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421. Interfaith Relations in Pakistan Perspectives and Worldview of Youth in Punjab

Author:
Ahmed Ali
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
In the present day where concerns are gradually shifting from overpopulation to decreasing youth population in many countries, Pakistan’s youth population makes it a young nation. On a theoretical level, a large youth population with energy and capacity for work should help boost the national economy and contribute to GDP growth. However, in practice, lack of focus on youth in policymaking has drastically checked Pakistan’s ability to capitalize on its youth bulge and channelize the youth’s energies for economic growth. Still more worrisome, youth engagement is usually overlooked in policy discourse and formulation concerning peace and security, even though youth are integral to Pakistan’s security issues including violent extremism and terrorism. In recent past, the scale of religious extremism and violence witnessed in Pakistan could not have been possible without the formidable role of the youth who were indoctrinated in violent ideologies and used as weapons of war by militant groups. The Amnesty International has documented the using of youth in conflicts and hostilities around the world. In Pakistan, a Taliban commander Qari Hussain called the children “the tools to achieve God’s will”.1 The strategy of using young people in acts of violence was demonstrated by terror outfits, and children and teenagers were deployed as human bombs. However, despite Pakistan’s bitter experiences with faith-based extremism and terrorism, the youth continue to be discounted in policy. There is no effective or functional youth policy to speak of, though leaders do quite often cite the youth bulge as a source of national strength and promise uplift of youth. But rhetoric is barely followed by befitting policy measures. Resultantly, the youth are left largely rudderless and disenchanted which make them vulnerable to exploitation. There is already enough evidence to suggest that the current generation of Pakistani youth harbor anger inside which is often manifested in violent ways including in the forms of vigilantism and lynching.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Leadership, and Youth
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Middle East

422. Untapped Innovation? The Racial and Gender Divides That Hinder the U.S. Knowledge Economy

Author:
Alexander Kersten and Gabrielle Athanasia
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The United States’ innovative spirit rests on a complex network of economic rules favoring market-based competition, predictable legal arrangements for patenting and securing intellectual property, and incentives for investors. It also relies on a robust university system that provides the requisite educational training and facilities to carry out research and development (R&D). Maintaining this network fundamentally requires a focus on early education, especially in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). A more inclusive innovation economy also demands greater attention to communities of color, who are often poorly connected to the innovation economy; women, who are underrepresented in the innovation economy; and those in regions that do not yet share in the prosperity of the United States’ innovation clusters. To build a more inclusive innovation-based economy, policymakers should foster equitable access to early childhood STEM education. They should encourage the expansion of technology transfer programs across universities and colleges, including historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs), and connect them to their regions’ economic growth. Policymakers, academia, and industry leaders should also encourage minorities and women to participate in the patenting and venture systems that support the innovation economy. Renewing American innovation means making opportunity as universal as the talent that seeks it.
Topic:
Economics, Gender Issues, Race, Labor Issues, Discrimination, and Innovation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

423. Red Ink: Estimating Chinese Industrial Policy Spending in Comparative Perspective

Author:
Gerard Dipippo, Ilaria Mazzocco, and Scott Kennedy
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
A new report by the CSIS Economics Program and the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics quantifies the size of total industrial policy spending by China and compares it to seven other major economies: Brazil, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. Much of the existing research on industrial policy focuses on its effects, but there are few, if any, published studies that attempt a systematic comparison and quantification of overall industrial policy spending. The heart of the report is the careful calculation of total industrial policy spending by China and the other economies, combining estimates from multiple tools, among them direct subsidies, tax breaks, below-market credit, and state investment funds. The report provides additional context by examining the historical trajectory of industrial policy of these economies and the evolution of industrial policy across these economies for three industries—aluminum, semiconductors, and electric vehicles. The historical and sectoral analyses point to some similarities across economies, but they also demonstrate how distinctive China has been in terms of both quantifiable spending and non-quantifiable policy tools. Finally, this report discusses several important policy implications, including greater transparency and more harmonized reporting about industrial policy spending and the potential ways in which policymakers could employ these data to more effectively limit industrial policy spending by China and other economies.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, Industry, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
China and Asia

