personalistic dictatorship of Lukashenka who has uncompetitively remained in power since 1994, lets neither politicians nor officials accumulate sufficient economic or political power. The bureaucracy in Belarus is formed primarily of people who demonstrate full loyalty to the regime. This makes the cabinet of ministers a purely technical, not political body. However, could not this be the evidence of its unprofessionalism? The research statement of the current paper is that Belarus government appointees and bureaucrats take their offices according to their experience and competence, not only because of their personal or political ties. In particular, I assume that for an absolute ma- jority of ministry staffers their way to power was paved with specialized education and professional careers in their area, and later they were appointed to leading positions in the Government or state-building institutions without building political careers.
Topic:
Governance, Authoritarianism, Reform, Leadership, and Elites
Political Geography:
Europe and Belarus

43. Russia’s Stony Path in the South Caucasus

Author:
Philip Remler
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As the battle between Armenia and Azerbaijan heats up, Russia struggles to contend with a vastly more complicated landscape in the South Caucasus. Since shortly after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia’s aims and policies in the South Caucasus have been constant, but its capabilities to project power and influence have fluctuated. Russia’s engagement with the entire Caucasus region is best characterized as a tide. Its power and influence began to ebb at the start of the Karabakh conflict—with the February 1988 massacre of Armenians in the Azerbaijani city of Sumqayit being the key galvanizing event.2 After that, the tide receded rapidly, leaving even Russian possessions in the North Caucasus without effective central control. The First Chechen War marked low tide, which only began to rise with the Second Chechen War, beginning in 1999. Until about 2004, Russia was too weak and internally divided to project power and influence in the wider Caucasus region in a meaningful way. To be sure, Russian influence was never gone completely, even during the lowest ebb of the tide. Russia still marshaled greater resources than the new states of the Caucasus could muster, and it threw its weight around. But in the 1990s, Russia did not have a unified governing apparatus, but rather a mass of competing clans among which regional actors could maneuver. For example, after the Soviet collapse, Moscow left the Russian military units in the Caucasus to their own devices. Those units served as mercenaries, arms suppliers, and logistics providers to both sides in the Karabakh conflict. It took a decade for Moscow to reassert its so-called power vertical in the Caucasus, symbolized by President Vladimir Putin’s success in 2004 in finally ousting chief of the general staff Anatoliy Kvashnin.3 Russia’s assertiveness in the region grew steadily thereafter, with sharp upticks after the 2008 war with Georgia and Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Elites, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus

44. Chinese Views of South Korea: Aligning Elite and Popular Debates

Author:
See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have experienced periods of conflict and cooperation since officially forging “partnership” relations in 1998. From a historical perspective, Korea was among the most willing participants of the Sinocentric tribute system and its underlying cultural hierarchy. Yet the 2003-2004 dispute over the ancient Koguryo kingdom’s identity marked the first major downturn in the China-ROK relationship since normalization. The rapid expansion of trade, at an average annual rate of 18 percent since 1992, has not prevented the two sides from fighting over political grievances. Most notably under the current Xi Jinping leadership, Beijing’s assertions of unprecedented friendship quickly turned into accusations of betrayal requiring economic punishment. Why and how did China’s policy toward South Korea shift so drastically after two decades of diplomatic normalization? To answer, we must focus on the expectations raised by China’s national identity for ties with South Korea. This study examines the evolution of Chinese views of South Korea with a focus on elite and popular narratives since 2013. Despite increased interdependence, these narratives point to China’s increasingly fragile political ties with Asian partners. Most importantly, China’s growing weight facilitates its strategic combination of economic and discursive tools of diplomacy framed by national identity. Recent tensions over the U.S.-ROK military alliance displayed Beijing’s denial of direct economic retaliation under the cover of public hostility, conveniently blurring the lines between state-led and voluntary actions. By hardening the identity dimensions of conflict, such strategies may only have long-term counterproductive effects of constraining Beijing’s political influence at home and abroad. The four sections below proceed as follows. First, I review two decades of China-ROK relations since the establishment of partnership ties in 1998. I identify two related trends: the intensification of political disputes despite trade, and China’s growing economic leverage in managing those disputes, keeping an eye on the role of national identity. Second, I assess the pessimistic turn in China’s domestic discourse on South Korea in the Xi Jinping period, using official, academic, and media sources. Third, I trace the interaction of elite and popular narratives, focusing on the 2016-2017 dispute over a U.S. missile defense system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). I briefly extend the discussion to public clashes over Hong Kong in 2019 to underscore the enduring impact of China’s major power and domestic political identities on China-ROK relations. To conclude, I consider the trajectory of bilateral relations under the leadership of Xi Jinping and Moon Jae-in, including the domestic and foreign policy implications of nationalist discourse.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Public Opinion, and Elites
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

