Is sovereign borrowing so different from corporate debt that there is no need for bankruptcy-style procedures to protect debtors? With the waiver of immunity, sovereign debtors who already face severe disruption from short-term creditors grabbing their currency reserves are also exposed to litigious creditors trying to seize what assets they can in a 'race of the vultures'.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Political Economy
Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition, McMaster University
Abstract:
The Asian financial crisis has re-opened the debate about the role of the state in the region's industrialisation. Just when there seemed to be growing acknowledgment across the economic and political disciplines that certain kinds of state involvement were vital to the rapid upgrading of the Northeast Asian economies and that understanding what made states effective or ineffective was a crucial issue, along came the financial hurricane. Profound disarray of an economic and social nature has been the most immediate and important consequence of this watershed event. Theoretical disarray has followed closely in its path. This paper seeks to inject some theoretical rigour into the discussion of the Asian crisis. State power in the Asian setting - whether and in what way the state's transformative capacity is weak or robust - and how it relates to the impact of international markets is central to the argument that follows.
Complex humanitarian emergencies have caused widespread death and suffering over the last two decades. While recent tragedies in Bosnia, Rwanda and Angola have made the world more aware of the terrible human toll involved, the international community has yet to develop effective policy responses to stem such crises.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Development, Economics, Genocide, Human Rights, Migration, and Politics
The paper represents a preliminary and partial analysis of the information collected in a comparative 12-country study of the adjustment of national employment and social-welfare policies to the increasing internationalization of product and capital markets. After the postwar decades, when national governments were still able to control their economic boundaries, the first international challenge came in the form of the oil-price crisis of 1973/74, which confronted industrial economies with the double threat of cost-push inflation and demand-gap unemployment. It could be met if countries were able to achieve a form of “Keynesian concertation” in which expansionary monetary and fiscal policies would defend employment while union wage restraint could be relied on to fight inflation. For this solution, “corporatist” industrial-relations institutions were a necessary but not a sufficient condition.
The Asian financial crisis put in bold relief two big differences between the Asian and the Western economies. One has been hotly contested, while the other has been virtually ignored.
The devaluation of the Russian ruble this year was predictable, especially considering Russia's poor monetary history. State-manipulated money has been a Russian hallmark since the time of Peter the Great and shows that the country's money problems are endemic and do not depend on who controls the central bank. Czarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet governments have used the central bank printing press to finance deficit spending, resulting in high inflation, confiscation of savings, capital controls, or a combination of the three.
The International Monetary Fund and the U.S. Treasury Department's Exchange Stabilization Fund are undemocratic institutions unaccountable for their actions. Their current functions have little to do with their original missions. The ESF is used by the executive branch to circumvent Congress in the provision of foreign aid. Its foreign exchange interventions have, in any event, always been wasteful and ineffective at controlling the relative price of the U.S. dollar. The IMF has also been used to provide massive bailouts in the cases of Mexico in 1995 and of Asian countries since 1997. Defenders of the IMF as an international lender of last resort are misinformed since the IMF does not and cannot serve that purpose. Both institutions should be abolished, not reformed, because they are not needed to resolve currency crises and they preclude superior solutions.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Political Economy
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
On January 13, 1998, Stephen Golub, professor of economics at Swarthmore College, led the sixteenth seminar in AEI's series Understanding Economic Inequality. Mr. Golub's presentation sought to dispel fallacious but widespread views concerning the effects of competition from low–wage countries in international trade, including the view that such competition has significantly increased wage inequality in the United States.
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
The currency crisis that started in Thailand in the summer of 1997 was followed by repercussions on the currencies of neighboring countries, culminating in a crisis infecting most countries in East Asia. Japan and China, which have developed strong ties with the rest of Asia through trade and investment, have not been exempted from this contagion. This paper looks at the latest currency crisis in Asia from the perspectives of these two regional giants.
Topic:
Economics and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Israel, East Asia, Asia, and Thailand
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
Just like many other crises, the Korean currency crisis came suddenly. In mid–November 1997, headlines in the Korean press consisted mostly of presidential election stories. At that time the presidential race was very close; the Grand National Party candidate, Lee Hoi–Chang, was making a dramatic comeback, while the National Congress for New Politics candidate, Kim Dae–jung, was making his best effort to maintain his narrow lead. Thus, when President Kim Young Sam announced on November 19 his decision to fire key economic policy–makers on the grounds of mismanaging the economy, most Koreans were surprised at the news and questioned the president's motivation. Two days later they were completely shocked to learn that the Korean government was asking the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency standby loans because the Korean foreign reserve level was very low at $7.3 billion and most foreign financial institutions were unwilling to roll over their short–term loans to Korea.