424. Sanctions, SWIFT, and China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payments System

Author:
Barry Eichengreen
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
In response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the United States and a coalition of cooperating countries imposed harsh financial sanctions on the Russian government, corporations, and individuals.1 These sanctions bar Russian banks from using SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) to facilitate cross-border payments, prohibit banks from doing most forms of business with Russian entities, and freeze assets held abroad by the Central Bank of Russia in the form of treasury securities and bank deposits. These developments have led Russia, as well as other countries contemplating whether they might find themselves in the same position, to explore alternatives. Such options could include building a substitute for SWIFT to send instructions regarding cross-border interbank transactions; identifying financial counterparties other than Western banks with which to do international business and platforms other than Western clearinghouses through which to make payment; and finding a vehicle other than the dollar for denominating and executing transactions. Specifically, countries are looking to China, which has large internationally active banks, has created its own clearinghouse for cross-border transactions and is embarked on a campaign to encourage broader international use of its currency, the renminbi.2 This note investigates how far China has gone in creating alternatives to SWIFT, Western banks, and the dollar. It explores whether Russia and other countries might be drawn toward this parallel international financial universe and what economic and political implications this has—for the United States, for its geopolitical rivals, and for global economics and politics. China is making strides in fostering cross-border use of the renminbi and building a renminbi-based interbank payments system that can serve as an alternative to SWIFT and Western clearinghouses. However, these remain somewhat limited alternatives—for the moment. The situation could change faster if lent additional impetus by Western sanctions. Thus, countries such as the United States that employ financial sanctions should prepare for the development of alternative financial arrangements in China and possibly elsewhere. This may mean relying more heavily on nonfinancial measures insofar as financial sanctions eventually become less effective.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, Finance, Borders, and Banks
Political Geography:
China and Asia

425. Economic Security in Emerging Markets: A Look at India, Vietnam, and Indonesia

Author:
Matthew Goodman, Matthew Reynolds, and Julianne Fittipaldi
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
With the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, supply chain resilience has emerged as a policy priority of the United States and its allies. The issue of supply chains has also raised the profile of emerging economies that offer possible alternatives to China as production platforms for multinational firms. This report surveys economic security policy developments in three major emerging economies: India, Vietnam, and Indonesia. It finds that all are attempting to take advantage of this new focus on supply chain resilience, while (to varying degrees) balancing the economic security risks posed by China’s rise. The United States and its allies have an opportunity to work with these emerging economies to shape their decisions about trade, investment, and technology policies in ways that promote mutual economic security and enhance international economic rules and norms.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Emerging Markets, International Trade and Finance, and Markets
Political Geography:
Indonesia, India, Asia, Vietnam, and Asia-Pacific

426. How China’s Human Capital Impacts Its National Competitiveness

Author:
Briana Boland, Kevin Dong, Jude Blanchette, and Ryan Haas
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
How will the strengths and weaknesses of China’s human capital impact national competitiveness? China’s efforts to maintain economic growth, strengthen supply chains, develop strategic science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) sectors, and secure a modern military edge hinges on the ability to cultivate and utilize human capital. As the United States and other countries increasingly engage in multidomain competition with China, it is critical to start from a clear-eyed understanding of China’s human capital and Beijing’s strategy for nurturing national talent. Investments in higher education, strategic STEM sectors, and military talent demonstrate key areas in which Beijing is focusing on cultivating human capital. However, China must overcome significant obstacles to innovate as it faces substantial demographic pressures, socio-economic inequalities, and challenges to attracting and retaining top talent both domestically and internationally.
Topic:
Economics, Labor Issues, Human Capital, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

427. An Analysis on India's Foreign Economic Relations and Its Implications for Korea-India Cooperation

Author:
Jeeyon Janet Kim, Hyoungmin Han, Hyeyoon Keum, and Jonghun Pek
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Economic exchanges between Korea and India have been expanding since the signing of the Korea-India CEPA, which took effect in 2010, and the promotion of the New Southern Policy (NSP) by Korea, but the level of exchange still remains insufficient considering the potential of the two countries. We aim to contribute to deepening Korea-India trade cooperation by analyzing India's foreign trade investment relations. Part II and III examine India's recent trade and investment structure with major countries including Korea, and Part IV analyzes India's status on the global production networks. In conclusion, Part V presents various implications for Korea-India trade cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, Asia, and South Korea