45. Deposits Made “Sacred”: The Dangerous Red Line of Lebanon’s Elites

Author:
Mounir Mahmalat
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
Facing the ashes of an economic model based on sectarianism and cronyism, Lebanon currently endures a perfect storm of overlapping financial, economic, and political crises. Since its inauguration on January 31, 2020, the technocratic government of Prime Minister Hassan Diab, aided by international advisors, elaborated an “economic rescue plan” to explore options for recovery. Leaked as a preliminary version in early April, the plan offers a sobering analysis of Lebanon’s economic realities. The plan exposes Lebanon’s present-day power struggle between traditional communal elites and a reformist protest movement. While some assumptions and projections are questionable or left unexplained, in conclusion, the plan depicts as inevitable a contribution of large deposits in the form of “bail-in’s” to cover losses only in the banking sector twice as large as the national economy. In such a scenario, a part of the largest deposits could be transformed into bank equity or placed into a dedicated fund to be replenished with reclaimed “stolen funds.” While some assumptions and projections are questionable or left unexplained, the plan makes visible the power struggle between an elite trying to preserve its interests in the status quo and a reformist protest movement. As a major conclusion, the plan depicts as inevitable a contribution of large deposits in the form of “bail-in’s” to cover losses only in the banking sector twice as large as the national economy. In such a scenario, a part of the largest deposits could be transformed into bank equity or placed into a dedicated fund to be replenished with reclaimed “stolen funds.” Communal elites and party leaders didn’t spare strong words to denounce that plan. While Nabieh Berri unceremoniously declared deposits as “sacred”, former Prime Minister Saad Hariri prophesied “economic suicide” when deposits would be used to cover banks’ losses (assumed that much more could be murdered in the economy). Other leaders from all political parties followed suit, including Hezbollah and the Progressive Socialist Party. Liquidity injections into the banking system in a “bail-out” scenario should leave deposits untouched and be financed largely by privatization of state assets. Despite the high stakes at play for politicians’ bank accounts and the legal complexity of bail-ins, this unusual unity is not trivial to explain. For sure, by accepting any cut on deposits, elites would admit political defeat and declare a 30-year legacy of economic policies as a miserable failure.
Topic:
Reform, Economy, Elites, and Economic Crisis
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

46. The Structure of Government Elites within the Regime of Alaksandar Lukashenka

Author:
Francisak Viacorka
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
his paper reveals the structure and trends within Belarus government elites in the period between 1994 and 2017. Belarus remains one of the least free and under-reformed post-Soviet countries yet it seems to have a strong functional bureaucracy. Seventy-еight per- cent of ministers and state committee chairs are employed according to their professional ca- reer background. The share of appointees with specialized education rose from 71.9% to 86% during Lukashenka’s presidency. So the author assumes that in the case of unrest or political transition, a bureaucratic apparatus composed of specialized professionals could play a stabi- lizing role. This research also shows slight indigenization1 and westernization of Nomenklatura2. The number of officials born in Belarus increased from 71.9% to 81.4%, and those from the west- ern Horadnia region increased from 4% to 20%. At the same time, the research revealed, that the Government continues to have an inadequate representation of women (<5%), and other parties (<11%); meanwhile, it has an increasing presence of professional military (from 15% to 20%).
Topic:
Government, Minorities, Transition, and Elites
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

47. Justice for the Rich, Judgement for the Poor: ‘Elite Immunity’, Rampant Impunity and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria

Author:
Mike Opeyemi Omilusi
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Institution:
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Abstract:
The challenge of systematically studying the African power elite and the mode by which it governs has become urgent not only because of the conceptual and theoretical dead-ends to which much of current received wisdom leads, but also because a better understanding of the nature, composition and renewal of the elite is critical to our understanding of the governance of the public sphere (CODESRIA, 2003). A focus on political elites is a focus on the primacy of political interests. As both Mosca and Pareto underscore in their works, members of the elite act in order to preserve their position within their societies. Specifically, political elites’ action is aimed at the preservation of their political power. As Thomas Schwartz argues, members of the political elite are ‘ambitious people seeking office for individual recognition, career advancement, and the power to affect societies’ (Schwartz 2009, cited in Tardelli, 2013:88-89). [...] This study therefore, interrogates the content and context of executive immunity and its attendant culture of impunity that permeates the political environment. It contends that the immunity clause not only sanctifies, abinitio, criminal behavior by the said public officials but also gives them every incentive to be vile and depraved to their heart’s content – to turn immunity into impunity.
Topic:
Poverty, Criminal Justice, Impunity, and Elites
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

48. Battle of Ideas: Brexit: a revolution by or against the establishment?

Author:
Lisa Mckenzie, Anand Menon, Daniel Moylan, and Waterfield
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
Can Brexit be understood as representing a genuinely revolutionary moment in British history, or are there much deeper, longer-term trends that explain the current moment? Speakers included: Lisa Mckenzie, Durham University Professor Anand Menon, UK in a Changing Europe Daniel Moylan, Urban Design London Bruno Waterfield, The Times
Topic:
European Union, Brexit, Referendum, and Elites
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

49. Challenge Paper: Inequality and Exclusion

Author:
CIC
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
Inequality and exclusion are among the most pressing political issues of our age. They are on the rise and the anger felt by citizens towards elites perceived to be out-of-touch constitutes a potent political force. Policy-makers and the public are clamoring for a set of policy options that can arrest and reverse this trend. The Pathfinders’ Grand Challenge on Inequality and Exclusion seeks to identify practical and politically viable solutions to meet the targets on equitable and inclusive societies in the Sustainable Development Goals. Our goal is for national governments, intergovernmental bodies, multilateral organizations, and civil society groups to increase commitments and adopt solutions for equality and inclusion.
Topic:
Civil Society, Inequality, Sustainable Development Goals, Multilateralism, Elites, and Exclusion
Political Geography:
Global Focus

50. The protests in Iraq: Corruption and foreign interference in the firing line

Author:
Mariette Hagglund
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Recent large-scale protests in Iraq reveal deep dissatisfaction with the political elite and the dysfunctional system of governance. The protests could pose a threat to Iran’s foreign policy, whose channels of influence lie within parts of the Shia political elite in Iraq.
Topic:
Religion, Governance, Social Movement, Protests, and Elites
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East