428. Impacts of New International Tax System on Multinational Firms’ FDI

Author:
Sangjun Yea
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
In this study, I present a theoretical model to quantitatively assess the economics impact of Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, especially focusing on the changes in the FDI patterns of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Pillar 1 offsets the incentives of MNEs' profits-shifting for tax-planning purposes, thereby reducing the inbound FDI into the countries with low corporate income tax rates. Pillar 2 burdens MNEs with 'top-up' taxes attributed from the subsidiaries in low tax countries. As the profits after tax (PAT) of MNEs shrink at the global level, innovation and R&D investment for new products will decrease, and as a result, global FDI flows will hamper.
Topic:
Economics, Foreign Direct Investment, Multinational Corporations, and Tax Systems
Political Geography:
Global Focus

429. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and Digital Trade in Southeast Asia

Author:
Andreyka Natalegawa and Gregory B. Poling
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
In October 2021, the Biden administration announced the development of an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) with partner nations to “define our shared objectives around trade facilitation, standards for the digital economy and technology, supply chain resiliency, decarbonization and clean energy, infrastructure, worker standards, and other areas of shared interest.” Details on the framework are still being worked out, but it now seems that those six areas of focus have been distilled into four negotiating “pillars.” Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Sarah Bianchi said in early February that these would include “fair and resilient trade, supply chain resilience, infrastructure and decarbonization, and tax and anticorruption.” The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) will likely lead negotiations on the first, while it appears that the Commerce Department will take the lead on the other three. The details of each pillar will be worked out in the months ahead, but the Biden administration is certain to face challenges and trade-offs across each, given the diversity of economies and political constraints across the region. USTR has said the trade pillar will be “high-ambition” and include binding commitments. But this will be complicated by the fact that the administration plans to roll out the IPEF through executive action rather than as a traditional trade deal requiring congressional approval. This pathway will help the framework sidestep political obstacles that agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership faced before Congress, but it also means that the administration cannot offer increased market access or any other concessions that would require changes to U.S. law. Moreover, moving forward with the IPEF through executive action has led to concerns among partners that the framework could be vulnerable to U.S. domestic politics or that a future administration may well roll back or abandon the framework. Given these self-imposed constraints, the administration will face headwinds trying to convince countries to sign on to high-standard provisions on digital trade, labor, and environmental standards that might run counter to their perceived short-term political or economic interests. One possible solution would have been to make the involvement in the other three pillars, where there are likely to be more tangible benefits for other countries, contingent on an agreement in the trade pillar. But that would run counter to the desire to get as many countries on board as possible. So, the administration has instead indicated that countries will be invited to engage in each pillar a la carte. And while like-mindedness in and of itself does not immediately guarantee their support for the IPEF, the likely result is that only Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and perhaps South Korea—the most developed economies which already share U.S. standards on digital trade, environment, and labor—will engage with USTR on the trade pillar. But a wider array of economies will likely join the talks with the Commerce Department on the other three.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Digital Economy, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific

430. Russia Futures: Three Trajectories

Author:
Cyrus Newlin and Andrew Lohsen
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Beginning in 2018, the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS initiated a research project to explore scenarios related to Russia’s future development and to consider the transatlantic implications of each scenario. The project, which was generously funded by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, was intended to provide policymakers with an understanding of how Russia’s domestic political situation, economic outlook, military activities, and foreign policy might evolve in response to modern-day challenges including climate change, growing competition in the Arctic, and the fraught relationship between China and the collective West. Based on original research and workshops involving U.S., Norwegian, and European experts, CSIS identified three potential scenarios for Russia’s future development. The first scenario envisioned a path of continuity, in which Russian leaders strove to maintain the status quo. The second scenario foresaw a trend of risk reduction in the Kremlin’s decisionmaking that led to a partial normalization of relations with the West. The third scenario considered a darker future, in which Russian leaders accepted a higher degree of risk to manage mounting problems at home and abroad, leading to sustained confrontation with the West and the further detachment of the Russian government from its people. These scenarios were being prepared for publication when Russian president Vladimir Putin launched a renewed invasion of Ukraine on February 24 and ushered in a period of deep uncertainty for European and global affairs. Almost immediately, Russia’s act of aggression turned the country into a global pariah, triggering international sanctions far beyond the Kremlin’s expectations and consolidating transatlantic unity to an extent that was difficult to imagine in the tense months immediately preceding the invasion. As orthodoxies have been challenged and expectations reconsidered, contingencies that were thought impossible—from embargoes of Russian hydrocarbons to the potential use of nuclear weapons by the Kremlin—are starting to feature into conversations among policymakers and analysts.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Development, Economics, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe